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Abstract 
This inquiry considers the importance of tacit knowledge, and how it might be 
characterised in an NHS memory service and a local authority day-care and 
respite service for people with dementia.   
When investigating the sorts of knowledge that might be valuable in helping 
individuals affected by dementia-type memory problems, service settings offer 
good prospects for locating empirical enquiry.  Interactions between people with 
dementia, practitioners and carers invariably occur at points such as assessment, 
diagnosis and care-giving.  
Through in situ observations of interactions between health and care 
practitioners, people with dementia and carers, the knowledge repertoires of each 
were considered. This thesis explores how these knowledge repertoires differ, yet 
when they come together in practice situations it becomes apparent that each 
individual's knowledge is potentially valuable for making sense of the situation. 
 
In the memory service knowledgeable accounts from individuals and carers 
regarding when and how memory problems first appeared are imparted to the 
clinician. This knowledge, along with the clinician's knowledge, is brought to bear 
in determining memory status.  In the social care setting 'getting to know' 
individuals - whose abilities to articulate their own accounts may be fading - 
requires spending time together during which a sense of the individual can be 
gained. 
The explicit-tacit knowledge mix in any practice situation is unproblematic unless 
an account of, or justification for practice is required.  Qualities of knowledge that 
render this impossible are that tacit knowledge is inarticulable linguistically; and, 
in any given instance there are no known means of differentiating between the 
involvement of either tacit or explicit knowledge.   
To attend to these difficulties an alternative way of seeing tacit knowledge is 
explored, whereby different understandings of tacit knowledge are surfaced when 
its relatedness to 'time' and 'practice' is considered.  A set of notional knowledge-
time-practice convergences are put forward. 
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Who Knows Where the Time Goes? 
(Sandy Denny) 
 
Across the evening sky, all the birds are leaving 
But how can they know it's time for them to go? 
Before the winter fire, I will still be dreaming 
I have no thought of time 
 
For who knows where the time goes? 
Who knows where the time goes? 
 
Sad, deserted shore, your fickle friends are leaving 
Ah, but then you know it's time for them to go 
But I will still be here, I have no thought of leaving 
I do not count the time 
 
For who knows where the time goes? 
Who knows where the time goes?  
 
 
Cloud Atlas (David Mitchell) 
“Power, time, gravity, love. The forces that really kick ass are all invisible.” 
 
 
Fieldnote: 'Kate' talking with a lady with dementia at Oak Hall whilst doing a 
crossword 
 
"There's things you don't even know you know." 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Hidden 'value' in organisations: the background to this PhD journey 
In 2005 I worked as a research assistant in an NHS mental health trust on a one-
year study of a self-directed teams approach called 'Team21'.  The trust's decision 
to implement self-directed teams was heavily influenced by the Brazilian 
businessman Ricardo Semler whose story - recounted in his book "Maverick" 
(1993) - describes the transition of his company Semco from an autocracy to a 
form of radical democracy.  One of Semler's fundamental ideas was about 
assimilating into his company a set of philosophical ideals that included: personal 
freedom; individualism; control [of] greed; sharing information and power; 
flexibility; and employee advancement based on competence (Semler, 1993:5).  
Semler estimated the way to achieve this assimilation was by moving away from a 
hierarchical organisation, a process he described as "rounding the pyramid".   
In the trust where I worked, copies of "Maverick" (1993) were widely distributed 
amongst staff.  It was Semler's account that provided the main inspiration for the 
trust's then chief executive to describe a trust-wide vision for self-direction, which 
became known as "Team21".  Team21 was premised on the idea of self-directed 
clinical teams. Efforts to support and develop teams were underpinned by the 
recognition -  
 "that these teams, working with carers and users, have the knowledge 
 and skills needed to improve services and gives [teams] the tools and 
 responsibility to make a difference". (Team21 Support Unit, 2005) 
 
The chief executive's characterisation of teams was distilled in a particularly 
memorable PowerPoint slide from his regular presentation on Team21.  The slide 
of a simple drawing of several stick people represented a team comprised of staff, 
service users and carers, all with differing roles and experiences yet all members 
and contributors to the team. The question 'who is in my team?' became 
something of a mantra during this time, designed to trigger thinking about teams 
in a broader and more inclusive way.   
Implicit in the widening out of the team to include patients was the redefining of 
the role of patients, service users and carers from being not just recipients of 
services but also contributors to the team.  This aspiration was important because 
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it signalled an idea: that patients and carers bring their own repertoires of 
knowledge and expertise to the encounters they have with clinicians in a 
healthcare organisation. Enmeshed in patient and carer knowledge is 'lived 
experience', a dimension unique and personal to an individual. 
The implementation of Team21 was informed by a set of guidance materials for 
teams on how to implement self-direction.  Discussions I had with two colleagues 
from the organisational development department had started with talking about 
issues relating to the mechanics of how teams were being asked to work.  Over 
time our reflections turned to what this way of working might mean for the 
organisation. What unintended outcomes might 'pop up', and did a self-directed 
way of working offer particular benefits that might be conceptualised as a form of 
value?   
Semler assumed the competence, expertise and motivation of the workforce, 
believing that employees knew best about their area of work and could be trusted 
to make decisions about what worked best. 
"I don’t think a company’s success can be measured in numbers, since 
numbers ignore what the end user really thinks of the product and what the 
people who produce it really think of the company." [...] "Another way of 
looking at Semco is to say that we treat our employees like responsible 
adults. We never assume that they will take advantage of us or our rules (or 
our lack of rules); we always assume they will do their level best to achieve 
results beneficial to the company, the customer, their colleagues, and 
themselves." (Semler, 1994:64) 
 
An important idea expressed here is that success does not necessarily equate to a 
realisable, quantifiable value such as profit.  Semler highlights that it is both the 
end user and the employee, in terms of their respective valuing of an end product 
and its actual production, which matters.  
An interesting point about the Semco phenomenon was that Semler's multi-
faceted philosophy was practically operationalised in encouraging and giving 
permission to employees to organise themselves, and to use their knowledge, 
know-how and expertise to produce goods on time and to the satisfaction of the 
end customer. Without the parameters of what might be considered to be usual 
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organisational rules, employees did get jobs done on time and to customers' 
satisfaction. This raises interesting questions about what knowledge and 
motivation employees draw on in work settings when they are 'left to get on with 
it'. 
 
Team-based working - which had become interesting to the NHS trust where I 
worked - was the subject for research by Professor Michael West from Aston 
University. West had visited the trust shortly before I started in post.  West's 
pioneering work echoed Semler's basic premise about a flattened hierarchy for 
supporting teams: 
"In team-based organisations the emphasis is not on vertical power 
relationships, but on achieving a shared purpose and understanding and the 
integration across teams (West & Markiewicz, 2004). In effect, the hierarchy 
that dictates power is flattened, and autonomy is distributed across the 
organisation via horizontal integration. Furthermore, while traditional 
organisations emphasise stability and continuity through the reinforcement 
of rules, regulations and bureaucracy, team-based organisations welcome 
change, flexibility, responsiveness and innovation, allowing them to adapt 
quickly and competitively to their external environment." (Carter et al, 
2008:2)  
 
My exposure to these various perspectives on self-directed teams led me to 
elaborate on my own 'take' on the interlinked ideas about self-direction, value, 
and non-traditional forms of teams in healthcare organisations. These thoughts 
eventually gave rise to the spark of an idea for a PhD.  At the end of the evaluation 
of self-directed teams I had settled on the following thought: since clinical teams 
are the main human resource of NHS organisations, they as individuals and what 
they do (i.e. diagnose, treat, and provide all aspects of direct care to patients) 
represents a form of value that is qualitatively different to the value commonly 
understood as residing in other assets such as computer systems, buildings, and 
equipment. For estimating the worth of tangible assets like equipment and 
buildings, straightforward equations (how many, current and future market 
value) are appropriate.  However, applying this same approach to the valuing of 
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human resources will provide only a partial account of worth.  An equation cannot 
explain the spectrum or the multi-faceted nature of value in an individual 
encounter between a member of clinical staff and a patient. In a practitioner-
patient interaction it seems that there is something happening that is about the 
countless possibilities and permutations associated with individual knowledge, 
past experiences, skills, and the hoped for outcomes that individuals bring to the 
encounter. In other words, something complex is happening, the entirety of which 
cannot be articulated or accounted for.  The knowledge involved is applied 
practically, yet is not readily defined through vocabularies currently available: 
"Practical knowledge is never tidy, an appropriate language for handling 
much of it has yet to be developed" (Eraut, 1985) 
 
The interweave between essential components in clinical work of knowledge, 
experience, practice, and decision-making was the topic for Gabbay and Le May's 
(2011) ethnography. "Inexpressible knowledge" (Gabbay and Le May, 2011:71) 
was used to describe the nature of the work which was talked about by 
practitioners during interviews. Inarticulable dimensions of knowledge are also of 
significance in relation to epistemic communities - 'Communities of Practice' 
(CoPs) being one such form, defined by Lave and Wenger (1991:98).  
 
In the run-up to starting a doctorate my interest was the possible value implicit in 
self-directed team models and how might this translate into worth to the 
organisation. I pondered on how (or even whether) healthcare organisations 
'recognise' the parts of their business that are difficult to articulate, such as 
intangible components of clinician-patient encounters, ideas, innovations, know-
how, and ways of working that are in people's heads.  An annual report is one of 
the key means through which healthcare organisations provide an account of the 
organisation's work and financial activity, yet these intangible elements are 
rarely, if ever, alluded to in annual reports.   
However, when details of the MERITUM Project (2002) came up during my initial 
literature searches about intangibles I realised that there was research activity in 
this field.  The MERITUM Project was funded by the European Union and involved 
researchers from a number of European universities in Denmark, Finland, 
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Sweden, France, Norway, and Spain. The role of the researchers was to develop 
guidelines for companies for managing and reporting on intangibles in 
organisations. In the resultant guidelines developed from the project it was 
suggested that in practice the terms "intangibles", "intellectual capital" or 
"knowledge" are used interchangeably to refer to "a set of factors that represent 
sources of corporate earnings." (Cañibano et al, 2002:10). 
In the literature the term 'intellectual capital' is used as something of a shorthand 
for summarising the entirety of an organisation's value in the terms of its 
intangible resources and assets. Under the umbrella of intellectual capital is 
encompassed several forms of capital, defined as human, structural, and relational 
capital.  Intellectual property (IP) is value arising from innovation occurring in 
any of the domains of intellectual capital.  The World Intellectual Property 
Organization defines IP as referring to "creations of the mind: inventions; literary 
and artistic works; and symbols, names and images used in commerce."  Certain 
forms of IP such as 'know-how' seem particularly interesting because they are 
embedded in human beings and therefore may be idiosyncratic and difficult to 
specify, as well as difficult to replicate.  
As I read around the concept of intellectual capital I came across a paper by 
Habersam and Piber (2003) which I viewed as relevant to my particular interests 
in intangible aspects of interactions between clinicians/practitioners and 
patients/service users. The paper reported on two qualitative case studies of 
hospitals: one in Italy and one in Austria. Through interviewing hospital staff 
about dimensions of their day-to-day work the researchers aimed to explore and 
try to surface the intangible dimension involved in curing patients (Habersam and 
Piber, 2003:758).  During interview staff were asked what of their day-to-day 
work could be quantified; what could be written down; what could be 
explained/transferred to others; and what could not be explained/transferred to 
others.  It seemed to me that this enquiry represented a thoughtful approach to 
the empirical study of intangible aspects involved in the provision of healthcare to 
patients.  
 
My initial forays into reading about intellectual capital and its dimensions seemed 
to augur well.  The idea that intellectual capital was the 'sum' of intangible sources 
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of value appeared to promise an easy and unproblematic route into the appraisal 
of intangibles in organisations. This 'promise' did, however, unravel.  On further 
reading, and from discussions with my main supervisor, I began to see that the 
concept of intellectual capital concept is problematic for several reasons. There is 
no consistent consensus or agreement about what intellectual capital is or 
constitutes, a point highlighted in a paper by Nerantzidis and colleagues 
(2013:169) concerning the myths of intellectual capital (IC):  
"There is still an abundance of definitions reflecting different perspectives, 
roles, component parts and viewpoints that justify the IC definition 
conglomeration."  
Marti (2007:248) suggested that applying a frame of reference used for tangible 
assets to intangibles is problematic because it creates an impression of: 
 "“intangibles” as assets that can be entered in the books as if they were tangibles".    
This suggests that there may be grounds for a reconsideration of the term 
intellectual capital.  Traditionally, the term 'capital' resides in the field of financial 
accounting, yet this may not be wholly appropriate as a descriptor for value 
associated with intangibles.  
The final point to make, perhaps the more critical, is that there is no overarching 
or central theory for intellectual capital.  In a recent systematic review by Evans et 
al (2015) of 37 published papers on intellectual capital (IC) within healthcare a 
helpful critique is provided of intellectual capital research and theoretical 
impediments to the advancement of empirical research in this field: 
"Many of the conceptual hindrances outlined above can be linked to the need 
for stronger or more explicit use of theory in future studies. Although several 
authors refer to IC as a ‘theory’, the IC framework does not meet formal 
criteria for theory development as outlined by Whetten. Rather, the 
tripartite IC framework is a typology. Furthermore, while the RBV [Resource 
Based View] and KBV [Knowledge Based View] help contextualize IC as a 
concept and highlight its importance, they do not offer insights on how IC 
influences organizational performance and how IC can be developed and 
supported. Alternative theories are needed to guide hypothesis 
development". (Evans et al, 2015:6) 
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The decision I made to discard intellectual capital as my topic seems, in hindsight, 
a wise one, given that some of the difficulties I may have faced are presaged in 
Evans and colleagues' (2015) systematic review.  
My thinking had moved through several stages.  I started by envisaging at a team 
level the greater freedom afforded by self-direction to exercise expertise to create 
positive outcomes for patients.  I ended up by thinking about inexpressible 
elements in practice within practitioner-patient encounters, and whether the 
potential worth of intangible elements in practice might be realised by the wider 
organisation. The challenge was in how I might focus these ideas and make 
something out of them for a research project. 
 
My selection of topic and focus 
Once I had decided that the challenges involved in empirical investigation in an 
under-theorised field would be substantial and beyond the scope of what was 
achievable in a PhD, I took action to redefine the topic and focus for the research.  
Conversations with my supervisor led me to look more closely at 'tacit' 
dimensions of knowledge, a topic that had cropped up in my reading of the 
literature on intellectual capital.   
Although my initial focus on intellectual capital had turned out to be something of 
a dead end I was able to carry some of what I had learned forward: an 
appreciation of challenges involved in studying intangibles; a greater awareness 
of the concepts within the field and of the ways that researchers had attempted to 
investigate intangibles; and some clearer ideas about the components for a study 
on tacit knowledge and how such a study might be framed.  A significant challenge 
I predicted for my own work related to whether and how it would be possible to 
declare findings about tacit knowledge given the ineffable characteristics ascribed 
to it. 
 
When I began to try to formulate my project I had several ideas that I thought of 
as interconnected.  I was interested in the idea that not everything a person 
knows can be articulated linguistically, and I reflected on the implications of this 
for interactions between practitioners and service users in service settings. 
Connected with this, I thought about certain types of impairment that ultimately 
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bring about the demise in a person's ability to articulate linguistically; dementia 
being an example.  A diminishing ability to articulate must mean that, at some 
stage, the individual is no longer able to give an account of self.  When reaching 
this point the individual may become increasingly reliant on persons who 'know' 
her/him to take over the management of particular aspects of life such as 
managing finances or keeping the person safe.  Given that this ability to articulate 
begins to be lost in individuals with dementia, what sorts of knowledge and ways 
of knowing might be helpful within services that are supporting individuals with 
dementia?  
An idea that I considered was that the term ‘inarticulable’ could be viewed as both 
characterising something about dementia and something about knowledge.  
Dementia, as it develops, reduces a person's ability to articulate. We might say 
that inarticulation is a characteristic of dementia that becomes more amplified as 
an individual progresses along a dementia trajectory. Regarding knowledge, it is 
its tacit dimension that is commonly described as inarticulable.  
To summarise my line of thinking: I wondered whether focusing enquiry on a 
population which experiences articulation as a problem might be helpful for 
surfacing empirical data about articulation more generally which, in turn, may 
open up insights into the broader topic of articulation of tacit knowledge.   
As my interest had been sparked by ideas about intangible aspects of the 
practitioner-service user encounter, it seemed an obvious choice to locate my 
fieldwork in practice settings.  From previous and current employment I was au 
fait with the work of memory services and day-care services. I knew that a 
person’s ability to articulate what effect memory problems have on them is likely 
to be greatest at the early stages of memory problems.  A GP with concerns about 
a person's memory is likely to refer the person to a local specialist memory 
service for further investigations – usually a memory assessment.  I regarded 
specialist memory services as representing a key point at which practitioners 
start to make sense of the experiences of people with dementia and draw on their 
own repertoires of knowledge.  
I came across a small number of clinically oriented case studies reporting on the 
preservation of knowledge in individuals with dementia (Crystal et al, 1989; 
Miller et al, 1998; Hseih et al, 2009).  A possible way of describing the nature of 
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preserved knowledge is that it involves the retention of certain abilities such as 
playing the piano or painting, which represent individual 'know-how'.   
"Previously learned skills or talents can be conserved in the setting of 
dementia, and demented individuals have been described who maintained 
card-playing skills, musical skills, painting talent, and word game skills." 
(Miller et al, 1998:978) 
"Patients with dementia, such as Alzheimer’s disease, can continue to play 
the piano skilfully despite profound cognitive impairment. It has been 
suggested that this may be because these skills have been well-rehearsed 
and become automatic motor movements." (Hseih et al, 2009:301) 
 
These case studies highlight that before becoming cognitively impaired the 
individual had acquired particular skills or talents, and even in a state of severe 
cognitive impairment the individual continued to demonstrate these talents. For 
example, the creative practices of musicianship or painting were preserved even 
through the period of irreversible cognitive decline these individuals had entered 
into.  These case studies bring to attention a seeming discrepancy between 
cognitive status and retention of certain capabilities.  Even though the passing of 
clock/calendar time appeared to mark a decline in the cognitive capabilities of 
these individuals with dementia, the same passing of time seemed not to be a 
predictor of deterioration or diminishment of these individuals' talents. 
Findings from Snowdon's (2003) report on the famous longitudinal "Nun Study" 
of 678 Catholic Sisters in Notre Dame Congregation (aged from 75 to 107) are 
similarly puzzling.  The Sisters who participated in this research underwent 
cognitive testing in older age and had given prior consent to brain donation after 
death, meaning that their physical brains could be examined for evidence of 
dementia pathology at post-mortem.  Sister Matthia, a woman who up until her 
death at 104 years was fully compos mentis, was subjected to post-mortem which 
revealed that her brain showed stage 4 pathology of Alzheimer's disease present 
in the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus areas (Snowdon, 2003:450-451). 
Likewise, in the case of Sister Bernadette, who died from a massive heart attack at 
age 85, at post-mortem her brain scored the maximum of 6 on the Braak and 
Braak scale - indicating the greatest spread of Alzheimer's disease pathology 
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(Snowdon, 2003:452).  Yet, during annual cognitive tests at ages 81, 83 and 84 
Sister Bernadette had consistently scored highly and there were no indications of 
mental deterioration. When she was tested at age 84, without looking at a clock or 
a watch she stated the time within 4 minutes of the actual (clock) time. 
Findings from the case studies and the Nun Study establish the following 
possibilities: that there can be dissonance between individual cognitive 
performance and the health of the physical brain; and that there can be disparity 
between an individual's performance in cognitive tests and that individual's 
expression of particular talents or know-how. 
 
My vision and motivation for the research 
My vision for this research was to try to 'trace' tacit knowledge in service settings: 
to be in situ and actively look for enactments or expressions that might infer tacit  
knowledge.  Trace is an expression that Mol (in Mol et al, 2010) used as a 
metaphor to describe her explorations of meanings of care.   
My motivation to conduct research on the topic of tacit knowledge and within 
defined service settings relates to several factors: my personal interest in people's 
lived experience of dementia; curiosity about tacit knowledge as implicit in 
individuals, perhaps not resting on cognitive capabilities; and an interest in how 
tacit knowledge may be involved in practice within dementia services.  
I started from the perspective of fully acknowledging that tacit knowledge is 
unseen and ineffable, yet it is enmeshed in phenomena that is observable or, at 
least, accessible to empirical investigation such as everyday practices and 
conversations.  Going into situations of daily, routine practice to observe in situ 
the essentially 'ordinary' is a typical ethnographic approach and this was the line I 
adopted.  I anticipated that this would allow me to observe and/or listen to 
aspects including different sorts of practice; the conversations and interactions 
between people at the respective service settings; arrivals and departures; and 
behaviours and routines. I also anticipated that I would be talking with people 
with dementia, staff, and possibly family carers of people with dementia, and that 
conversations I may have with people would be important in my orientation 
towards trying to comprehend tacit knowledge.  
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I considered that my proximity to such interactions, encounters between people, 
and conversations would provide scope to construct a sensemaking account to 
represent the data from each service setting.  
 
The location of this research within broader work 
Theoretically, my PhD research is essentially located in ideas and 
conceptualisations of tacit knowledge in Michael Polanyi's work on personal 
knowledge (1958; 1961; 1966; 1967), from which I have drawn insights about 
qualities of tacit dimensions in relation to particular practices (e.g. diagnosis), as 
well as ideas about the interrelatedness of tacit and explicit knowledge.   
Harry Collins' (2010) important reappraisal of Polanyi's work in his book entitled 
Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, and also discussed in Collins' chapter in Schatzki et 
al (2005), cannot be disregarded.  Collins' main challenge to Polanyi is that at least 
some of what is termed tacit knowledge could be explicated if there was need or 
requirement.  This said, Collins concedes that not all knowledge can be explicated.  
The capability of humans to 'improvise' according to the social context (Collins, 
2005:125; Collins, 2013:123) Collins considers to be evidence of tacit knowledge, 
in a form that cannot be explicated. 
 
Empirical and theoretical literature which addresses knowledge as accumulated 
through, and sedimented in, health and care practice is another important 
reference point for my work.  This includes work by Gabbay and Le May (2004, 
2011); Eraut (2002); Liaschenko, in Thorne and Hayes (1997) and Benner (1982; 
2001). Their understandings of tacit knowledge seem closely associated and also 
aligned with Polanyi's conceptualisations of tacit knowledge.  Benner expressly 
espouses Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit knowledge in her scholarship on 
nursing knowledge and expertise in practice.  
An important empirical text - Ethnographies of Diagnostic Work: Dimensions of 
Transformative Practice by Buscher et al (2009) - is another location for my work. 
In Goodwin's chapter on anaesthetic practice the conceptualisation of knowledge 
as embodied is an important understanding in working with people who are in 
the semi-conscious state of being anaesthetised, that is, temporarily non-verbal.  
More directly, Moser's chapter about the Marte Meo approach in dementia care 
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settings discusses making sense of behaviours, demeanour and actions of people 
with dementia who have lost the capability to convey their experiences 
linguistically. 
My work is also located in ideas from Fuchs concerning embodied knowledge, the 
lived body, lived time, continuity of self, and memory of the body (Fuchs, 2003; 
2006; 2016).  Specifically, Fuchs' work provides philosophical orientations 
towards memory, the knowing body, and time as experienced individually.  These 
conceptualisations open up ways for making sense of some observable actions, 
verbalisations and conduct of people with dementia in my fieldwork settings.  
Glaser and Strauss' theory of status passage (1965; 1971) and the temporal 
dimension of passage is another location for my work in that it offers a way to 
conceptualise important aspects such as turning points, transitions, and the idea 
of "becoming a person with dementia" (Dhedhi et al, 2014:3).  Aspects of my work 
that consider health and care professionals involved with individuals with 
dementia I relate to Glaser and Strauss' (1971) notion of 'legitimators' of 
passages.  
A relatively small body of empirical literature has considered temporal 
dimensions in aspects of the lives of older people, and I locate my work in this 
body of literature which includes studies about people with dementia (Marshall, 
1975; Orona, 1990;  Nygard and Johansson, 2001; Vernooij-Dassen et al, 2006; 
Beard and Fox, 2008; and Svanstrom and Sundler, 2015).  
 
I locate aspects of my work concerned with knowledge performed in health and 
care practices and its temporal dimensions in recent empirical work by Hopwood 
and colleagues (Falk et al, 2017a, 2017b; Hopwood in McLean et al, 2014). 
It is in terms of ethnographic method that I have come to describe my work, both 
in respect to the method used, and the how of approaching writing an account of 
my study (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993; Willis and Trondman, 2000).  As a 
researcher engaging with temporality through the doing and writing of an 
ethnography I align myself with Dawson's (2014) thoughts on temporal 
sensemaking and the need in fieldwork to accommodate (and live with) different 
conceptions of time. I have also found Hannerz' (2003) fascinating insights about 
"site temporalities" (Hannerz, 2003:209) to be helpful in recognising how the 
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ethnographer faces challenges in acquiring understandings of the field setting, 
and building relationships in a timeframe that is frequently short when 
considered against durations of time that those who occupy a setting have for 
acquiring similar comprehension. 
 
My choice of research settings  
My vision was to do my empirical work in two dementia services - one health and 
one social care. Having identified a social care day and respite care service and an 
NHS older people's community mental health service I approached the relevant 
service leads with a summary of my proposed project. Both my 'first choice' 
requests were granted.  
The two services were located in the town of Northweston in the neighbouring 
county to the one where I was employed.   The NHS specialist memory service was 
part of the older person's community mental health service.  The staff team had 
offices in the CSD Centre from which some of the clinics and group sessions were 
run. The rest of the team's work was conducted through home visits and clinics in 
other NHS premises.   The other service was a council-run day-care and respite 
service for people with dementia, co-located with an intermediate care service 
and with a respite service for people with learning disabilities in a council owned 
building called Oak Hall.  Service settings for people with dementia, I anticipated, 
would provide opportunities for me to observe practices in which knowledge was 
(potentially) significant in care processes, interventions, diagnosis, and treatment. 
I knew broadly what the parameters were that differentiated statutory health 
from statutory care services, but went into the field with an open mind to 
differences and similarities in the two services. 
 
At this stage I was, in a rough sense, conceptualising the services as two places on 
the service pathway for people with dementia. As a researcher one of the service 
settings (the NHS service) was used to having students of various disciplines on 
placement, and it transpired that there was at least one active research project 
(other than mine) in the service during my fieldwork.  Regarding the council-run 
social care service, my PhD project was the first research project of any kind that 
the service had hosted.  
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Method and overall data collection strategy 
Ethnography was the method I employed, chosen in favour of other approaches 
that may have qualified as being suitable. A panel member at my Progression 
proposed that an observational approach might be suitable, but I was drawn to 
the essential narrative, storying tradition of ethnography. I anticipated that the 
conversations I would have and the interactions and everyday activities I would 
observe during fieldwork would lend themselves to being told using a narrative-
led genre.  An ethnographic approach also seemed to align with my motivation to 
'give voice to' tacit knowledge. 
 
The vision to 'trace' tacit knowledge might be likened to picking out the form of 
something, or finding signs to suggest some activity or mechanism is operating. 
Conversely, tracing would not be associated with attempting to isolate something 
or extract it from its surrounds. My overall data collection strategy was, therefore, 
to deliberately expose myself to as many opportunities as possible for observing 
and noticing the details of activities and interactions within these two practice 
settings, so that ultimately I could build a narrative that would carry these ideas 
and possibilities in story form. I was aiming to get a feel for everyday activity and 
business as usual at both settings through observing and listening. Prior to 
entering the field I envisaged that in the social care setting people with dementia 
may strike up conversations with me, and that I would have opportunities to 
engage in conversation and also to join in with activities. I imagined that the NHS 
memory service setting would afford me opportunities to closely observe clinical 
practice relating to memory assessment and diagnosis. My intended way of 
working was to take fieldnotes in situ (or shortly afterwards) to describe what I 
had seen and heard.  Supplementary to this I hoped to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners.  
 
How this thesis is structured 
My thesis is structured around the account of my data collected in the field, which 
are presented as case narratives in chapter 4 (NHS site) and chapter 5 (council 
site).  These are prefaced by two chapters - an account of the theoretical and 
empirical research underpinning the field research (chapter 2), and an account of 
15 
 
the research approvals process and methodology (chapter 3).  Following the case 
narratives are a discussion chapter (chapter 6) and a conclusions chapter (chapter 
7). 
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Chapter 2: Perspectives from theory and from empirical literature  
Introduction  
In chapter one I began by describing the background for starting a PhD, and how I 
had become interested in the 'indefinable' aspects of what was happening during 
the interactions and practices between healthcare staff and patients and service 
users; and the possible value or worth of these essentially intangible aspects.  
These ideas had grown out of conversations with colleagues and my personal 
reflections about one organisational setting and its practices and day-to-day 
operations.  
The main aim for this chapter is to develop a characterisation of knowledge for 
health and care practice settings which is fully encompassing of a tacit dimension 
of knowledge.  How I set about achieving this aim is to work on a number of 
fronts, which I introduce here. 
 
I explore an idea which is particularly significant for locating my project, both 
theoretically and empirically: the idea of the dimensional nature of knowledge.  In 
my introduction I cited Marti (2007) who asserts that it is problematic to treat 
intangibles using the frame of reference used for tangibles.  Differentiating 
between tacit and explicit dimensions of knowledge is similarly problematic, 
although some scholars have attempted this by framing the differentiation 
between tacit and explicit as either dichotomous, or on a continuum. I consider 
these approaches to configuring knowledge, and what new insights can be drawn 
regarding the relationship between tacit and explicit dimensions. 
 
I examine Michael Polanyi's perspective on the tacit dimension of knowledge and I 
highlight particular insights that may be pertinent to my later chapters in terms of 
what, within facets of practice, might signal performative aspects of tacit 
knowledge. 
The idea from Polanyi that all knowledge is fundamentally tacit, and that this tacit 
dimension of knowledge is essentially ineffable, has implications when considered 
in the context of health and care practice.  Through reflecting on theoretical and 
empirical bodies of work I develop a problematisation of tacit knowledge that 
then provides a frame of reference for subsequent chapters. The knowledge 
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performed in or through 'practice' might be envisaged as oscillating between 
being tacit and being explicit (as codified knowledge).  The enmeshing of tacit 
knowledge and practice is highlighted in work by, for example, Eraut (2002) who 
refers to the "intervisibility of practice"; Gabbay and Le May's "inexpressible 
knowledge" (Gabbay and Le May, 2011:71); and Amin and Roberts' (2008) four 
modes of "knowing in action".  
 
I give attention to the acquisition and accumulation of knowledge, which is 
interesting and relevant when thinking about practices in health and care 
services.  Ideas about the transition from novice to expert are discussed by Benner 
(1980, 1982) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980), and further insights into how 
expertise is gained through formal training and experience are provided in 
Nettleton et al’s (2008) study of doctors becoming consultants. 
The notion of accumulation of knowledge through years of formal training 
interspersed with time in practice placements highlights ideas about acquiring 
knowledge and skills for practice over time.  The relatedness of time and practice 
is also considered by Hopwood and colleagues (Falk et al, 2017a, 2017b; 
Hopwood in McLean et al, 2014) in empirical work that explores temporal 
dimensions of healthcare knowledge and practice. 
One idea about time that is relevant to researchers conducting empirical research 
is from Hautala and Jauhiainen (2014). They draw attention to the idea that a 
sense of calendar/clock time becomes apparent during sensemaking, after data 
collection in the field: 
"Time is not usually explained explicitly. Its linear existence becomes clear in 
the analysis of empirical material". (Hautala and Jauhiainen, 2014:658). 
 
In addition to temporal aspects of knowledge and practice, are temporalities of 
care recipients and carers.  Literature which considers time in the lives of people 
with dementia includes empirical work by Svanstrom and Sundler (2015) of the 
experience of time passing for people with dementia living alone; Vernooij-Dassen 
et al (2006) on the experiences over time of receiving a diagnosis of dementia; 
Nygard and Johansson (2001) on the sorts of temporal 'problems' that people 
with dementia experience; Orona (1990) on the temporal aspects of carers' 
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experiences of changes to their family member with dementia; and Kvale (1974) 
who developed a temporal conception of memory.   
Temporality is a dimension of the formal sociological theory of 'status passage' 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1971:3) - a theoretical lens through which can be envisaged 
as 'passages' all types of transitions people make in their everyday lives: those 
which are unavoidable and have a 'natural' quality (e.g. fundamental transitions in 
life such as from childhood into adulthood, or from agedness to death) and those 
that have the appearance of being chosen and self-initiated (e.g. transitioning 
from unemployment to getting a job).  The interrelated topics of health, illness, 
and ageing provide rich grounds for considering status passage, and transitions 
from one status to another. Vickers (2010) considered the illness onset of multiple 
sclerosis as passage; Marshall (1975) compared organisational features of two 
congregate residential facilities for older people, and explored residents' senses of 
their "dying status passage" (Marshall, 1975:350) in terms of how perceptions 
were influenced by how dying trajectories were constructed through 
organisational features; Glaser and Strauss (1965) considered dying as an 
example of non-scheduled status passage.   
 
The fieldwork for this PhD sensitised me to the transitions of people with 
dementia and their carers, and events that punctuate transitions - such as 
diagnosis.  The concept of status passage and its temporal dimensions represent 
an important theoretical lens that I suggest is useful for envisaging different 
aspects of dementia.  Although temporal aspects of dementia have been explored 
empirically (as I have made mention of) such studies are rare, as Nygard and 
Johansson have pointed out (2001:85).  I identified only one article (Tolhurst and 
Kingston, 2013) which critically evaluated the theoretical contribution that status 
passage may provide to an understanding of dementia. I was unable to identify 
any empirical examples of studies on dementia that had used status passage as a 
framework for analysis.  Only in one ethnographic study that I located (Beard and 
Fox, 2008) was the diagnosing of Alzheimer's disease referred to as marking a 
status passage.  
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How I engage with 'time' in this chapter is by giving thought to ways that 
temporality might be conceived in practice settings, and the different ways that 
scholars have engaged with temporalities theoretically and in practice settings.  
Following both my fieldwork, and my sensemaking and analysis of empirical data, 
the dimension of time took on a compelling and germane potency.  I thought about 
time becoming important in the lives of people affected by dementia in instances 
such as the looking back to how life was before dementia, and the looking forward 
to how life might become following an official diagnosis.  Time seemed relevant to 
certain practice dimensions, such as time together - the time afforded to care staff 
during which they get to know individuals and what mattered to the person; or in 
timeliness of an intervention - such as noticing that a situation was changing and 
required either immediate or pre-emptive action to avert a crisis. Time seemed 
implicated on occasions when individual temporalities seemed to collide with 
organisational rules or policies.  Another way I thought about time was how it was 
implied in the accumulation of experience and expertise for practice. 
When I approached the field I was not thinking specifically about 'time' except in a 
chronological sense: how it framed my moving through a PhD, and marked 
various milestones such as obtaining ethics and research approvals.  A much fuller 
appreciation of time emerged during data analysis when time conceptions became 
a key strand in my sensemaking process.  Particular time conceptions which I felt 
were insightful in offering me ways of making sense of my data are: Abbott's 
(2001) thoughts about time relating to an individual life course; Bluedorn's 
(2002) insights about how people connect with their futures; and Barbara Adam's 
conception of the 'Timescapes' perspective (Adam 1998; 2004; 2008), particularly 
her list of "irreducible elements" for understanding time. (Adam et al, 2008)  
 
Dimensions of knowledge  
Turning now to the view that knowledge has more than one dimension, a way to 
explore this is by considering our everyday life: what do we have knowledge 
about that we can confidently represent linguistically; and, of what we know, we 
feel is not possible to represent with the linguistic tools available to us. This line of 
thought is elaborated on by Johannessen (1990:152) who suggests that there are 
different types of knowledge, or at least different contexts which place different 
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constraints on the claim to know something.  Johannessen (1990:151) provides a 
situational example of a scientist claiming to have made an important discovery in 
chemistry yet is unable to articulate this verbally or provide the evidence for the 
basis of the claim.  It is easy to think of other fields of work where there is an 
expectation to produce appropriate evidence to substantiate a claim of 
knowledge.  A legal prosecution may rely on material forensic evidence being 
available; or claims made about the efficacy of a particular treatment protocol are 
validated by an explanation from research conducted in the field. Nonetheless, 
explaining the basis for a claim to know might not be straightforward in every 
situation. Diagnosis is one such example.  The two main diagnosis errors that can 
occur are missing a serious disease (and diagnosing it as something not serious), 
or diagnosing a serious condition or disease that is not there. Kohn (2014) writes 
that strictly speaking "diagnosis" is defined as the naming of the disease causing 
the person to be ill, yet in practice: 
"The cognitive process of assigning this name is a mysterious combination of 
pattern recognition and the hypotheticodeductive approach that is only 
remotely related to the mathematical process of using test results to update 
the probability of a disease." (Kohn, 2014:39, 41) 
And, that  
..."diagnosis involves integrating information from history, observation, 
exam, and testing using an ill-defined combination of knowledge, experience, 
pattern recognition, and intuition to name a patient's illness." (Kohn, 
2014:40) 
 
Kohn's account highlights that making a diagnosis is characterised by the factors 
of implicit uncertainties; the weighing of probabilities of a person having a 
particular disease or condition; and considerations about the ability of a 
particular test for determining the particular disease or condition that is in the 
frame as a potential candidate.  
In relation to knowledge Kohn indicates that the precise knowledge-experience-
pattern recognition-intuition combination is opaque and may not be fully known 
or described.  
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One provisional conclusion we might draw from this is that if we cannot articulate 
everything we know, it then becomes impossible to fully account for our basis of 
knowing, and only a partial account can be given.  
Thinking about knowledge in clinical practice helps to animate Johannessen's 
(1990:152) suggestion that there are different types of knowledge.   
To develop this further, one explanation that has been put forward is that 
knowledge is dichotomous, being of one type or another - either explicit (thus 
codifiable) or tacit.  This dichotomous standpoint is what Hislop (2002:166) has 
stated - "represents one of the most widely accepted distinctions between 
different types of knowledge and is embedded in the vast majority of the 
contemporary writing on knowledge in organizations".  This perspective assumes 
that there are two forms of knowledge, separate from each other and with 
individual characteristics.  Characteristics that Hislop (2002) suggests have been 
assigned to tacit knowledge are: that it is personal, residing in individuals as 
embodied (Hislop, 2002:167); and in some contexts it may be regarded as being 
collective, such as shared values relating to a social context where a set of ideas 
are circulating, or the collective knowledge within Communities of Practice 
(Hislop, 2002:167). Characteristics ascribed to explicit knowledge  are that it is 
assumed to exist independently of human bodies, codifiable as documents or 
embedded in machinery, tools, and other such physical artefacts (Hislop, 
2002:167); that it is considered to be objective and "free from individual 
subjectivity" (Hislop, 2002:167); and that developing and creating explicit 
knowledge is separate from using and applying it. (Hislop, 2002:168).  
Importantly, the dichotomy perspective assumes that tacit knowledge can be split 
away from explicit knowledge, and this is a perspective that I will return to later 
in this chapter in setting out a problematisation of the tacit dimension of 
knowledge.   
Whilst the dichotomous version of knowledge is considered problematic by some 
scholars (e.g. Grandinetti, 2014; Hislop, 2002; Dienes and Perner, 1999), it may 
nonetheless hold some usefulness for bringing into focus enquiry about what is 
the basis for, and constraints on the claims that are made to know something 
(Johannessen, 1990:152).  It may also be useful in providing some of the basic 
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ground for problematising tacit knowledge, specifically in relation to health and 
care practice. 
 
An alternative to the view that knowledge is either tacit or explicit is set out in 
Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge.  Polanyi considered that there is a form of 
knowledge that is tacit, and that its existence is justifiable through the principle 
that all knowledge is "fundamentally tacit" (Polanyi, 1961: 467) being "either tacit 
or rooted in tacit knowledge." (Polanyi, 1966:7).  Tacit and explicit dimensions of 
knowledge are "not sharply divided" (Polanyi, 1969:144). The nature of the 
interrelatedness of tacit and explicit dimensions of knowledge is given further 
explanation in Polanyi's publication entitled Sense-giving and sense-reading 
(1967:314): 
"The ideal of a strictly explicit knowledge is indeed self-contradictory; 
deprived of their tacit coefficients, all spoken words, all formulae, all maps 
and graphs, are strictly meaningless." 
 
Unlike the dichotomous view, here the tacit dimension of knowledge is hidden in 
the 'mix' of comprehensive knowledge, and there is a sense of it being taken-for-
granted, assumed.  The quotation from Polanyi draws attention to this unspoken 
tacit dimension of knowledge, and serves to undermine the dichotomous position 
that views explicit knowledge as 'unmoored' from tacit knowledge.  Brown and 
Duguid (2001:204) confer with Polanyi in suggesting that it is impossible to 
"shake off" from the explicit the tacit dimension:   
"in use the explicit nonetheless always possesses this other, implicit 
dimension." (Brown and Duguid, 2001:204)   
 
From another position, seeing tacit and explicit knowledge as related has been 
expressed in terms of their situatedness on a 'continuum' (Nonaka and von Krogh, 
2009; Grant, 2007; Jasimuddin et al, 2005; Leonard and Sensiper, 1998).  
Leonard and Sensiper (1998) first proposed the continuum idea, referring to 
Polanyi's idea that all knowledge has tacit dimensions as a "messier assumption" 
than the one they assert:  
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"Knowledge exists on a spectrum. At one extreme it is almost completely 
tacit, that is semiconscious and unconscious knowledge held in peoples’ 
heads and bodies. At the other end of the spectrum, knowledge is almost 
completely explicit, or codified, structured, and accessible to people other 
than the individuals originating it. Most knowledge, of course, exists in 
between the extremes." (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998:113) 
 
Leonard and Sensiper's perspective assumes the knowledge continuum to be 
linear and with spatial dimensions, as suggested in references to "ends" and 
"extremes".  Jasimuddin et al's (2005: 107) perspective follows a similar idea:  
"[T]he position of knowledge on the tacit-explicit continuum is determined 
by its tacit-explicit mix". 
 
In both the knowledge continuum and the dichotomous perspective, tacit is 
viewed as being distinct from explicit knowledge, either through polarity or by 
virtue of characteristics that differentiate.  A propositional frame of reference 
such as this creates artificial distinctions between tacit and explicit.  An important 
consideration about the idea of gradations of tacit/explicit knowledge is that this 
implies there is a point where tacit and explicit 'meet' which, in turn, suggests 
'start' and 'end' points.   
Grandinetti (2014:339) has referred to the confusion that arises from theorising 
about how knowledge is constituted:  
"In actual fact, hypothesizing a variety of tacit knowledge configurations 
characterized by a decreasing content of tacitness hardly reduces the 
amount of ambiguity and uncertainty; if anything, it increases it because we 
fail to understand what exactly occupies the space in between the two 
extremes, which becomes a grey area where tacit and explicit are generically 
mixed together." 
 
Hautala and Jauhiainen's (2014) conceptualisation of knowledge accepts the ideas 
that knowledge is made up of tacit and explicit elements, and exists in an "explicit-
tacit continuum" (Hautala and Jauhiainen, 2014:665), but their view of knowledge 
also considers how temporal and spatial dimensions are relevant: 
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"To reveal processes of comprehensive knowledge, one has to adopt a 
theoretical and empirical framework accordingly. Such a framework 
addresses three aspects. First, knowledge creation is a process connected to 
multiple dimensions of time. Comprehensive knowledge is not only 
connected to linear time but also to relational experienced time [...]. Second, 
comprehensive knowledge is contextual and inseparable from multiple 
dimensions of space [...]. Third, as we will show in the results section, within 
these dimensions, complex and comprehensive knowledge creation 
addresses many combinations of space and time.”  (Hautala and Jauhiainen, 
2014: 656).  
How temporal and knowledge dimensions in healthcare practice are brought to 
the fore (e.g. ideas that practice is embodied and situated; referenced to a 
particular time and place; and performative aspects of knowledge) is the focus of 
recent work by Hopwood and colleagues (2017a, 2017b) and Hopwood (2014).  
Individual temporal experiences of people with dementia have been considered in 
empirical work by Nygard and Johansson (2001). Their work illuminated aspects 
of knowing by people with dementia in relation to everyday life: e.g. inner 
temporal rhythms that alerted people it was time to get up, and "lived knowledge" 
(Nygard and Johansson, 2001:89) of the time an everyday activity took.   
 
Perspectives on knowledge as personal and tacit: Michael Polanyi's 
theoretical work  
The first listed definition of the word "tacit" is from the early 1600s, its meaning 
given as "silent, unspoken" (originating from the French tacite) and, from the 
Latin word Tacitus: 
"that is passed over in silence, done without words, assumed as a matter of 
course, silent." (Online Etymology Dictionary: Douglas Harper) 
 
The term tacit knowledge (a shorthand for, or packaging of the construct 'tacit 
knowing') is attributed to Michael Polanyi who expounded ideas about knowing 
into a theory of personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958; 1961; 1966; 1967) - a 
knowledge residing with individuals.  In the years prior to Polanyi's theoretical 
work on knowledge there were indications that he was already interested in and 
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thinking about some threads that may have been early formulations for his later 
work. During his schooling in Hungary a letter written by Polanyi contained a 
reference to Ding an sich from Kant's philosophy, which literally translates as “the 
thing in itself” - that which is perceived via mediation through our senses, but 
which is itself essentially unknowable (Blumenau, 2001).  
Scott (1997), referring to Polanyi's letter, wrote:  
"Discussing the scientists who judge the world by appearances and cannot 
get at the Ding an sich, he conjectured that this reality behind appearances 
might be movement, energy, aether or molecules and observed that this 
ultimate cause affects him although he has nothing to do with it." (Scott, 
1997:12) 
 
A point to draw out from this is - on the basis that the Ding an sich is unknowable 
it would reasonably follow that the account a person can give of what they have 
apprehended of it would be a partial account.  Polanyi used the term "defective 
articulation" (Polanyi, 1958: 88) as a way of referring to situations in which it is 
possible for a person to speak about the 'what' of performing an action or series of 
actions (for example: 'I am swimming backstroke'), but not possible to 
linguistically articulate the entire 'know how' of that set of actions.  Polanyi's 
"defective articulation" represents this idea of incompleteness of account.  In 
further elaboration Polanyi proposed that whilst a person is fully aware that 
she/he knows how to perform a set of actions (for example - riding a bicycle) the 
particulars of this are known only in an instrumental manner, whilst focally the 
person remains unaware of the particulars.  Attempts to articulate the 
comprehensiveness of swimming backstroke by isolating the particulars would 
not result in full articulation.  A focus on particulars would necessarily mean 
overlooking complex interplays between the constituent parts.  This similarly 
applies to becoming skilled at something: this is not achieved through learning the 
constituent motions of a skill because breaking a skill into constituent parts is 
likely "to paralyse its performance" (Polanyi, 1961:460).  Referring back to the 
respective continuum and dichotomous perspectives on tacit-explicit relatedness, 
neither perspective speaks to nor addresses the problem of articulation to which 
Polanyi refers.   
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Grandinetti (2014) has noted that Polanyi's (1958: 87) position was that tacit 
knowledge is not "something difficult to articulate, but something impossible to 
articulate". (Grandinetti, 2014:338) 
I highlight this point as being important for two reasons. Firstly, in the field of 
management studies interest has been directed towards trying to capture and 
quantify tacit knowledge - often by means of proxy measures. Scholars who have 
attempted this have been defeated by both the elusiveness of the concept and the 
lack of current research techniques that would meet this challenge.  Castillo 
(2002:47) illustrates, citing from the work of Pfeffer and Veiga (1999): 
"despite querying, testing, and surveying even the most helpful and divulging  
employees, any effort to harness an employee's stock of tacitly held 
knowledge is pointless, as this knowledge cannot be differentiated from the 
explicit knowledge that that person holds." 
 
Secondly, if attempts to study tacit knowledge by 'isolating' it have so far failed, do 
we need to adopt different approaches that appreciate and take account of what 
might be termed 'in situ', inseparable, and embodied characteristics of tacit 
knowledge?  And, might tacit knowledge be 'animated' and made sense of by 
viewing it through other conceptual lenses which themselves have 
noteworthiness in the field setting where tacit knowledge is being investigated, 
for example: 'practice' and 'time'? 
A point made by Hautala and Jauhiainen (2014:657) that knowledge is 
"inseparable from the one who knows" expresses something of the significance 
that Polanyi placed on the idea of the individual as the knower.  Knowing is 
profoundly associated with the implicit nature of the mechanisms of the body.  
The workings of "internal actions and stimuli" (Polanyi, 1961: 461) (i.e. seeing, 
hearing, touching) integrating to form perception, are what results in 'knowing'.  
The body, using the sense organs, is the "vital instrument" for the knowing of 
anything and everything outside of the body (Polanyi, 1967:15).  Seeing outward 
and 'knowing' in such a way is fused with awareness of our knowing self (Polanyi, 
1961:468).  
If the body is the "vital instrument" for knowing (Polanyi, 1967:15) this infers that 
knowledge is mediated in and through the body.  This idea represents a challenge 
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to both the dichotomous and the continuum perspectives on knowledge, on the 
basis that both these represent disembodied views of knowledge.  The main 
challenges Polanyi's perspective presents to the dichotomous view are that there 
are no current means of distinguishing between cognitive, sensorial and physical 
activities in the body that are involved in knowing; and no means to determine 
which (and at what stage) tacit or explicit forms of knowledge are being 
performed in and through the body.  
 
Polanyi's ideas about the body's role in knowing prompt another thread of 
enquiry: the activation and performance of knowing in practice settings.  Polanyi 
offered many examples from practice for illustrating his theoretical principles.  He 
himself studied medicine and practiced as a field doctor in Serbia during World 
War I for a period of about eighteen months, so it seems plausible that his 
theoretical work was influenced by his first-hand experience of practice.  
Although in illustrating the dimensions of tacit knowledge Polanyi borrowed from 
diverse fields such as topography of landscapes, human vision, and physics, it was 
his illustrations from medicine that seem to have been given particular 
importance as exemplars of application of his theory: 
"The structural kinship of the arts of knowing and doing is indeed such that 
they are rarely exercised in isolation; we usually meet a blend of the two. 
Medical diagnosis combines them about equally." (Polanyi, 1961: 461) 
 
The process and conditions for acquiring knowledge Polanyi viewed as extending 
beyond learning from books and lectures into practice, practice being a site where 
knowing and doing become blended.  In order to deepen her/his knowledge of a 
disease a medical student will focus on the individual symptoms and their 
variance, "but only clinical practice can teach him to integrate the clues observed 
on an individual patient to form a correct diagnosis of his illness, rather than an 
erroneous diagnosis which is often more plausible." (Polanyi, 1961: 460)  
In diagnosis the particulars and the whole, and the juxtaposition between the two, 
are suggested as significant by Polanyi.  A physician looks at a person's symptoms, 
initially without knowing what is wrong.  When a diagnosis of the condition is 
reached the symptoms become meaningful in terms of the whole, but without 
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becoming less noticeable. (Polanyi, 1961: 463)  Through this example the notion 
that there are two types of meaning is illustrated.  One meaning is that when 
isolated particulars are looked at in relation to the whole it can be noticed or 
appreciated that the particulars and the whole are not separated from each other 
in space.  The individual symptoms reside in the patient (whole and embodied) 
and no space exists between the particulars and the whole.  Symptoms (the 
particulars) need to be enquired about in order to start to build a provisional 
hypothesis about the meaning for the whole of a particular set of symptoms. The 
other meaning this illustrates relates to the physician's visual perception 
alongside the use of tools and probes: 
"where the uncomprehended particulars are inside our body or at its 
surface, and what they mean extends into space outside". (Polanyi, 
1961:463)  
Through the physician's sense organs (i.e. visual perception through the eyes) 
vital information is gathered from what is available that can be seen.  Tools and 
probes may be simultaneously used for gathering data about particular aspects of 
the patient's health status that cannot be perceived and determined through 
visual perception alone (e.g.  a Sphygmomanometer is used for measuring blood 
pressure; a thermometer for measuring body temperature; or Beck depression 
inventory as a screening tool for depression).  
Mullins (2006:28) cites from the original 1957 "Preface" to Polanyi's Personal 
Knowledge, in which Polanyi wrote:  
"I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an action 
that requires skill. Skillful knowing and doing is performed by subordinating 
a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skillful achievement, 
whether practical or theoretical." 
 
"Active" knowing suggests at least attentiveness and some sort of dynamic quality 
to knowing.  A characteristic of a skilful performance of knowing seems to involve 
spotting "clues", which then shape the accomplishment.  This knowing, Polanyi 
seems to be saying, involves apprehending an entity using personal sensorial 
faculties; and the nature of one's senses functioning in a performance of knowing 
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are indescribable,  because of their implicit interwovenness with the internal 
bodily system.  
An example in Polanyi's Knowing and Being (1961) concerns knowing what kind 
of seizure a patient was having: 
"A few years ago a distinguished psychiatrist demonstrated to his students a 
patient who was having a mild fit of some kind.  Later the class discussed the 
question of whether this had been an epileptic or a hystero-epileptic seizure.  
The matter was finally decided by the psychiatrist: 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'you 
have seen a true epileptic seizure. I cannot tell you how to recognise it; you 
will learn this by more extensive experience". (Polanyi, 1961:123) 
 
This example of 'diagnosis' opens another idea about a tacit dimension of 
knowledge which is that correct diagnosis of the type of seizure is achieved only 
through exposure to extensive experience of seeing many seizures of this type, 
ideas which are echoed in Kohn's reference to the "mysterious combination of 
pattern recognition and the hypotheticodeductive approach" (Kohn, 2014: 39,41) 
involved in diagnosing.   The example also brings to light another of Polanyi's 
concepts which he terms "comprehensive entity" to refer to what might also be 
described as the completeness and all-inclusiveness of  (in the instance given) the 
human entity.  The comprehensive entity is discussed in depth in Mullins (2006) 
wherein he describes how the effort of concentrating on the particulars of the 
entity (e.g. symptoms, and features of a condition that are manifesting) "weakens 
for the moment a knower's sense of the coherence of the entity". (Mullins, 
2006:32)  Conversely, efforts to grasp a more complete awareness of the whole 
will tend to engulf the particulars so that they appear to recede back into the 
whole.  Citing from Polanyi's Knowing and Being (1961), Mullins (2006:32) draws 
attention to how making a discovery about something is "by a see-saw of analysis 
and integration similar to that by which our understanding of a comprehensive 
entity is progressively deepened". (Polanyi, 1961:129-130)  
 
Tacit and explicit knowledge dimensions: health and care practice 
I begin this section by thinking about health and care practitioners themselves, in 
terms of their personal, individual knowledge. As I have already highlighted from 
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an example from Polanyi (1961: 460), experience gained through practice seems 
to provide experiential knowledge that may reinforce knowledge acquired via 
formal and academic learning.  
The acquiring and shaping of knowledge for practice is discussed in influential 
work by Benner (1982) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980).  Benner (1982) cites the 
Dreyfus model of skill acquisition based on their study of chess players and pilots 
(1980).  This model asserts that acquiring and developing a skill involves passing 
through five levels of proficiency: novice, advanced beginner, competent, 
proficient, and expert.  Benner elaborates further:  
“The levels reflect changes in two general aspects of skilled performance. 
One is a movement from reliance on abstract principles to the use of past, 
concrete experience as paradigms. The other is a change in the perception 
and understanding of a demand situation as that situation is seen less as a 
compilation of equally relevant bits and more as a complete whole in which 
only certain parts are relevant". (Benner, 1982:127-128) 
 
In interpreting what might be happening as a person moves from novice to expert 
level, Benner resorts to allegory, referring to 'the whole' and 'the parts' and the 
shift in perception from focusing on the parts towards attention to the whole. The 
quotation from Benner echoes Mullins' (2006) interpretations of Polanyi's ideas 
about the deepening of understanding that is achieved by alternating one's focus 
on the whole and the parts successively.  The movement from novice to expert 
which Benner discusses suggests inner change (i.e. in perception), and the idea of 
'change' might be viewed in terms of the temporal aspects of becoming proficient.  
When thinking of formal education and training routes into various health and 
care professions temporal aspects become plain.  For example, in England a 
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) takes either three or four years to complete, 
and clinical placements are an integral aspect of the training. Medical students 
generally spend five or six years doing their degree, followed by two years doing 
their postgraduate foundation course, then three to eight years in specialist 
training. Clinical placements are undertaken throughout.  The three year Bachelor 
of Arts in Social Work typically takes three years during which time students 
undertake practice placements.  A way of understanding time in practitioner 
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training is as chronological, objective time which is measured through clocks and 
calendars.  This mode of time has been named 'chronos' by the ancient Greeks.   
It might be said that an appropriate duration of time is actually necessary and 
required for specific courses of study (e.g. nursing, medicine, social work) in order 
to ensure proper preparation for practice.  Yet practice situations themselves (as 
placements, or employment following completion of formal practitioner training) 
are where expertise and knowledge may be further refined.  In Nettleton and 
colleagues' (2008) study, for example, interview data was collected from 
physicians doing higher level training to become consultants.  One consultant 
surgeon who was interviewed drew attention to how knowing what to do and 
how to do it increased through repeatedly performing a practice: 
"The first, second or third time you do something you're going to feel 
insecure, by the time you've dealt with it 20 or 30 times you're fine." 
  (Nettleton et al, 2008:340)  
 
This quotation highlights how, in the particular complexities of medical practice, 
performing a practice (e.g. a set of procedures) a few times is insufficient to 
achieve a status of competence.  Only by repeatedly performing the set of 
procedures are confidence and competence acquired.   
Thinking back to Benner's words about "skilled performance" (Benner, 1982:127-
128) alongside this quotation from Nettleton we start to build up a sense of the 
dimensionality of practice.  Two seemingly obvious dimensions of practice are the 
skills involved in performing, and knowledge.  In the first section of this chapter I 
explored an idea about the dimensions of knowledge being explicit and tacit, and 
an idea from Polanyi that all knowledge is fundamentally tacit.  A competent 
practitioner 'knows' what to do and how to do it, and this blending of what 
Polanyi termed "skilful knowing and doing" (Polanyi, 1958; 1961) represents an 
intertwining of different types of knowledge with practice to produce skilled 
performance. Even though the precise mechanics of knowledge and skills 
enmeshing in a skilled performance are essentially indescribable through the 
linguistic means available, some insights, which follow, have been offered by 
scholars as to how knowledge and skills might converge.   
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Knowledge in healthcare is picked up by Sturmberg and Martin (2008) who 
describe it as "a multidimensional dynamic construct".  Referring to Kurtz and 
Snowden's (2003) 'Cynefin' framework they offer a conceptualisation of 
knowledge in healthcare that encapsulates knowledge as "complex", "knowable", 
"chaos", and "known" (Sturmberg and Martin, 2008:769). They assert that each 
domain is value-free, with no one being superior to another: 
"[H]owever, each uses different thinking strategies to generate knowledge 
and to problem solve, which has inherent legitimacy and utility within that 
domain". (Sturmberg and Martin, 2008:770) 
  
From the field of social practices Reckwitz (2002) provides a perspective 
suggesting that practice is that which has become integrated activity of the body:  
“Practices are routinized bodily activities; as interconnected complexes of 
behavioral acts they are movements of the body. A social practice is the 
product of training the body in a certain way: when we learn a practice, we 
learn to be bodies in a certain way (and this means more than to ‘use our 
bodies’).  A practice can be understood as the regular, skilful ‘performance’ 
of (human) bodies. This holds for modes of handling certain objects as well 
as for ‘intellectual’ activities such as talking, reading or writing." [...] "A 
‘practice’ thus crosses the distinction between the allegedly inside and 
outside of mind and body".  (Reckwitz, 2002: 251-252) 
 
In a similar vein, van Manen (1995:11), cited in Toom (2012:631) offers the view 
that tacit knowledge is "embodied in skills that are located inside practices, ways 
of doing things, knacks, sensitive touches, etc."  This is a perspective suggesting 
that tacit knowledge is deeply ensconced in practice, and concealed in skills.  
Eraut (2002) described the vacillations inherent in practice, likening it to: 
"a continuum of possibilities from a situation where almost none of a 
person’s practice is visible to a colleague (psychoanalysis would be a good 
example) to one where nearly all their practice is visible." (Eraut, 2002:179) 
 
Eraut coined this phenomenon as the "intervisibility of practice" (Eraut, 
2002:179) in usual working conditions.   
33 
 
The notions of 'embodied' practice and the 'intervisibility' of practice come 
together in an obvious way pre and during surgical procedures when the body is 
being worked on. Writing about anaesthetic practice Goodwin (2009:73-91) in 
Buscher et al (2009) points out that an anaesthetised person is not able to speak 
and practitioners in this setting rely on the reading of bodily signs.  Goodwin 
describes this process as "intensely collaborative" (Goodwin, 2009:73), illustrated 
by the combination of (a) information supplied by the body and captured by 
technological augmentation (i.e. heart rate, oxygen saturation, carbon dioxide 
levels, and so on), and (b) the sensations involved when a practitioner has contact 
with the body, such as  "the feel of a needle being inserted indicates something of 
its location in the body", or that certain "breath-sounds" can indicate respiratory 
distress. Knowing something of the status of the patient through using one's 
sensorial faculties and through additional tools that connect the anaesthetist to 
the patient's body is elaborated on by Polanyi (1961):  
"The actual impact of the tool on our palm and fingers is unspecifiable in the 
same sense in which the muscular acts composing a skilful performance are 
unspecifiable: we are aware of them in terms of the tool's action on its object, 
that is in the comprehensive entity into which we integrate them. But the 
impacts of a tool on our hands are integrated in a way similar to that by 
which internal stimuli are integrated to form our perceptions: the integrated 
stimuli are noticed at a distance removed outward from the point where 
they impinge on us".  (Polanyi, 1961:462) 
 
Ways of knowing the patient are explored by Liaschenko, in Thorne and Hayes 
(1997) in the context of nursing practice. One way of knowing the patient is as the 
case - a way of knowing that is virtually all biomedical, and represents a 
disembodied manner of knowing: 
“No particular physical body, nor indeed any body, is required for a nurse to 
have case knowledge. Knowing the case is what Arney and Bergen (1984: p 
8) call the ‘disappearance of the experiencing patient’”. (Liaschenko, 
1997:25) 
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Case knowledge is:  
“limited to objectified physiological and psychological data, and the 
relationship between person and nurse focuses on the functioning and 
monitoring of physical and psychological processes”. (Liaschenko, 1997:24-
25) 
  
By definition, case knowledge represents a removal of, or disregard towards 
human agency that is the patient's.  Liaschenko sets out what knowledge might be 
involved in knowing the patient as a person, beginning with acknowledging that 
knowing, whether it is directed towards a patient or to anyone, is not motivated 
merely by what the knower can gain in terms of getting the person "to do 
something." (Liaschenko, 1997:27).  Rather, within the practice there must be 
commitment to individual agency: 
"Knowledge of a person is partly a knowledge of how that person lives, as 
well as what she or he lives for. Disease and illness threaten and sometimes 
change drastically a person's agency and therefore the kind of life she or he 
can lead [Charmaz, 1991]." (Liaschenko, 1997:27-28) 
 
Although case knowledge requires and depends on time (in terms of time needed 
for reading notes about the person or discussing a case with a colleague), time 
here perhaps is qualitatively different to time spent in talking with or listening to 
the patient.  
Time also comes to the fore in points made by Nettleton and colleagues (2008) 
specifically in relation to the training of doctors.  If insufficient time is allocated 
for being exposed to the situations of clinical practice then it cannot be 
guaranteed that the required expertise will be reached during training.  Reforms 
in the NHS have included new regulations for the training of doctors, one 
consequence being the reduction by seventy-five percent in the number of hours' 
training completed by doctors before qualifying as consultants.  Doctors are thus 
qualified but inexperienced. (Nettleton et al, 2008:339, 340). 
"It's purely inexperience because they haven't seen it. I think that no matter 
how bad the training was, because you'd seen it all, because you'd done it all 
so many times, you got a feel for it and that was only with experience. I 
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suppose most of the time you were working on automatic pilot."(Interview 
with female consultant in Nettleton et al, 2008: 340) 
 
The notion that is raised in this interview is that getting "a feel for it" comes with 
experience of doing something many times, and that frequency of the experience 
of immersion in practice could in some sense 'make up' for poor training.  
Experience through practice was key (in a way that training appeared not to be) 
in enabling performing of practice in an automatic unconscious manner.  This is 
not, though, to suggest that practice is devoid of conscious purpose or 
forethought.  Kjeld Schmidt has written about practice in work and draws 
attention to the purposefulness of practice: 
"2.1. When conceived of as a practice, work is not reduced to executive 
activities (i.e., mere activities), such as sequences of operations, but is taken 
to also encompass sundry conceptual activities such as envisioning outcome, 
devising methods and planning, identifying tasks, preparing and allocating 
tasks, as well as activities of evaluating, instructing, learning, etc." (Schmidt, 
2015:99) 
 
Practice has a theoretical and conceptual basis - these aspects of practice 
generally introduced, taught and conveyed to the individual 'novice' within a 
formal learning type setting.  However, as noted by Johannessen (1990) it is not 
enough to comprehend the theory and concepts of a practice.  Rather, these need 
to be applied to and tested in practice in order for individuals (and presumably 
their teachers and supervisors) to establish whether "adequate mastery" has been 
achieved (Johannessen, 1990:162). 
However, an important point is surfaced here about this notion of "adequate 
mastery".  It becomes problematic in the context of knowledge and skills being 
deeply enmeshed in practice, because of how the issue of appraisal of mastery 
may be approached when what we understand to be its constituents (knowledge 
and skills in performance) defy being separated out from practice.  The question 
of mastery is important in health and care services, since historical examples 
show some of the negative effects and consequences of incompetent practice.  The 
seemingly opaque nature of personal knowledge used by clinicians in practice is 
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discussed in Gabbay and Le May's Practice-Based Evidence for Healthcare: Clinical 
Mindlines (2011). "Clinical mindlines" refers to: 
"internalized, collectively reinforced and often tacit guidelines that are 
informed by clinicians' training, by their own and each other’s' experience, 
by their interactions and their role sets, by their reading, by the way they 
have learnt to handle the conflicting demands, by their understanding of 
local circumstances and systems, and by a host of other sources". (Gabbay 
and Le May, 2011:44; 2004:3) 
 
The emergence of clinical mindlines was described by clinician interviewees, and 
points were distilled by the researchers. Clinical mindlines: 
"were grown from experience and from people who are trusted; they were 
'stored in my head' but could be shared and tested and then internalised 
through discussion, while leaving room for individual flexibility." (Gabbay 
and Le May, 2004:3) 
 
In interview, when asked to give an account of the reasoning behind how a clinical 
condition or situation had been addressed, practitioners either could not 
articulate this, or were able to answer only through recounting a memorable 
incident from practice, or by alluding to something they had heard or read.  
Gabbay and le May (2011) noted that it seemed curious that highly trained and 
competent clinicians were unable to describe in any concise way their praxis.  
"Inexpressible knowledge" was a term Gabbay and Le May (2011:71) coined for 
the ineffable nature of the work which practitioners at one of the research sites 
spoke about during interviews. 
 
Another way the idea of competence in practice has been looked at is in the 
context of Communities of Practice (CoPs), a form of epistemic community defined 
by Lave and Wenger (1991:98) as: 
"a system of relationships between people, activities, and the world; 
developing with time, and in relation to other tangential and overlapping 
communities of practice".   
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Wenger (2010) defined competence as involving three elements combined. The 
first two are collective understanding of the nature of the community of practice, 
and mutual engagement reflecting in interactions. The third expresses 
competence as involving access to a repertoire of resources such as language, 
routines, sensibilities, artefacts, tools, stories, styles and, significantly, the ability 
to use this repertoire properly. (Wenger, 2010:80) 
Based on an in-depth review of the literature on CoPs Amin and Roberts (2008) 
delineated four modes of "'knowing in action'" according to activity of knowing, 
and type of knowledge. Thus, for example, "craft/task-based" activity is 
characterised by aesthetic, kinaesthetic and embodied knowledge; and 
"professional" activity is characterised by specialised, expert knowledge acquired 
through extensive training over time, is declarative, and has aesthetic and 
kinaesthetic dimensions. (Amin and Roberts, 2008:357)  
Strati (2003) proposed that knowing in practice may be understood by 
approaching it with an aesthetic sensibility; that there is a "close interweaving 
between aesthetics and tacit knowledge".  He defined aesthetic knowledge as "the 
form of knowledge that persons acquire by activating the specific capacities of 
their perceptive-sensorial faculties and aesthetic judgement in the day to day lives 
of organizations." (Strati, 2003:54).  Applied to practice in the care professions an 
aesthetic and sensorial approach might involve a practical dimension such as 
'seeing' how a person looks physically (e.g. pallor of skin); and also involve more 
abstract dimensions: perhaps a sensing of the person's emotional state, and 
awareness of one's own feelings or instincts about the person and their situation.  
In respite and day-care settings where people may remain for anything from one 
day up to a protracted assessment stay of weeks or months, recognising and 
staying aware to variations in an individual's state is important and necessary in 
order to be able to support the person if they become distressed, disorientated, 
agitated, or angry. In health settings such as clinics or home visits, the timeframes 
are different and contact may last for minutes rather than hours. Practice is likely 
to be focused on assessment, diagnosis, treatment and review. A key moment such 
as an assessment or diagnosis represents what Beard and Fox (2008:1512) 
describe as "a specific episode, or turning point" which is likely to be momentous 
for the individual and their carer. Such potentially life altering moments require 
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clinical knowledge to be mediated or 'softened' by a knowing of how one might 
feel if one were in the same situation as the patient.  Kissel and Carpenter (2007: 
279) have highlighted the often idiosyncratic and complex calculation physicians 
use to select which words to use (and those not to use) when giving a diagnosis of 
dementia, the implication being that great variance in the directness, clarity, or 
lack thereof, exists in the delivery of a diagnosis.  
 
Thinking of settings that are focused on care Ahrenkiel et al (2013) investigated 
how professional competence unfolds in preschool day-care centres for children, 
using methods of observation, staff interviews, and workshops.  Facets of work in 
these settings include welcoming children on arrival, mealtime and bedtime 
activities, dressing and undressing, and cleaning up. Such aspects tend to be 
overlooked and not considered as part of professional competence.  Also explored 
was the notion of "gestural knowledge" (a term used for representing the relation 
between body and mind which asserts that these are not sharply divided but also 
not entirely one); and how gestural knowledge was involved in smoothing 
transitions from one situation to another, such as transitions between home and 
the centre. (Ahrenkiel et al, 2013:83)   The authors assert that the ongoing 
functioning and operation of preschool day care centres: 
"is dependent on professional competences that can be conceived as 
"unnoticed".  These aspects of professional competence are embedded in 
routines, experiences and embodied forms of knowledge". (Ahrenkiel et al, 
2013:79) 
 
The authors drew on the notion of "unnoticed" (coined by the Danish researcher 
Bech-Jorgensen, 1994) as a way for describing "dimensions of work that often 
escape the eye that looks for measurable and easily documented curriculum-
oriented activities". (Ahrenkiel et al, 2013:82)   
Moser in Buscher et al (2009) provides an account of a way of practicing care that 
is explicit in its concern to harness the knowing of individuals with dementia in 
order to improve and produce meaningful outcomes for those individuals. This is 
a practice approach called Marte Meo, which is worthy of a full description here 
for its illustrating of commitment to knowing the person as a person, the 
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importance of which has already been highlighted (e.g. Liaschenko, 1997). The 
Marte Meo approach: 
"makes visible and explicit an alternative and care-based definition of the 
problem of dementia, with wider possibilities for action in terms of care, 
patient agency and subjectivity, than the biomedical one allows". (Moser, 
2009:194)  
 
Fieldwork was conducted by Moser in a Norwegian nursing home and was 
"sensitised" towards tracing care approaches to dementia. From a study of the 
application of Marte Meo to the situation of one man with dementia Moser 
concluded that in Marte Meo diagnosis and action were thoroughly entwined: 
each shaped and transformed the other.  It also seemed to be the case that in care 
practices dementia may be known and acted upon in ways that are different to 
those supported by a biomedical approach. Marte Meo provides an example of - 
"how care practice and care approaches to dementia may transform what by 
biomedicine was given up as a deplorable, but unsolvable problem into a 
'solvable', or, at least, a bearable and liveable one." (Moser, 2009:194) 
 
Moser provides an account of a Mr Lang, a man with dementia who was admitted 
into a nursing home. He arrived with a history of moving between institutions for 
elderly care and dementia care, and there had been a failure to provide a 
permanent place for him in a care home.  He had been diagnosed with advanced 
dementia with additional psychiatric conditions. Nursing home staff were aware 
that they were taking on a difficult and potentially unsolvable case.  Permissions 
were sought to adopt the Marte Meo approach and, once granted, a 24-hour 
"deviation log" was introduced enabling the logging and coding of various forms 
of unrest, aggression, agitation and problematic behaviours on an hourly basis. 
This produced over the next few weeks colourful maps that suggested little in the 
way of patterns of behaviour, but did indicate certain behaviours including "little 
and irregular sleep." (Moser, 2009:196) 
The interactions between Mr Lang and the staff who were mainly involved in his 
care were videoed, then these were played back to staff whilst being analysed, 
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involving pausing the video at points and giving an explanation of what was 
happening. (Moser, 2009: 198)  
Moser suggested that video recordings and their subsequent analysis help to "give 
voice" to care approaches - a narrative that is often made silent or eclipsed by a 
biomedically oriented view of dementia.  Importantly, the Marte Meo method 
supports a commitment to "finding what the language of the individual is rather 
than assuming that the person is empty." (Moser, 2009: 198-199) 
The combination of care staff piecing together details from Mr Lang's past (before 
he was diagnosed with dementia), continuing to provide care to him, and also 
reviewing the video materials, built up a repertoire of knowledge about Mr Lang 
in which knowing him was a part. The evidence that Mr Lang was becoming 
'known' by staff seemed to be shown in the new ways that they were working 
with him, based on blending and incorporating what they knew of details of his 
past with the practices they now adopted with him. The vehicle for change was 
the Marte Meo method, and applying this, Moser suggests, made: 
"things that used to be hidden and invisible in the flux and the tacit, 
embodied practices of care, visible also in everyday care interactions". 
(Moser, 2009: 204)  
 
Practices and the way a health condition is defined - Moser suggests - are 
importantly related, and both may contribute to how individual agency is 
perceived.  In relation to Mr Lang there was a 'somaticising' definition of 
dementia: either it was individual (located in the individual's brain) or it was 
relational and interactional.  The diagnosis that Mr Lang arrived with at the 
nursing home defined him as though he was 'lost' in the dementia: dementia was 
the active agent in creating problems and challenges in care. Mr Lang's situation 
was powerfully re-framed and reconstructed through applying the Marte Meo 
approach.  
This sort of knowledge that is both appreciative of human experience, and how 
disease and illness create disturbances to getting on with everyday life, 
Liaschenko (1997) suggests is integrated into the practice of nursing: 
“Much of the work of nursing practice is concerned with creating and 
managing routines of lived experience. We attempt to take the disruption of 
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disease and illness and render it a manageable element integrated into the 
life experience of the person”. [...] “Knowledge of the routines of lived 
experience is knowledge of how people live in a temporally structured 
existence; it is attendance to how the ordering of their lives gives meaning, 
and it is attendance to the disruption of those orderings”. (Liaschenko, in 
Thorne and Hayes, 1997:28-29) 
 
From the examples I have given from health practice and from care practice some 
overlapping concerns and shared themes become evident.  It is notable that a 
central aim of practice in both health and care settings is to maintain and improve 
wellbeing. Fundamental to this is the knowledge and knowing of the practitioner 
regarding how the individual is in the present time: the individual’s mental 
wellbeing and physical health status; risks; key relationships; the social context in 
which the person lives including the immediate living situation; and even the 
person’s motivations in life. 
 
Thinking about the variety of different sorts of practice across health and care it is 
clear that in many instances practice contains formal and process-driven 
elements, such as tests, assessment, protocoled interventions, procedures, and 
prescribing of treatments. 
For example, the work of staff in dementia care settings will invariably involve: 
using hoisting equipment for which they have been trained; adherence to any risk 
or behaviour management plans specific to individuals; following of correct 
safeguarding procedures and reporting processes in cases where a member of 
staff suspects an individual with dementia is being abused; correct administration 
of individual medication; and adherence in practice to such policies as prevention 
of falls. These are all instances of explicit knowledge which is codified as a 
procedure, protocol or operational policy.  Adherence in practice to such policies, 
protocols and procedures can be monitored and checked either during an event 
itself (through observation) or afterwards through auditing of records. If 
something goes wrong in a practice the provision of evidence that the procedure 
was correctly followed should exonerate the practitioner(s) involved. 
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Thinking of examples of knowledge codified within a health care context in which 
the needs of people with dementia are being addressed, an obvious example is 
lines of treatment.  The current drug treatments recommended for persons with 
Alzheimer's disease are the three acetylcholinesterase (AChE) inhibitors - 
Donepezil, Galantamine, Rivastigmine, and another drug, Memantine. (National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence/NICE: Technology appraisal guidance 
[TA217]). The guidance sets out clinical guidelines and recommendations for 
which drugs are suitable for which stage of Alzheimer's Disease (which might be 
considered to be a temporal dimension of prescribing); in which circumstances 
Memantine should be prescribed rather than a AChE inhibitor; under what 
conditions a drug should be prescribed; considerations of treatment cost; equality 
of access to treatment; and consideration of factors other than just cognition 
scores when deciding on treatment. 
These clinical guidelines are essentially dealing with those aspects of treating a 
condition that can actually be circumscribed.  These guidelines relate to another 
body of codified knowledge about specific drugs which is the British National 
Formulary (BNF) (2017).  This details the drug dosage, side effects, monitoring 
requirements, directions for administration, patient and carer advice, and so on. 
The NICE guidelines and the BNF are codified knowledge that is evidence-based, 
presented in a protocoled format. The guidelines inform certain practices such as 
prescribing.  Because prescribing is a practice in which there are innate risks to 
the patient, such as incorrect dosage, side effects, contraindications, and so on, 
safety of practice is paramount. Knowledge codified in protocoled formats, if such 
protocols are followed, provides a means by which certain elements of certain 
practices can be accounted for. This becomes important if something goes wrong 
(e.g. an adverse drug interaction) as the actual records of prescribing in a patient's 
notes can be checked against a given protocol or best practice guidance to 
establish whether practice adhered to the protocol.  
 
Another example is to think about the interpretation of a particular type of 
codified knowledge which memory clinic practitioners commonly encounter: a 
brain scan (e.g. generated by a computerised axial tomography/CAT). In the clinic 
setting, as I observed during fieldwork in an NHS memory service, the clinician 
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with sight of the scan results can then decode this by correlating details in the 
visual display with codified knowledge of different types of memory problem. One 
instance of knowledge being decoded was observed in the clinic setting where the 
clinician saw that the scan showed no evidence of cerebral infarction, which she 
then interpreted to the patient as being indicative that there had not been a stroke 
or mini stroke.  
The point to draw from these respective examples of drug treatment for dementia 
and brain scans is that these illustrate the utility of codified knowledge for 
treatment of a health condition, or for establishing the status of the health of the 
brain which, in dementia, provides key evidence for diagnosis.     
 
Shifting the focus slightly from frontline practice itself to think about the 
overlapping nature of health and care needs, and the service contexts in which 
practice occurs, NICE in association with SCIE (Social Care Institute for 
Excellence) provides explicit and comprehensive recommendations regarding 
supporting people with dementia and their carers directed towards providing 
support that is integrated across health and social care: 
"This guideline covers preventing, diagnosing, assessing and managing 
dementia in health and social care, and includes recommendations on 
Alzheimer's disease. It aims to improve care for people with dementia by 
promoting accurate diagnosis and the most effective interventions, and 
improving the organisation of services." (nice.org.uk/guidance/cg42). 
 
Recommendations made concern integration of health and social care; risk 
factors, prevention and early identification; diagnosis and assessment; 
interventions for cognitive and non-cognitive symptoms; palliative care; and 
interventions and support to carers.  The recommendations, it could be said, 
involve bringing to bear different but overlapping repertoires of knowledge (from 
health and social care practice) to people with dementia and their carers.  One 
situation that hovers around the fringes of dementia diagnosis is that of people 
with mild cognitive impairment (MCI).  MCI is defined as a pre-clinical stage of 
dementia, representing a risk factor for conversion to dementia. These individuals 
may be diagnosed with MCI (placing them in a high risk group for developing 
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dementia) but are then discharged because they do not meet the criteria to access 
dementia services. 
The same NICE/SCIE guideline states: 
"1.1.1.6:  People who are suspected of having dementia because of evidence 
of functional and cognitive deterioration, but who do not have sufficient 
memory impairment to be diagnosed with the condition, should not be 
denied access to support services. [2006]" (nice.org.uk/guidance/cg42) 
Not being denied access to support services is contingent on such support 
services existing and people being signposted to those services.  
In terms of individuals who have been diagnosed with dementia, input from 
specialist NHS memory services starts to fade out once medication (if 
appropriate) has been prescribed and the individual is stable on the dosage. 
Further input at this point is most likely to be limited to signposting to support 
organisations (e.g. domiciliary care or organisations that can help with benefits 
applications), or referring on to another health practitioner such as a dietician or 
occupational therapist.  Once the objectives of assessment and diagnosis are 
completed individuals are generally discharged from specialist memory services.  
Health knowledge performed in practice within realms such as diagnostic 
services, signposting, and follow-up/review for people with dementia transmutes 
into quantifiable costs for the NHS.  Service inputs and indicative costs in a 
particular "memory protection" service model spanning primary and secondary 
care (Hawkins, 2015) were estimated on the basis of an average pathway per 
patient as £877.00. For another service model - an entirely specialist led memory 
service - the total average pathway cost per patient was estimated as £491.00. For 
social care including domiciliary care and day-care, a social services assessment 
determines whether and how much an individual with dementia and their family 
must pay towards needs-assessed social care provision. 
I highlight the costs aspect in health and care services for people with dementia 
and their carers in order to bring attention to the nature of 'valuableness' or 
worth to people with dementia of knowledge performed in practice; and also as a 
preface to the next section where I open up the idea of repertoires of knowledge 
of people with dementia themselves. 
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Transmission of knowledge through the knowledge repertoires of 'knowing' 
patients and service users  
In this section I consider knowledge and knowing located in or with people with 
dementia.  I borrow a characterisation of individual knowledge from Nygard and 
Johansson (2001:89) - "lived knowledge of" (a subject).  
Individuals' knowledge becomes a particularly intriguing line of thought when 
considering a practice situation such as a memory appointment or in day-care. 
Here, the individual with dementia is present and is articulating her/his 
experiences and self-knowing of living with dementia.  Dementia - in terms of 
defining what it involves and its nature - has no single definition.  A 'query' about 
the nature of dementia may likely generate different answers depending on who it 
is posed to (i.e. someone with dementia, a carer, a neuroscientist, a dementia 
nurse, a GP, an activities coordinator at a day-care centre, and so on).  However, 
some perspectives about dementia are privileged and considered authoritative 
over others.  The biomedical perspective of dementia (as I found during the 
preparation and submission of an ethics application for NHS review) is pervasive 
in discourse about dementia, imbuing the language of medicine and nursing.  
Cheston and Bender (1999) describe a "formulation" of dementia that is oriented 
around a definition of dementia as a disease of the brain.  Changes in the brain 
occurring over time and associated with dementia are linked to a progressive, 
staged route towards decline in the person's memory.  This path begins with early 
stage changes and destruction occurring within the physical brain. This gives way 
to the appearance of psychological features, notably where cognitive function is 
affected by damage to the brain and the person becomes more and more 
impaired. The symptoms associated with this severe impairment are varied and 
usually negatively framed, using terms such as confusion, wandering, aggression, 
and disorientation. (Cheston and Bender, 1999: 68-69)  This essentially deficit 
model of dementia represents a perspective where individual identity is closely 
aligned with cognitive capability. This is used as the rationale for explaining that 
increasing memory impairment (affecting cognitive ability) results in a person's 
identity (or self) beginning to disappear.  Neuroscientists, Squire and Kandel 
(1999:9) are cited in Fuchs (2016:6) stating: 
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"We are not who we are because we think. We are who we are because we 
can remember what we have thought about […]. Memory is the glue that 
binds our mental life, the scaffolding that holds our personal history and that 
makes it possible to grow and change throughout life. When memory is lost, 
as in Alzheimer’s disease, we lose the ability to recreate our past, and as a 
result, we lose our connection with ourselves and with others".  
 
This viewpoint correlates thinking (an activity it is assumed as undertaken by the 
brain, although the emerging viewpoints of 'embodied cognition' may call this into 
doubt [e.g. Wilson, 2002]) with memory.  A further claim is the close interlocking 
between individual identity and memory: when memory becomes affected by 
dementia there is a fragmentation of identity that ensues.  
Chatterji's powerful and poignant ethnographic case study of a Mr Rijder in a 
nursing home in the Netherlands explored whether patients with Alzheimer's 
Disease can be thought of as "experiencing subjects" (Chatterji, 1998:355) and 
exposed from Mr Rijder's situation that multiple and often conflicting 
perspectives may exist towards an individual with dementia but that the 
individual lived experience is singular.  'Identity' has been explored by Thomas 
Fuchs, a philosopher and also a psychiatrist who works with people affected by 
schizophrenia and people with dementia.   The notion of the 'continuity of self' is 
particularly interesting as an argument for framing the question of identity in 
cases where the experience of time, memory, or thinking may become fragmented 
related to one's mental health. Fuchs proposes the idea of "a continuous 
awareness of oneself-as-subject" - the awareness of self in the terms of "a 
background certainty which need not be made explicit, examined or verified".  
This is a pre-reflective self-awareness which is "part of the first-personal 
givenness of every experience".  So there is a continuous self-awareness, not 
dependent on self-observation, self-reflection or remembering (Fuchs, 2016:8).  If 
continuity of the self was about consciously remembering of earlier experiences 
this would only amount to cognitive continuity, and there is in any case a question 
mark over cognitive continuity related to human capacity to consciously 
remember certain earlier experiences.  In the course of everyday life individuals 
drift in and out of cognitive acuity - for example, when driving a vehicle on a 
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familiar route it is not uncommon to 'lose' a chunk of the journey and be unable to 
recall it. This suggests that realisation of conscious cognitive continuity is probably 
inconceivable.  Fuchs suggests that the basis for selfhood should be physical 
existence through time (Fuchs, 2016:1) rather than being linked to any 
requirements for a person to remember their past. For people whose memory is 
significantly impaired, being in a state of memory impairment does not diminish 
or change the certainty of the person having had those experiences and 
continuing to have them. (Fuchs, 2016: 7-9).  From the perspective of not having a 
memory impairment: 
"One could argue that we instantly become aware of who we are, and in a 
Lockean way, through activating our memory, reconnect with the day before. 
However, this is not necessarily the case: frequently, a moment of confusion 
may arise, for example on my travels, when it takes some time to remember 
where I am, what time of day it is, or even who I am. And yet even before I 
explicitly remember all this, in the first moment of awakening, there is 
already a basic bodily self-awareness in which I find myself. To this end, 
there is no need to remember falling asleep the night before, nor to recall my 
name or any other autobiographical knowledge." (Fuchs, 2016:9) 
 
A point to make in terms of knowledge and knowing is that the biomedical 
perspective is not attuned to knowing the person as a person, but is focused on the 
person as a case, and this represents a notion of a person with dementia as 
disembodied.  Fuchs' ideas about knowing being located in the body, and selfhood 
being essentially dependent on the body's existence seem to offer weight to 
cognitive status per se not being the basis for knowing.  
'Continuing to have experiences' (Fuchs, 2016) is a useful point to develop in 
terms of lived experiences of people with dementia. Attending to the lived 
experience of dementia is captured in the summation:  
"knowledge of how that person lives, as well as what she or he lives for". 
(Liaschenko, in Thorne and Hayes; 1997:27) 
 
These points from Cheston and Bender, Fuchs, and Liaschenko, draw attention to 
the "positioning [of] people with dementia" (Beard and Fox, 2008:1511): where 
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and how people with dementia and their lived experiences are situated in 
practice, and in discourse. In chapter 3 of this thesis I consider the positioning of 
people with dementia in research, from my own experiences of the NHS ethics 
review process for this PhD project. I raise the point that vulnerability is part of 
the dominant discourse about people with dementia, and that labelling people as 
'vulnerable' can result in their exclusion from participation in research, thus can 
"be deeply silencing" (Boden et al, 2009:742).  
Individual narratives of people with dementia, Collins (2015) suggests, may be 
important in countering the biomedical perspective of dementia where the 
prevailing view is that disintegration of the self is considered inevitable. Collins 
writes:  
"Individual perspectives of AD [Alzheimer's Disease] not only help in 
understanding the subjective experience of AD, but insights can also be used 
to improve the system of care and to critically challenge societal views of AD. 
Individual perspectives of AD provide insight into how people experience 
and navigate the condition. They provide fundamental understandings of 
how people negotiate death and illness." (Collins, 2015:2) 
 
Empirical work about lived experiences of dementia appears to be a burgeoning 
area of research.  A meta-synthesis of qualitative research about lived experiences 
of people with dementia by Górska et al (2017), for example, initially identified a 
large number of studies (3427 records) out of which 34 papers were suitable for  
review. Findings of particular note are: the awareness people with dementia had 
of changes in their cognitive capability, including memory; the importance to 
people of their sense of agency and maintaining control over their own affairs; 
and the idea that identity is maintained through personality traits, beliefs and 
opinions, actions, and activities. Particularly interesting was the finding that loss 
of skills was a risk to continuity of identity in terms of uncoupling the person's 
past from their current situation.  
Empirical work has been reported by Kontos and Naglie in O'Connor and Purves 
(2009) detailing clinicians' accounts concerning bodily expressions in people with 
dementia that were interpreted as knowing based on past personal experience. 
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One example was from a physiotherapist working with a resident who was a war 
veteran and also had dementia: 
"There are a lot of war veterans who live here and I'll never forget this one 
resident who I worked with. I had a hell of a time getting him to stand up 
from his wheelchair so we could work on his walking...He refused. One day I 
was thinking about who this man was and what his life experiences were and 
started singing the national anthem.  Well you wouldn't believe it but he 
stood up from his wheelchair and saluted me!  So from then on we began our 
physio sessions with the national anthem." (Kontos and Naglie, 2009:192) 
 
Published literature by or involving people with dementia about their lived 
experiences is relatively sparse. This might, though, be changing. An articulate 
account detailing aspects of what it feels like to experience dementia has been 
recently broadcast on BBC Radio 4 by the author of the publication 'Somebody I 
used to know' (2018).  The author, Wendy Mitchell, was diagnosed with young 
onset dementia in 2015 at the age of 58.  
 
I conclude this section by noting that it brings together a set of viewpoints that 
converge in a rather uncomfortable way, revealing some tensions between 
dominant discourses from biomedicine and lived experiences of people with 
dementia.   
 
Status Passage: characterisation for dementia  
Beard and Fox's (2008) paper is the only empirical example that I located which 
frames receiving a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease as marking a status passage 
(i.e. Glaser and Strauss' theory of status passage, 1971).  However, not unrelated - 
and therefore worth briefly mentioning - is "master status", a term which has 
been used in empirical research to conceptually frame dementia in discussions of 
identity.  A finding from an ethnographic study in a long-term care setting for 
people with dementia by Doyle and Rubinstein (2013) was that a dementia 
master status was a characteristic through which people with dementia were 
perceived as and dealt with by staff as 'other', which the authors refer to as 
"othering". 
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Diagnosis might be viewed as one way through which a dementia 'status' may be 
assigned.  Implicit in any diagnosis is the notion that there is something wrong, 
but in a dementia diagnosis there is the further factor that what is wrong is 
irreversible. Something has been lost that will not be regained, and the naming of 
the problem as 'dementia' signals to other people that the individual's identity is 
now changed in some irrevocable sense. Goffman (1963) used the term "spoiled" 
identity to refer to how identity becomes marred when certain negatively valued 
characteristics such as criminality, poverty, and physical or mental impairment 
become associated with an individual.  Grouping people according to certain 
characteristics they are perceived, by others, to share is evident in most health 
and care systems, including in the NHS research ethics system.  Here, it might be 
said that there is a categorising of people according to particular characteristics 
they are viewed as sharing such as 'vulnerability' and 'lacking capacity'.  Blanket 
terms such as 'vulnerable' become categories to describe people at a group level 
rather than at an individual level. The applying of terminology collectively might 
appear harmless, yet if a label such as 'vulnerable' becomes the accepted way to 
define a whole group of people this has possible consequences and repercussions 
for individual identity.   
The undesirability of a particular individual passage may be seen in relation to its 
reversibility or non-reversibility (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:14-32).  Dementia as a 
passage is in most cases (though young onset dementia is an exception) 
simultaneous with an ageing passage. Although a dementia passage is not 
inevitable nor is it currently reversible, an ageing passage is inevitable whilst 
being non-reversible. The nuance between these statuses might be defined in the 
terms that ageing per se is a 'normal', expected passage. Even though ageing is 
non-reversible, it cannot be assumed to be undesirable from the perspective of an 
individual.  The passage of dementia is also non-reversible, yet may well be looked 
upon as undesirable by the individual and their loved ones.  Governments may view 
dementia as a drain on resources, and pass this responsibility to agencies such as 
health and social care who must make special provision for people in this passage. 
The phenomenon of status passage originated with Arnold van Gennep's Les rites 
de passage (1909), and its properties were subsequently expounded on and 
extended by Glaser and Strauss (1971).   
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Status passage is a rather rich concept, and with wide utility so that it lends itself 
as a way of looking applicable to any imaginable status, or to any passage 
associated with any status. Very few authors have drawn attention to status 
passage in relation to dementia, Tolhurst and Kingston (2013) and Beard and Fox 
(2008) being rare examples of those who have.  The desirability of different 
passages is framed by Glaser and Strauss' (1971) words, and these take on a 
rather poignant significance if oriented to a particular event such as being 
diagnosed with dementia: 
"The passage may be considered in some measure desirable or undesirable 
by the person making the passage or by other relevant parties. Going from 
unmarried to married status generally is thought desirable; becoming a 
prisoner is generally undesirable." (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:4) 
 
A characteristic of status passages is that they may be either "non-scheduled" 
meaning that a passage is not subject to any "man-made or imposed schedule" 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1965:48), as in the case of dying; or "scheduled".  Dementia, if 
viewed as a health condition with a trajectory that is unpredictable in respects 
such as the rate at which an individual will become impaired, what skills will be 
retained the longest, and so on, is a non-scheduled passage. (E.g. Tolhurst and 
Kingston, 2013) 
Of particular interest for my research is the temporal dimensions of status 
passages: the notion that a status passage is in constant motion, moving with time.  
This opens up ideas about transitions - that a person in passage transitions 
between statuses, and within a status the passagee transitions, so that s/he is not 
static, "not just 'in' a status." (Glaser and Strauss, 1971: 47).  Transitional phases 
may be brief, so for a person with dementia an example might be a day per week 
scheduled to attend a day-care service, or regular periods scheduled for going into 
respite care. These transitions occur between home and 'institution'.  Entry to 
permanent care represents a transition, but also may be looked upon as the 
gaining of an additional status whereby the person becomes a resident or a 
patient of an institution. 
The timings, sequencing and stages of passages may be overseen by those who 
Glaser and Strauss (1971) term official "legitimators": authorised persons who 
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have roles in announcing timings, and may be crucial in temporal handling of a 
passage (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:36).  Thinking about legitimators in relation to 
different aspects of my research project, these might include staff at the university 
who oversee doctoral passages; members of ethics committees who process and 
oversee sequencing of projects; memory services staff who oversee various 
aspects of healthcare for people referred with memory problems (e.g. the events 
of initial appointment, referring for scans and tests; diagnosis; prescribing; 
review; discharge); care service managers who are involved in overseeing the 
assembling and holding of information about individuals, their needs, their 
medication, care arrangements, and so on; frontline care staff who handle 
transitions such as arrivals and departures from institutional settings, as well as 
the scheduling and timing of activities and events and individuals' transitions 
through these. 
I have oriented these selected insights from status passage to the situation of 
people with dementia. In doing so some points have been highlighted which seem 
helpful for conceptualising particular aspects that 'follow' a diagnosis of dementia. 
These aspects are: impact on identity, moving through time, transitions, and 
legitimators.  
 
Problematisation of tacit knowledge 
In problematising tacit knowledge I have chosen to weave this argument around 
one of the defining characteristics of tacit knowledge which is 'articulation'.  I 
consider articulation of tacit knowledge through orienting it to a practice context: 
services for people with dementia. 
I begin by restating Polanyi's conceptualisation of knowledge that all knowledge is 
"fundamentally tacit" (Polanyi, 1961: 467).  In this case, the assertion is that there 
is no knowledge that lacks a tacit dimension/ all knowledge has a tacit dimension. 
This serves to ground the claim that it is not possible to differentiate tacit 
knowledge from the comprehensive knowledge in which (theoretically) it is a 
dimension.  Theoretical frameworks that express the possible relations between 
tacit and explicit such as the tacit-explicit dichotomy and the tacit-explicit 
continuum do not solve the basic problem that, for all practical purposes, 'pure' 
tacit knowledge cannot be differentiated from explicit knowledge.  From this 
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standpoint neither can it be possible to say with certainty which mode of 
knowledge is being performed in a given instance (Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999, have 
argued this point about differentiating tacit from explicit based on empirically 
driven attempts to extract tacit knowledge from employees).   
Turning towards practice, van Manen (1995:11) has noted that tacit knowing "is 
embodied in skills that are located inside practices, ways of doing things, knacks, 
sensitive touches, etc." This embeddedness is problematic in two senses: (a) that 
tacit knowledge is so subsumed in the 'naturalness' or 'expectedness' of actions 
and skills in practice that it seems virtually indistinguishable from that which is 
natural, and ordinarily expected (i.e. its sedimentation in what might be observed 
as 'responses' to a situation); and (b) its absorption into the doing of practice then 
renders it "inexpressible" (Gabbay and le May, 2011:71) linguistically.    
This characteristic of being inarticulable may render tacit knowledge as 
problematic in certain conditions in health and care practice.  These conditions 
are the occasions when it is required or demanded that an account, explanation, 
or justification of practice be provided. One such circumstance could be the 
carrying out of a review of the rationale for care practice and variations in 
practice, where practitioners are asked to formally account for practice. The 
"defective articulation" which Polanyi (1958: 88) speaks of refers to the 
limitations of representation (linguistically) of the entirety of what we know in 
any instance, because the tacit dimension of knowledge defies articulation in this 
way.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology and research process  
Introduction 
The structure for chapter three reflects my own progression through various 
interlinked stages which, collectively, formed the research process.  I begin by 
briefly describing how I came to the method of ethnography.  I then provide an 
account of the processes and procedures for NHS ethical review through which 
my research project was scrutinised, and provide some critical reflections on this. 
A section about the terms that framed how I approached and undertook 
ethnographic fieldwork is next. In this I reflect on the importance of attunement to 
conceptual frameworks for approaching research involving people in late life and 
the issues that may accompany this including those of cognitive frailty, dementia, 
and caregiving. I consider my own positionality to participants and in relation to 
method.  I consider ‘time’, introducing perspectives on time in relation to 
ethnography. 
This chapter concludes with some brief reflections on undertaking research in a 
memory service and a day-care and respite service and approaching the writing of 
the thesis. 
 
Ethnography: appeals for, and appeals to 
Imaginatively, it might be envisioned that ethnography is a research method that 
puts out an appeal to researchers to tell stories that have not yet been told and, in 
this endeavour, to shed new light on a topic and reveal aspects about it that are 
new or may be presented in a different way. By the same token, for a researcher to 
choose to use ethnography for a research project s/he needs to be drawn to it, 
find it appealing, and recognise its unique utility for a specific project.   
Willis and Trondman (2000) press home the potency of the method of 
ethnography for tracing and revealing new understandings about every-day, in 
situ occurrences and happenings. They introduce the first issue of "Ethnography" 
(2000) with a Manifesto for Ethnography, anchoring it in two contexts described 
thus: 
"First are the symbolic forms, patterns, discourses and practices which help 
to form it and give it shape, so that the ethnographic enterprise is about 
presenting, explaining and analysing the culture(s) which locate(s) 
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'experience'.  Second, and more widely, for us the best ethnography also 
recognizes and records how experience is entrained in the flow of 
contemporary history, large and small, partly caught up in its movement, 
partly itself creatively helping to maintain it, enacting the uncertainty of the 
eddies and gathering flows dryly recorded from the outside as 'structures' 
and 'trends'." (Willis and Trondman, 2000:6) 
 
This beautiful description points to something about 'inseparability'.  Firstly, in 
the nature of what is being investigated - that experience is caught up in, and 
indivisible from discourses and practices and so follows and maintains the flow of 
culture(s).  Secondly, in terms of the how of conveying in ethnographic writing: in 
written ethnography is embodied storying, and storying involves using particular 
literary devices (common to fictional works) such as metaphor, alliteration, 
anecdotes, and connotation.  What made this method attractive to me were the 
possibilities it augured for expressing research using a narrative, storytelling 
approach.   
Ethnography’s orientation to working with people rather than treating them as 
objects of research (Wolcott, 1999:61-63) appealed to me, as did the way of being 
within the settings where receptiveness to looking, seeing, and responding 
reflexively was called for rather than obligation to a set of research procedures. 
At a practical level I needed to maintain a day job in order to fund my doctoral 
studies. Whilst my ethics and governance approvals for my research project 
allowed me to conduct fieldwork over 12 months, including an option to apply for 
extra time, employment commitments did not allow for one single long, 
uninterrupted duration of time in situ in the two settings. Later in this chapter in a 
section on the terms for conducting ethnographic fieldwork I offer some thoughts 
about the possible implications of undertaking ethnography in this time-
segmented way, and I consider the factors which may be involved in spending 
time in situ in health and care settings.  
Narrative and ethnographic work in the field, some of which was influential in my 
initial decisions about methodology whilst other work I came across during and 
after fieldwork, has included: chapters from Mol and colleagues' Care in Practice 
(2010); Ethnographies of Diagnostic Work (Buscher et al, 2009), particularly the 
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strands about tacit dimensions of work, and the chapter on Marte Meo; and 
Chatterji's ethnographic case study (1998) of a man with Alzheimer's Disease at 
the point at which he was institutionalised into a care home  which is a narrative 
structured around a problematisation of the notion of 'voice' as it relates to people 
with dementia. I revisited Pauline Morris' sociological study, "Put Away" (1969), 
which I had read first in the mid-1990s in the context of studying for a vocational 
bachelor's degree to work with people with learning disabilities. The narrative - 
although not a self-claimed ethnography - is a powerful rendering of the 
languishing of people in long-stay 'mental handicap' hospitals during the 1960s, 
and the devaluation implicit in routines of care, the physical environment of the 
hospital, lack of personal possessions, and lack of personal agency.  
The qualities of ethnography that I have been particularly drawn to may be 
summarised as: the being there in situ that provides possibilities for looking and 
seeing, then recording, reflecting and making sense; alongside the crafting of a 
narrative that imparts one's own sensemaking, but which also allows the reader, 
with their "own background and experiences" (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993) to 
engage with the text and advance their own understanding. 
 
Formalities and Realities: Seeking research and ethical approvals 
I had previous experience of the formalities of seeking and obtaining NHS 
research and ethical approval and knew that the processes were weighty and very 
time consuming.   
At the stage of preparing applications for peer review, research governance, and 
ethical approval I was mindful also of how I might go about representing 
ethnographic work (specifically) in the terms of the approvals systems. 
At the preparation stage I did not know how the ethics and governance for the 
social care component of my research project would be dealt with. It transpired 
that this was and is a grey area: even in instances where an NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) reviews and grants approval for a combined health and social 
care project, local Research and Development (R&D) governance approvals and 
monitoring relates only to NHS fieldwork sites.  Furthermore, it is outside of the 
remit of NHS RECs to comment on ethical issues relating to non-NHS sites such as 
local authorities. 
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The ordering of the processes, as I understood, was firstly an application for peer 
review of the project to Keele; then a mapping over of any relevant information 
from the peer review form to the online ethics application; ethical review by an 
NHS REC and, subject to obtaining ethical approval, the granting of research 
governance approvals from the R&D department at the NHS trust where I would 
be conducting my work. Alongside this I would be applying for local governance 
approvals from the local authority for the social care site. How the ethics 
approvals for the NHS related to the social care ethics approvals I did not know. 
Between early August and early September 2013 I submitted my peer review 
application to Keele, and the requisite Research Governance Framework (RGF) 
form to the local authority. In early October 2013 the local authority approved my 
proposed research project at the day-care and respite service (Oak Hall).  In mid-
November 2013 I finally obtained peer review approval after various delays 
relating to the review process and the requirement to make minor amendments. 
With local authority approvals granted I sought clarification from the Research 
and Governance lead at the university about whether I may now commence 
fieldwork at the local authority site.  Taking this option would have meant 
submitting an application to Keele University ethics committee to review the 
social care component. The view from Keele seemed to be that the single, 
streamlined NHS REC process 'trumped' any other possible ethics review avenues 
open to me. My frustrations were related to my feelings that ethical issues my 
study raised specific to the social care setting should be dealt with in the context 
of social care ethical review. 
In early January 2014 I emailed the regional manager for the Health Research 
Authority NRES putting to him my questions about the social care aspect of my 
project. He responded: 
"I just need to clarify that NHS REC review is not normally required for 
research involving NHS or social care staff recruited as research participants 
by virtue of their professional role. Although if you intend to include service 
users then ethical review will be required. However, from the information 
provided it is entirely possible that your application would benefit from 
review by the National Social Care Research Ethics Committee 
- http://www.screc.org.uk/ . SCREC can review studies taking place in NHS 
58 
 
settings with NHS patients where the approach uses social science or 
qualitative methods, provided that the research does not involve any change 
in treatment or clinical practice, so it may be worth contacting them to see if 
your application is more suitable for review by them." (Email: 02/01/14) 
 
Given that I was using a social sciences methodology, SCREC sounded an 
appropriate route to follow.  However, mindful of how close I was to completing 
my application to NHS REC I didn't want to unwittingly create more delays.  I was 
also concerned that applying through a non-NHS process might be seen as less 
legitimate by the R&D department at Two Shires Trust, and that this may in turn 
compromise the positive relationship I had been trying to nurture with that team.  
As a researcher I would have preferred to follow the SCREC route, but 
pragmatically the 'right' decision was to continue the application for NHS REC 
approvals.  
My initial online submission to the central hub overseeing RECs was rejected (for 
the reason of being "not valid").  Whilst the rejection was frustrating at the time, 
the narrative behind the "not valid" reason is particularly interesting and 
somewhat concerning when one considers the range of types of research study 
which may wish to recruit people with dementia. In the initial set of 'screening' 
questions on the form I had responded "no" to the question: 
"Do you plan at any stage of the project to undertake intrusive research involving 
adults lacking capacity to consent for themselves?" 
There are implications relating to this question on two counts. The definition of 
"intrusive research" provided on the form is: "any research with the living 
requiring consent in law. This includes use of identifiable tissue samples or 
personal information". The implication is that holding personal information about 
an individual - such as name and address - is no less intrusive than taking and 
using a tissue sample from an individual.  The anomaly of not differentiating 
between levels of intrusion has been highlighted by Crabtree (2013: 361) who 
notes that "The reference to 'intrusive' research may equally relate to randomised 
controlled trials or qualitative studies of patients". 
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The other point is about capacity. In the statutory principles relating to the Mental 
Capacity Act (2005) principle 1 states: "‘A person must be assumed to have 
capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.’ (section1(2))"   
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) Code of Practice: Chapter 4.4 enlarges on and 
further clarifies this principle by indicating that assessing capacity must be 
established not according to the person's ability to make decisions generally, but 
according to the person's ability to make a particular decision at the time when 
required.  The question on the form implies that it can be known in advance by a 
researcher that at least some participants will lack capacity to consent to what 
they are being asked to consent to, and at the time when the consent is being 
sought. To all intent and purpose the question is asking researchers who are 
involving participants from certain groups that may be deemed 'vulnerable' to 
make the assumption that those participants 'generally' lack capacity.  
The response from the REC manager about my application was that I had given 
conflicting responses in relation to the questions about capacity/non-capacity of 
participants (i.e. people with dementia).  There was a specialist REC that could 
approve studies involving people who lacked capacity, I was advised, to which I 
would need to submit a revised application form which would require a new 
batch of signatures.  
February 2014 was the earliest that my application could be reviewed by a 
specialist REC.  Two weeks after attending the REC meeting at which my project 
was discussed and questions posed to me by committee members, I was notified 
that my application had been given a 'provisional opinion'.  This meant that there 
were aspects of the application which I would need to address and revise before a 
final opinion could be given. The REC’s concerns mainly related to ethical issues at 
the social care setting which, as I knew from email correspondence with the R&D 
team, fell outside of RECs remit to comment on. The issues raised were: 
- The consent process was viewed as insufficiently rigorous. It was suggested 
that a member of the clinical care team should approach individuals to 
determine capacity. If the individual lacked capacity the same member of the 
care team should approach the person's carer.  
- Consent should be taken prior to the day of observation. 
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- Observations in a group setting where not all participants had consented to 
being observed was viewed as an issue, and the committee were 
recommending that everyone in the group should have consented or the 
researcher should not observe that day. 
 
I sought an opinion about capacity from the medical director at the trust where I 
work, who is also a consultant psychiatrist with people with dementia.  She 
advised that capacity is always topic specific.  For example, a person with 
dementia may not have the ability to make decisions about their finances but 
would be capable of expressing their wishes or agreement for a here and now 
situation such as taking medication.  
I also re-read the Mental Capacity Act's (2005) Code of Practice which concurred 
with my original thinking - that it was appropriate to seek consent from people 
with dementia within the setting and at the point in time directly relating to the 
reason for which they were being asked to consent. Thus: 
"[A]n assessment of a person’s capacity must be based on their ability to 
make a specific decision at the time it needs to be made, and not on their 
ability to make decisions in general." (Mental Capacity Act (2005) Code of 
Practice: Chapter 4.4)  
 
I could not see how the REC’s proposals could work.  The suggestion that the 'care 
team' should assess capacity, rather than the researcher, overlooked the fact that 
members of the care team were potential participants for my research project.  In 
effect this would mean that one group of participants (staff) would be assessing 
capacity of another group of participants (people with dementia). Had this even 
been feasible it would create additional burdens for an already busy staff team.  
The assumption appeared to have been made that members of the care team 
would see the determining of capacity as theirs to make; a point I disagreed with.  
Furthermore, making judgements about capacity might rightly be questioned by 
social care staff on the premise that this was a big ask of a staff group who were 
not particularly well paid.  My view was that, as a PhD researcher, I was 
responsible for weighing up whether an individual understood what I was asking 
in terms of consent. 
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My revised consent strategy was duly submitted to the committee.  My project 
was given ethics approval in mid-April 2014 (IRAS project ID: 140652). 
This turned out not to be quite the end of the approvals process: extending 
observations to cover home visits with the Older People's Community Mental 
Health Team required a further submission in the form of a substantial 
amendment.  This was submitted to the REC in September 2014 and was 
approved.  
 
A critical consideration of research approvals for research in health and 
care  
The feelings of unease I had about making my research project 'fit' a prescribed 
process of application and review which felt restrictive and constraining have 
been articulated by other researchers who have questioned whether the 
paradigmatic assumptions that permeate NHS Research Ethics Committees 
(RECs) are appropriate for reviewing non-clinical research that uses social 
sciences methods. (e.g. Dingwall, 2008; Burr and Reynolds, 2010; Parker et al, 
2011; Pollock, 2012; Crabtree, 2013; Stevenson et al, 2015)  
The international trend towards tightening of ethical scrutiny for research 
projects is proclaimed as an "uncontested social good" (Crabtree, 2013: 359), and 
the extra layers of regulatory requirements for the conducting of research seem to 
represent a notching up of administrative obligations. However, it remains 
unknown whether meeting these requirements makes an actual difference to the 
ethical practice of researchers not only in terms of conduct in the field, but also at 
the planning and development stages where choices are made about 
methodology, method, and research design. 
The process of seeking ethical approvals is essentially administrative and on the 
whole is conducted through online systems.  For me it felt strange that - having 
crafted the materials of one's own PhD research project - this was then 'pushed' 
through an administrative system. I felt that this created a disconnect between the 
researcher and their work – a point that was reinforced during the REC meeting 
where I talked through my proposed research project and was asked questions 
about my work.  Questions from the committee included those that touched on 
hefty theoretical and philosophical matters, such as "how tacit knowledge could 
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be transferred, if useful, to others", and "what an ethnographic study is".  There 
was also a question about 'immersion' relating to ethnographic research 
specifically: "what the process for becoming embedded was."  On the one hand I 
felt as though these questions were important ones to ask.  On the other I felt 
frustrated that I was in a situation which was not amenable to appreciation of 
discourse around the question focus but was actually about process and 
'processing' my application in the terms of a regulatory framework: essentially, 
deciding whether the proposed research posed risks to any of the participants.   
The weighty regulation and sometimes impenetrable processes that have 
developed around the ethics of research in the UK hark back to the circumstances 
of unregulated scientific activity by Nazi doctors during World War II, and the 
subsequent principles of 'permissible medical experiments' (1949) set out in the 
Nuremberg Code of 1947. Ethical principles for research later became enshrined 
in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) which is intended to provide guidance to 
physicians and others conducting medical research involving human subjects. 
Specific types of research referred to in the Declaration are biomedical research, 
clinical research, and non-therapeutic biomedical research involving human 
subjects. (World Medical Association/WMA, 1964).  In the UK, researchers 
(including PhD candidates) must obtain ethical approval for their work if they are 
intending to conduct research with participants who are identified on the basis of: 
"their past or present use of services (adult and children's healthcare within 
the NHS and adult social care) for which the UK health departments are 
responsible (including services provided under contract with the private or 
voluntary sectors) including participants recruited through these services as 
healthy controls".  
(http://www.hra-decisiontools.org.uk/ethics/engset1.html: accessed 
14/06/16) 
 
Such wide criteria make it likely that any research interested in aspects of health 
and/or social care will need to be subjected to ethical and research approvals. 
Depending on the type of research and whether it involves participants who are 
deemed as vulnerable related to attributes such as age, mental or physical health, 
or disability, researchers must follow the appropriate approvals route.  In the case 
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of my research project - as already noted - the (blanket) assumption of lack of 
capacity of people with dementia meant that I was routed to a specialist REC 
which reviews projects that are assessed as involving participants lacking 
capacity. For any such project researchers are expected to make themselves 
familiar with the principles and provisions relating to research within the Mental 
Capacity Act, 2005.  Anyone, including a researcher, who makes decisions 
involving people lacking capacity has a legal duty to have regard to the statutory 
Code of Practice that accompanies the Act.  Researchers must also demonstrate in 
their ethics application how they will comply with the Data Protection Act (1998).  
That is, how the project will ensure safe storage, handling and protection of data 
about, and given by, research participants. As a researcher I recognised the 
importance of compliance with the legal and regulatory framework but, as I saw it, 
this was my 'duty of care' to my study participants.   
The REC form question provoked my own reflections on the term "vulnerable".  
The assumption of 'vulnerability' made about certain groups of people in the 
context of their potential participation has, as Crabtree (2013: 366) suggests, 
"enormous ramifications attached in terms of research participation".   
In relation to individuals with dementia one consequence of the 'vulnerable' label 
is that it provides no differentiation such as who is vulnerable, in what 
circumstances, or when.  Any blanket application of a term to a group of people 
discourages approaching and thinking about each person as an individual.  This 
seems to be in contrast with the tone of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which does 
clearly emphasise that people who may fall within the provisions of the act are 
individuals who should be supported to reach their own decisions wherever this is 
possible. The juxtaposing of "vulnerability" with "consent" in the REC form 
question feels profoundly troubling - a symptom of a reductivist system that may 
(albeit unwittingly) prejudice how RECs deal with reviewing research projects 
which intend to involve participants deemed to have vulnerabilities.  Boden et al 
(2009: 742) point out that the construct of 'vulnerability' is not easily classified 
nor are there objective classification schemes that may be applied.  Being 
categorised as vulnerable can lead to being excluded from participation in 
research, thus the label of vulnerability can "be deeply silencing." (Boden et al, 
2009:742) 
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The sound-bite that sums up my experience of taking a research project through 
the NHS ethics and governance regulatory system is "resistance is futile" (The 
Borg, Star Trek), but any resistance I felt to the requirements of a system was 
tempered by the idea that there was an ultimate purpose and goal.  Being willing 
to play by the rules of the game resulted in being granted permissions to enter the 
spaces of worlds to which one would not normally be admitted, other than by 
virtue of working in that world, or being a patient or service user, or having a 
significant personal relationship to that person.  Reaching the point of being able 
to start fieldwork with participants who have been labelled 'vulnerable' means 
that all the boxes have been ticked in terms of gaining the required approvals and, 
in those terms, it is certainly no mean feat.  But reaching the start point might also 
be viewed as hugely meaningful in terms of the chances that become available to 
gain access to the narratives of people who use services.  The need for the 
narratives of service users to be heard is considered by Crabtree (2013:374): 
"Narratives that have emerged from obscurity through the struggles of 
service user movements have normally been regarded as emancipatory. 
However, within the discourses and ideology of many REC guidelines and 
procedures, similar attempts to elicit service user accounts may be deemed 
intrinsically harmful to participants." 
 
It is the messiness and untidiness of social sciences research (in particular) that is 
perhaps most problematic for regulatory systems such as those for research 
ethics and governance approvals to deal with.  Pollock (2012) and Burr and 
Reynolds (2010) raise the point that amongst qualitative research approaches the 
perceived 'messiness' of ethnography can amplify the notion in NHS RECs that it is 
riskier than other qualitative methodologies.  For social science researchers 
wishing to conduct ethnography amongst persons defined as 'vulnerable' the 
barriers may be particularly significant.   
 
Terms and methodological considerations for undertaking ethnographic 
fieldwork in statutory dementia services 
In this section the particular terms for undertaking ethnographic fieldwork in the 
two services are considered.  
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I reflect on sensitisation to underlying structural issues related to services for 
people in older age, and consider being in situ engaging with people with certain 
types of frailties associated with older age, dementia, and caregiving. 
I give thought to researcher positionality to project and to participants, and the 
methodological issues that are surfaced. I end with a consideration of ‘time’ 
introducing perspectives on time in ethnography from Dalsgaard (2013), Pink and 
Morgan (2013), Jeffrey and Troman (2004), and Wolcott (1987).  
 
Whilst young onset dementia affects a substantial number of people in the UK 
with estimates of approximately 40,000 people under the age of 65 living with 
dementia,  dementia is most prevalent amongst people aged over 65 affecting 
approximately 850,000 people. (Prince et al, 2014)  From these figures it would 
be expected that people seen by memory services or using other dementia 
services would be predominantly of older age (65 plus), and that spousal carers 
might typically occupy similar age brackets.  For undertaking research in situ 
within health and care dementia services it is necessary to become sensitised to 
particular positions on ageing and critiques of these.  Two approaches to 
theoretically framing ageing which I have found helpful are Grenier et al’s (2017) 
ideas about the marking out of boundaries of health and illness in later life 
through institutional and organisational practices, and “‘intersectionality and 
interlocking oppressions’” from Hulko (2009).  Debate and policy about later life, 
Grenier et al (2017) suggest, is framed from one of two perspectives: either 
successful  ‘active ageing’ in late life, or failed or ‘frailed’ ageing characterised by 
physical and/or cognitive frailties requiring care. (Grenier et al, 2017:318-319) 
Reflections sparked by these ideas about ageing for my own research project I 
briefly highlight here, and in my case study chapters (4 and 5) I provide further 
insights based on observations in the field. 
Thinking about Grenier et al’s (2017) framing of late life, increasing age is known 
to be the biggest risk factor for dementia. (https://www.dementiastatistics.org/) 
In terms of my fieldwork I would thus have expected to encounter people who 
developed dementia at different ages, including people who became cognitively 
frail in their 80s and 90s but up until that point had enjoyed a healthy active late 
life.  Another consideration is aspects of individual identity (both of a person with 
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dementia and a carer) such as gender and class which, Hulko (2009) posits, are 
intersectional with dementia. For my research project, although I may be unable 
to draw confident conclusions from experiences in the field regarding how these 
aspects play out during interactions between practitioners, people with dementia 
and carers, my attunement to the conceptual framework of intersectionality and 
to ideas from Grenier et al (2017) about how practice shapes and perpetuates 
particular discourses about dementia enables me to reflexively consider this in 
the field.   Through being in situ I am also able to consider how other factors  - 
accumulating alongside cognitive frailty – might create conditions of precarity for 
the person and their carer, such as fragility of care arrangements,  comorbidities, 
and behaviours that create risks. 
 
As a PhD candidate I was approaching the fieldwork settings with my own 
personal history which included already acquired knowledge and experiences 
related to people with dementia, gained from previous employment.  Regarding 
ethnography specifically, entering the field with pre-existing knowledge that is 
deemed relevant to the project sets up a particular researcher-to-project 
positionality.  Knoblauch (2005:3) uses the term “members’ knowledge” to refer 
to having considerable tacit and explicit background knowledge of a field of study. 
Prior knowledge is considered problematic in terms of the potential effects of 
what the researcher already knows: for example, how does this play out in the 
researcher’s interactions with participants; during sensemaking in the field; and 
during analysis. Whilst it may not be possible to resolve the fact of having prior 
knowledge, how it is handled and accounted for reflexively becomes an important 
consideration. 
In terms of my own positioning in relation to ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ research 
Giazitzoglu and Payne’s (2018) discussion on this topic is particularly helpful.  The 
key distinction made between outsider and insider research is that the former is 
carried out by ethnographers with limited prior knowledge of the research site 
and its members, and the latter by ethnographers who operate, to different 
degrees, within their own group, or in a group the ethnographer gains 
membership to, based on shared or closely similar social and cultural identity 
typically arising from previous experiences. (Giazitzoglu and Payne, 2018:1150)  
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For ‘outsiders’ key challenges centre around  gaining physical, not to mention 
social entry to a research site, and the sensitivity to members’ culture which may 
be lacking.  Yet, “outsiders bring anthropological distance, and may be more alert 
to taken-for-granted features of the setting.” (Giazitzoglu and Payne, 2018:1150).   
Crabtree (2013) describes the ethical approvals journeys of three doctoral 
students conducting ethnographic research projects in health-based institutional 
settings involving 'vulnerable' participants. One of the researchers had formerly 
been a nurse, and this insider-experience seemed to privilege her in terms of the 
relative ease she had in gaining access to the fieldwork site.  Another researcher 
was an academic with 'outsider' status in respect to the NHS: 
"I’ve no health care background at all so I had difficulty getting NHS ethical 
approval. My ethnography was based in a hospital study and the ethics 
committee . . . were uncomfortable with me being on the wards the whole 
time. So I could only go when I had a special interview or meeting, which I 
had prearranged."  (‘Hannah’. People with dementia, hospital setting, 
England, 2008, in Crabtree, 2013:370) 
 
During both the research ethics and governance approvals processes and when I 
sought local permissions from the organisations with jurisdiction over the 
respective fieldwork sites, the information I was required to give announced my 
association to the NHS as an employee.  To participants in the fieldwork settings I 
‘announced’ myself as a researcher, but generally only if my background came up 
in conversation did I divulge that I had prior knowledge relevant to my field of 
study.  A particular example where my prior knowledge collided with my 
fieldwork provides insights about which reflexive points can be articulated. The 
context for this example was my historical acquaintance with a man with learning 
disabilities who I subsequently encountered in one of the fieldwork settings.  I had 
prior knowledge of him as an individual, we having both sat as committee 
members with an independent advocacy organisation. I also had prior knowledge 
of the field having previously worked with people with learning disabilities as a 
non-clinical practitioner, and I was sensitised to debates about historical 
oppression of people with learning disabilities. I enlarge upon prior knowledge as 
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a reflexive point in chapter  5 towards the end of the section entitled ‘memory of 
the past and thoughts of the future’.  
A further reflection on my positioning in relation to people with dementia, staff 
and carers concerns the question of how the requirements for conducting 
research in health and care settings (i.e. ethical and governance review and the 
researcher’s subsequent compliance) shape or perhaps even ‘prescribe’ 
positionality. I have previously referred to the question of whether paradigmatic 
assumptions that permeate NHS Research Ethics Committees (RECs) are 
appropriate for reviewing non-clinical research that uses social sciences methods. 
Even just reflecting on the subtle difference in emphasis between the term 
‘participant’ –the term specified in IRAS on the REC form for describing 
involvement in a research project -  and ‘informant’ (typically used in 
ethnographic research), it becomes apparent how certain language might then 
shape subsequent aspects of being in the field.  ‘Participant consent’ seems out of 
step in an ethnographic study. If, for example, ‘informant’ was substituted for 
‘participant’ the term ‘consent’ would seemingly become strange: asking a person 
to give consent to inform lacks sense.  In terms of my position as a researcher to 
people involved, the term participant might connote otherness: my research 
project that others participate in. 
Moving these reflections into the notion of participant ‘consent’, in the terms of 
the REC form it was required that I ensured that consent was "voluntary and fully 
informed". (NHS REC Form A30-1.)  Pollock (2012) has suggested that the ethical 
and governance review framework reduces the process of gaining informed 
consent into a "'rational-technical' procedure" entailing the involvement of 
persons idealised as fully informed and autonomous, and has advocated the idea 
of cultivating "'ethical mindfulness' on the part of individual researchers". 
(Pollock, 2012:3)  
My own concerns about the participation of people with dementia centred around 
on what basis would I ‘know’ whether people gave consent that was informed and, 
if consent involved particular cognitive abilities, what was the meaning of consent 
in relation to individuals living with dementia?  I could not see how it was possible 
to be completely sure about levels of ‘informed-ness’ and, regarding the people 
with dementia I encountered,  there were significant questions about their 
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autonomy (regarding Pollock’s point).  For example, it was uncomfortable to think 
about  people with memory problems in terms of  the ‘voluntariness’ or not of 
their attendance at a memory appointment or day-care.  
Further thoughts regarding informed consent relate to getting to know 
individuals with dementia and establishing rapport within the particular settings 
of fieldwork.  At the memory service although the practitioners were a constant, 
the episodic nature of attending clinic for a memory appointment meant that I had 
only one encounter with each person with memory problems (and respective 
family member or carer). The one-off, boundaried nature of appointment-time 
becomes problematic if one is trying to establish rapport with a person attending 
their appointment.  It is also true that aspects of how appointments are structured 
– in terms of purpose and the interventions for unpacking the memory problem -  
provide no real ‘space’ or permissions for the researcher to develop rapport with 
appointment attendees.  At the day-care and respite service setting practitioners, 
similarly, were a constant. Patterns of day-care attendance by individuals varied: 
some people attended day-care only during a stay in respite care; some people 
attended day-care because they happened to be staying in the respite service 
during assessment; some people attended day-care on regular ‘set’ days; and 
others were attending in order to try it out and find out whether it would be a 
satisfactory arrangement for themselves and their carers. Being ill, holidaying, or 
entering permanent care were reasons for non-attendance. Overall it was 
impossible to predict who would  be there on days when I was there. Nonetheless, 
there were some people who did seem to mostly attend on their scheduled day(s) 
and this allowed me to spend time, engage in activities with, and talk with about 
ten people – with whom rapport was established.  A further comment is that I 
became aware of potential limitations concerning rapport that were connected 
with a characteristic of dementia – that of ‘forgetting’.  The basis for, or content of, 
rapport established between a researcher and a person with dementia at one 
point in time may be forgotten by the person with dementia, and the threads of 
this may need to be re-established at each separate time of engagement between 
the researcher and the person.  In both memory service and care settings 
establishing rapport may also be the basis for practitioners to carry out health or 
care interventions where the trust and confidence of the person with dementia 
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needs to be gained.  Getting to ‘know’ an individual is likely to be a more realistic 
intent in a care setting (where there are possibilities for time spent together) than 
in the space of a memory appointment, where time duration tends to be relatively 
short and task or intervention focused. 
 
In terms of protecting the identities of participants, I stated how I would address 
this issue on the participant information and consent sheets.  I provided 
assurances of anonymisation of field-notes through removal of personal 
information such as the person’s name, service name and location, and similarly 
anonymising quotations from participants used in the thesis.  Regarding 
anonymisation of names, I opted not to use an individual letter followed by a 
blank (e.g. Mrs. H_____________) but instead to use pseudonyms.  I felt that using a 
blank name would have stripped out identity, whereas a pseudonym maintained a 
sense of persona.  Selecting pseudonyms for participants was informed by norms 
in practice at the two service settings.  In the memory service people with 
memory problems and carers were addressed by practitioners formally using Ms, 
Mrs or Mr.  I emulated this by replacing real surnames with pseudonym surnames, 
except for daughters, sons or partners of the person with dementia where I 
replaced first names with pseudonyms. Since practitioners in the memory service 
mostly introduced themselves to people attending appointments using their first 
names I mirrored this by using first name pseudonyms, except for the consultant 
psychiatrist where I used ‘Dr’ followed by a family name pseudonym.  In the social 
care setting individuals with dementia were addressed by practitioners using 
their first name (or less commonly their title followed by their family name), and 
people with dementia and carers used practitioners’ first names. I adopted the 
same approach and used pseudonym first names, except in the case of a mother 
and father carer who I referred to as Mr and Mrs (and a pseudonym).  
Absolute protection of identities of participants cannot be guaranteed or claimed 
in a research project such as this one which depends on narrative description and 
the possibility that in describing particular aspects of an individual the person 
might become recognisable to someone reading the thesis.  I was very conscious 
of how language biases may creep into descriptions of situations and people and 
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was very careful during making field-notes to avoid representing something 
observed or heard with either a negative or a positive ‘slant’.      
 
I now turn to the matter of ‘time’ in a methodological sense in relation to my 
research project. I draw on perspectives from scholars concerning “time modes” 
(Jeffrey and Troman, 2004) in ethnography, and consider these in relation to my 
own project where I did not have one single long, uninterrupted period of time in 
fieldwork. 
Wolcott’s chapter ‘On Ethnographic Intent’ (1987) sets out one position on what 
ethnography is not. Wolcott offers a set of key statements, with corresponding 
caveats. His essential point is that the presence of individual ingredients of 
ethnography do not in-and-of-themselves make an ethnography or assure that the 
final creation will be ethnographic. The individual ingredients Wolcott refers to 
are ‘field technique’, ‘good description’,  ‘gaining and maintaining rapport with 
subjects’, and ‘length of time in the field’.  Wolcott (1987:37) considers time in 
fieldwork as one of a number of  ‘necessary but not sufficient’ ingredients of 
ethnography.  He suggests that factors such as the individual researcher’s skill, 
sensitivity, problem, and setting - as well as circumstances for pursuing fieldwork 
– are contingencies that inform optimum periods of fieldwork. Addressing this to 
my own fieldwork, on one hand the question was – what constituted sufficient 
time for achieving immersion and what duration of time would mean I could claim 
my work as ethnography? On the other hand the question was – if my work 
revealed deficiencies in duration of time what other modes of time might be 
helpful for re-framing the terms for my ethnographic fieldwork? 
Knoblauch (2005) notes that the image of ethnography has been shaped by the 
actualities of long-term field studies common to anthropology, but that this image 
of ethnography is, in contemporary times, being reconsidered. One form that has 
emerged is “focused ethnography” - ethnographic work which focuses on small 
elements of one’s own society and restricts itself to certain aspects of fields. It is 
characterised by relatively short-term field visits, with shorter time in data-
collection substituted for by intensity of data-collection.  (Knoblauch, 2005:1-8)    
Examples of eight ethnographic research projects in healthcare which have 
described themselves in the terms of focused ethnography are given in 
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Higginbottom et al (2013). Details of projects’ time duration in the field are not 
provided, but data collection and analysis descriptions indicate the scope of each 
project inferring the duration of time in the field.  For example, a study by 
Smallwood (2009) is described.  Smallwood set out to explore, describe and 
interpret the roles of nurses in the culture of a cardiac assessment team, and this 
involved 7 semi-structured interviews, 5 participant observation sessions, and 
reflective field journals. 
Pink and Morgan’s (2013) exploration of short-term theoretically informed 
ethnography highlights a number of points about time. Research context and 
specific discipline, it is argued, are involved in characterising and shaping a 
particular ethnographic project. In healthcare contexts ethnography may involve 
intensive and short excursions into people’s lives during which the researcher 
delves into questions that seek to “reveal what matters to those people in the 
context of what the researcher is seeking to find out”.  (Pink and Morgan, 
2013:352)  Theoretical engagement through a very focused dialog between 
research and theory is a particular feature of this mode (Pink and Morgan, 
2013:352-3), and the authors suggest that this mode of short-term ethnography is 
very suited to interests in the nonrepresentational:  
“the unspoken, unsaid, not seen, but sensory, tacit and known elements of 
everyday life”. 
Given that there is no actual ‘standard’ for duration of time in the field an ideal 
length of time in the field, Jeffrey and Troman (2004:536) suggest, is difficult to 
establish.  Furthermore, Walker’s (1986) thoughts (cited by Jeffrey and Troman, 
2004: 538) – “ethnographic projects are never finished, only left, with their 
accounts considered provisional and tentative” – provide a different framing of 
the question of time: more as a question of how far has one got with one’s own 
research question given one’s own duration in the field.  Jeffrey and Troman 
(2004:538-546) offer the concept of “ethnographic time modes” which they 
specify as ‘compressed’ (a short period of intense ethnographic research where 
the field site is inhabited by the researcher almost permanently for anything from 
a few days to a month); ‘recurrent’ (temporal phases such as the inspection of a 
statutory body, or regular points in chronological time, are sampled with a focus 
on ascertaining similarities and differences over time); and  ‘selective 
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intermittent’ (specific rich contexts are selected and the frequency of time spent 
in the field is flexible and intermittent yet occurs over a sustained period of time).  
For my research project perhaps the most helpfully illuminating perspective on 
time in relation to ethnographic fieldwork is from Dalsgaard (2013). Dalsgaard 
highlights that ‘the field’ has typically been demarked in terms of spatial 
properties and defined by geographical distance.  However, opening up to 
temporal-oriented thinking about the field generates other ideas about how the 
field is constituted: 
“Defining a ‘site’ simply as a set of social relationships makes it as much 
temporal as spatial (see Okely 2007:360), and indeed, when replacing the 
longitudinal holistic study with question-based and time-limited projects, 
there seems to be an emergence of more and more ‘sites’, where it is 
primarily their temporality that is the defining characteristic that separates 
the selected site from that which it is not.” (Dalsgaard, 2013:214) 
 
Thinking about my own project where fieldwork was not a long, single, unbroken 
duration of time, Dalsgaard’s thoughts open up possibilities for differently 
emphasising time. Rather than thinking about my ‘fieldwork’ in terms of the 
timespan of my presence (Dalsgaard, 2013:217) and/or absence in which 
‘duration’ is emphasised, I start to think about my fieldwork in terms of 
Dalsgaard’s idea of “multi-temporality” of the field.  This involves framing 
fieldwork as multi-temporal practice, “stretched between perspectives of time as 
duration (the experience of how the field is emerging) and time as dimension (the 
chronology of cumulative events that comprise it)”. (Dalsgaard, 2013:222)   
How might such a framing of ‘sites’ as both multi-temporal and spatially-defined 
affect or inform a researcher’s ethnographic practice?  This brings to the fore the 
matters of engaging with the field conceptualised as spatial, and engaging with the 
field conceptualised as multi-temporal: the interplay between, on the one hand 
physically being there in the settings of fieldwork and, on the other, engaging with 
multi-temporality (e.g. temporalities of individuals and practice).   
Thinking again of the ethnographic time modes set out by Jeffrey and Troman 
(2004), these become helpful for describing the temporal framing or temporal 
‘terms’ for a specific research project.  In terms of duration in the field, the time 
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mode that I would say characterised my fieldwork is ‘selective intermittent’ 
(Jeffrey and Troman, 2004:538-546).  Undertaking ethnographic fieldwork within 
these terms does provoke the important question of what would be considered 
‘sufficient’ time in the field to conduct ethnography and establish rapport with 
participants.  For my research project, a long unbroken time duration in fieldwork 
would not necessarily have resolved the particular issue of rapport as there were 
other factors involved which were particular to the settings.  The frequency of 
individuals’ appointments with the memory service and the differing reasons and 
circumstances surrounding whether particular individuals attended day-care 
determined who I came into contact with and how frequently. These were factors 
that fundamentally shaped the options available to me for spending time with 
individuals and developing rapport.   
 
Reflections on undertaking research in the settings and approaching the 
writing of the thesis 
I provide some brief reflexive comments here about undertaking research in a 
memory service and a day-care and respite service, reflecting specifically on 
blending in or standing out. 
Initially, being at the CSD Centre – the building where the memory service team 
was based - felt uncomfortable. I hung around in the team office, probably 
appearing to others as though I was doing very little in terms of research related 
activity. I felt oddly positioned in relation to the activities around me: 
practitioners on the phone to patients or other health and social care colleagues, 
recording information on the computer system, discussing a patient with another 
team member or arriving or leaving from or to a patient visit. My state of just 
‘being’ –while noticing events in the office and entering into conversations with 
people - felt conspicuous in the context of the active ‘doing’ which was occurring 
around me.  I felt less awkward in the care setting (Oak Hall), maybe because early 
on I began interacting with individuals with dementia which positioned me 
similarly to any other visitor to that setting.  In the memory service once I began 
observational work in appointments and during home visits I felt that I was 
viewed by practitioners, clients and carers as a ‘student’ who happened to be 
doing a PhD. The wife of a man with dementia being seen in clinic asked me about 
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my PhD – where I was studying and how was I getting on, but this was the only 
occasion where attention was given to my PhD specifically.  At Oak Hall, even 
though features of the setting made it easy for me to fade into its day-to-day 
normality, certain aspects would quite suddenly identify my role and position as 
different to that of others in the setting.  For example, I was asked on a few 
occasions by individuals with dementia - who assumed I was a member of staff - if 
I would assist them to the toilet. Even though I always announced myself as a PhD 
researcher by wearing an ID badge, and I did not wear a uniform as direct care 
staff did, I sometimes needed to provide further explanation. Not having a swipe 
card meant I had no independent access into or out of locked areas of the Oak Hall 
building. This drew attention to a difference between staff and me, but also gave 
the ‘appearance’ of me sharing with people with dementia a lack of access. In fact, 
all I had to do was ask to be let through the locked door. I understood the 
rationale for locked doors but felt uncomfortable about the power imbalances 
surfaced in this – essentially that autonomy and agency was situated with staff, 
myself, other visitors: anyone who was not a person with dementia.  
 
Making a difference is probably an overly optimistic hope for what a PhD might 
achieve, but more within reach in my particular case is, perhaps, to produce what 
Stoller (2007) calls "memorable ethnography". "Memorable ethnography" is 
memorable because it conveys to its readers a grappling by ethnographers and 
their characters - 
"with the things most fundamentally human - love and loss, fear and courage, 
fate and compassion - deep issues that connect readers to the people they 
encounter in ethnographic texts." (Stoller, 2007:180-181) 
 
The idea of an ethnography as an assembling together which, through skilful 
presenting of the juxtapositions of the items assembled, has an effect on readers is 
picked up by Willis and Trondman (2000). They describe the production of "'Ah 
ha'" effects "where evocative expression through data hits the experience, body 
and emotions of the reader".  'Ah ha' effects extend beyond any initial responses 
made by a reader, outwards, so that they "fuse old experiences with new ones, 
thus opening up readers' minds towards new horizons".  (Willis and Trondman, 
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2000:12).  Ethnographic texts, essentially, must "convince" (Golden-Biddle and 
Locke, 1993:595; 598-612), a process which concerns the persuasiveness of the 
narrative in terms of "authenticity" (the idea that the researcher 'was there' and 
conveys genuineness to the experience); "plausibility" (the ethnographic text 
rings true for the reader in terms of familiarity and relevance but is at the same 
time distinctive and innovative); and "criticality" (that the text disrupts and 
reframes the taken for granted, or the assumptive notions that the reader holds).  
Significant too are writing practices themselves in terms of the presenting of the 
narrative and the readability of the text to the reader.  Ethnographic and narrative 
work that had struck a chord with me was mostly work that linked in some way to 
my own background and experiences.  One cannot disentangle oneself from past 
experiences and knowledge, and this is self-evident. Golden-Biddle and Locke 
(199: 596) suggest that readers are "steeped in their own personal and 
intellectual contexts [and] engage and interpret the text by relating their reading 
to these contexts".  
 
In preparing for and doing ethnography, and then writing it, 'time' took on a huge 
significance. Just the aspect of the judging of 'timing' for entering the field can be a 
critical factor (as I was to find out when one of my research settings was 
threatened with closure soon after entering the field), but also the beat of time 
which seems to quicken in the last stretch of the seven years allotted for 
undertaking a PhD part-time, concertinaing time. For engaging with temporality 
during doing and writing ethnography Dawson (2014:131) proposes a three-
strand framework: 
"Temporal awareness, that refers to a broadening of our understanding and 
sensitivity to time issues, for example, in recognizing that competing 
conceptions of time can co-exist; temporal practices, that relate to the 
research skills (practices) developed in doing the research, for example, in 
holding on to contradictory conceptions of time in the pragmatics of 
conducting fieldwork and in the analysis of competing data; and temporal 
merging, a concept used to capture the interweaving of time conceptions as 
well as the way temporality can be accommodated in the write-up of 
research material." 
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Furthermore, the polyphony of stories (about which one is constructing a 
sensemaking narrative) are themselves all engaged with time, from the 
participants' stories to the researcher's story.  From my perspective writing 
ethnography involved holding different storylines and recognising the interweave 
with time: stories represent accumulations of human experience over time 
(looking backwards) and stories extend out into an future which is as yet 
unknown.  In my writing I did not try to represent one definitive story, but I 
attempted instead to express my understanding about a unifying assemblage that 
provided linkages between the stories. 
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Chapter 4: case study of an NHS site  
Preamble: scope of fieldwork 
The Older Persons' Community Mental Health Team (OPCMHT) is a multi-
disciplinary team based in the CSD Centre in the town of Northweston. The 
function of the team is to provide mental health care to older people experiencing 
mental health issues, including people with dementia.  A specialist memory 
service is provided by the team offering assessment of memory, diagnosis, 
treatment and, if required, referral or signposting onto other services. The 
OPCMHT works under the auspices of the Two Shires NHS Foundation Trust. The 
trust provides inpatient and community mental health services for adults and 
children, Learning Disability and Drug and Alcohol services across 95 sites within 
two counties, and neighbouring areas. It also provides community based physical 
health care services in its west area, and a range of specialist services within a 
neighbouring city and four large towns.  
Research fieldwork was conducted in the OPCMHT over a thirteen month period 
commencing in May 2014.  During the course of fieldwork three staff members 
left the team, but at the point of entry into the fieldwork setting the team 
comprised a team leader; four members of medical staff; four administrative staff 
members; three specialist roles consisting of an Advanced Practitioner in 
Dementia, a Nursing Home Liaison Nurse, and two Memory Review Nurse 
Practitioners; four community mental health nurses; one assistant practitioner; 
one clinical support worker; two social workers, and two occupational therapists. 
The fieldwork involved observing patient/practitioner appointments in clinic, 
usually with a carer or family member present; home visits (approved via 
submission of a substantial amendment for this aspect of fieldwork by the REC on 1 
July 2014: Ref. 14/NW/0090); a course session of the Wellbeing College where I 
observed carers; and observations at one team allocation meeting. In addition I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with two of the clinicians whose clinics or 
home visits I had previously observed.   
 
Detailed summary of fieldwork 
The fieldwork involved in situ observations of a total of 54 individuals, of whom 
16 were people with memory problems, 15 were practitioners from the OPCMHT, 
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and 23 were carers or family members.  The settings for observations were the 
CSD Centre (i.e. clinic rooms, the team meeting room, the team office, and a 
seminar room) and the homes of individuals referred to the memory service.  
Observations during prescheduled clinic appointments with a practitioner at the 
CSD Centre were attended by the person with memory problems and, in most 
cases, a spouse/partner or other family member.  Between May and December 
2014 thirteen such clinic appointments were observed, where the individual was 
being seen by either Laura Newton (Advanced Practitioner in Dementia) or Dr 
Ozha (Consultant Psychiatrist). For two of the appointments observed the 
individual with memory problems attended alone. In November 2014 fieldwork 
was extended to include observations during home visits.  This required 
submitting a substantial amendment to the REC (approved on 1 July 2014: Ref. 
14/NW/0090).  Other observational work consisted of a team allocation meeting 
(September 2014) and a Wellbeing College seminar for carers (March 2015).  
About 15 hours were spent in informal activity including sitting in the team office; 
conversations with team members; liaison with the secretaries about clinic 
appointments that I could potentially observe; conversations with the 
administrators for the Wellbeing College; attendance at a Two Shires NHS 
Foundation Trust best practice event at which members of the team had a display 
stall about the service; and attendance at a meeting of the local Clinical 
Commissioning Group. 
I interviewed two of the clinicians whose appointments with individuals with 
dementia I had already observed (Advanced Practitioner in Dementia and 
Community Psychiatric Nurse). I was unable to secure an interview with the 
Consultant Psychiatrist whose clinics I had observed, despite attempts made to do 
so.     
Alongside fieldwork in the NHS setting I was required to provide regular updates 
by email to the Two Shires NHS Foundation Trust R&D department on 
recruitment, and to complete a yearly audit. I was also required to demonstrate 
that my project met formal research and information governance requirements 
(i.e. participant consent, recruitment, and maintaining a site folder). Compliance 
was monitored through a formal site monitoring visit from the R&D department’s 
site monitor.   
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In total about 45 hours was spent doing observations, interviews, and attending 
meetings. This did not include either travel time to the sites of fieldwork or 
administrative aspects of fieldwork. 
The observational work is presented in chronological order, and data from the 
two interviews with practitioners is pulled into the narrative and is used for 
elaborating on and explaining certain aspects of practice. 
 
Setting the scene 
It is common for the first face-to-face meeting between the individual with 
suspected memory problems and one of the team's registered practitioners to 
take place in a clinic setting.  For the person, and often their carer too, this is a 
significant moment during which assessments of cognitive functioning are 
completed, from which indications and evidence of the presence of memory 
problems are relayed to and discussed with the person.  Further tests may be 
requested, such as brain or MRI scans, but already there is a strong sense that the 
stage is set for a diagnosis of memory problems of some sort.  A diagnosis of 
dementia may not be life threatening but it is almost certainly life-changing for the 
individual concerned.  
 
The doing and the knowing: the work of the Advanced Practitioner in 
Dementia 
I start by providing an account of the scope of the work of Laura Newton - the only 
Advanced Practitioner in Dementia in the team and a qualified RMN (Registered 
Mental Nurse) by background.  This first section is primarily developed from 
interview data, supplemented by notes from observations, and from notes I made 
after conversations with Laura. My conversations with Laura were brief and 
occasional, only occurring when Laura had time to talk between her 
appointments, and consequently I have few notes from conversations.  My 
decision to present some of the interview data at this early stage was made on the 
basis that the comprehensive account Laura gave during interview detailed 
aspects of Laura's professional background, her role, and the team context - which 
was information that might only be inferred during an observation of an 
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appointment.  For example, observations of appointments on their own were not 
sufficient to enable me to comprehend the team's process of referral.   
 
Laura runs a clinic in which she sees up to eleven patients per week.  Patients are 
often accompanied by a family member, commonly their spouse or partner, or 
daughter or son.   In the context of the appointment setting there is much 
happening in the interactions between the people involved: subtleties of 
communication such as a hesitation, emotional timbre, eye contact, facial 
expressions, and laughter.  
Laura described specifics of her role in terms of referrals coming into the team: 
"It’s my role to do the bulk of new memory referrals so primarily from GP 
practices, practically all of the referrals are from GPs, sometimes from liaison 
psychiatry and occasionally from social services, but the bulk are from GPs.  
And what we do is we triage the memory referrals and if they seem to be 
reasonably straightforward, not too complex, then I will tend to do them. If, 
for example, they are younger people with memory problems, people with 
co-existing mental health problems, so a history of schizophrenia, that kind 
of thing, or where one of their main problems seems to be perhaps that the 
patient’s depressed and has memory problems, then they will tend to go to a 
consultant, but other than that I will do the bulk of the memory referrals."  
(Laura, interview) 
 
Laura gave a start-to-finish summary of her role with patients - the process that 
applied to the majority of the patients she saw: 
"So I will assess the patient either in their home or in memory clinic, usually 
send them off for more tests if I think there is a likelihood of dementia and 
then I’ll see the patient again with the results of those tests and deliver a 
diagnosis. And then initiate medication - if that’s indicated for the patient - 
and then I will see them usually after about three months to follow up, to 
make sure they’re OK on their medication, reasonably stable, no side effects, 
and just check they’ve got all the services they need in place and then I’ll pass 
them over to the memory nurse reviewers." (Laura, interview) 
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The vast majority of patients seen by Laura were referred from a General 
Practitioner (GP) with concerns that an individual had dementia-type memory 
problems. In most cases it was confirmed in the memory service that the 
individual had either dementia or mild cognitive impairment (MCI).  The 
relatively uncommon instances of  inappropriate referral included women 
experiencing memory problems associated with menopause, people with acquired 
brain injury, or memory problems that were associated with heavy drinking - 
these referrals often being of younger people, sometimes as young as twenties or 
thirties. The prevalence of young onset dementia (under the age of 65) albeit 
relatively rare is also difficult to spot, and thus any referral - regardless of age - 
needed to be investigated.  As Laura explained, with these referrals the team 
preferred those people to go to Neurology first for in-depth screening and scans 
but: "we will see people with memory problems for whatever reason."   The 
misconstruing of the nature of the service was considered one possible reason for 
the sometimes inappropriate referrals:  
"I think that’s because we call it a memory service as opposed to a dementia 
service." (Laura, interview) 
Nonetheless, in a small minority of cases - Laura estimated two or three people in 
a year - it became apparent that these individuals who had been referred into the 
team did have early onset dementia.  
Some referrals that Laura picked up were of people with memory problems that 
were unspecifiable. The term 'watchful waiting' is commonly used in healthcare to 
refer to the process of keeping an eye on a potentially emergent health problem 
whilst not actively intervening with any treatment. Those people for whom it was 
not possible to make a diagnosis of dementia Laura kept on her caseload so that 
she could monitor them: 
"I suppose where it gets a little more complicated is some people when you 
see them have what’s called a mild cognitive impairment, so you’ll think it’s 
more than just an age-related memory problem but you wouldn’t feel 
confident to diagnose dementia. So then I will tend to see those patients 
again after six months and just keep an eye on what their memory’s doing." 
(Laura, interview) 
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There were some people Laura saw with whom her role needed to stretch out to 
address not only their memory problems but also other dimensions of life where 
risks and complexities would pop up: 
"And the other thing that can be more complicated is if somebody comes and 
actually they’re not all that straightforward, when you get them in clinic they 
are, perhaps, depressed or they have other risk factors or there are 
safeguarding issues, that kind of thing. So quite often even though they look 
on paper as though they’re reasonably stable and just need memory 
assessment, sometimes when they come to clinic we do actually have to get 
lots of other services involved with them and then I’ll tend to keep those 
patients on for longer." (Laura, interview) 
 
Not everyone referred into the memory service was always amenable to support. 
Laura described how she sometimes needed to negotiate with individuals in 
relation to additional support, utilising the rapport she had established with a 
person as the basis for then acting as a sort of support 'broker' between the 
individual and other members of the team. She gave one example of this: 
"The other thing that I’m thinking about doing a little more often is working 
more closely with the Occupational Therapists and the reason for that is that 
quite often the patients who are most in need of some help and input at 
home - and I’m particularly thinking of a couple of patients that I have that 
are living in quite distressing conditions - let’s say, their houses are in quite a 
neglected state and they’re in quite a neglected state and they are absolutely 
adamant that they don’t want services in. And I have to try and respect that 
but at the same time I’m wondering, because they’ve let me in quite happily, 
if I was doing joint visits with Occupational Therapists, maybe some of those 
patients would agree to see somebody that is actually already there and have 
some input from them. So I genuinely want to help these couple of patients 
that I’m thinking about but I have to be mindful and respectful of the fact 
that at the moment they’re saying they don’t want social services’ input or 
don’t want any more referrals." (Laura, interview) 
Laura was undoubtedly a clinician of considerable experience and standing within 
the team, with her level of expertise reflected in the scope and responsibility that 
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her role carried.  The acquisition of knowledge and skill for nursing practice that 
Benner (1982) describes is one way of comprehending the progression from 
novice to expert. Laura eloquently described becoming an Advanced Practitioner: 
"I suppose many years ago when I was first training as an Advanced 
Practitioner and spent time with Consultants looking at how they assessed 
patients with dementia, what I was, I suppose, trying to do is build my own 
way of how I was going to adequately assess somebody so that at the end of 
an hour’s assessment I could come up with some kind of impression and 
know whether I was going to refer for tests or a review or discharge or 
whatever. And I started looking at how I could write down what they were 
saying, how I could capture what the essence of what all these different 
consultants were doing and what was important. And I suppose from that - 
although I don’t have anything written down - I have a very routine, set way 
of working when I’m assessing patients so I will kind of follow a medical 
model in terms of looking at presenting complaint, physical health issues, 
past medical history, physical health check, looking at current medication, 
doing that in a very routine way, but also in asking the same sort of 
questions in a fairly routine way."(Laura, interview) 
 
Laura had a defined role within the team as advanced practitioner in dementia, 
but working to that role was not the whole story. Rather, the role was hewn and 
fashioned by Laura, given a characterisation by her based on her own experiences, 
acquired knowledge, and particular interests. 
 
Appointment structure 
In this section I describe from my observations of Laura's appointments their 
structure and format.  
On the ground floor of the CSD Centre there were a number of clinicians' offices, 
which often doubled up as clinic rooms, and it was in one of these rooms that I sat 
in on Laura Newton's appointments.  Appointments were not 'formulaic', but I 
observed a loose structure in terms of content and process, described by Laura in 
interview as "a routine, a set way of working".  From Laura's perspective the focus 
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was the assessment of memory, but there was a prelude, a leading into this, a 
necessary setting of the scene before the topic of memory was broached.  
All appointments began informally, with introductions and maybe a brief 
exchange on something topical such as the weather.  The formal part of 
proceedings usually opened with Laura outlining the reasons for the appointment. 
If this was the first time the person was being seen, the contents of the referral 
letter (usually this came from the individual's GP) would be summarised. The next 
part - in some senses the most delicate - was where memory was asked about 
explicitly.  At this juncture a partner, family member or carer was often also asked 
for her/his perspective about the individual's memory.  Laura's questions were 
usually couched in terms of any noticeable changes to the person's health and 
memory. A gathering-of-information section followed, which included questions 
about recent or historical physical and mental health, and current medication. 
There was also a brief physical examination, most often consisting of taking blood 
pressure, pulse, and sometimes requesting that the person demonstrate their 
mobility and agility by performing a movement such as raising an arm or leg.  
Laura's questions, along with the physical examination, were the means for 
probing for signs that may indicate the person had some form of memory 
problem. What generally followed was a formal assessment of memory. For 
people being seen by Laura for the first time the full Mini-Mental State 
Examination (MMSE) was used, whereas for a review appointment Laura might 
use the short form of the MMSE.  After the test Laura relayed her conclusions back 
to the individual and outlined further actions, which might include asking whether 
the person would be willing to have an EEG or a scan.  The person and their 
accompanier were given an opportunity to ask questions at this point. 
The final part of the appointment was concerned with the social context for the 
assessment of memory.  This involved Laura seeking clarification from the person 
and their accompanier about any support they were receiving, and the offering of 
relevant information such as how memory was affected by the specific type of 
dementia, potential side effects of medication, practical information (e.g. how 
prescription ordering works; what a scan would involve should the person be 
referred for one), and in some cases signposting the person to relevant sources of 
support.  Addressing the social context of being assessed for and diagnosed with 
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dementia is considered a critical part of the assessment process, without which 
the testing of memory can be experienced as threatening and anxiety provoking to 
individuals with memory problems (Cheston and Bender, 1999).  
 
Having set the scene for this chapter by introducing the team, the fieldwork 
setting, Laura herself (advanced practitioner in dementia) whose appointments 
form a large part of the practice I observed,  and the appointment structure I now 
commence with my account of observations of appointments beginning with three 
clusters of appointments between Laura and people with memory problems.  
Then, two of Dr Ozha's appointments; a Wellbeing College seminar for carers; and 
lastly two home visits with a community psychiatric nurse. This chapter concludes 
with a gathering of insights that have accumulated and how these define or shape 
the fitting together of the three concepts of tacit knowledge, practice and time. 
  
Observations of Laura's appointments: the first clusters   
My first observations were of four appointments over the space of a morning, the 
first being with a Mrs Maddox who was accompanied by her husband. This lady 
was newly referred by the GP who had concerns about Mrs Maddox' short-term 
memory.  Laura used the letter from the GP as the basis for opening up a 
conversation about memory: what had Mrs Maddox noticed about her memory?  A 
story emerged of Mrs Maddox noticing problems with her memory over the past 
year and, when Laura continued to gently probe into how this affected her 
everyday life, it seemed that this line of questioning provoked anxiety: 
Mrs Maddox speaking: "I've seen people a lot worse. I never want to go like 
that." [...] "I just wanted to be normal. Are there a lot of people who go like 
this?" (Fieldnote 24/6/14) 
 
Mr Maddox rallied to his wife's aid, seemingly attempting to soften the magnitude 
of the topic of the conversation by his suggestion that problems with her memory 
were intermittent rather than constant: 
"It's been going on, little things, for a number of years. I think it's gone a little 
bit worse, but sometimes it just seems normal" (Fieldnote 24/6/14) 
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The word "normal" as used by both Mrs and Mr Maddox seemed to situate 
dementia as not normal, or as representing a moving away from normal.  From Mr 
Maddox' perspective his wife's memory seemed normal sometimes, as though the 
problem of dementia was intermittent.  
This exchange between the Maddox' and Laura surfaces the idea that an 
individual's memory problems may initially appear as occasional forgetfulness 
that fades in and out of prominence, seemingly nothing to be concerned about.  
However, this sense changes when the individual is first exposed to external 
scrutiny: perhaps it is during a routine check-up with the GP that memory 
problems become apparent.  
Mr Maddox expressed that he was intervening with greater frequency to assist his 
wife in everyday activities of living.  He seemed to normalise this assistance, 
referring to the sharing of activities and jobs around the home. Yet, he had also 
taken practical measures suggestive of someone preparing for a future problem of 
unknown proportions. He had made sure their Will was up-to-date and had put in 
place measures to try to maintain a safe home: 
"We've tried to cover everything. We have the alarm system. We have a 
meter for any gas leaks". (Fieldnote 24/06/14) 
 
In the appointment Mrs Maddox was encouraged to focus on her memory through 
Laura's request that she give attention to how her memory had been recently. 
This temporal framing of memory which was inherent in Laura's questions is 
interesting in terms of how this was responded to by Mrs and Mr Maddox. In her 
response to Laura Mrs Maddox placed her memory problem as emerging over the 
past year, whilst her husband said that "little things" had been occurring over a 
number of years.  In Mrs Maddox' words there is also a juxtaposition between the 
other people she has previously seen with deteriorating memory and her own 
lived experience of memory problems now. Her words expressed a sense of 
apprehension about the possibility that her memory would deteriorate, already 
having seen the evidence from other people that memory problems usually get 
worse rather than better over time.  
When I met Mrs Maddox it was at a point when she was continuing to engage in 
the activities she had been involved in, probably all her adult life. What was 
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changing now was that her husband was assisting her and even taking over some 
of these tasks: 
Mr Maddox: "I blame myself really. I think I do a little bit too much for her. At 
times she feels normal. In the house we share duties, make it a joint event". 
(Fieldnote: 24/06/14)  
 
The situation of Mrs and Mr Maddox appeared to be characterised by change: as 
Mrs Maddox' memory worsened and affected her everyday life Mr Maddox 
adjusted to this by stepping in and filling in the gaps in tasks and routines that Mrs 
Maddox could no longer manage herself.  
Laura carefully broached her view about the nature of the problems Mrs Maddox 
was experiencing - not using the word dementia but phrasing the problem as: "I 
do think that your short-term memory isn't so good".  She then followed this with 
assurances that there would be further tests done, which seemed to provide some 
feeling of relief to Mr Maddox who commented that now "at least" they were in 
the system. The normality of life that the Mr and Mrs Maddox used to enjoy 
seemed to be retreating characterised by Mr Maddox moving into a carer role, and 
both looking at a future coping with the effects of dementia.  
 
After the appointment with Mrs Maddox a lady called Mrs Bourne (accompanied 
by her husband) arrived.  She was here to see Laura for a follow up review from a 
previous appointment. Since her last appointment she had attended the hospital 
for a CAT scan (computerised axial tomography) and an ECG (Electrocardiogram). 
Laura read through the CAT scan results and then interpreted, drawing attention 
to it being "quite good news", "a good scan" because there was whole brain 
shrinkage rather than selective, and there was no cerebral infarction which would 
have been indicative of a stroke or mini stroke. Nor was there evidence of any 
ischemic changes to the brain detected on the scan which Laura described as 
unusual, but also good.  The scan did not provide sufficient grounds for a 
diagnosis of dementia, though Alzheimer's disease could not be ruled out entirely. 
Laura's appointment routine, her set way of doing things, did not in practice ever 
seem to translate into a prescribed or scripted approach in her questions to 
people with dementia and their family members and carers.  During this 
89 
 
appointment she asked Mrs Bourne and her husband a question that initially 
appeared to me to be un-crafted and simplistic: "What is really troublesome?"   
Speculating further about this question and thinking about it in the context of 
other appointments subsequently observed in the course of fieldwork I concluded 
that there was a family of questions like this, all open ended and, I guessed, 
archetypal in the sense of having a concentrated purpose of trying to get to the 
nub of how a person is being affected by their memory problems.  I imagined also 
that the use of questions like the one asked emerged from years of practicing in 
the field and being exposed to many different situations involving individuals with 
dementia. This accumulation of practice, I imagined, ultimately led to a knowing of 
what one was seeing (diagnosing) but also, alongside, a knowing how to ask the 
right questions of individuals and carers, to tap into their resources of experiential 
knowing.   
Thinking along the lines of accumulated practice, from sitting in during Laura's 
appointments I gained an impression of practice being multi-faceted. Alongside 
certain observable expressions and performances of clinical knowledge (e.g. 
clinical procedures and explanations of medication) there were also the unseen 
processes of thought and making judgements about the individual's memory 
difficulties.  Laura's conclusions were subsequently verbally articulated to the 
person in the clinic room. Even the manner in which conclusions and information 
were conveyed to the individual might be considered a facet of practice. 
Mrs Bourne, Laura concluded, probably had MCI and the approach would be to 
watch and wait. The reality of this for Mrs Bourne was that she would be invited 
back for a review by Laura in six months' time and any problems that arose in the 
meantime should be directed to the GP. The care pathway for people seen by 
memory services in Northweston and its surrounds could be described as being 
designed around dementia exclusively in that - aside from assessment - the 
pathway was not geared for people with MCI. Given that there is credible evidence 
that suggests that MCI is a risk factor for developing dementia this waiting 
without intervention approach provided to people with early signs of memory 
problems but no formal diagnosis of dementia, seemed rather bleak.  
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The third person to arrive for an appointment was Mr Burton who attended 
unaccompanied.  My immediate impression was of an independent and 
unimpaired man, although this was not his first appointment with Laura 
indicating that memory problems had already been identified. The conversation 
began with discussing medication. Mr Burton described how he was having dizzy 
spells, nausea, and was feeling light headed.  Laura checked his blood pressure 
and pulse, relaying to him that his pulse had slowed a little, but that this can be an 
effect of particular medications.  Mr Burton described his memory problems in 
terms of not remembering, and forgetting: 
"I'm fine....it's just the memory, you know. It doesn't seem to be any worse, 
but it hasn't got any better." (Fieldnote 24/06/14) 
And later on in the appointment: 
"An example of my memory... I looked at the letter before coming in, and I 
couldn't remember your name."  (Fieldnote 24/06/14) 
 
Laura expressed concern about risks in everyday life, and asked Mr Burton about 
how he was managing with things such as remembering to lock the door at night 
or when the house was unoccupied. Mr Burton was forgetting to lock doors. But, 
in spite of a degree of impairment he seemed to be getting on with his everyday 
life: managing to hold down a cleaning job as well as delivering leaflets for a local 
charity, and he and his wife had put their house on the market. My impression of 
Mr Burton was that alongside the sense of just getting on with life as usual there 
were unexpected moments of forgetfulness which strayed into his daily routines 
causing some disruption, but not yet creating a serious problem for him.  Laura 
advised him that she would arrange for him to be seen by one of the nurses from 
the team in three months' time - a "handing over" - indicating that there would be 
no further appointments with Laura for the time being. Mr Burton was at the 
stage of his memory problems being relatively mild, but he nonetheless had a 
cognitive impairment - an identified risk for progression to some form of 
dementia. Interruptions to daily life arising from momentary forgetfulness that 
anyone may experience from time to time are generally speaking unrelated to 
dementia. The notion of lapses in memory does represent a point of interest since 
temporarily forgetting is such a widely experienced phenomena that it might even 
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be considered 'normal' to forget.  Fuchs (2016: 9) has given attention to this, 
noting that in everyday life confusion may arise and it may take some time "to 
remember where I am, what time of day it is, or even who I am".  In Mr Burton's 
case it was not that forgetfulness was inconsequential. Indeed, there were 
implications of forgetting such as Mr Burton overlooking an important action 
which might have led to exposure to a risk.  
When Mr Burton forgot to lock the door at night this was probably not a huge 
issue because he lived with his wife and he could rely on her to check that the 
door was locked.  Going out in the day and forgetting to lock the door, bearing in 
mind that his wife was not at home during the day, was a problem.  Practically, Mr 
Burton could not be relied upon to definitely lock the door, nor was it certain that 
the question would come to him implicitly - 'have I locked the door?'  Mr Burton 
was aware and knew he was forgetting things, and in the appointment Laura's 
questions seemed to be directed towards establishing what sort of impact his 
memory problems were having on his everyday life.  
Mr Burton's situation raises the question of the nature of the juxtaposition 
between a person's level of impairment and the risks they are exposed to.  Does a 
more significant memory impairment always mean greater exposure to risk?  
Laura's illustrations given during interview suggested that the juxtaposition of 
impairment with risk factors was generally unpredictable. There were some 
people who looked "on paper" as though they were reasonably stable, but when 
they were seen in clinic it turned out that there were quite significant risk factors 
(e.g. issues related to safeguarding) that required a multi-agency response. Laura 
listed some of the risk factors she routinely asked patients about: whether the 
person was still driving; was s/he forgetting to switch off the cooker; or forgetting 
to lock doors.  'No' answers to such questions usually indicated that the person 
was reasonably stable - 
…"but for other people the risk factors are the biggest reason why they’re 
presenting with their memory difficulties, so you may need to spend an 
awful lot more time if somebody’s leaving the house at night and getting lost 
or forgetting to take all their medication or taking too much medication. So 
things like risk factors sometimes you can deal with it really quite quickly, 
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other times it’s the main issue for a patient’s presentation." (Laura, 
interview) 
 
The potential incongruence between level of impairment and exposure to risk was 
further elaborated on by Laura: 
"We have people who are really quite impaired living alone at home and we 
have people who are only minimally impaired but are having to be moved 
into residential settings because of their risk factors." [...] "So we can have 
somebody who’s quite impaired but is actually perfectly happy sitting at 
home all day long just having carers come in two or three times a day to 
make sure that they’ve got things to eat, and they’ll sit and watch TV quite 
comfortably and won’t ever do anything else. Sometimes people with 
minimal impairment will be going out, losing their money, not being 
particularly safe on the roads, still feel perfectly capable to manage their 
lives but actually - because of their lack of awareness of some of the risk 
issues - are quite vulnerable." (Laura, interview) 
 
Given these examples from Laura, and the specific example from Mr Burton's 
situation, questions arise concerning the delicate topic of when.  That is, when is 
the point that the exposure to risk tips the balance and it becomes necessary to 
intervene? Laura seemed to have judged Mr Burton to be stable because her 
intention now was to hand over to one of her nurse colleagues who would review 
him in due course, but at the same time there was an acknowledgement that there 
was at least one risk factor that persisted - forgetting to lock the door.   
 
The final observation of the morning was of Laura's appointment with Mr Wooler, 
who was accompanied by his wife.  The conversation initially concentrated on the 
recent retest of Mr Wooler's driving through the Driver Vehicle Licensing 
Authority (DVLA).  Mr Wooler had recently received a four-page letter from the 
DVLA notifying him that he had failed the test and the reasons why.  In spite of 
this news Mr Wooler seemed upbeat: "You don't forget about driving"; whilst his 
wife had the view that not driving would save them money, with no road tax, MOT 
or vehicle insurance to pay.  Mrs Wooler proceeded to provide Laura with an 
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update on Mr Wooler's physical health. He had been a possible candidate for 
surgery to sort out a vein blockage in his legs, but the operation was considered 
too risky, a state of affairs that Laura was already au fait with as it was recorded in 
his notes.  The conversation moved on with Laura tactfully asking about any other 
changes, to which both Mr Wooler and his wife responded by saying that his 
memory had improved.  The short form of the memory test which Laura then 
administered did not show evidence of memory deterioration. Mr Wooler was 
taking medication for his memory problems - Donepezil, which is in the family of 
cholinesterase inhibitor drugs often prescribed for people with Alzheimer's 
disease and some other dementias. These drugs work by boosting the level of a 
chemical in the brain that seems to help memory, and can result in improved 
cognitive function. However, one not uncommon side effect which must be 
monitored by a healthcare professional is that a person's pulse and heart rate may 
be slowed.  A blood pressure and pulse check carried out by Laura revealed that 
his pulse had slowed.  Laura reassured Mr Wooler telling him that although his 
pulse was "a bit on the slow side [it] has always been a bit slow. No harm".  But 
nonetheless she would write to the GP to ask whether the other medications Mr 
Wooler was on might be reduced, and in time Laura may need to reduce the 
Donepezil dosage.  
Neither Mr nor Mrs Wooler seemed particularly perturbed by the situation they 
were in- that of living with dementia.  It seemed that for the moment at least that 
Mr Wooler's memory problems were not impinging on their lives to any great 
extent.  In fact, Mr Wooler talked about how he had been working on building a 
dolls' house "from memory" over the past seven years, and was currently 
wallpapering it.  Even in the face of what appeared to be a major issue facing Mr 
Wooler - the vein blockages in his legs - this couple were remarkably upbeat and, 
it seemed, had great confidence in Laura and her management of Mr Wooler's 
treatment: 
Mr Wooler to Laura: "I'll just keep doing what you say and I can't go wrong 
then." (Fieldnote: 24/06/14) 
 
The second cluster of appointments I observed was a week later, with the first 
person to be seen - a Mrs Ladley - newly referred by the GP and accompanied by 
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her daughter. The letter from the GP to Laura stated that both Mrs Ladley and her 
daughter were concerned about Mrs Ladley's memory.  Laura began by 
addressing Mrs Ladley, opening with a question that seemed simple and 
unremarkable but having profound implications:  
 Laura: "Do you think you have a problem with your memory?" 
  Mrs Ladley: "Yes. I was a bit heady, and can't remember... "[tails off] 
  Laura: "Do you think it's worse than your friends' memories?" 
 Mrs Ladley: "I play bridge - it [the ability to remember] depends who you are 
with" 
  Laura: "Are you aware you are forgetting conversations with people?" 
 Mrs Ladley: "It creeps up on you...I try to write everything down". (Fieldnote: 
1/7/14) 
 
As the conversation progressed it became apparent that there were discrepancies 
between Mrs Ladley's account and that of her daughter:   
Daughter: "She can't remember conversations that we've had. She can't 
remember family news. I have to write things down for her. She hasn't 
played Bridge for six months". (Fieldnote: 1/7/14) 
 
These were frank words, voiced to Laura, but with Mrs Ladley present and party 
to the conversation. Mrs Ladley had become "she".  There was frustration in Mrs 
Ladley's daughter's voice.  She was faced with a changed and changing situation, 
one which was now starting to impinge on her own reality.  She was taking up the 
reins and filling in the gaps where Mrs Ladley was beginning to struggle, 
compensating for her mum's memory difficulties, giving reminders and writing 
things down. The strain of this seemed apparent in Mrs Ladley's daughter's 
expressions of exasperation with her mum, and distilled in her words: 
 "It's hard when you're doing it all."  (Fieldnote: 1/7/14)  
 
Laura asked Mrs Ladley's daughter how long she thought the problem had been 
going on for. "About seven years?" was the response, followed by an explanation 
that the start of the problems coincided with a stroke that Mrs Ladley had in 2007.  
Mrs Ladley's daughter presented a narrative of events in chronological time: the 
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stroke in 2007, and her mum not having played Bridge for six months. Mrs Ladley 
herself had a clear view of the far past and recounted childhood experiences of 
school.  This memory, it seemed, was within her power to recall:  
Mrs Ladley: "I can remember certain things like that, quite easily." 
(Fieldnote: 1/7/14) 
 
Her short-term memory, though, was vague. Mrs Ladley remembered that a 
cleaner was coming in, but the discrepancy between hers and her daughter's 
recollections about the level of support and who was providing it was evident. 
Another 'correction' of events from her daughter followed:  
 "I'm going in nearly every day." (Fieldnote: 1/7/14) 
 
These parallel narratives of mum and daughter suggest divergences - each 
account indicating a view of placements of events in time - and perhaps indicative 
of two differing temporal experiences. The clinician, Laura, seemed to act as a sort 
of moderator to these two temporal accounts. Laura, undoubtedly, had seen such 
gaps between patient and carer accounts on many occasions before.  
The situation of Mrs Ladley may be seen as one where memory problems 
impinged on normal going about one's daily life - the normal routines of life that 
are set in time and, to a certain extent, ordered by time (e.g. waking, sleeping, 
mealtimes). Liaschenko, in Thorne and Hayes (1997: 28), expressed this idea of 
going about daily life as the “routines of lived experience”.  If these are disturbed 
or interrupted by disease, injury or disaster Liaschenko (citing Charmaz, 1991) 
notes that “our subjective sense is that our lives, and not merely patterns of clock 
time, are affected”.   The fact that Mrs Ladley's daughter was going in every day to 
check on and assist her mum - yet Mrs Ladley's version of her own life (playing 
Bridge, and doing what she had always done) was very different - suggested that 
memory problems were creating ongoing disruption to the normal experience and 
routines of life.   
The living arrangements for Mrs Ladley were becoming ever more precarious and 
fragile.  She had fallen in her garden, and she had tripped over in her bedroom 
resulting in two black eyes. There was some doubt about whether she was 
remembering to eat - even though her daughter cooked and plated dinners for her 
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it was not certain that she was always eating these, and whether she was 
managing to independently prepare something for her tea was also questionable.  
There was an occasion when Mrs Ladley had left the gas on, and she did not 
always remember to lock the doors at night.  There were also concerns expressed 
by Mrs Ladley and her daughter about the medication she was taking, particularly 
statins prescribed for cholesterol.  Both wanted the statins to be stopped, or 
reduced.  For Laura the statins were less of a worry: her view was that Mrs Ladley 
was on the right level of medication and getting this changed would be a matter 
for Mrs Ladley and her daughter to consult with the GP.  What concerned Laura 
most was that Mrs Ladley might have further falls.  For the time being the fall risk 
and other risks that had been spoken about during the appointment were 
essentially being 'absorbed' by Mrs Ladley's daughter.  But, there was some 
slightly better news in relation to Mrs Ladley's memory function. The results from 
the short form of the memory test Laura conducted were notable enough for her 
to comment. On the drawing exercise Mrs Ladley had done well:  
 "The drawing is really quite good. This is surprising" (Fieldnote: 1/7/14)  
 
Laura felt surprised perhaps because Mrs Ladley's performance was not what 
Laura had expected given the descriptions from Mrs Ladley's daughter about her 
level of impairment. Maybe Laura was erring towards the daughter's account 
being more credible than Mrs Ladley's, and the good drawing represented 
something of a disturbance to the daughter's narrative. 
Towards the end of the appointment Mrs Ladley's daughter asked what help was 
available.  When Laura answered she perhaps had in mind the risk of falls that had 
surfaced during the conversation earlier. Referral to an Occupational Therapist, 
various meal delivery options and, possibly, the need for a care package were 
Laura's thoughts. Asking for help, as Mrs Ladley's daughter was doing, is perhaps 
one indication that one's own resources to manage are now either insufficient, 
exhausted, or both.  Some attention has been given to the significance of the when 
of carers asking for help, for example by Newbronner et al (2013) who reported 
on a study of the experiences of the journey of care by family carers of people with 
dementia. The findings highlighted that caring for someone with dementia was 
characterised by being a "long-term and changing experience" in contrast to the 
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characterisation of typical encounters with health and social care practitioners 
being "short term and episodic". (Newbronner et al, 2013:70)  These encounters 
with service providers and other professionals were viewed as potentially critical 
in terms of often being the points in time when carers' needs for help, advice and 
information would be most acute. If professionals either failed to recognise carers' 
needs when there was the opportunity to do so during contact, or were poorly 
equipped to advise and support, this ran the risk of care-giving breaking down 
and the knock on effects of this such as impact on physical or mental health.  
Laura's concerns about Mrs Ladley falling, and the tangible offers of help that she 
put to Mrs Ladley's daughter, signified that she did recognise that there was 
potential for the care relationship between Mrs Ladley's daughter and her mum to 
break down. The likely consequences of a breakdown in this family care 
relationship were not voiced but undoubtedly Mrs Ladley's daughter had at least 
an inkling that this might push her into a situation where permanent long-term 
care would have to be considered. 
 
The next person Laura was to see - a Mrs Eadie - did not show up, although I did 
meet this lady a fortnight later at a rescheduled appointment.  Laura's response to 
the 'no show' was to phone Mrs Eadie at home.  Mr Eadie answered and explained 
that his wife was out shopping. It seemed as though she had not received the 
appointment letter, or that she had forgotten.  There was now an unexpected 
space before the next appointment which Laura used for reviewing notes and 
catching up with phone-calls. I sat and waited, conscious of how busy Laura was, 
and that even when it seemed there was a moment available to her to reflect on 
clinical work there were always more pressing matters that she needed to attend 
to in relation to clinic and other appointments.  
The next scheduled appointment that day was with Mrs Osborne who arrived 
with her daughter.  Mrs Osborne was here for a review appointment, and Laura 
began by asking whether there were any changes in her health or her memory.   
"Occasionally, you know, you worry you've said the wrong thing". (Fieldnote: 
1/7/14) 
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Mrs Osborne appeared to be quite passive, barely speaking during the 
appointment, her daughter instead providing most of the responses to Laura's 
questions. As the appointment progressed a narrative emerged about Mrs 
Osborne's weight loss and the possible reasons for this. Her daughter was 
concerned because although there were meals being delivered to her mum and 
paid carers were there at lunchtime to ensure that the meals were offered, Mrs 
Osborne was refusing these, saying that she was not hungry.  Laura questioned 
why the carers weren't monitoring food consumption, and asked Mrs Osborne 
directly whether she knew why this was happening. Laura was interested in 
whether the 'not eating' problem had been worse since Mrs Osborne had started 
on prescribed medication, since it was known that the particular medication she 
was on could reduce appetite. Mrs Osborne's daughter corroborated Laura's 
theory - yes, her mum's appetite had diminished since she had started on the 
medication. For Laura the eating difficulty required a collective solution: "How 
can we get over these problems with food?" Might a solution be for carers to 
spend more time with Mrs Osborne, cook her a meal, and eat with her?  Laura was 
putting forward this suggestion without knowing the full details of the domiciliary 
care arrangements that had been put in place. For example, it may well have been 
the case that, - from the domiciliary care agency's perspective - time constraints 
were an issue.  Time constraints for care visits have received much attention in 
national news in recent years, the problems associated with time typified in the 
idea of the fifteen minute care visit. Some local authorities continue to 
commission these very short care visits (Moriarty et al, 2014: 85), often 
unsatisfactory for addressing the complexities of needs related to dementia, and 
unsatisfactory not only from the individual's perspective (not getting their needs 
met) but also from the perspective of family carers who are putting their trust in 
the care being provided.  Short visits, in Mrs Osborne's case, would have 
prohibited care staff from going beyond the basics of heating a meal and putting it 
in front of her.   
It was not just Mrs Osborne's daughter and Laura who were concerned about this. 
A member of staff from a local housing association was visiting Mrs Osborne 
regularly, and had also expressed concerns about her not eating. It was 
particularly important for Mrs Osborne to have regular meals - she had diabetes.  
99 
 
Furthermore, her daughter said there were occasions when Mrs Osborne had put 
her medication in ornaments, so had not taken it, and this posed a risk in relation 
to the continued successful management of her diabetes. 
There were other risks too. Mrs Osborne had an alarm which she wore on a 
lanyard, but when she fell recently she was not wearing the alarm.  Her wandering 
out on the streets was worrisome to her daughter: "Is she forgetting where she is 
going?"   
Mrs Osborne's perspective was very much less dramatic: she was simply walking 
to the paper shop every day to buy a daily newspaper. The facts were that she was 
able to remember both where the shop was and the name of the newspaper she 
purchased. Laura's administration of the short form of the memory test revealed 
little deterioration in Mrs Osborne's memory.  Putting in extra support to Mrs 
Osborne at mealtimes certainly looked like a way of resolving the eating problem, 
but the longer visits that would facilitate this were contingent on care agency staff 
availability and resources. Although potential solutions were defined by Laura she 
could not really influence the outcome, and it would be left to Mrs Osborne's 
family to negotiate a solution directly with the social services care manager and 
the home care agency. 
 
Taking stock of the appointments  
In these first two clusters amounting to six observations of appointments there 
are some points that begin to build up from aspects that seem interesting and may 
also act as connectors between different 'cases'.  Points of note are the nature of 
the impact of dementia; accumulations of practice and what this may mean in the 
context of the appointment setting; and the delicate balance that seems to exist in 
the weighing of diverse risks, risks that are often consequential to increased 
forgetfulness but sometimes arising when other needs of the individual are only 
being partially met. 
The accounts provided by patients and carers seem to indicate a rather complex 
interweave between lived memory problem experience and the impact that 
memory problems are having on individuals and carers, respectively.  
Discrepancies in accounts given by individuals and by carers of their experience of 
dementia were evident, which raises questions about how memory problems are 
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recognised, acknowledged (or not), and impactful. For example - how might a 
view that dementia is not "normal" (as in the case of Mrs Maddox) be 
consequential in terms of how an individual and their carer cope as memory 
problems progress? The second point concerns practice in the clinic appointment 
setting. In these six appointments there were observable aspects of practice that 
could be articulated in the form of a notated commentary (e.g. describing 
administration of the memory test). However, what remains hidden, that these 
outward expressions of doing do not reveal, are the over-time accumulations of 
experience and types of knowledge, and how these are combined or configured 
uniquely to each appointment. This is illustrated in the aspect of Laura asked 
questions of patients and carers.  For me as an outsider a question can be heard 
(observed) and understood in terms of the nature of its enquiry,  but its meaning 
in terms of the 'why that phrasing', 'why asked at that particular moment', 'why 
asked in a particular tone of voice' are known only to the person who asks it.  The 
point of interest is that observable aspects of practices are like the visible outer 
layer of something, but all that is involved in the formation of a practice is like its 
inner layers - indiscernible, undetectable.  
Another noteworthy point is about the risks that arise when a set of conditions 
changes. Even though the transition from 'normal' forgetfulness associated with 
ageing to problematic or abnormal forgetfulness may be very gradual, and may 
involve passing through distinct phases such as mild cognitive impairment (MCI) 
as was the case for Mrs Bourne, there comes a point when 'forgetting' starts to 
have consequences.  A clinician's mental checklist alerts her to risks which she can 
then probe further to ascertain whether action should be taken, and the urgency 
(or not) required to address risk. Risks are not necessarily always to do with 
forgetfulness. For example, Mr Wooler's risks were about the state of his physical 
health as much as his memory. The risks around a slow pulse and heart rate 
caused by the Donepezil medication had to be weighed against the benefit of the 
medication. There was also his physical health to be considered.  With Mrs 
Osborne, similarly, the situation of not eating was risky for management of her 
diabetes, and for Mrs Ladley there were risks around falling, and what seemed to 
be a risk that the care relationship with her daughter was beginning to break 
down. 
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Observations of another cluster of appointments  
A fortnight later I attended the CSD Centre to observe another cluster of four 
morning appointments with Laura. The first person was a Mr Powell, attending 
for a review appointment and accompanied by his son and his son's partner. Prior 
to the appointment there was time to have a brief conversation with Laura who 
told me that Mr Powell had an alcohol problem, but that he had not yet 
acknowledged or accepted that he had memory problems.   
From my first encounter with Mr Powell I noticed straight away the smell of 
alcohol on his breath. His alcohol consumption was broached very carefully by 
Laura, who wanted to know how much he was drinking, and whether he was 
driving after drinking.  Mr Powell said he had two pints of beer a day and 
sometimes whisky as well, but that he did not drive after drinking.  These probing 
questions about this very sensitive topic of alcohol were not just about making 
sense of the type of memory problems Mr Powell was experiencing.  Questions 
were also a way for Laura to elicit information that would help her to decide if she 
would need to take actions related to her duty of care as a clinician in this 
instance. So, although Mr Powell's daughter had apparently contacted the DVLA 
about his memory problems it was entirely possible that Mr Powell was 
continuing to drive.  A priority for Laura was to ascertain whether Mr Powell was 
telling the truth regarding driving whilst under the influence of alcohol. This was a 
topic that Mr Powell's son was silent about, and he seemed nonplussed about his 
dad's memory problems and their interweave with alcohol consumption, perhaps 
because as yet underlying risks had not surfaced into critical problems: 
Mr Powell's son: "My dad has his moments but nine times out of ten 
everything seems to be ok". (Fieldnote: 14/7/14) 
 
The relevance of Mr Powell's alcohol consumption to his memory problems 
became apparent when Laura explained that his memory issues were related to 
vascular issues. Heavy consumption of alcohol has been shown to be a 
contributory factor to illness, and there is consistent evidence to show that there 
is an association between heavy drinking and/or abstinence and cognitive decline 
(Lafortune et al, 2016).  It could also be said that drinking, smoking, eating, and 
exercise behaviours are a matter for individuals to decide about rather than for 
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governments or even family members. In Mr Powell's case his decision to drink 
had been brought into the space of a health service setting, and was now recorded 
in patient notes, no longer a private matter.  Laura advised, if possible, to cut 
down on alcohol. Then, in what seemed to be an empathic gesture, she drew 
attention to herself and acknowledged that she was "overweight" and that she felt 
"hypocritical" (Fieldnote: 14/7/14) in advising Mr Powell to change his 
behaviour. This felt like a very human moment, an expression of trying to dissolve 
or blur the edges of the distinct roles of patient recipient and clinician expert.  
The triangle of driving, memory problems, and (what seemed to be) heavy 
drinking was of particular concern, and the risks in the scenario Laura elaborated 
to me after Mr Powell and his son and partner had left. Without the evidence that 
Mr Powell was driving whilst under the influence of alcohol there was little that 
Laura could do, other than advising the family to inform the DVLA.  
 
The next person to be seen by Laura was a Mr Ron Seymour whose brother, Doug, 
accompanied him. This was a review appointment. Doug, the main carer, managed 
most aspects of Ron's life and spoke on his behalf.  As well as caring for his 
brother Doug was also supporting their sister who had arthritis. All three lived in 
the same house; none of them had ever married.  There was acknowledgement of 
Doug's essential role within this family unit: 
 Laura: "You're the gel that's holding everything together". 
 Doug: "I'm the one that's keeping it going". 
 (Fieldnote 14/7/14) 
 
Over the past nine months there had been some changes in Ron's capacity and he 
could no longer manage his own medication, nor understand or deal with money.  
Doug had picked up the reins and now supervised Ron, making sure that he was 
taking his medication correctly, and all essential tasks such as cooking and 
budgeting were also now undertaken by Doug.  Ron's involvement in his own 
affairs seemed to be diminishing - limited to jobs such as helping Doug in the 
garden, and this gave the appearance that Ron was retreating into the background 
where he was the 'cared for'.  This arrangement whereby Doug was lynchpin 
clearly worked in terms of keeping everything ticking over.  Nonetheless, the two 
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brothers were elderly and their sister clearly had some health issues, and there 
was no obvious back-up plan should Doug no longer be able to care for his 
brother.   Although establishing the nature of the clinical needs of the person and 
monitoring any changes in mental and physical health might be described as core 
aspects of Laura's role, I noted that Laura used the time in the appointment to 
check out practical issues such as social care needs, safety at home, Power of 
Attorney arrangements, and carer wellbeing.  In the instance of Mr Seymour there 
was active enquiring by Laura about how the two brothers were managing, and 
whether extra help was needed in the home.  The information volunteered by 
Doug about Ron's diminishing independence provided potential clues to his 
current status in terms of memory. The memory test was the tool available for 
assessing memory, but was not used on this occasion because Ron had scored 
very low on the test at his last appointment (as Laura later explained to me after 
the brothers had left).   
Doug's narrative captured his brother's declining independence and his transition 
through states of increasing impairment towards greater reliance on Doug.   
Laura's role was that of a clinician involved in the care and treatment for Ron. Her 
standing as a professional did mean she could wield at least some influence in 
terms of mobilising resources that would bolster up support to Doug in his caring 
role.  There was also a more personal aspect to her role in this situation, which 
was linked to particular knowledge Laura had been made privy to, which was that 
Ron, Doug and their sister had made a 'pact' to care for their parents and then for 
each other when their parents died.  This pact was now being put into action by 
Doug as he took on a caring role towards his brother and his sister.  
The Seymour's situation was a changing one, and it could not be known if or, more 
likely, when an event might occur that would 'tip' the fragile arrangements of 
family care into an entirely different scenario where, perhaps, formal care 
arrangements would be needed.  Laura knew that the current care arrangements 
for Ron were almost entirely contingent on Doug's ability to continue to provide 
support - a situation which Laura would undoubtedly have seen replicated in 
other families she had met during her years in practice. From this practice 
experience Laura would have seen how situations panned out, and the sorts of 
factors that pre-empted a breakdown in care arrangements.  This sort of 
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knowledge might be described as both practical and experiential: the ability to 
estimate - 'if this, then that' and 'when this, then that'.   
Knowing what she did know about the Seymour's situation was probably a factor 
in how she then proceeded to not only advise but to actually insist that Doug 
should telephone her if any problems arose.  Ordinarily Laura would have handed 
over to Pat (a specialist nurse in the team) but Pat was leaving - a cause for 
concern for Laura as the post Pat was leaving had not been advertised as yet, 
leaving Laura in a holding position with patients such as Ron. 
 
The last appointment was with a Mrs Eadie, a lady who had been seen by one of 
Laura's colleagues at home and subsequently been referred to Laura with "slight" 
memory problems.  This was a rescheduled appointment from a fortnight earlier 
when Mrs Eadie had failed to attend the original appointment. Laura was unsure 
whether she would turn up for this one, but she arrived on time having been 
dropped off by her husband, who arranged to pick her up after the appointment. 
Mrs Eadie came across as a very intelligent and independent person, appearing to 
distance herself somewhat from the notion that she may have memory difficulties. 
Laura started by recapping about the most recent memory test that Mrs Eadie had 
undergone, referring to one of the tasks of completing a half drawn picture.  
Mrs Eadie responded with:  
 "It's automatic, it's not something you remember. You've seen it before." 
 (Fieldnote: 14/07/14) 
 
Mrs Eadie's words caused me to wonder if she was thinking about the tests and 
that people have no control over their automatic responses to these sorts of tests.  
For example, if an automatic response turned out to be 'wrong' this would draw 
attention to the possibility that there was a problem.  Mrs Eadie knew that she had 
a memory problem, and voiced this. Laura's response was to confirm what her 
role was: "My job is to sort out mild memory problems from more severe ones".  
This led to Laura asking Mrs Eadie a question which was of a type which 
suggested that Laura was taking a softly, softly approach - offering self-
determination: 
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"What would you like us to do about your memory difficulties? We could 
send you for a scan, then look at possible medication?"(Fieldnote: 14/07/14) 
 
The conversation continued with Mrs Eadie - seeming to pre-empt the possibility 
that Laura would suggest she start on medication - talking at length about her 
previous bad experiences of taking medication in relation to major surgery, and 
for hypertension. The conversation progressed and yielded further insights into 
the context for Mrs Eadie's thinking: her daughter had mental health issues and a 
diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis, for which she was taking medication. It seemed 
that Mrs Eadie's own difficulties with memory were being eclipsed by her 
daughter's needs as well as by Mrs Eadie's anxieties about her daughter.   
Laura gently continued with the tack of passing 'ownership' of the memory issue 
back to Mrs Eadie: 
"Let's talk about your memory. What would you like to do? Do you want to 
be discharged and just carry on as you are?"(Fieldnote: 14/07/14) 
 
This, it seemed, gave Mrs Eadie permission to say what she wanted, which was to 
be discharged from memory services. She started to talk about her friend's 
husband with dementia, saying that he was now in care, and then: "I'm not like 
that at all."   This differentiation between her own memory difficulties (currently 
mild) and those of her friend's husband (considerable enough for him to be 
admitted into long-term care) conveyed a sense of her distancing herself from 
dementia.  It echoed the way in which Mrs Maddox, the first patient whose 
appointment I observed, had seemed to push the possibility of dementia away. 
The process of being referred back to Laura by asking the GP was explained to Mrs 
Eadie, and her obvious reluctance to consider trying out medication was a further 
reason for her to be discharged. However, at this point Laura offered Mrs Eadie an 
ECG brain scan, something which she agreed to. An information leaflet about the 
scan was given to Mrs Eadie, along with verbal indications about the timescale in 
which this would take place. Mrs Eadie left, and Laura spoke to me about her 
thoughts: 
"I think she does have Alzheimer's disease, so I'm quite happy for her to 
come back". (Fieldnote: 14/07/14) 
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The interaction between Laura and Mrs Eadie illustrated well the enormity of 
being faced with the prospect of a significant memory impairment, and how a 
clinician tried to facilitate a patient to take the first steps (agreeing to a scan) 
towards finding out the nature of the problem and possible lines of treatment.  
Laura's hypothesis that Mrs Eadie had Alzheimer's disease was not voiced during 
the appointment because Laura had made a judgement that Mrs Eadie was the 
sort of person who needed to see for herself the evidence to support or refute this. 
The skilful coaxing of Mrs Eadie to have a scan demonstrated knowledge in action; 
the bridging of the gap between what is known (or at least strongly suspected) 
and setting a process in motion towards confirmation of what is known and 
appropriately addressing the problem. 
 
Just over a week later I was at the CSD Centre again, to observe two morning 
appointments. The first was with Mrs Bell whose daughter-in-law Anne 
accompanied her. Having explained the format of the appointment, Laura then 
introduced the matter of memory.  Mrs Bell felt that her memory was about right 
for someone of her age. Laura's opening question was typically understated, but I 
had realised from early on during my observations that her questioning was 
designed to reach the nub of the issue at hand: 
Laura: "Do you lose track of a conversation, of what you were about to say?" 
(Fieldnote: 22/7/14) 
 
Laura continued with gently asking probing questions of Mrs Bell, allowing her 
daughter-in-law to interject.  Anne's account of her mother-in-law suggested that 
over the past eighteen months there had been a gradual deterioration in short 
term memory. Mrs Bell was apparently unable to remember birthdays or 
appointments, and more worryingly she was forgetting how much medication to 
take and when, which had led to an incident in which she overdosed on co-
codamol, taking a whole day's dose in just a couple of hours. The conversation 
moved on to some questions about physical health and then a physical health 
check.  This began with checking blood pressure, and then pulse. Laura explained 
that she would listen carefully to Mrs Bell's pulse and so things would go quiet 
whilst she did so.  A pulse cannot literally be 'heard', but it can be perceived.  
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Taking a pulse requires the clinician to touch the wrist of the person; taking a 
blood pressure reading involved Laura using a piece of equipment - which bridged 
the gap between the clinician's physical body and the patient's body, connecting 
the two together. Involved in these two clinical procedures is perception via the 
senses: touch, seeing, and hearing, the purpose being to assess the body, to check 
that blood pressure and pulse are within the norm of what would be expected.  
Polanyi (1967; 1961) described the perceiving of something as a projecting from 
within a person to the outside, and that the projection was similar in cases when 
people used tools and probes to perceive. 
After blood pressure and pulse had been taken there were some different 
questions about medication and then her family and how she was managing 
currently. Mrs Bell was very clear and quite adamant on some pieces of 
information. She knew she had a brother and could remember his name; 
remembered her sons' names; recounted details of her youth and how she had 
worked as a domestic at the local hospital; and knew that she was having some 
help from her sons in managing day to day finances. Laura had sight of the full list 
of prescribed medications for Mrs Bell, but Mrs Bell was sure that she was taking 
only one tablet per day which was for her blood pressure. Mrs Bell's daughter in 
law seemed unconvinced that the medication was going untaken because it was 
known to her that Mrs Bell's son Eddie was organising the medication for her.   
Mrs Bell's certainty about the medication that she was taking was rather puzzling 
- what if it was the case that she was only taking one tablet for blood pressure? 
The question of who decides whether an account of a person with dementia is 
credible, and whether expectations about capability to give an accurate account 
need to be adjusted over time raises the issue of agency in people with dementia, 
and this seemed pertinent to Mrs Bell.  In the short form memory test that Laura 
then conducted with Mrs Bell these questions seemed to be amplified further.  
There is a part of the test where the person is read three words, and a few 
moments later is asked to try to recall the three words. Mrs Bell was unable to do 
so:  
  "I should have been able to remember - it was only five minutes ago". 
  (Fieldnote: 22/7/14) 
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Clearly, the memory test is designed to test for memory problems, and implicit in 
this is the revealing of deficits. I surmised that this set up a rather peculiar 
tension, which I made a note about:  
"I have a feeling that Mrs B wants to get it right. She wants to please Laura. 
Do these two things equate with each other?" (Fieldnote: 22/7/14) 
 
The experience of having one's memory assessed - however kind and caring the 
clinician - would be difficult to conceive in any way other than as anxiety-
provoking. Mrs Bell's defence of herself, as a person who could provide an 
accurate account, was revealed in her expressing herself adamantly about the 
medication she was taking. Rather poignantly, it seemed to me, was how this self-
account now seemed overruled by the exposing of her difficulties through the 
memory test. 
 
Following Mrs Bell, Laura was seeing a Mrs Noyce with her daughter Elaine. Mrs 
Noyce had recently had two scans: a CT scan which showed that she had had a 
very minor heart attack, and a brain scan which revealed there was some atrophy 
to the brain, a generalised shrinkage that was more than would be expected for 
someone of her age. Laura explained that this was indicative of mild Alzheimer's 
disease, but that there was some good news in that there was no evidence of 
stroke.  
With Mrs Noyce there was discussion in relation to her physical health and 
history. The fact that Mrs Noyce had had one of her kidneys removed meant there 
were certain considerations in relation to prescribing medication to help with her 
memory. Laura introduced the possibility that Donepezil could be prescribed, and 
explained that this helped to maintain a person's memory as it is currently, 
usually for four to five years. Mrs Noyce agreed to this and Laura wrote out the 
prescription, also giving details about possible side effects, to make an 
appointment with Laura if these were severe, and described to Elaine how the 
prescription ordering worked. Laura seemed to want to particularly press home 
to Mrs Noyce the importance of taking the medication, saying to her that she 
should try to stick with the medication even if the tablets caused nausea because 
this would usually settle down.  
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  Laura: "Your job is to take the tablets; your daughter's is to order them."  
  (Fieldnote: 22/7/14) 
 
Mrs Noyce's daughter Elaine used to work as a ward clerk at the local hospital and 
had recognised Laura through this connection. She also had contacts with Keele 
University and was clearly familiar with local health systems, a likely advantage in 
relation to helping her mum navigate through the system. Checking with Mrs 
Noyce whether there was anything further she could help with, and reassuring 
her that she or her daughter should contact Laura if there were any problems, the 
appointment came to an end and the two women left the clinic room. 
 
My observations of Laura's appointments resumed in late autumn 2014 with 
three home visits. The first of these was with Laura and one of the team's 
occupational therapists, Karen, to meet a lady called Ms Evans who lived alone.  
Ms Evans had been seen by Laura in clinic six months ago, and she had been 
having fairly regular appointments with Karen. Ms Evans had a package of care 
consisting of two domiciliary visits per week from a home care agency, a pendant 
alarm for emergencies, and Karen had referred her to a befriending service run by 
the local branch of the Alzheimer's Society, and to Age UK which had completed 
an Attendance Allowance application (Higher Rate) on Ms Evans' behalf.  A 'hot 
meals' service had been offered to Ms Evans but not taken up. Ms Evans was 
managing everyday life adequately by following reminders on her calendar, using 
a tablet dispenser for medication, and having support from the home care agency 
to attend hospital and other appointments. However, Laura was concerned about 
her overall vulnerability in relation both to her isolation, and the progression of 
dementia: a recent brain scan showed that there was slight shrinkage to the brain, 
but also a Meningioma - a slow growing, usually benign, brain tumour associated 
with symptoms of dementia, as well as other impairments including tremor, 
unsteadiness, seizures, headaches and behaviour change. Ms Evans explained that 
she had had a fall hurting the right side of her head and was having twinges of 
pain.  
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Laura did some basic health checks of blood pressure and pulse, confirming that 
her BP was a bit high but not too bad. Then she broached the subject of Ms Evans' 
current circumstances: 
Laura: "Speaking very frankly [Ms Evans], you are very committed to staying 
here, in the home you know and love?" 
Ms Evans: "I don't go out now. I've been to the gate and along a bit. I'm afraid 
of tripping". (Fieldnote: 25/11/14) 
    
This exchange represented Laura's concern as well as her professional duty of 
care, as she now knew that Ms Evans had a Meningioma, was having problems 
with memory, and had had a fall in a two storey house where her bedroom was on 
the first floor.  Ms Evans' response confirmed the fear she had of falling, but was 
also a reassurance to Laura and Karen that she was mainly staying indoors which 
she perceived as a low risk environment. There was no mention of family 
involvement, but Ms Evans had a next door neighbour, Alan, who had Enduring 
Power of Attorney for her, and helped out by visiting her and generally keeping an 
eye out for her. Karen viewed the main risk for Ms Evans as there being nobody on 
hand to help if she fell or became unwell, but that this was being addressed by an 
alarm system for any emergencies and the two domiciliary visits per week for 
ongoing monitoring and support.  
Laura brought the conversation back to medication, and asked if they could talk 
about medication for memory problems. She could prescribe medication if Ms 
Evans wanted to try, although it was not certain that medication would help. Ms 
Evans wanted to know if the medication would interact with other tablets she was 
taking, and would the medication be taken separately to her other tablets. She 
clearly knew the questions to ask as well as seeing that the medication would 
maybe help with her memory problems: 
"I would like to try something, with being on my own". [...] I think anything's 
worth trying. It goes blank. Even normal things get forgotten." (Fieldnote: 
25/11/14) 
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Laura would write the new prescription and contact the pharmacy directly, and 
there would be a general keeping an eye on things entailing one of the support 
workers from the team popping in to see how Ms Evans was getting on.  
Without the involvement of next of kin (there did not appear to be immediate or 
extended family involved, and Ms Evans described herself as being on her own) 
Ms Evans' continuing independence largely relied on her own strength of will, of 
wanting to continue to live in her own home rather than going into permanent 
care.  The accumulation of different factors in Ms Evans’ situation (Meningioma, 
dementia, the circumstances of living alone and without family involvement), and 
how she coped with these pressures whilst trying to preserve a sense of 
independence seem to signal fragilities in her life situation at this point.  Being in 
late age and living alone with dementia is suggestive of a different reality to being 
in late age and living alone whilst continuing to be active and healthy.  
Portacolone et al (2018:2) highlight that the impact of cognitive impairment on 
abilities to manage domestic matters and to navigate service systems is likely to 
intensify the precarity of living alone in old age. 
Regarding all the other people with dementia whose appointments I observed, 
even though several people lived alone, in those cases there was still at least one 
family member involved - a brother, daughter, son, or daughter-in-law.  For 
people with dementia who don't have family, or whose families are simply not 
involved, there are not the same possibilities for the knowledge or knowing of 
family members about the person to be brought to bear.  In the case of Ron 
Seymour for example, his brother (and carer) Doug was a witness not only to the 
subtle memory changes that occurred over time affecting Ron's capacity to 
manage, but he also knew his brother and could provide a narrative to 
professionals of who Ron was. In the interaction between Ms Evans and Laura and 
Karen, there was an acknowledgement of and respect expressed by Laura that Ms 
Evans loved her home and wanted to remain there, but all that was available to 
build up a picture of who she was as an individual were fragments of knowledge 
gathered about her only since the time she had begun to have memory problems 
and been referred to the team. If a person with dementia is unable to provide a 
narrative about her/himself, and there is not a family member or advocate to do 
so, this would seem to be a risky situation for the person. One risk that may arise 
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is being at the mercy of the state to provide support and care, and this seemed to 
be the situation that Ms Evans was in, with her package of care and support being 
provided by public, private and voluntary sector agencies. Another risk, which 
seems a more serious one, is related to loss of personal identity. Without any 
family members to provide a knowledgeable account of who the person is, 
keeping the person's identity intact - especially as s/he continues to be affected by 
dementia through the passage of time - presents a problem.  This second risk may 
be traced to ways of understanding what a human self is, and particularly how the 
self is perceived under the medical gaze in the context of healthcare where the 
biomedical view is dominant.  In terms of nursing practice Liaschenko (1997:25) 
suggests that a nurse's construction of meaning of what a person is, is interrelated 
with the type or types of knowledge a nurse is bringing into the encounter with an 
individual. If a person is classified as a ‘case’ the knowledge that is brought to bear 
is “limited to objectified physiological and psychological data, and the relationship 
between person and nurse focuses on the functioning and monitoring of physical 
and psychological processes.” (Liaschenko, 1997:25).  Liaschenko goes on to link 
personal agency to the bringing about of a meaningful life, and in this context she 
offers a perspective on what knowledge of a person is:  
"partly a knowledge of how that person lives, as well as what she or he lives 
for." (Liaschenko, 1997:27) 
 
Svanstrom and Sundler (2015) suggest that the lived experience of people with 
dementia who live alone is a neglected area of research. Their study of the 
phenomenon of living alone with dementia whilst having a manifest care need 
revealed a number of interesting findings. In relation to my own reflections on the 
living situations of participants who came into contact with local NHS memory 
services, Svanstrom and Sundler's (2015) study illustrates from the accounts of 
people with dementia a fragmentation of identity: 
"It seems as if the person with dementia gradually loses their memory of 
themselves and their former life when the home does not act as a demand 
for attention or a spur to action anymore. Ordinary life becomes increasingly 
more like a quiet background and life seems to become slow". [...] "Vague 
memories of what were once meaningful for the person with dementia, such 
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as memories of a partner, work or events in their youth, seem to be all that 
remain of their identity. These memories can be stirred in interaction with 
other people and become very vivid even though they are distant in time." 
(Svanstrom and Sundler, 2015:150) 
 
In acknowledging Ms Evans' strong wish to stay in her own home Laura was 
affirming that she had personal agency and, implicit in this, that Ms Evans was 
free to exercise this. For Ms Evans perhaps the threat to identity would become 
apparent if she was unable to remain in her own home and had to enter 
permanent care. For people who live alone and without family involvement it is 
difficult to imagine a way of continuation and safeguarding of the story of a 
person's life - her past experiences, talents, connections with other people, 
personality and characteristics - as she moves from home into care.   
 
The second home visit I was due to observe was with a ninety two year old lady. 
When Laura and I arrived at the house there was nobody in, and we were unable 
to proceed with the visit.  
In early December 2014 I did my final observation of Laura's appointments - a 
home visit with Laura to a Mrs Perkins who appeared to be quite physically 
unwell as well as having memory problems. Her husband, also her main carer, 
answered the door to Laura and me.  During the visit it was mainly Mr Perkins 
who provided the narrative of how things were while Mrs Perkins spoke 
infrequently. I suspected this was related to her seeming to be quite breathless, 
and the struggle she seemed to have with articulating much beyond yes and no 
answers to Laura's questions.  Mrs and Mr Perkins were clearly a close couple, 
and it appeared to me that Mr Perkins loved his wife and was content to care for 
her, in spite of the challenges of doing so.  Laura wanted to find out how things 
were and, as the conversation progressed, it became clear that Mrs and Mr 
Perkins had differing opinions about the difficulties within their current situation. 
Mrs Perkins said that she wasn't sleeping well but that she generally felt fine. Mr 
Perkins' view was that she always said this but the way he saw it was that she 
wasn't fine - she could do very little for herself, her sleeping was disturbed, and all 
the symptoms Laura had foretold would appear had now appeared.  Laura 
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checked Mrs Perkins' blood pressure, a process which Mrs Perkins found 
uncomfortable, although her blood pressure reading was normal. The memory 
test was conducted and afterwards Laura explained that Mrs Perkins' score had 
gone down from 10 to 6, but this was par for the course. Mr Perkins seemed to 
view the visit as an opportunity for him to voice his concerns about the situation, 
and from Laura's responses it was plainly obvious that things were becoming very 
difficult: 
Mr Perkins: "Everything falls down and collapses when I'm ill." [...] "I was off 
colour the other week... I had a bad turn in Smiths at the Post Office.... I went 
all wobbly. That's when things break down - when I'm ill." (Fieldnote: 
9/12/14) 
 
Laura did a quick check of the notes and confirmed that Mrs Perkins was getting 
all of the entitlements that she should be getting.  She asked whether extra help 
was needed, and whether Mr Perkins was feeling "depressed at all?"  Then, who 
was doing the cooking?  To which Mrs Perkins pointed to her husband and both of 
them laughed, after which Mr Perkins said "I do everything".  Although Mr Perkins 
said that he didn't have any particular concerns about risk to his wife, the ongoing 
care arrangement was clearly solely dependent on his ability to continue to be the 
carer. Information about a local voluntary sector organisation that provided a 
sitting service was offered by Laura, who then voiced her concerns: 
 Laura:  "One of my concerns is if you become unwell." 
 Mr Perkins: “That is my concern too." 
 Laura: "Would family rally round?" 
 Mr Perkins: "They have no idea how she is...they don't grasp it". 
 (Fieldnote: 9/12/14) 
 
In this situation Laura's priority was for Mrs Perkins, as the patient. Once it had 
been ascertained that Mrs Perkins was not exposed to risk Laura's concerns 
turned to Mr Perkins.  Like Doug Seymour who was lynchpin in the care 
arrangements for his brother, Mr Perkins was similarly essential to his wife's care, 
and in these terms Mr Perkins' needs were inseparable from those of his wife. 
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Thinking across these thirteen situations of individuals who had been seen by 
Laura in clinic or at home, the intersections between different characteristics of a 
situation may be drawn out and considered using the lens of ‘precarity’. Here, 
attention is drawn to intersections between (for example) living with dementia, 
types of care arrangements and contingencies, physical health status, carer gender 
and carer relationship to the person with dementia.  The question of keeping a 
watchful eye on the person with dementia and, in some instances, monitoring 
domiciliary care arrangements was highlighted in the situations of Mrs Ladley, 
Mrs Osborne, Mrs Maddox, and Mr Powell. The family member or carer was 
keeping a watch on the individual to either a greater extent – as in the case of Mr 
Maddox who adopted high vigilance and monitoring of risks – or a lesser extent – 
as in the case of Mr Powell whose combination of drinking and driving was 
underplayed by his son. With Mrs Ladley there was a sense that her situation was 
‘being held up’ by her daughter and that these familial resources were close to 
being exhausted, with a corresponding possibility that familial caregiving could 
break down completely. The situations of Ron Seymour and Mrs Perkins can be 
characterised by the sense of their respective familial carers being the lynchpins 
of care, but this is precarious because everything depends on one person whose 
own situation might change in some way which may move the carer into 
precarity. As Mr Perkins observed:  
“Everything falls down and collapses when I’m ill. […] That’s when things 
break down – when I’m ill.”    
The situation of another person seen by Laura – Mr Wooler - was characterised by 
precarity because of a physical health issue for which he could not have surgery. 
Remaining in satisfactory health became essential because the restorative surgical 
procedure was not an option for Mr Wooler.  
A further comment concerns unarticulated assumptions that may be made by 
practitioners regarding gender in relation to familial caregiving. Viewed through 
the paradigm of intersectionality (e.g. Grenier et al, 2017; Hulko, 2009) 
interlocking oppressions within caregiving in dementia become highlighted 
relating to membership of defined social groups  - e.g. being a woman carer and 
the intersectionality between this and caring for someone who is in late age and 
has dementia.  The disproportionate impact of dementia on women has been 
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clearly described in the report ‘Women and Dementia: a global research review’ 
(Erol et al, 2015) which highlights that more women than men live with dementia 
and around two thirds of primary caregivers for people with dementia are 
women. (Erol et al, 2015: 5,23). It is likely that this reality is perpetuated in 
practice in terms of the assumptions that may be made by practitioners about 
women taking on care responsibilities for a relative with dementia. 
  
Observations of memory appointments with Dr Ozha, a Consultant 
Psychiatrist  
I observed two appointments in clinics of one of the consultant psychiatrists, Dr 
Ozha, at the CSD Centre. These were in early October 2014 and early December 
2014, respectively.  
The first appointment observed was with Ms Baker, who looked only to be in her 
50s, accompanied by her partner Damien.  People under the age of 60 with 
suspected dementia are always seen by a consultant psychiatrist from the team, as 
I had become aware of during Laura’s interview. Dr Ozha reminded Ms Baker of 
when he had last seen her, and that this was a follow up appointment relating to 
concerns raised about her memory following a memory test she had undergone at 
home.  More positively, results from the brain scan showed that things were "fine, 
and nothing to worry about".  The conversation then moved on to how Ms Baker 
had been over the last few months, were there any problems with taking 
medication, could she provide any examples of her memory getting worse, and 
how much help had she needed in recent months. Ms Baker described how she 
had been worse over the course of the last few months, struggling with her 
fibromyalgia, and staying in bed because of it. Her partner Damien filled in some 
of the gaps where Ms Baker was clearly struggling to answer. He explained that 
she would forget straight away, and this was really noticeable during 
conversation. Ms Baker said she liked Damien to be around because she had fits.  
Dr Ozha asked her about her bowels and bladder and she explained that she was 
struggling to get upstairs to the bathroom toilet in time. Both the seizures and not 
getting to the toilet in time were clearly distressing events for her and Dr Ozha 
gave reassurance and, whereas at the start of the appointment he had frequently 
looked at his notes, he now gave and continued to give good eye contact. Ms Baker 
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rarely went out now - which I imagined was related to the threat of seizures, the 
pain from the fibromyalgia, and fear of what may happen if she needed the toilet. 
Advice for managing fibromyalgia by doing some light exercise had already been 
given, and Dr Ozha gave some encouragement to stick with the advice, underlining 
that by giving the heart a needed workout this would also give the brain a 
workout.  The theme of exercise continued with Dr Ozha introducing the idea of 
exercise on prescription: "Small things you do will help you".  Dr Ozha's approach 
was to encourage Ms Baker to do what she could for herself, and it seemed as 
though he was affirming Ms Baker's agency.  Ms Baker was concerned that the fact 
that she had had a lot of injuries to her head and had these contributed to her 
memory problems? Dr Ozha explained that head injuries did increase the risk of 
memory problems, and that seizures and medication were also contributory to 
risk. Maintaining good eye contact with Ms Baker he gave further reassurance not 
to worry about the brain scan; and that being stressed and uptight during the 
memory test would affect the score. These two pieces of information I then 
realised were a preamble to Dr Ozha giving his diagnosis: 
 Dr Ozha: "Clinically, I would say you have a mild form of dementia". 
 Ms Baker: "That's not very nice, telling me that! Won't it go worse?" 
 Dr Ozha (maintaining good eye contact): 
 "Memory problems don't necessarily deteriorate quickly...it can be  
 years. People develop their own strategies." (Fieldnote: 2/10/14) 
 
Beyond this diagnosis Dr Ozha didn't know what type of dementia it was, and the 
important thing was that Ms Baker shouldn't let it interfere with her life. It was  
vital to keep up with hobbies - Ms Baker mentioned that she enjoyed knitting. 
Ms Baker was clearly shocked by the diagnosis and Dr Ozha then seemed to adapt 
to her response by using a gentler approach and modified language, describing 
the diagnosis as: "It is a mild form of memory problems".  He suggested that the 
brain scan may need to be repeated further down the line.  
Dr Ozha asked about support: did Ms Baker need any more help or support at 
home? Her partner Damien was experiencing bouts of depression, but he was 
getting help through a local voluntary sector support group. He was the main 
carer for Ms Baker, and this was acknowledged by both she and Dr Ozha. 
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  Ms Baker: "He does a good job. I don't know what I would do without him." 
 Dr Ozha: "We need to tap into these sources of support. We do 
underestimate things like talking to people, meeting people, and how they 
can help. We are primed to think in terms of medication. Talking to other 
people in groups - these things will help." (Fieldnote: 2/10/14)  
 
Implicit in Dr Ozha's words was an expression of how the effects of dementia 
extended into all aspects of a person's life, and thus the biomedical perspective of 
dementia was only a partial view; the acknowledgement that medication alone did 
not help a person to get on with their life, and that psychosocial support was 
equally if not more important.  Medication might help Ms Baker, and Dr Ozha said 
that he was thinking that Donepezil may be useful to try, but that there were both 
risks and benefits in taking medication and that he would be happy to put this on 
hold for the moment. For Ms Baker what was happening to her physical body was 
a concern: she was putting on weight and she did not like this. Dr Ozha responded 
to this by saying that the body needs to expend a certain amount of energy but as 
a person aged this meant that not as many calories were required. 
Ms Baker: "When I get down and depressed the first thing I go for is 
chocolate."  
Dr Ozha: "It is ok having a plan, but you need to stick to the plan for the rest 
of your life". (Fieldnote: 2/10/14) 
 
Dr Ozha saw where things were going with Ms Baker - her overall physical health, 
the effect of the seizures, and the fibromyalgia, all of which predisposed her to 
weight gain, and how all of these factors can conspire against good health.  Dr 
Ozha had the view that it was essential for Ms Baker to optimise her health and 
slow deterioration by following a plan of health maintenance. Dr Ozha would refer 
her back to her GP - and then the question posed to Ms Baker: "shall we meet 
again in a few months' time?" Asking Ms Baker to see him a few months hence was 
a way of monitoring how she was getting on. Dr Ozha thought that it would be 
necessary and beneficial to see Ms Baker again, and from Ms Baker and her 
partner's perspective it was a short enough time away to give reassurance that 
119 
 
they were not being abandoned by the professional who had expert knowledge 
about memory problems and the impact these had on Ms Baker's life.  
 
In early December 2014 I attended the CSD Centre to observe Dr Ozha's 
appointment with a Mr Seward, who was accompanied by his wife and his 
daughter Kay. Mr Seward had recently been seen by Dr Candler, and was also 
being visited at home by Suzanne, another member of the team.  As Mr Seward 
began to talk it was evident that he was experiencing some very distressing 
symptoms of mental health, which Dr Ozha was aware of.  Mr Seward was seeing 
snakes, people in the house, people down the toilet, cameras outside, a man with a 
moustache and, his daughter added: "and furry creatures".  
  Dr Ozha (to Mrs Seward and Kay):"Does it upset him?"  
  Mr Seward: "Terrible it is". 
 Dr Ozha (to Mr Seward): "You do get upset by it? Do you think it is real, or 
the brain playing tricks? Are those images very sharp, are they very clear?"  
  Mr Seward: "They are in a pipe. They come up through the carpet." 
  Dr Ozha: "Do you talk to them? Do you ignore them?" 
  Mr Seward: "I tell them to bugger off!" <laughs> (Fieldnote: 11/12/14) 
 
The conversation then turned to medication and Dr Ozha asked Mrs Seward about 
medication. Mr Seward had been prescribed risperidone, a drug that could help 
people with dementia experiencing psychotic symptoms such as delusions and 
hallucinations. Dr Ozha told the family that results from Mr Seward's blood tests 
showed that his lithium levels were normal, and then proceeded to talk the family 
through the diagnosis and what could be done to help with the hallucinations. Mr 
Seward was diagnosed with Lewy Bodies dementia, a type of dementia that Mr 
Seward's daughter Kay already had collected information about and now said: "It 
sounds exactly like my dad". She had also read up on antipsychotic medication, 
that it could make worse the symptoms of Lewy Bodies dementia. Dr Ozha was in 
agreement and explained in more detail the symptoms presentation, and that 
from today Mr Seward should stop taking risperidone and begin with a different 
medication that was not an antipsychotic. It was logical to stay clear of 
risperidone, but if it became necessary a different antipsychotic could be 
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prescribed. Mr Seward would also be referred for a second brain scan and an 
Electroencephalography (EEG). As a clearer picture emerged about the diagnosis, 
symptoms, and treatment options that would be pursued the family appeared 
reassured.  The frightening nature of the hallucinations was fully recognised by Dr 
Ozha who explained that these were caused by chemical imbalances in the brain.  
He advised on some practical measures that could be taken to moderate the 
effects of these negative symptoms, suggesting making sure that there was 
adequate lighting.  
Dr Ozha (to Mr Seward):"Is there any other alternative that you can think 
of?" (Fieldnote: 11/12/14) 
 
This question was really asking whether Mr Seward was able to take on board a 
different explanation of the hallucinations; could he see that they were not 'real'?  
This seemed too much of a stretch for Mr Seward who clearly felt convinced that 
what he was seeing was real.  As the appointment drew to a close Dr Ozha gave 
further reassurance to the family, and checked how Mrs Seward was coping. Kay 
interjected that her dad was struggling with walking.  A referral would be put 
through to the occupational therapist for this. The final action was Dr Ozha 
writing the prescription for the new medication and handing it to Kay.  
In spite of Mr Seward's situation being one which involved highly distressing and 
ongoing symptoms, in this 25 minute appointment the exercising of knowledge 
from the respective repertoires of Mr Seward, his daughter and wife, and Dr Ozha, 
seemed to combine together and bring about a resolution for that moment in time. 
There was no absolute solution to Mr Seward's difficulties but with the symptoms 
very clearly described by Mr Seward and his daughter a plan could then be 
devised by Dr Ozha, checked with the family for its acceptability, and then put in 
place.  Addressing difficult to manage symptoms of dementia to render them more 
manageable, although only a temporary solution, does push the ultimate 
inevitability of the end point of a trajectory of dementia away and further into the 
future. Reaching points of agreement through sharing knowledge and through 
negotiation - as was the case in looking at and finding a better way to manage Mr 
Seward's symptoms - would seem to be a cause for the individual with dementia 
and their family to have some hope.  
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Observation of a seminar for carers run through the Wellbeing College 
The Wellbeing College was the overarching banner under which was bundled all 
courses related to recovery in mental health. Out of the programme of courses 
was one course specifically designed for carers of people with dementia which 
was led by the senior occupational therapist Judith and co-facilitated by a former 
carer.  The course ran over four sessions, and I observed session three: 
"Understanding and living well with dementia".   
The session began with welcoming a mixed group of carers and people with 
dementia. Refreshments were available and there was a nice atmosphere of 
people talking and interacting. About fifteen minutes into the session Judith 
introduced the plan of how the session would work which was that the group 
would 'split' into two and there would be a seminar in one room and a physical 
activity session in the other.  The expectation, although not voiced, was that carers 
would separate from the person with dementia they cared for and go into the 
seminar group, whilst people with dementia would remain in the same room and 
participate in the activities session. This separation seemed relatively smooth and 
people who had been to either of the two previous sessions would have known 
that this is how the sessions were run.  
I joined the carer seminar in which there were five female carers and three male 
carers participating, plus the two facilitators. The session was introduced as being 
about understanding the different ways that dementia can affect a person's life at 
home. The 'tone' for the session was set by Judith's opening words to carers: 
"All the knowledge I have pales in comparison to the knowledge and 
experience you have as carers. I have the theory and professional 
knowledge".  (Fieldnote: 11/3/15) 
 
In Judith's words was the acknowledgement that there were different repertoires 
of knowledge - knowledge which arises from lived experience, theoretical 
knowledge, and professional knowledge. In Polanyian terms all knowledge is 
fundamentally tacit (Polanyi, 1961: 467).  The idea that carers are armed not with 
"professional" knowledge but with a different repertoire of experiential 
knowledge is an interesting one, and in the discussions within this seminar 
contrasts, as well as overlaps, between spheres of knowledge emerged.  Judith 
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talked through some of the resources available that carers might see as relevant 
and of interest - books on prescription, Alzheimer's Society information sheets, 
and national policies and resources. Judith probed a little deeper, asking carers 
what they hoped would be in national policies. The question clearly interested the 
carers and drew some enlivened responses. 
The first comment was - "joined up care for both the sufferer and the carer." This 
viewpoint snowballed into an exchange of responses and views about GP 
practices specifically: 
Carer: "I would hope they would bring GPs on board more, and they would 
show more interest." 
Carer: "We have a heart nurse at our surgery, but we don't have a dementia 
nurse." 
Judith (responding to first carer): "They are generalists - hopefully they 
know how to refer." 
Carer: "It is carers who know. GPs understand this, and will straight away 
write a referral to the specialist service." 
Carer: "At our practice we have 'I am a Carer'. You get the GP to sign it and it 
opens all the doors." 
Carer: "There's no 'line': today you're you, and tomorrow you're a carer. 
There's no card you can carry." (Fieldnotes [selected]: 11/3/15) 
 
This exchange of comments and views crystallises some essential characteristics 
of the lived experience of carers. Here it is indicated that carers are those who 
know: they know that something is not right about their partner, husband, mum, 
dad, sibling. GPs acknowledge this knowing as an expertise of carers that derives 
from intimate knowing. But, these comments also provide a poignant sense that as 
dementia is confirmed as a likely diagnosis in the person with suspected memory 
problems, the person who cares - a husband, wife or daughter - silently steps over 
a line into a new identity of a carer. 
A slide was put up by Judith with a quote from Tom Kitwood: "Once you have met 
one patient with dementia you have met one patient with dementia." This framed 
a group exercise which followed which was to list as many ways (as could be 
123 
 
thought of) that dementia could affect a person's daily life. Carers chipped in with 
suggestions from their own experiences:  
"safety - the gas cooker"; "loss of interest" (in things the person used to 
enjoy); "putting things away in different places than where they belong"; 
"passivity"; "loss of independence"; "problem solving ability"; "the financial 
side - things they used to do financially, and now they can't do them...and 
losing money as well". 
 
Some of these comments provoked knowing laughter from carers, and Judith 
commented that all of this was very serious but sometimes all you can do is laugh; 
humour could diffuse a situation. 
Carers highlighted some of the strategies they had adopted for improving 
communication with the person they cared for: 
Carer: "It's reducing choices, isn't it." I ask my wife to put her "black shoes 
on" or "walking boots". This was the carer's way of specifying the task". 
(Fieldnote: 11/3/15) 
 
The co-facilitator of the seminar, a former carer, then drew carers' attention to the 
book "Contented Dementia", from which she quoted the author's three 
commandments:  
- Don't ask questions; 
- Learn from the person what they can do; 
- Always agree, and walk into another room if necessary. 
Here, another way of approaching knowledge was offered: a co-producing of 
knowledge, but also an approach that reflects acknowledgement of the individual 
agency of the person with dementia. 
The seminar seemed to provide some positive time out for carers, during which 
they could share their expertise with other carers and gather some new insights 
and knowledge from carers and the facilitators. The "two groups" approach 
seemed satisfactory to carers, and perhaps the person with dementia knowing 
that their carer was nearby (in the adjacent room) and vice versa was a helpful 
way of structuring the sessions. 
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Home visits with Keith Chapman, a community psychiatric nurse  
Accompanying Keith on two consecutive home visits to the home of Mr Merfyn 
Jenkins represented my last contacts with patients connected to the memory 
service.  Out of all the observational work involving patients receiving a service 
through the memory team Merfyn was the only person I saw more than once.  
This came about because of luck and timing: Keith happened to be doing two 
home visits to Merfyn with only a month in between them, and both coincided 
with times when I was available.  
The visits to Merfyn felt qualitatively different to the other home visits which had 
all been with Laura, maybe partly because Keith had a different role to that of 
Laura's and a different personal style, but also perhaps because of the engagement 
with Merfyn being focused around an activity that was a particular passion for 
Merfyn and was an activity that he excelled in.  The accounts of the two home 
visits that follow are of a man with dementia who was able to preserve an entire 
skill-set, fully absorb himself in his hobby which, it seemed to me, allowed him to 
temporarily put aside his own sadness about the recent loss of his wife.  
 
First visit to Merfyn Jenkins 
I had already met Keith during my fieldwork visits to the CSD Centre, and he had 
said he would be happy for me to accompany him on some scheduled home visits.  
We had arranged that I would attend a home visit at Mr Merfyn Jenkins' home at 
2pm on March 11th 2015.  I arrived and waited on the pavement near to the 
house for about fifteen minutes, but there was no sign of Keith.  As I waited, 
Merfyn - who would have been expecting Keith to arrive - came out of his house 
and invited me in.  In the house Merfyn tried to explain to me that Keith had 
contacted his daughter to relay a message that the visit was cancelled. Merfyn 
seemed very sure that this was the case, and I could see that his account was 
consistent with there being no sign of Keith.  I made my goodbyes, promising that 
I would speak with Keith and find out when the appointment was going to be 
rescheduled. Once back at the car I realised that Keith had left a voicemail 
message saying that he had to cancel the visit at the last minute in order to cover 
the duty rota for the team.  
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The visit to Merfyn was promptly rescheduled by Keith, and a week later I arrived 
for the second time at Merfyn's home. He greeted Keith and me in Welsh and, once 
inside his home I realised that his welsh roots were of great importance to him. 
Keith had, on several previous occasions, been shown Merfyn's collection of 
photographs and prints of a bay in North Wales.  Now, as a first time visitor, it was 
my turn to be shown the pictures.  There were also photographs of his wife who 
within the past twelve months had died. Merfyn still felt this loss. His wife's 
bedroom he had kept as it was before she died - the bed made up and her personal 
items still in the room.  Just prior to the game of snooker Merfyn showed Keith 
and I his wife's room, and I imagined Keith had been shown the room on previous 
occasions. 
Merfyn said to Keith that he was looking forward to having a game of snooker 
with him; playing snooker was for Merfyn a great source of pleasure and he 
seemed to view it as the focus for the interaction with Keith. Upstairs Merfyn had 
a large room that he had converted into a snooker room, complete with a full sized 
table, a set of cues, scoring board, table light, and various certificates and trophies 
that indicated that Merfyn had been a serious player in his time. As the game 
between Merfyn and Keith commenced it was noticeable how good Merfyn was at 
explaining the rules of the game and the values of the individual balls, and that he 
also seemed instinctively to know in what order to pot the balls, knew exactly the 
scoring system, and at moments during the game offered advice to Keith on the 
best positioning for taking a particular shot. Merfyn was comfortable in the role of 
expert snooker player, and it was obvious that he was very knowledgeable of the 
game. However, this ease was disturbed by his awareness that memory problems 
were starting to creep up on him. 
  Merfyn:  "That's one thing I'm not doing as good - I miss things". 
  Keith:  "Do you wear glasses?" 
 "I notice that Merfyn then goes over to the cupboard, takes his glasses and 
puts them on". (Fieldnote: 17/3/15) 
 
The game continued with Merfyn noting that the game was at the stage where all 
the red balls were in the pockets and "we're both onto the colours".  
  Keith (to Merfyn):  "Have you mastered any tricks over the years?" 
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 Merfyn: "I don't think so". [...] "I've noticed already that you are a good 
player." (Fieldnote: 17/3/15) 
 
Merfyn's words suggested hesitation and doubt, and a sense that he felt unable to 
talk confidently about his own past achievements in snooker, even though to me it 
seemed clear that he had retained much of the silent, tacit knowledge required to 
play (and win) a game. Yet, the next moment he was explaining that he had a game 
of snooker with a friend the previous night and that he had potted the balls "one 
by one, and they were hard ones". (Fieldnote: 17/3/15)  The game with Keith 
ended, and Merfyn had won. He then instructed Keith on potting the remaining 
balls up, and himself re-arranged and reset the scoring board. 
Through activities that a person with dementia does over time, and repeatedly, it 
is often the case that changes in the person's abilities become noticeable. Merfyn 
had an awareness of change over time: he was aware that he would "miss things". 
In the snooker game he had forgotten to put his glasses on, although not forgotten 
where his glasses were.  There was doubt and uncertainty creeping in which 
coloured his appraisals of his own achievements - even his previous achievements 
in snooker, of which there was visible and tangible evidence in the various 
trophies and awards on display in the snooker room.  
During an interview with Keith three months later he described what the signs 
were of doing a good job day to day.  A key goal was to establish the confidence of 
people with dementia, and a sure sign of this was: 
"...that people let you back in their house"[...] "If they answer the phone to 
you, if they agree to another visit, then you’re doing something right." (Keith, 
interview: 4/6/15) 
 
The initial developing of a rapport with the person was extended into support and 
interventions:  
"And following that, I guess it’s just perception and how reactive they are to 
the different therapies and interventions that you might put forward, 
whether they complete them, whether they engage in that process or not.  
Because it’s easy to go in with a leaflet and a piece of paper and a direction 
and say, ‘Here, do this!’ but if you don’t put all of the colour around it as well 
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and the relationship, the rapport, the therapeutic alliance that goes with it, 
then it can get lost and people don’t place any value on it, so they’re less 
likely to do what you’re asking them to do. " (Keith, interview:4/6/15) 
 
This implies that a relationship involving getting to 'know' the person is key both 
because this is the basis for a therapeutic alliance and it is likely to be valued by 
the person, inferring too that this approach is valuing of the person.  Keith playing 
snooker - on every occasion that Merfyn wished it - could be viewed as an 
expression of entering the world of Merfyn.  Keith's approach also expressed a 
recognition of individual agency, particularly in the sense that snooker was a 
specific area where Merfyn's unique skills and sense of self were enacted. This 
chimes with Liaschenko's discussion of knowledge in nursing practice to affirm 
individual agency: 
"Knowledge of a person is partly a knowledge of how that person lives, as 
well as what she or he lives for."(Liaschenko, 1997:27, citing Charmaz, 1991)   
 
Second visit to Merfyn Jenkins 
I met Keith at Merfyn's home and we were greeted and invited into the house. We 
sat in the dining room and Merfyn recounted to us how, since Keith's last visit, he 
had been to the cemetery to his wife's grave, and that a memorial was now in situ 
containing a photograph of his wife and with a holder for flowers.  And set into the 
memorial were two stones from Cemaes Bay on Anglesey, a place depicted in 
many of Merfyn's paintings and which clearly had been an important place for him 
and his wife.  Merfyn went into the kitchen whilst Keith and I remained sitting. 
With Merfyn out of earshot Keith said to me that this was "quite positive", because 
usually Merfyn would have become upset by now, talking about the loss of his 
wife.  
When Merfyn re-entered the room Keith broached with him the subject of the 
carers who used to come in. Merfyn hadn't wanted to continue with the service 
and it had been stopped. Keith was raising the subject now because he wanted to 
check with Merfyn whether the current arrangement of his daughter calling in 
each day was working satisfactorily.  Merfyn reassured Keith that all was well and 
showed him the notebook which his daughter kept updated with entries detailing 
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recent activity. Keith continued to ask how things were generally with Merfyn - 
was he managing to sort out meals for himself, was he managing his medication? 
Merfyn described meal arrangements as "a mix of Tesco and Megan [his daughter] 
bringing meals".  But, he was having trouble with sleeping, he said. 
At this point Merfyn seemed to struggle to express himself, and it appeared to be a 
big effort for him to maintain the conversation with Keith. The difficulty was 
resolved by Merfyn thinking that he needed to call Megan, and initiating a phone-
call to her.  He was checking with her what time she would be calling in today. 
Having the time of Megan's visit clear seemed to reassure Merfyn who then 
suggested to Keith that they have a game of snooker. Upstairs Merfyn showed us 
more pictures of Anglesey, some of them in the spare bedroom. This was the room 
that we had been shown when we previously visited - the room that Merfyn's wife 
slept in prior to her death, and that had been kept in the same way since her 
death. Merfyn kissed the pillow, talking as though to his wife. He told us that he 
visited his wife's room and always cried.  
Soon a game of snooker was underway between Merfyn and Keith. In the relaxed 
atmosphere of the game Keith casually revisited Merfyn's earlier comment about 
having problems with sleeping: how was he managing sleep and not sleeping, and 
did he find it easier to sleep at night if he was active and busy during the day? 
Whether or not he did a lot in the day Merfyn noticed no difference to his sleep. 
Watching Merfyn play snooker - having earlier seen him struggle with finding the 
words when in conversation with Keith - he seemed more comfortable and more 
articulate in this role of playing. As the game progressed Merfyn occasionally 
interjected with hints and tips about techniques, directing his comments to Keith.  
Again, making the most of the easy and relaxed situation Keith asked Merfyn 
whether he wore glasses. Merfyn said that he did, but couldn't find them, to which 
Keith responded: 
"I was wondering if that was why your playing is a bit off today". (Fieldnote: 
21/4/15) 
 
Merfyn then potted the next ball, seemingly a retort to Keith's comment about the 
glasses. Keith potted the brown ball (in error) and it was put back on the table by 
Merfyn, who then potted another ball.  Taking a different cue and a stand from the 
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rack Merfyn tried another shot. He didn't get the one he attempted but then 
returned the cue he had just used and picked up the previously used cue. With this 
he took a very tricky shot, managing to hit the red ball, and at the next go he 
potted the red.  Following on with another tricky shot he was less successful - 
missing the shot and accidently potting the white and the black.  Seemingly in full 
command of the game he stated to Keith the value of the ball that Keith should try 
for, and offered instruction on exactly where he should aim the shot. Watching 
this interaction between the two men I was struck by Keith's approach: 
"There is a sense in Keith's approach of recognising Merfyn as the expert, a 
veteran. A sort of deference, or at least respect". (Fieldnote:21/4/15) 
 
Keith won the game, possibly a confirmation that Merfyn hadn't been quite on his 
usual form.  Merfyn instructed Keith on how to tidy the balls away - a further 
display of his expertise and his command over the playing of snooker on his 'home 
ground'.  He was also a good loser - evident in how he complimented Keith on his 
style and for winning the game. 
Keith and I left Merfyn's home, Merfyn giving me a hug goodbye - just a gesture of 
his appreciation of the visit, and the company it provided. It seemed to me that on 
both visits the snooker game was the real 'therapy', during which Merfyn relaxed, 
stepped into the role of expert and was perhaps more amenable to respond to 
questions or talk about himself than he would have been in a more typical style of 
home visit. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
In this chapter I have surfaced a number of ways in which knowledge might be 
characterised in a memory service: the idea of repertoires of knowledge and how 
individuals' current knowledge repertoire seems to reference the past (both 
illustrated in articulations of individual histories and insights about memory 
problems, and in the knowledge of clinicians which has been accumulated through 
professional training and practice);  and how these knowledge repertoires are 
brought to bear in the describing, explaining, assessing and diagnosing of memory 
problems.   
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To conclude this chapter I offer an articulation of how I see the linking together of 
the three concepts of tacit knowledge, practice and time. 
Time is implicated in memory loss. It is indicated in aspects such as the rapidity of 
memory loss, and that memory might seem to be better on some days than others.  
Memory deterioration is gradual and occurs over time, yet there cannot be 
assumed to be a pattern or regular gradient to this deterioration, as with Mrs 
Maddox whose husband perceived her memory loss as intermittent.  The effect of 
certain dementia drugs such as Donepezil is to maintain memory function on a 
plateau, seemingly giving people 'more time' in a maintained status of cognitive 
acuity.   
Whilst cognitive function becomes more impaired over time, this increasing 
impairment is not, of itself, a reliable indicator of a parallel increase in risks.  In 
the case of Mr Powell - a man who had not lost the ability to drive - unregulated 
alcohol consumption was nevertheless a factor that potentially rendered driving 
risky.  
When individuals have their memories assessed, this might bring to mind 
thoughts of other people they know with memory problems. However, these 
thoughts might be uncomfortable as seemed to be the case for Mrs Eadie who 
voiced her thoughts about her friend's husband with memory problems: "I'm not 
like that at all." The main difference, perhaps, between Mrs Eadie and the husband 
of her friend was simply that she had lived for less time with memory problems 
than he had. 
 
In trying to express how these insights might link together knowledge, time and 
practice, I start by drawing out the idea that at the point when individuals and 
carers have their initial appointment with Laura or Dr Ozha the situation is one of 
the individual having experiential knowledge of memory problems.  Yet, at this 
stage the individual lacks an explanation of the nature of the problem, a 'name' 
that defines it, and knowledge of what will happen with the problem as time 
passes.   
The clinician's knowledge is crucial not just for establishing what the problem is, 
but also for anticipating the various scenarios that could unfold for the individual, 
and for commanding a sequence of next steps (e.g. referring the person for a scan, 
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or signposting to support in applying for attendance allowance).  Given that the 
clinician has encountered people previously whose cases resemble those of the 
person being seen now, it is probable that this knowledge is helping the clinician 
to understand this person.  For example, in the case of Ms Evans Laura's clinical 
knowledge meant that she was familiar with the effects of a benign but growing 
Meningioma and the risks associated with this. Yet, perhaps because she grasped 
that what mattered to Ms Evans was to continue to live at home, Laura respected 
and did not try to dissuade Ms Evans in her wish to remain at home. 
Detailed predictions of how dementia will affect how an individual's situation or 
how the person's future might unfold are likely to be unreliable simply because of 
the many variables in each instance of a person living with dementia. However, 
Benner (1982:127-128) has suggested that clinicians make "use of past, concrete 
experience as paradigms." What might be taken from this in relation to clinicians 
working in memory services is that knowledge from past practice experience may 
help to inform a current or emergent situation of a person with dementia.  
 
How the interlinking between knowledge, time, and practice might be expressed 
is to say that a clinician brings to the memory appointment clinical knowledge of 
how memory problems affect individuals and how symptoms and risks may be 
managed and, because the clinician knows how dementia affects people, she can 
also advise on what considerations and preparations for the future might be 
helpful for people with dementia and carers.  Time and practice are what have 
forged the knowledge of the clinician, whereas we might say that the individual's 
knowledge has been forged by lived experience of memory problems. A carer's 
knowledge spans time, but in a different manner to that of the clinician: a carer 
knows the person as they were before dementia and as they are now.  In the 
appointment the clinician, person with memory problems and carer use 
knowledge from the past to bring to bear on the current situation, as well as on 
any future concerns.  
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Chapter 5.  Case Study of a Social Care site  
Preamble: the service context for fieldwork  
Oak Hall is a local authority run two storey purpose-built facility for care, known 
as a Community Support Centre.  Located in the town of Northweston, it hosts 
three services: an intermediate care service supporting people without dementia 
between hospital discharge to home or into permanent care, or from home into a 
permanent care home placement; a respite service for people with learning 
disabilities catering mainly for people living in the community whose care 
arrangements or general living situation has broken down in some way; and a 
respite and a day-care service for people diagnosed with dementia residing in 
Polshire area.  It is this latter service for people with dementia that my case study 
is constructed around. 
The facility where respite and day-care is provided is called the Minton Suite, but 
the service is known and referred to as 'Oak Hall' by carers, clients and staff.  The 
staff team - as it was for the 13-month duration of my fieldwork - consisted of an 
operational manager, a deputy manager, four receptionists, an activity worker, 
and a team of care workers and senior care workers (known as 'seniors').  All staff 
are employees of Polshire council.  When I commenced fieldwork in May 2014 a 
new manager had just started in post. This was to change four months later at the 
end of September when the manager left her post and a new manager started.   
 
The scope and account of fieldwork  
Research fieldwork was conducted at Oak Hall over a thirteen month period from 
May 2014 until June 2015.  Mainly, my observational work focused on interactions 
between clients and care staff. The exceptions were two observations of staff 
meetings, namely a half-hour hand-over meeting and one three-hour management 
meeting.  Observational work was supplemented by semi-structured interviews 
with five members of care staff, one of whom was the Activities Co-ordinator.  
 
Unlike at the NHS memory service where my observations were almost 
exclusively 'one-offs' of  individuals in memory appointments, at the social care 
service I had repeat contact with the same individuals with dementia (and in some 
cases their carers) over time.  This reality of fieldwork afforded me the 
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opportunity with at least some of my participants to 'follow' some aspects of their 
lives.  Conversations I had with individuals, and the interactions between 
individuals and staff that I observed, triggered in me insights about people's 
personal stories and experiences.  I reflected on how people's stories have past, 
present and future dimensions, and how certain fragments of an individual's 
storyline may become surfaced during a conversation or are gleaned from seeing 
an individual demonstrating a competence during an activity (for example, calling 
for a game of bingo signals that the person has probably previously done this). 
Being party to the storylines of participants with dementia was one way through 
which I could get to know my participants.   
When deciding how to write my account of fieldwork at Oak Hall I wanted to try 
both to conserve the notion of past, present, future experiences as interlinked 
across the entirety of a life, and to reflect the sense of multiple times spent with 
the same individuals. I thought that a chronological account of my fieldwork 
would probably prohibit the threading together of several lots of observations of 
one person from different points in time.  To illustrate, I write about my first 
encounter with Stuart at Oak Hall, and immediately follow this with my visit to his 
parents' home, even though there were several weeks between these two events.  
My data is organised and elaborated on under conceptual headings (e.g. Arriving 
and departing).  
 
Detailed summary of fieldwork 
The fieldwork took place between May 6th 2014 and October 7th 2015. Fieldwork 
involved in situ observations involving a total of 27 individuals from whom signed 
consent had been obtained. Of these, ten were people with dementia – consent 
being provided by the person with dementia except in two cases where a 
caregiver gave consent as nominated consultee. Twelve of the individuals were 
frontline care staff and five were managers. Observations took place at Oak Hall in 
the day-care lounge, the adjacent kitchen, the two smaller lounges, and the team 
meeting room.  Five members of the care staff team participated in individual 
semi-structured interviews. 
Three public council meetings held in council buildings I attended in person, and 
one council meeting I viewed subsequently via the broadcast of the webcam. 
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I visited the home of the family carers of one person with dementia who at the 
time was staying at Oak Hall whilst being assessed, and I visited one person with 
dementia and their spouse in their own home. 
Nine months into my fieldwork I presented some slides about my fieldwork and 
early thoughts about findings to a group of seven clients, four members of staff 
and two family carers. This was an informal session followed by a discussion. 
In total about 96 hours were spent in observation, interviews, home visits and 
attending meetings. This did not include travel time to the sites of fieldwork or 
administrative time. 
 
Introduction to Oak Hall staff 
My first visit to Oak Hall Community Support Centre (hereafter referred to as Oak 
Hall) was arranged during a phone conversation with the newly appointed 
manager, Cath.  She suggested that attending the seniors' meeting would be a 
good way for meeting staff and introducing myself. 'Seniors' were staff who had 
responsibility for each shift or, in the case of day-care, the senior on duty who 
planned and led activities in the day-care room.   
My thinking was to try to impart to this group of staff the research project, what 
the project entailed, and to answer any questions. The reality was somewhat 
different.  
At the meeting on May 8th 2014 I spoke briefly about the proposed research 
study, including what my hopes were in terms of recruitment and involvement of 
staff and people with dementia: 
"From the responses from staff to my introduction - no questions and 
something I interpreted as a sense of awkwardness - I felt that staff probably 
did not fully understand what I would be doing, but I was hoping this 
understanding would develop over time. In retrospect introducing the 
research was a necessary formality to go through but not something that I 
felt had helped people to understand the research project." (Fieldnote: 
10/5/14) 
 
A few months into my fieldwork - when I was regularly spending time in day-care, 
and staff and clients were used to seeing me - I adjusted these first impressions of 
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staff's responses to the project.  Most staff seemed willing to keep an open mind 
about why I was there and what I was doing. As time went by there were 
instances where staff provided 'tip offs' and snippets of knowledge, such as a 
nurse who also worked at another care facility telling me about what she viewed 
as the very positive care philosophy there, and suggesting that it may be 
interesting for me to visit. 
Another snippet of information had emerged from a conversation with Cath after 
the first seniors' meeting I attended. She had explained that it was a new 
experience for staff to have a researcher in situ at Oak Hall.  I was unaware of 
what conversations, if any, had taken place between Cath and my original contact 
person, the Commissioning Manager for Children, Families and Adults.  Cath was 
fairly new in post at Oak Hall, and I thought it unlikely that during that short time 
she would have been involved in decisions about a research project, but I just did 
not know.  As a researcher I had an 'agenda' of objectives, the primary one being 
to successfully complete fieldwork.  Fieldwork itself was contingent on having 
access to potential participants, obtaining consent, and being able to collect data. 
Furthermore, an aspect of being granted local research permissions to conduct 
research at Oak Hall was my agreement to produce an end of fieldwork report. 
Once in the field these various fieldwork activities required ongoing negotiation - 
finding out what would work in situ (e.g. how to approach potential participants) 
whilst being sensitive to and mindful of everyday constraints in this environment.  
 
Introduction to the building, clients, and the service provided  
The respite and day-care service is located in the Minton Suite - a wing that was 
added to the existing Oak Hall building in 2012 at a cost of £500,000.  The wing 
provides twelve respite beds and twelve day care places for people with a 
diagnosis of dementia. It is named after "Minton Lodge", the council's former local 
centre of excellence for dementia care where seventeen assessment and respite 
places to people with dementia had been provided.  Minton Lodge was sold by the 
council in 2010 and subsequently demolished in 2012, then replaced with a 
housing development.  When the Minton Lodge service closed its respite and day-
care facility was transferred to Oak Hall.  The reprovisioned service fits the 
description of a specialist facility, as defined by Bamford et al (2009:30): 
136 
 
"Specialist Respite Facility: Provision of overnight respite, sometimes in 
conjunction with day care. Some facilities also provide residential/nursing 
care." 
 
On my second visit to Oak Hall Cath gave me a tour of the building. I was shown 
the Day Care lounge and dining room - primarily for people with dementia - then 
the corridors where there were bedrooms, sluices, and another lounge. We went 
into a couple of the unoccupied bedrooms, used for respite breaks by people with 
dementia.  I was struck by the manager's emphasis on the physical aspects of the 
building, particularly her highlighting of the state-of-the-art hoist tracker system 
in most of the bedrooms, which enabled staff to hoist a person easily between 
bedroom and en-suite bathroom. The mirrors in each bedroom were also pointed 
out and I was told that each mirror had wooden shutters that could be drawn 
across the mirror so that anyone distressed at seeing their reflection - perhaps not 
recognising who they saw - could keep the shutters drawn across.  The corridor 
where all the bedrooms were was light and airy and had lots of windows, as well 
as some seating areas.  Further on in my fieldwork I did see people with dementia 
using the seating areas. 
I was shown a very attractive and well maintained landscaped garden which could 
be accessed from either of the two lounges and had a covered walkway so that 
people with dementia could go in the garden safely and walk a whole loop through 
and then back into either lounge and along the corridor back to the day-care 
lounge. I imagined that this was designed to engender in the person with 
dementia a sense that they were progressing from place to place, rather than 
merely walking round in a loop. 
The respite part of the building was a place where people temporarily lived and it 
was here that there were the bedrooms, bathrooms and sluices.   
"I did notice the smell of the physical building, generated (no doubt) from 
toilets, the sluice, just people's bodily stuff." (Fieldnote: 20.5.14) 
 
The purpose of the Oak Hall building, its architectural features, and the 'feel' of it 
for me as a visitor-researcher is worth a brief reflection.  In my earlier working 
life I had worked in care homes for people with dementia, visited people in care 
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homes, been into long-stay institutions, worked with people with learning 
disabilities after they had been resettled from long-stay hospitals, and read and 
heard first-hand accounts about life in an institution. My acclimatisation to Oak 
Hall had a very personal dimension in which past experiences sensitised me to the 
Oak Hall environment in particular ways. For example, the locked door between 
the day-care lounge and the rest of the building reminded me of a previous 
situation I had encountered in which people were told by staff that they could not 
leave. Robinson (2004) explains how the architectural features of a building and 
its equipment and furnishings 'cue' behaviours, expectations, and beliefs.  There is 
potency to this cueing process because it engages subconscious aspects of 
ourselves such as our memory of other experiences and, furthermore, if we then 
enter the specific building we are likely to adopt particular behaviours that are 
normatively correct for that environment (Robinson, 2004:13).  Wolf 
Wolfensberger (1969) coined the term the "language of architecture" to suggest 
that a building's architecture is infused with the attitudes and philosophies of the 
designers and those that guide and direct them. This idea he applied to the 
architecture of institutions to which people who are devalued, or are at risk of 
being devalued, have a direct association (for example, a medium secure mental 
health unit).  To reduce the risk of negative associations relating to architectural 
forms and devalued persons, over-compensatory measures should be adopted in 
the creation of what Wolfensberger termed "supra-normative" environments 
containing value-enhancing features and excluding stigmatising ones: 
[if]"a person or group is already devalued or at risk, processes and 
juxtapositions should not merely be statistically normative ones, but should 
even go further by being supra-normative in the sense of actually adding 
extra value projection to the person or group. For example [...] the interior of 
a residence for devalued people should be even a bit more attractive and 
clean than average homes". (Wolfensberger in Bednar, 1977:159) 
 
In Oak Hall my first impressions of the material environment were coloured by 
noticing traces of institutional regimes. The entry and exit doors to the respite 
area and the day-care lounge were locked and only accessible with a swipe-card, 
which only staff had.  Seats in the main day-care lounge were arranged in a large 
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circle, and the high-backed chairs looked as though they would be unwieldy to 
move and rearrange in a different way. Yet, such traces of institutional life were 
juxtaposed with other factors such as friendliness and kindness of staff, and the 
general look and feel of homeliness that staff had created. 
As we walked around Cath introduced me to several people with dementia 
including one man who had been resident at Oak Hall for several months.  
Decisions were pending about a suitable permanent care placement for him. 
Much later on in my fieldwork I heard the term 'over-stayer' used by the leader of 
the council during a public meeting to describe people whose stay at community 
support centres exceeded the 'maximum' respite care period of 29 days.  Stays of 
more than 29 days were deemed as "permanent care" which the council was not 
licensed to provide.  I thought it was telling that I never heard this 'rule' 
mentioned by the manager or any of the staff at Oak Hall. 
During the tour of the building I broached with Cath the delicate issue of clients' 
consent in relation to my research project.  Her view was that many - possibly 
most - of the people with dementia using services at Oak Hall were unlikely to 
have capacity to consent.  I felt unsure how to interpret her seemingly broad 
statement about capacity: whether the implication was that I should work from 
the basis of not assuming capacity and steer down the Nominated Consultee route. 
The assumption of capacity - unless there is evidence confirming lack of capacity - 
is made clear in the Mental Capacity Act (2005).  The Act also acknowledges that 
capacity is subject to fluctuations, and is topic and time specific.  Cath's comments, 
which may simply have been her way of alerting me to the basic challenges 
associated with obtaining consent from people with dementia, usefully provoked 
me to reflect on the possible variations and viewpoints about ethics.  That is, how 
did practitioners address ethical issues arising in day-to-day practice (I thought it 
likely that this would be mainly along pragmatic lines), and were there any formal 
mechanisms for monitoring of ethical issues in frontline local authority services? 
And, importantly, what were the ethical issues of concern to people with dementia 
and carers?   The concerns of carers and people with dementia did come to the 
fore in a rather unexpected way in July 2014: a local newspaper headlined that the 
council were considering closing the service to people with dementia at Oak Hall.   
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Recruitment and establishing myself as researcher in the field 
In the first months of fieldwork between May and July 2014 I visited Oak Hall once 
a week, typically arriving around 09:30 and staying until lunch was served at 
around 12.15.  On the few occasions I spent time at Oak Hall in afternoons I found 
it seemed not such a good time to engage individuals in conversation as people 
often fell asleep or appeared less energised.   
My efforts were initially put into the practicalities of meeting and introducing 
myself to people with dementia, usually in the day-care lounge; and also in 
negotiating with the administrative and reception staff the most effective way to 
make contact with carers to inform them of the research project.  It was suggested 
by the manager and the administrative staff that I provided participant 
information sheets and consent forms for inclusion in the Oak Hall welcome pack - 
posted out to all new clients.  I agreed to this approach, which seemed promising, 
and by early July 2014 a trickle of signed consent forms began arriving at Oak 
Hall, mostly signed by carers rather than the person with dementia.  
I was in regular contact with one of the members of the administrative team 
(Karen) by email.  She became my main contact for getting information out to 
potential participants. 
"I had received an email from Karen requesting more SAEs and consent 
forms. Decided that - on the basis that carers had signed the forms in both 
instances - the best, though not ideal, approach would be to give Oak Hall 
Consultee forms. My concerns about doing this are that it makes a huge 
assumption that people are unable to consent for themselves, and also I risk 
the chance that carers will not fully understand the 'consultee' form. Tricky 
really." [Fieldnote: 9/7/14] 
 
These first fieldwork visits typically involved me sitting in the day-care room with 
people with dementia and staff, chatting with people, and joining in activities.  I 
adopted a mind-set oriented towards noticing what was happening in the 
environment, the conversations and interactions taking place between people, 
care practices; and trying to pick up on clues to emergent 'story-lines'.  Alongside 
my orientation towards becoming immersed I was aware that I needed to start to 
approach individuals with dementia to introduce my role and my research project 
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at Oak Hall.  Every visit offered the possibility for recruiting a person with 
dementia or a staff member, and so I always carried with me a folder containing 
participant information sheets, consent forms and Nominated Consultee forms.  I 
adopted a fairly stock way of introducing the research to people with dementia:  
- Asking the individual if I may sit by them and introduce what I was doing at 
Oak Hall.  If the person agreed, I described the research purpose as being to 
try to understand how staff used their knowledge to help and support people. 
I offered an information sheet to the person, and drew attention to the part 
about observing and what this meant (i.e. sitting in the room, looking, making 
notes). I then asked the person how they would feel about me doing some 
observations of them. If the person indicated being content, I then asked 
directly whether or not they were willing to give me permission to do so. This 
was the basis for introducing the consent form and requesting signed consent.  
 
Directly recruiting people with dementia (rather than approaching a carer to be a 
Nominated Consultee) involved me making judgements about the person's 
comprehension of what it meant to give consent. I could not know in any 
definitive sense whether an individual had fully grasped what I was asking, but I 
approached people assuming their capacity.  There were people who I did not 
approach directly: individuals who I could see still interacted with staff, and 
sometimes participated in activities, but whose verbalisations were single words 
or sounds from which it was impossible to know the meaning or what the person 
wished to impart.  I drew on the knowledge of day-care staff about individuals and 
their life situations, and this coloured my thoughts about whether to approach a 
person or not. For example, I discovered from talking with Kate and Jan the 
general unhappiness of one man who did not want to be at Oak Hall and had to 
comply with specific dietary restrictions. Understandably this resulted in him 
being short tempered and usually reluctant to take part in any activities.  Even 
though this man was quite articulate and would have been likely to understand 
and be able to provide consent, I did not want to put him in a situation where he 
might have felt another demand was being placed on him.  Two individuals - 
Andrew and Stuart - I realised I would not be able to obtain informed consent 
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directly from and I approached their respective carers who agreed to be 
Nominated Consultees. 
Three other individuals who I had spent time talking with and recognised it was 
very unlikely that they would be able to provide informed consent, had family 
involved.  One of these individuals was dropped off at Oak Hall by her husband, 
who often appeared concerned and stressed. In theory the point at which a carer 
dropped off or collected the person was a good time to speak with them, but in 
reality this was probably one of the most stressful points of the day for carers.  
Dropping off and then leaving the person involved separation which was not 
necessarily what the person with dementia wanted, and carers undoubtedly knew 
this and had their own feelings about this to somehow manage.  I decided it would 
be insensitive for me to use this moment to approach carers, unless an 
arrangement had been agreed in advance to meet with a carer at this point.   
My other options for approaching carers were: to offer an information sheet to 
carers to take with them when they dropped of the person with dementia (which I 
did in one instance but it did not open up an opportunity to follow up with the 
carer); to write to carers (in one case a carer I wrote to about being a Nominated 
Consultee did not respond to my letter, and in another case there were no contact 
details available for me to write to the son of a lady with dementia).  
The first person recruited into my research project was in early July 2014.  The 
last person I recruited in February 2015 - a gentleman with dementia who I saw 
infrequently but always had a chat to when his respite stay coincided with one of 
my visits. 
 
Arriving and departing: a practical representation 
It was typical that at the point when I arrived at Oak Hall at around 9:30am I 
would see several clients already in the day-care lounge - usually people who 
were staying in respite care.  Other people would be having breakfast in the dining 
area, visible from the main day-care lounge through an always open sliding door.  
Two or more members of staff, one a senior, were there preparing for that day's 
session and welcoming people with dementia as they arrived  - generally 
transported in for the day by a family carer or sometimes by a taxi driver. In the 
lounge and dining area it was common to see five or six members of the care team 
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involved in various day-to-day activities such as assisting individuals with 
breakfast, chatting to people in the day-care lounge, reading through handover 
information, and writing notes.  When a carer left the building after dropping off  
the individual with dementia it was usually to do something that was easier 
accomplished alone, such as shopping or going to the hairdresser's or bank.  
On arrival at Oak Hall people with dementia signed in at reception - maybe having 
a brief chat with the reception staff - then were shown through an opaque glass 
door into the day-care lounge, an area that was only accessible using the swipe 
card which all staff carried.  The panelled glass wall between the day-care lounge 
and the corridor led to reception in one direction and in the other direction to the 
staffroom, manager's office and the kitchen.  This partitioning wall had been 
draped with curtains so that any activity in the corridor could not be seen by 
clients who were in the day-care lounge, and the frosted glass of the locked door 
also prevented seeing in or seeing out.  The basic premise of the door that was 
locked and therefore impossible to exit from (without a swipe card) was to reduce 
the risk of people with dementia absconding from the building.  However, this 
didn't mean that people didn't try.  Michael, a man who was always dropped off at 
day-care by his wife, must have realised that the day-care lounge door was the 
main entry and exit point and would often go up to the door, try to open it, try 
again, and then either give up or become frustrated and demand to leave.  Often 
staff were able to distract him with the offer of a cup of tea, but occasionally there 
was a minor altercation in which Michael would protest, raise his voice, swear, 
and staff would respond by very firmly stating that he needed to stay here until 
his wife came to collect him later on.   
Arrivals and departures took on particular meanings in the context of day-care 
and respite care at Oak Hall. There were arrival-departure events that were of 
very short duration, such as the individual with dementia and their carer arriving 
then the carer promptly leaving in order to minimise disruption or upset to the 
person.  At a practical level moments of arrival were opportunities for carers to 
pass information about the person with dementia to care staff: relaying that an 
individual had a poor night's sleep, for example, signalled to care staff that the 
person may be tired and more likely to fall asleep during the day. Arrivals for 
respite care were more complex events, drawn out in time. They involved 
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bringing items the person needed for their stay such as clothing, toiletries, and 
medication, and usually there was a handover between carer and a staff member. 
Arrivals and departures of staff starting or ending their shift, or to attend the 
handover meetings at the beginnings and ends of shifts were everyday events.  
Perhaps less obvious, but equally interesting, were instances of attempted 
departure (as in the example of Michael) that remained uncompleted, prevented 
by the locked door.  Other forms of departure included temporary halts or 
suspension in using the day or respite service, common in instances where a 
person was unwell, and stayed at home, or had been admitted to hospital.  
Entry into a nursing home was generally a sign that the person could no longer be 
managed at home, and represented not only a permanent cessation in using the 
services at Oak Hall, but also signalled the near certainty that the person would 
not return home. For a spouse or other family carer of an individual with 
dementia - even in cases of the individual eventually entering permanent care - 
there is a journey towards this for the carer and the individual which is gradual. In 
the general instances I have already described there was a sense in which 
dropping off the person with dementia for the day or for a weekend or longer 
respite break became a familiar pattern that perhaps enabled individual and carer 
to get used to periods of separation.  
 
I was also party to the narratives of specific individuals whose impairments 
seemed to become more apparent over the duration of fieldwork. These were 
small fragments of information about individual journeys, through which I 
learned of particular events in a person's life from which change ensued that 
seemed to affect both the individual and their carer. Out of six people who I met 
during my fieldwork who all eventually moved into permanent care there were 
two people - Stuart and William (participants in this research)- whose lives I came 
to know about, mainly through meeting their carers and other family members.   
William, who I recruited into my research project within the first couple of 
months of starting fieldwork, is married to Cherry.  She wrote to me early on in 
my fieldwork inviting me to visit her and William at their home, keen that I should 
meet William in his home environment. My first visit to their home was one 
evening in September 2014, during which I learned a little about their life 
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together and the changes that Cherry saw in William related to dementia.  Over 
the following nine months there were about four occasions when my fieldwork 
visits to Oak Hall coincided with one of William's stays in respite care.  Shortly 
after completion of fieldwork at Oak Hall I heard that William had fallen at home. I 
subsequently visited Cherry and heard from her how William had fallen late at 
night and despite considerable effort she found it impossible to get him up. The 
paramedics were called.  As a result of the fall he was promptly admitted to a local 
residential care home, an interim placement whilst the options could be 
considered. This seemed like an inevitability.  The precarity of the situation 
leading up to William’s admission could be described in terms of Cherry’s coping 
with all aspects of care for William who himself was becoming less mobile. Cherry 
had problems with her back, undoubtedly further aggravated by physically 
assisting William to the bathroom and bedroom which were upstairs. It had been 
Cherry's firm wish to continue to care for William at home, but this option now 
retreated following William's admission into interim care.  The fall seemed to me 
to represent a defining moment of diminishing options.  In fact, unless Cherry 
thought that she could manage William back at home, there was no choice other 
than entry into permanent care:  a transition that seemed to symbolise a 
relinquishing of care responsibilities from a carer to a care home.  At the time 
William fell there were no care home places available locally, therefore the place 
initially offered for William was some distance from their home.  This was 
unsatisfactory and Cherry was insistent to the social worker that William should 
be somewhere close to her.  By late 2015 William had moved into permanent care, 
where he remains, a mile from his original home. His departure from his home 
and entry into permanent care marked profoundly a separation between William 
and Cherry, perhaps unimagined by either of them even just a few years earlier.  
There was another type of departure that signified endings that were final and 
involved loss, such as people dying or the 'taking away' or removal of certain 
things permanently.   During the time that I conducted fieldwork at Oak Hall none 
of the people I had met died, but I knew individuals - such as Michael - who lost 
faculties or whose faculties became irreversibly impaired through a particular 
health crisis.  
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As well as personal forms of loss there are losses and permanent ‘takings away’ 
that can affect people collectively.  One such taking away occurred during my 
fieldwork stage.  This was the closing and removing of the county's two council 
run day and respite services for people with dementia - Oak Hall and Long Edge – 
an important event for carers and people with dementia, and one which I give an 
account of at the end of chapter 5. 
 
Memory of the past and thoughts of the future  
Having a dementia-type memory problem is the essential eligibility criteria for an 
individual to use the services provided at Oak Hall, and so almost by definition 
'memory' is significant.  
Many of the activities that took place in the day-care lounge were structured 
around a memory frame of reference.  Activities such as quizzes and crosswords 
taxed people's abilities to remember.  Reminiscence activities involved objects 
from the past which individuals were gently encouraged to engage with for 
jogging memories of past experiences.  For singing sessions songbooks were 
provided so people could follow the words and sing or hum the tune.  Games such 
as bingo or skittles provided opportunities for people to exercise previously 
learned skills.  
There were people I met at Oak Hall - Claire and Andrew for example - whose 
reduced verbal repertoire became noticeable when staff, or I, tried to engage them 
in conversation. Yet, people who seemingly struggled to converse could still 
surprise by uttering the correct answer to a quiz question at the right time, or 
knowing all the words to a song.   
Out of all the people I met at Oak Hall it was Paul who maintained the abilities to 
articulate his thoughts about past, present and future with great clarity.  It was 
within the first few weeks of fieldwork that Paul and I met. He was one of the 
youngest people with dementia I encountered at Oak Hall.  Over the fieldwork 
period I felt that he was a 'constant' in that not only did our paths cross most 
weeks, but also that when they did Paul would often update me on the events he 
had witnessed, some funny, others sad, but all insightful of everyday life at Oak 
Hall.  Paul did not sit with other clients in the circle of chairs arranged around the 
edges of the lounge, but instead sat at a table outside of the circle, near the main 
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door.  Shortly before I first introduced myself to Paul I had heard from a member 
of staff what seemed to represent the consensus view that the reason he always 
sat at a table at the side of the room attending to activities he brought with him 
was because he had previously been a teacher.  Paul's own account was 
qualitatively different, and served to highlight how he saw himself positioned 
currently in relation to his diagnosis of dementia. He described to me how he sat 
at the edge of the room looking in because:  
[Paul]"wants to convey a slight 'distance', not from people but more from the 
future in terms of developing dementia himself." (Fieldnote - 9/7/14). 
  
Paul had a diagnosis of Pick's Disease - a frontotemporal form of dementia.  Up 
until near the end of my fieldwork at Oak Hall he was very aware of the likely 
trajectory of his dementia and how it would affect his needs and abilities over the 
next couple of years: the near future.  However, all this was brought into question 
sometime during the last couple of months I was conducting fieldwork.  A new 
picture had begun to unfold concerning Paul's future.  From a conversation with 
his consultant psychiatrist Paul had found out that he was one of only a handful of 
people affected by Pick's Disease in whom the characteristics came together in an 
atypical way, involving less severe effects.  This revised prognosis was presented 
to Paul by the health professionals involved in his care who were suggesting in 
fairly optimistic and confident terms that he should expect to be invited for a 
review in two years' time with no major deterioration anticipated within that 
timeframe.  Paul and his wife were thus presented with a revised future, different 
to the one that they had started to prepare themselves for psychologically and in 
terms of practical measures they had begun to put in place.  Paul was upbeat 
about this latest appraisal of a much slower decline, and laughingly told me that 
there was now a possibility that he may 'outlive' his wife.  However, it was not all 
plain sailing just because of this less gloomy prognosis: the emergence of a new 
problem - that Paul's eyesight was affected by Pick's Disease - was quite a blow. 
The healthcare team had referred him to an eye specialist to see what could be 
done to optimise his vision, but I realised that the deterioration in Paul's eyesight 
concerned him.   
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Paul always brought with him a sketch pad and would draw pictures of scenes 
within Oak Hall including of clients, the lounge area, and the garden, explaining to 
me that nobody was allowed to take photographs within the building so drawing 
was his way of developing a record of his experiences at Oak Hall.  I suspected that 
deteriorating eyesight would bring an end to his drawings, even though failing 
eyesight was perhaps the trade-off for a slower decline in cognitive capabilities.   
 
 
Figure 1: Drawing by Paul: researcher (SM) taking fieldnotes in situ at Oak Hall, 
22/04/15 
 
Life expectancy of people living with dementia might be viewed as a temporal 
aspect of dementia.  In frontotemporal type dementias - of which Pick's Disease is 
one - there is a specificity to projections about life expectancy.  In terms of 
number of years the outlook can be gloomy.  From the initial onset of symptoms of 
frontotemporal dementia life expectancy averages 6.6 - 9 years, but from the time 
of diagnosis life expectancy is only 3-4 years on average (Wilfong et al, 2016).  The 
degree to which temporal expectations are known with certainty, Glaser and 
Strauss suggest, "becomes a crucial condition for the people involved" (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1971:34).  The first that Paul knew about what was, essentially, a revised 
temporal framing to his diagnosis of Pick's Disease was during his conversation 
with the psychiatrist.  Up until this point Paul's view about his future was 
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informed by and in accordance with the original assessment by the healthcare 
team.  The further examinations and tests he had undergone had revealed new 
factors and new information that threw the original 'certainties' into disarray. In 
their theory of status passage Glaser and Strauss (1971) draw attention to how 
uncertain timings may be dealt with by those who have roles as legitimators for a 
passage. Legitimators are those individuals who have rightful authority, related 
(usually) to specialist knowledge about a particular passage.  In uncertain 
situations one possibility is for legitimators to develop a "'wait and see' passage", 
permitting them "to work in a temporal vacuum" (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:37).   
Given what Paul had said about the expected delay in deterioration (the 
healthcare team's confidence that Paul would continue to maintain his current 
level of wellbeing at least for the next two years, and quite possibly beyond) it 
seemed that Paul would have more time before seeing any deterioration. This idea 
of the bestowing of time by legitimators has been termed "promised time" (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1971:37). In Paul's case, this was time that neither he nor his wife or 
family expected.  The judgement by legitimators (in this case the healthcare team) 
that there will be more time has been suggested as crucial (Glaser and Strauss, 
1971:37) because it means that the legitimator(s) have "a structural prerogative 
to create a timing for the passage by which others may (even should) then 
organize their behaviour for its duration".   
In Paul's case this might well mean that his appointments with the consultant 
psychiatrist would be able to be planned further ahead into the future.  There 
might be a relaxing of the intensity and frequency of checking the status of Pick’s 
disease in light of a different picture of the future emerging. With expectations 
about when Paul would become more impaired now changed, the possibility that 
Paul may manage for longer living in his own home was now a real prospect. 
There were also grounds for hope that permanent care might not have to be 
considered, at least not in the near future.  Perhaps the amount of day-care and 
respite care  would need 'upping', or fine tuning of existing arrangements in some 
way to support a continuation of living at home.  
 
The situation of Stuart - a man with Down syndrome who had begun to have 
significant memory problems - illustrates ideas about the significance of being 
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known by others when someone is no longer able to speak of one's own history. 
Stuart arrived at Oak Hall in August 2014, the plan being to assess his needs so 
that provision could be made for his ongoing care.  Stuart had all but lost his 
ability to verbally communicate in a coherent way, and gaining a sense from him 
of what he knew about his recent past was unachievable. However, aspects of 
Stuart's story did become apparent through my own encounter with him and 
through his parents' account during my meeting with them.   
When I encountered Stuart at Oak Hall in mid-August 2014 I immediately 
recognised him as somebody I knew from about 15 years previously when I was 
involved in a local advocacy organisation that supported people with learning 
disabilities: 
"The biggest shock was seeing Stuart (I used to know him from Advocacy). 
Hadn't seen him for about 6 or 7 years. Asked Kate about the situation. 
Stuart is staying here for a couple of weeks in the Minton Suite. He has 
dementia. I remember him as very articulate and able to speak for himself, 
and quite 'exact' and particular. Quite different now."[Fieldnote: 19/8/14] 
 
I had not anticipated seeing somebody from my own personal past in the course 
of my fieldwork, and meeting Stuart triggered in me an odd sensation of seeing a 
person I knew, but completely out of context.  This was a moment when I felt I had 
fallen out of the 'role' of researcher and briefly struggled to maintain my 
composure.  I had the feeling that Stuart was diminished in some way and that any 
possibility of again enjoying a two-way conversation with him was irretrievably 
lost.  Stuart did not know me or recognise me. I was meeting him again now in my 
role as researcher, a Stuart who appeared changed. But because I knew him I was 
also dealing with my own personal feeling of shock at seeing him as he was now, 
and recalibrating in my head this new reality.  I experienced my own 'jolt' and a 
disturbance to my personal temporality; the idea that on one day I had seen him 
as an animated and capable man and the next time I saw him he looked the same 
yet was barely recognisable as Stuart.  I had the feeling of having missed a crucial 
section of the continuum of time during which he had stepped into having the 
experience of dementia.   
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Stuart was the only participant in my research project who I had previously had 
an acquaintance with, and with whom there was a before and an after encounter.   
His parents and sisters had a rich familial knowledge of Stuart, extending far back 
in time to his childhood.  Mr and Mrs Harris, Stuart's parents, knew him probably 
better than anyone else, and had cared for him at home throughout his life until he 
was brought into Oak Hall.  I met the Harris' at their home in September 2014, 
having contacted them to ask whether I might discuss with them the possibility of 
Stuart participating in my research project for which I would need agreement 
from a nominated consultee.  Mrs Harris expressed happiness and relief that there 
was somebody who remembered Stuart as he had been before he developed 
memory problems.  As I talked with the Harris' there were vividly recounted 
stories about him growing up, playing with his four sisters, family holidays to 
Scotland, and to France where Stuart used to read his selection from the menu in 
French to the waiters.  Mrs Harris frequently referred to Stuart in the past tense, 
rather as though there was no possibility of reconciling these two different 
realities of her son - Stuart 'then' and Stuart 'now'. The situation of Stuart was 
atypical compared with other people with dementia I met at Oak Hall.  Unlike the 
majority of people who participated in this research project Stuart's carer was not 
a partner, son, or daughter, but his parents. Carers are the primary witnesses to 
changes over time in the person they care for. They notice 'first times' - the first 
time a person is unable to perform a task which she or he was formerly able to 
manage with ease: 
[Mrs Harris] "explained how Stuart had started to change subtly about two 
and a half to three years ago. Then there had been an acceleration. One day 
he had gone upstairs to shave and wash his hair and had come down with 
only part of his hair wet. [...] Now, Mrs Harris says, he doesn't recognise his 
sisters, or family members. She tells him 'I’m your mum', but he doesn't 
understand". (Fieldnote: 11/9/14 - during a visit to Stuart's parents at their 
home) 
 
How Mrs Harris experienced this moment was personal and wrapped up in her 
history with Stuart, of being his mum.  However, we might also say that the 'first 
time' does occur for every person who develops dementia.  A first time may be 
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consciously realised by the individual (or not), or by a family member or partner 
(or not), but there has to be a first time. Beard and Fox (2008:1512) describe 
these moments as "a specific episode, or turning point", which may nudge the 
person towards seeking an appointment with a physician.   
 
Mrs Harris' words allude to another aspect of carer experience - the reconciling of 
memories of how someone was and how someone is perceived to be now.  Mr and 
Mrs Harris had shared their home with Stuart and therefore witnessed him 
becoming a person with dementia over a period of time, whereas my experience 
was of meeting him when he did not have any signs of dementia and then meeting 
him 15 years later by which time he was significantly impaired.  The change in 
Stuart was experienced as something gradual and subtle by Mrs Harris; whereas 
my experience of the change in Stuart was that it had the appearance of being 
sudden because I had not been there to see changes in Stuart. All I saw was a 
before and after, and had experienced none of the interim time.  
Thinking reflexively about how my own prior knowledge played out, I concluded 
that divulging to the Harris’ information about my previous acquaintance with 
Stuart and the circumstances through which I had known him, provided 
something like a shared reference point: my recollections of Stuart as a person 
before he had dementia converged with the Harris’ memories of him.  
Furthermore, prior knowledge acquired through a vocational degree course 
meant that I was sensitised to the communal history of people with learning 
disabilities in the United Kingdom, and am knowledgeable about the 
Normalisation critique (Wolfensberger et al, 1972) and the aspirations of the 
service accomplishments (O’Brien, 1989). This prior knowledge filtered how I 
made sense of the interactions between staff and Stuart which I observed.  
 
The lived experiences of people with dementia: responding to and making 
sense of individual expressions  
At the point at which Stuart had come to Oak Hall to be assessed his ability to 
verbalise in a way that could be understood by people around him was so 
diminished that conversation tended to be focused around shared activities such 
as reading or, more accurately, looking through one of his favourite books. There 
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were two or three members of the care staff who were clearly fond of Stuart and 
made efforts to spend time with him and build a rapport.  I noticed that Jan, a 
senior care worker, used humour with Stuart to encourage a response: 
"Jan finds his 'Mr Big' book and looks at it with Stuart.  'Mr Big with his ball'. 
She goes through the pages, then says to him that they will play ball later. 
'What do we do when someone scores a goal? We shout hurrah!' Stuart joins 
in on the 'hurrah!' I see a bit of the former spark of Stuart. Then Jan asks 
where the keyboard is, and goes and finds it, brings it to Stuart. Jan plays 
some of the keys and asks Stuart if he can do this. 'I can't play the piano - can 
you, Stuart?' Jan is really gentle and encouraging towards Stuart". (Fieldnote: 
2/9/14) 
 
 I learned from staff that a decision had been made to prioritise Stuart's needs 
related to dementia over his needs related to being a person with a learning 
disability, so he was being assessed at the Minton Suite rather than at the respite 
service for people with learning disabilities, located in another part of the Oak 
Hall building.  There were differences between how staff talked to and related to 
Stuart and how they related to other clients. One way of construing staff 
approaches to Stuart was that these ways of relating to him 'infantilised' him.  Yet, 
I thought that their approaches were more likely motivated by a wish to connect 
with him and get to know him, and therefore be in the best position to assess his 
needs.   
Nonetheless, words are the content of discourse, and it is useful to be mindful of 
the many examples in history where discourse has resulted in 'silencing' whole 
groups of people – for example, through removing people from their families and 
communities and placing them in institutions.  A further point is that care work 
greatly relies on verbal communication between care staff and individuals. 
Listening, finding out, negotiating, and even challenging may be involved. It was 
also apparent that Oak Hall staff working with people with dementia had little or 
no experience of working with people with learning disabilities, and so there was 
no reason to expect them to be knowledgeable in this field. 
Stuart, as he was now, was unable to coherently verbalise his experiences of 
dementia, and how the experience was affecting him was essentially unfathomable 
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to the staff he had daily contact with.  This was true of other clients at Oak Hall, 
many of whom were losing the ability to articulate verbally their lived experience.  
At Oak Hall people’s behaviour, body language, gesture, facial expression, posture, 
skin pallor/flush provided important clues to care staff which could signal how an 
individual was at that moment in time (e.g. sad, happy, in pain, disoriented). Along 
similar lines, behaviour or demeanour could signal that something was about to 
change (e.g. a person becoming unwell, aggressive, upset).  A behaviour I 
observed quite regularly was restlessness (of participants in my research study 
and non-participants) which was sometimes accompanied by disorientation.  A 
common way that restlessness manifested itself was an individual asking staff 
where s/he was, or where was their partner, spouse, or family member.  If a 
person's concerns were not allayed to their satisfaction s/he might then pace 
about, and might try the doors in an attempt to leave the building.  
"A lady who I haven't met gets up and picks up a cushion from the seat next 
to her, then tries to open the (locked) door."(Fieldnote: 24/6/15) 
 
"Jan asks Andrew whether he would like a drink and biscuits. Andrew says 
no, he doesn't want anything at the moment.  Jan has clearly picked up on 
something because she then goes into the dining area (where Kate is on a 
one-to-one with a lady), and says to Kate that Andrew is getting restless. By 
this point Andrew has removed his blanket."(Fieldnote: 22/1/15) 
 
These instances illustrated that individuals could be actively engaged in leaving -
whether getting ready to leave the building, or setting off from one place with a 
particular intention to go elsewhere. These activities made perfect sense to them 
in the context of a lived experience at that moment in time.  Fuchs (2006) has 
suggested that whenever a person is absorbed in what they are doing an "implicit 
mode of temporality is retrieved", but that:  
…"this changes when a gap arises between need and satisfaction, desire and 
fulfilment, or plan and execution. Now the future appears as a "not yet" or 
"yet to come", experienced as the temporality of awaiting, striving, or longing 
for." (Fuchs, 2006:195) 
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For people whose sense of time is disturbed as a result of memory impairment, 
that disturbance or disorientation forms part of their lived experience, on the 
basis that they are interacting with the world as and how they perceive it.  The 
instances described of people feeling that they want to leave seem to come close 
to what Fuchs (2006:196) refers to as "lived time", which he states: 
…"may be regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its 
potentiality and capability."  (Fuchs, 2006:196) 
 
Even if an individual with dementia could be distracted from trying to leave the 
building, and then forgot that s/he was attempting to do so, this might still be 
regarded as an interruption to that individual's lived time, as well as a pushing 
away into the future any possibility of realisation of what that person wanted (i.e. 
their desire to leave the building remaining unfulfilled).   This may suggest the 
possibility that there are facets of services such as policies, and perhaps some 
practices, that are in conflict with the lived time of a person with dementia.  At 
Oak Hall having locked doors might be one such policy that conflicted with lived 
time, whereas the design of the garden - through which a person with dementia 
could walk in a continuous loop without being hindered by doors that were locked 
- did not obstruct or disturb this activity of moving from one place to another in 
lived time.  
On a day to day basis how staff responded to the lived experience of people with 
dementia when it may have appeared baffling, and in the absence of an 
explanation offered by the person, becomes an important consideration; 
important for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, there was what might be termed a 
"diagnostic" (Buscher et al, 2010:193-207) element, whereby staff needed to try 
to accurately 'diagnose' what was going on for the individual with dementia at 
that moment in order to provide a response that reflected accordance with the 
individual's lived experience.  Secondly, such moments might be seen as involving 
several elements: the individual's sense of lived time (temporality), the 
knowledge and knowing that is involved in making sense of that, and the practices 
within which the knowing or knowledge are then enacted.  The simultaneous 
coming together of tacit knowledge with practices Polanyi referred to as a blend 
of "skilful doing and knowing". (Polanyi, 1961: 461).  At Oak Hall I did observe 
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instances that I considered to be expressions of this blending of "skilful doing and 
knowing ", and I also heard accounts during interviews of examples of skilful 
doing and knowing.  In other interactions I observed between members of staff 
and people with dementia this blend of skilful doing and knowing seemed to be 
absent.  These were occasions where I felt there was a jarring or disharmony 
between the lived world being expressed by an individual with dementia and the 
responses to the person from an external source, or from the conditions of the 
external environment.  For example:   
"During a game of skittles Michael appears unsure whether he should 
continue with knocking skittles over - he looks for reassurance from Jan 
(staff member)." (Fieldnote: 9/10/14) 
 
Michael seemed to have forgotten parts of the sequence of playing skittles, and 
there were no verbal or other cues in his environment available to him at that 
moment that would prompt him to continue with his turn at skittles.   
With Paul it was different. Because he came across as an eloquent and seemingly 
unimpaired man it was difficult to get a sense of how his cognitive impairment 
was impacting on his everyday life and his interactions with others, except when 
he said something unexpected or reacted in a surprising way.  This leaking out of 
the person's inner world, their lived experience, was sometimes anticipated by 
staff if they knew the individual, but could by no means be guaranteed.  I observed 
a situation which illustrated what seemed like a mismatch between an 
individual's lived experience and a member of staff's perception of that person's 
experience. In the lead up to Christmas 2014 clients were being involved in 
decorating cards and making decorations.  
"Tina (staff) came over to where Paul was sitting and asked if he would draw 
a robin on two Xmas cards which Tina and three ladies in day-care were 
making. Paul agreed and did some practice versions on some green paper. 
He then drew a robin on each of the two cards. Then Tina came back over 
and asked Paul if he would do another robin for a further card. Paul 
responded: 'Don't push me to do any more, this is my limit'. Up until that 
point there had been friendly banter between Paul and Tina. Tina backed off 
at this point and went back to the ladies who were making cards. I heard 
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Diane (staff) say 'He has made his point'.  Then Paul (who I was sitting by) 
recounted to me a previous situation, as follows: When Paul had first started 
coming in for a few days' respite stay he was, on one of these occasions, 
preparing to go home (bags packed, and so on), at which point Tina had 
come into his room and asked if he had had a bath or shower. Paul replied 
'no', and Tina then said that he mustn't go home without having a bath or 
shower because if he did then she would get in trouble. Paul was adamant 
that he wasn't going to have a bath or shower, and recounted to me that 'I 
went home and I was in a right state'. He linked the bath scenario with the 
Xmas card situation just passed and said 'It was Paul do this. Paul, you must 
do that!'  I concluded to myself that there can be a level of distress, or 
something like powerlessness, that can be provoked, it seemed." (Fieldnote: 
19/11/14) 
 
The manifestation of skilful doing and knowing seemed to be differentiated 
according to the individual with dementia who the staff member was interacting 
with.  For example, the interaction already described between Jan and Stuart 
looking at Stuart's book, where Jan used her knowledge that there could be 
meaningful interaction with Stuart (who had very limited coherent verbal 
expression) via proxies such as his book, the keyboard, and so on. This was a 
situation where Jan was being empathic to Stuart's lived experience, and using 
this as a basis for trying to establish a relationship with him.  In interactions 
between staff and Michael skilful doing and knowing revealed itself differently. 
Michael was able to verbally articulate, albeit in an unelaborated way, but often 
behaved in ways where it was difficult to fathom the underlying reason for the 
behaviour.  On one occasion Michael had misappropriated a cutlery spoon: 
"Michael has 'acquired' a spoon and staff adopt various approaches to 
getting it off him. None of these strategies is successful. Michael then offers 
to 'lend' me 'his' spoon when he notices that I don't have a spoon. Today 
Michael also thinks Bernadetta (an Italian lady) is his wife Yvonne. It is not 
until Bernadetta repeatedly tells him that she is not his wife that he is able to 
accept it, but actually he then goes and sits by Bernadetta. I think he must 
still imagine that Bernadetta is Yvonne". (Fieldnote: 28/10/14) 
157 
 
 
Staff did not pursue retrieving the spoon from Michael: it posed no particular risk 
to him or to others, and staff knew that when he went home his wife would find 
the right moment to remove it and return it to a member of staff at Oak Hall.  
Similarly, though staff recognised that Bernadetta was finding Michael's advances 
tiresome this situation could be managed by distracting Michael.  Constantly 
telling Michael that Bernadetta was not his wife was unlikely to convince him that 
this was the case, just as telling him the spoon was not his was not going to change 
his belief that it was.  On what grounds would it be considered necessary to 
comprehend why a person with dementia has taken a particular course of action 
is an interesting question, and provokes further thoughts about different ways of 
trying to understand individuals with dementia through their behaviours and 
outward gestures (e.g. the new understandings from using the Marte Meo 
approach, described in chapter 2, did appear to offer a positive contribution to 
care).  Who shapes, constructs and decides what is included in such an account 
may be a further question to consider.  A comment by Grenier et al (2017) 
provides a way of situating what cannot be known in the context of care services, 
where:  
“the task is to value the lives, experiences and convictions of persons with 
dementia, even in circumstances where what is expressed seems foreign or 
‘unknowable’.” (Grenier et al, 2017:320) 
 
Staff members, particularly those who had spent considerable time with Michael, 
seemed to have a sense of what tactics worked best with him - not only in 
situations where Michael's lived experiences seemed out of synch with those of 
staff and other clients such as when he became fixated with wanting to leave the 
building, or was hiding food, but also the times when he was most amenable to 
interaction when staff would engage him in conversations and activities related to 
things that he liked or was good at. Bingo was one such activity: 
Jan speaking: "'Shall we have a game of bingo after? Get some of the other 
staff to help with marking the cards? And we'll ask Michael to call the 
numbers'" [...] "Michael is a very competent caller. Starts with Michael 
reading number, then Jan repeats the number. Then Michael quite suddenly 
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takes on the role and loudly speaks the numbers, really getting into the role - 
'legs eleven!'  Paul speaking: "'Michael calls the numbers very steadily' [...] 
Michael adjusts the numbers on the board so they are straight. Jan 
comments: 'that's it, you put them right. You don't like them messy do you?!' 
Michael laughs. They both laugh". (Fieldnote: 12/09/14) 
 
Here, Michael's skills were deliberately made visible and positively affirmed by  
Jan who announced to the clients in the room that she would ask him to call the 
numbers, and then acknowledged positively an aspect of his particular style which 
was to straighten the number counters on the board. Underpinning Jan's practice 
in this instance was that she knew Michael, knew that at this point in time he had 
the skills and capabilities to call the numbers and that he enjoyed doing this.  
Skilful doing and knowing applied to another situation with Michael, one which I 
did not observe but which was recounted to me during one of my observation 
sessions by the senior care worker, Kate, who had oversight for the day-care 
sessions:   
"Kate said that Michael 'had been in the wars'. He had a procedure carried 
out on his eye in hospital - something to do with a blocked vein behind his 
eye. The procedure was not successful, and the build-up of pressure behind 
his eye was causing headaches.  As a result of this he went back to hospital to 
have laser treatment. This had to be repeated. When he was next in day-care 
(early October 2014) Kate had heard a noise and saw that Michael was 
shaking and had gone white, and had stopped breathing. The paramedics 
were immediately called". (Fieldnote: 9/10/14) 
 
In this instance where Michael had suddenly become very unwell the bodily 
signals were very obvious and Kate was immediately alerted.  This timely, 
responsive care was in part due to Kate knowing the events that had occurred 
beforehand, and this knowing was reliant on Michael's wife having previously 
relayed this information to staff.  As Kate relayed more of the incident to me she 
looked over to where Michael was sitting pointing out to me that his colour had 
returned, and then drew him into the conversation saying to him that she was 
very pleased he looked so much better.  But, Michael's wife had said he was more 
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confused, and Kate wondered whether the confusion would continue and become 
part of how life was for Michael. This situation highlighted the temporalities of 
Michael's physical health condition - the sudden onset of an eye problem which 
then became acute; and the interaction between knowing (Kate knowing 
something was seriously wrong) and the suddenness of the onset of a life 
threatening situation.  Incidents such as this one might be described as having a 
particular and temporal rhythm: a rapid escalation of a health threat over such a 
short period of time might indicate that the event overtakes the speed at which it 
is possible to act.  The speed of the event required swift intervention from those 
who were in a position to help, a response involving simultaneous doing and 
knowing. Gourlay (2004) has suggested that tacit knowledge is said to be essential 
for competent performance in concrete situations to enable individuals to deal 
with new situations, and to fill in the gaps in formal training.  
 
Getting to know the person: practice from the position of knowing  
At Oak Hall the majority of the individuals with dementia who I met had lost or 
were losing the ability to coherently verbally communicate and were reliant on 
staff to make sense of nonverbal signals and expression. This was highlighted in 
an interview with Kate (senior care worker) who described how knowing the 
individual was of critical importance for understanding when something was 
wrong: 
"...you've got to take into account people's characters. Through their life, or 
how they've changed now, so it's patience really - getting to know people, 
that's the main one. Once you've got to know a person, if they can't 
communicate you sense, you get to sense... there's something wrong." [...] "I 
think if you get to know someone really well - we've had a couple - a 
gentleman who's just gone into full-time care. He didn't communicate at all, 
and he was a top accountant in his time, but the last month or so here - and I 
kept saying 'It's not right, there's something that's not right'." [...]  "You just 
pick up. Because he used to sit and he used to watch, he used to do, he liked 
skittle games and that, but I don't know - he seemed to be more into himself. 
You know, he weren't looking around so much, and he used to clap and 
whistle...well, that stopped." [...] "There was a slight change, you know, 
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gradually, but the last month or so we had him, I said to Jan, my colleague, I 
said 'He's not right is he?' And she said 'No', but there was nothing we could 
actually put a finger on." [...] "...because sometimes when someone with 
dementia is not well, uhhm...it depends on the illness but sometimes it takes 
them down a notch, and it's a notch that they might not be able to get up 
from, so that can take them further into a dementia, it depends." (Interview 
with Kate: July 29, 2014) 
 
This illustrates something of the subtlety or nuances of 'perception', a human 
sense which Polanyi viewed as being central to tacit knowledge.  Perception as it 
applied in the situation that Kate described involved getting a sense of, and picking 
something up - impressions that are difficult to specify, a point that Polanyi 
articulated in his work Knowing and Being (1961).  Both Kate and Jan knew that 
something was wrong but were unable to precisely pinpoint the something.   
There were other instances where people with dementia left staff in no doubt 
about their preferences, wishes or other concerns. An example of this was given 
during an interview with Lily, a care worker: 
"The way an individual likes… say how they like to have a wash or they like a 
shower or a bath or they don’t like that. We’ve had a lady in recently who 
doesn’t like water at all, so obviously she still has to bathe but she doesn’t 
want it near her face. So obviously when I found that out I had to relay that 
to me colleagues so they wouldn’t have to go through that. Because I give her 
the flannel and she went hysterical because it was all wet and so obviously 
you pass that on to someone else to make sure all of the staff members know. 
"(Interview with Lily: 27/8/14) 
 
Handing over information was one system which enabled staff to know about the 
person.  One of the members of care staff, Esme, asked me whether I was aware of 
the handover reports system:  
"Care staff carry the sheet around with them and use it as an 'aide 
memoire'...they often look at it just before they enter someone's room. The 
detail and narrative 'behind' the handover info is the client's individual file. 
Esme said some clients come with a 'This is Me' booklet. This is reliant on 
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carers/families to complete. Staff also do a 'pen picture' which seems to be a 
strengths based account - e.g. - 'Mrs X lets us know she is in pain by.....'.  Esme 
showed me another A4 sheet/table. This is used for flagging up any issues of 
an individual". (Fieldnote: 23/3/15) 
 
Client files, handover sheets, handover meetings and the 'This is Me' booklet all 
represented methods for capturing and codifying knowledge so that even before a 
member of staff got to know a person with dementia that member of staff could at 
least know about him or her. 
I came across several instances of an individual being previously known to either 
a member of staff at Oak Hall or to a client, dating back to before s/he was 
diagnosed with dementia.  One gentleman was the cousin of the wife of another 
client, James, and I heard James commented on changes he had noticed - one being 
that the man had lost a lot of weight.  On another occasion a member of staff 
mentioned that she had lived next door to this gentleman and that when he first 
came to Oak Hall he recognised her, but not now, and signs of deterioration have 
become obvious.  A friend of the father-in-law of one of the senior care workers 
had developed dementia and was in respite at Oak Hall: 
"...he was a very good friend to my father-in-law and his dementia is more 
advanced and when I first saw him it really did upset me, because I knew 
him before.  And his is more advanced and I did go home and I did get upset 
and then I thought, ‘Come on, you know you’ve got to go back to work and 
you’ve got to  get on with it,’ but that really did upset me because he used to 
go round with my father-in-law and they were very good buddies. I just 
couldn’t believe how advanced his had got and that really was upsetting. But 
now he’s been back again and I was alright this time, but at first I thought, ‘I 
can’t cope with this,’ but then I thought, ‘Come on Jan, you can cope with 
anything.’ And I felt a lot better since he’s been in again, I wasn’t upset, I just 
kept thinking that is the later stage of dementia." (Interview with Jan: Senior 
Care Worker 29/7/14) 
 
One of the implications of having knowledge about dementia and working with 
people with dementia was that if a member of staff also encountered dementia 
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closer to home - affecting a loved one - the member of staff could not help but 
know the potential trajectory for their loved one. This represented a convergence 
between their private and their professional life and, for some members of staff, 
going home after their shift did not mean a complete break from caring 
responsibilities.  Jan, who had accepted and adjusted to the fact that her father-in-
law's friend was in the later stages of dementia, was also now adjusting to her 
father-in-law having fairly recently been diagnosed with dementia: 
"And my father-in-law he’s only got early stages of it. Some days I go and I 
can have a real good conversation with him and he’s switched on, and then 
another day he just can’t remember what happened, he doesn’t remember 
doing things or whatever.  And I used to take him up the town every other 
Saturday, but now he’s decided he just doesn’t want to go through that door 
and that is very challenging.  And my husband as well, obviously because it’s 
his dad, he can’t understand it. I said to him, ‘This is the early stage, he’s 
going to get a lot worse than what he is now,’ but he obviously doesn’t work 
here so he doesn’t really deal with that sort of thing and it is hard for my 
husband." (Interview with Jan: Senior Care Worker 29/7/14) 
 
The here and now moment, and being in transition  
At Oak Hall I noticed that staff appeared to make every effort to involve clients in 
the here and now moment, and seemingly suspended - or perhaps downplayed - 
the problematic nature of memory problems that caused temporal disorientation 
in individuals they were caring for.  One tactic I observed might be described as 
'compensatory', where a member of staff acted in some manner that filled in the 
gaps where a person lacked capability: 
"I notice that Jan keeps swapping her songbook (putting it to the correct 
page for each song) with the gentleman (Andrew) next to her - to enable him 
to feel part of the singing - even though Jan comments that he has fallen 
asleep." (Fieldnote 23/3/15) 
 
Jan's actions created the appearance that Andrew was on the correct page, which 
seemed like a compensatory action for any difficulty he may have had in finding 
the right page. It was also anticipatory - should Andrew have awoken during the 
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singing he would be in synch with everyone else in the room who had a song book 
and was joining in.  Music - playing compact disks (CDs), singing along, dancing to 
music, and the occasional live music event - was given a central place in everyday 
activities at Oak Hall.  Many of the CDs that were played had songbooks with them 
and these were passed around so that people could follow the words if they 
wished to.  The inclusiveness of the music and singing sessions made it very easy 
for anyone to join in, so for clients who were new to Oak Hall these sessions 
seemed to offer a way of feeling part of what was happening at that moment:  
"Singing is definitely good for involving people. Even clients who aren't 
singing (or who are dipping in and out of singing) are connecting with the 
music. I look at Claire who is moving her hand in time to 'Rock around the 
Clock'. I haven't seen her so engaged and interested in other previous 
activities". (Fieldnote: 23/3/15). 
 
Sometimes both clients and staff got up to dance, and on several occasions a client 
or member of staff pulled me up to dance with them. Dancing and singing placed 
few cognitive demands on clients and I noticed that these were moments when 
people often looked animated.  Songs needed to be familiar to clients in order for 
them to join in the singing, and this was illustrated on one occasion where 
Christine, a student from a local further education college on a short work 
experience placement at Oak Hall - was handing out song books to clients.  Jan 
suggested to Christine that she changed the CD to one that had songs that people 
would know and would be able to sing along to: 
"There is a moving moment when we sing 'My Way'. The singing by six 
women and two men just encapsulated a feeling for me - something about 
singing the words and connecting to the meaning - 'Regrets, I've had a few, 
but then again, too few to mention. I did what I had to do, and saw it through 
without exemption' ". (Fieldnote: 23/3/15) 
 
This example of connecting to music is a far from spurious idea, and there are 
both emotional and temporal considerations in relation to music.  Music itself is a 
unique example of a temporal object, something which Toombs (1990) discusses 
in her work on the temporality of illness where she cites Edmund Husserl's 
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(1964) phenomenological analysis of time.  A tone or a melody is a temporal 
object which is temporally extended, yet experienced as wholes or unities 
(Toombs, 1990:228, citing Husserl, 1964). What is both noteworthy about 
experiencing a temporal object, and relevant to the example from fieldwork, is 
that: 
"it is experienced not as a succession of discrete, isolatable, now points along 
a given time-line but rather as a continuum - a continuum which at once 
incorporates not only the present now-point but those now-points which are 
just-past, as well as anticipations of future now-points." [...] "...when I hear a 
melody, I hear it as succeeding the note just-past which I still retain in my 
present consciousness. Furthermore, in hearing the present note, I anticipate 
a future note which will follow it as the melody unfolds temporally". 
(Toombs, 1990:228) 
 
This is a subjective experience of duration, and in relation to the hearing of a 
melody this is considered as "the temporal 'living through' the melody, and the 
experiencing of the melody as extended in duration." (Toombs, 1990:229).  The 
singing along to Frank Sinatra's 'My Way' by people with dementia was them 
being involved in doing something that connected them back to previous 
moments in time, but also everyone who was there in the room at that moment 
knew and anticipated what was coming in the chorus line 'I did it my way', and 
collectively joined in.  Music has also been highlighted by Fuchs (2016) who 
described it as being the "carrier of affects par excellence, and is thus capable of 
awakening the affective dimension of body memory" (Fuchs, 2016:21), and  by 
Busch et al (2001:3) who referred to the recognition of musical note as 
inarticulable tacit knowledge. Music as a connector between the here and now 
and a person's past experiences (such as an instance of a song or tune sparking a 
memory of a salient experience) does evoke the idea of moving between 
experiences, the notion of tacking back and forth.   
This might also provide a starting point for making sense of different types of 
arrivals and departures to and from Oak Hall, and the staying or remaining that 
people with dementia were subject to in the space between arriving and 
departing. The concept of "transitional statuses" (Glaser and Strauss, 1971: 47-52) 
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might be applied to such instances, given that arriving, staying and leaving 
indicated an aspect of living with the reality of dementia, whether experienced 
first-hand or as a carer of a person with dementia.  A person's attendance at Oak 
Hall drew attention to their status of having a diagnosis of dementia, yet away 
from Oak Hall many people enjoyed positive roles such as living in ordinary 
homes; being a grandparent, partner, father, mother; enjoying hobbies and 
interests; doing and being the same as other people.  A scenario of how the status 
passage of a person may move back and forth from being prominent on one hand 
to fading into the background on the other according to the person's movement 
between home and places designated for expert help, is provided by Glaser and 
Strauss: 
“Although some transitional statuses encumber only on a certain dimension 
of the passagee's existence, they may require that his total existence occur in 
a particular context. A mental patient may require therapy a few times a 
week; the rest of the time other aspects of his life are prominent, and his 
illness is subordinate. Thus, his illness passage is attended to only 
intermittently". (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:47) 
 
On a person's arrival (for day-care or a respite stay) staff would usually initiate 
conversation, drawing on their repertoire of knowledge about the individual, 
perhaps oiling the wheels of conversation by focusing on individual 
characteristics such as where the person lived or a particular hobby, or the 
person's grandchildren. The initial welcome was about helping people to feel 
comfortable: 
"Obviously when you first come here it’s not going to be familiar but the fact 
that it’s comfortable helps them to relax and obviously the way that people 
are then welcomed to that environment, so it’s all a matter of … are they 
going to just say, ‘Hello Mr Jones’ or are they going to say ‘Hello Fred’. It’s 
hopefully building up a familiarity so, again, when they come in the door it’s 
almost like oh, it’s just another place where you go in and meet friends, like 
going to an over-fifties club or whatever."(Interview with Activities Co-
ordinator: January 2015) 
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Establishing a sense of continuity for the person meant the staff building some 
threads within the experience that were repeated each time the person attended 
day-care, and thus imparting to the person some sense of familiarity with the 
people and environment of Oak Hall.  These important threads included having 
knowledge of, and knowing the person and acting on this by, for example, a 
person's personal preferences being incorporated into care regardless of which 
member of staff was providing the care; the same group of staff providing care to 
the person over time; and people with dementia receiving care in an environment 
that was the same from one time to the next.  Knowing the person, and then 
providing care from that perspective was a core positive bias at Oak Hall indicated 
in conversations between staff and noticeable in action and interactions between 
staff and people with dementia.  Except in situations where a person came into 
respite care with no warning (i.e. where a crisis precipitated entry to Oak Hall) the 
broad process of getting to know a person began even before s/he began to use 
the service, through obtaining information from the person's carer or family: 
"...we usually ask the family, we send out before the person’s come into the 
centre, they have a form to fill out saying "This Is Me" and obviously it’s got 
to be a close relative, and all their likes and dislikes, what they’ve done in 
their life and perhaps where they were born and about their family, siblings. 
And then if they’re married, it’s all that kind of thing." [...] "cos sometimes, 
depending how far advanced the dementia is, they can’t always tell you. 
Usually they can tell you from their childhood but they can’t always tell you 
there and now or sometimes they just forget everything, do you know what I 
mean? So obviously you want to know this person, and you don’t always get 
that person when they come in because… So you need to know a bit of the 
background about the family and like I say, their likes and 
dislikes."(Interview with care worker: August 2014) 
 
In Galvin et al (2005:2-3) the experience of family carers of people with dementia 
was characterised as one of 'liminality': a term which, in Anthropology, pertains to 
"the figure and role of 'bridge-maker' between at least two domains of 
knowledge".  Galvin and colleagues suggested that carers live in two worlds and 
have two ways of knowing: an experiential knowing derived from the private 
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world, and "a taken for granted knowing of the structured professional world".  
Carers and family members provided experiential knowledge of the person they 
were caring for to the staff at Oak Hall, often in the form of brief comments 
relayed when dropping a person off for respite or day-care. However, it was not a 
certainty that the "This is Me" paperwork would have been completed or available 
at the point which the individual with dementia first started using the day-care or 
respite service at Oak Hall and, moreover,  the information provided could not 
cover every eventuality of useful knowledge about the person for their time at 
Oak Hall.  Fragments of knowledge that carers provided about individuals had to 
be built on and expanded upon by staff through proactively getting to know a 
person.  Moving towards knowing a person happened through different types of 
care interactions between staff and individuals with dementia.  One example of 
interactions were those in which care was focused on the body, such as bathing, 
assisting someone in the toilet, or other activities such as using a hoist to transfer 
an individual, or getting the person up and dressed. These interactions involved a 
level of intimacy and relating to the person in an embodied way.  During such 
enactments of care there was a need for staff efforts to harmonise with co-
operation and willingness from the person (e.g. a person being hoisted) and, if the 
person was uncooperative, the onus was on the staff member to try to work out 
the root cause of the non-cooperation.  Trying to understand the reasons for 
particular behaviours or responses was described by Sarah, a member of the care 
staff, as "very Sherlock Holmes".  A way to conceptualise this is as missing or 
hidden knowledge in a given moment in time, which disrupts the care activity in 
some way and may prevent it from being completed.  In some cases knowledge 
may be hidden simply because the person with dementia is unable to articulate it 
verbally.  An instance of hidden knowledge was given by Sarah during an 
interview: 
"There was a lady that used to refuse to get dressed, flatly refuse [...] so we 
went into her wardrobe and, ‘Come on Gladys, up you get now, come on, let’s 
get dressed. Let’s put this nice skirt on.’ ‘No, no, I’m not getting dressed. Oh 
no, I’m not getting dressed,’ and we ended up, you know how a teenager 
would go through the wardrobe and heap clothes on the bed. Like that one, 
don’t like that one.  
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 ‘What about that one?’ 
  ‘Oh no! Not the black one!’ 
  ‘What about the pink one then?’  
 ‘Oh no, not the pink one.’  
 ‘Alright then, what about this one?’  
 ‘Oh yes …’  
She chose the skirt with it and through we went, with the t-shirt, jumper, 
beads to go with it, she chose her clothes, she let us wash her, she didn’t 
protest or anything but let us just wash her, change her, dress her, happy as 
Larry. All that was the problem, and we couldn’t figure, it took us about a few 
days to figure out that the problem with this was the clothing. She saw that 
skirt on the wardrobe and thought, ‘Not going out in that!’ So rather than, 
because she didn’t have a lot of speech, she couldn’t say, ‘I don’t like that 
skirt, don’t like that one it’s too tight’ or it’s not right, she just flatly refused 
to get out of bed. So she’d just say, ‘No!’ And once we figured out why, you 
can assist her, and keep her calm. We can assist her to be happy and content 
in what she’s wearing, because to some people it is the end of the world if the 
top doesn’t match their skirt, and we have to respect that." (Interview with 
care worker 15/11/14) 
Through a process of trial and error (the clothes sorting) the missing pieces of 
knowledge or understanding of the person had been surfaced, and the staff 
member was able to complete the care task.  Furthermore, once the staff member 
had acted on this new knowledge the lady concerned then got her needs met, 
defusing her frustration and enabling her to become calm.   
There were other instances where hidden knowledge - which would have made a 
difference to how care was enacted - only came to light later on after the event. A 
case in point that I observed involved Stuart, on a day that his parents and sister 
came to visit him at Oak Hall. Stuart was in the lounge, his parents and sister 
sitting next to him and chatting with him, and myself sitting next to his sister: 
“Leanne [member of staff] comes over to Stuart to hoist him up to take him 
to the toilet. Stuart’s sister is sitting next to him – and as the harness for the 
hoist is put behind Stuart he goes rigid and starts to shake/tremble. In doing 
so he slides right down the chair. Everyone rallies round and the hoist is 
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brought over. Stuart is on the floor by now and seems upset by what is 
happening. Another member of staff presses the emergency button and 
several more staff arrive. Stuart eventually is safely hoisted. Stuart’s sister 
says to me that if he feels he is being forced he will resist.” 
  [15 minutes later] 
 “Leanne returns and asks Stuart’s family if they would like to go to his 
bedroom. Leanne smiles and asks Stuart’s dad if he would like to take her 
arm [maybe she knows that he had a recent fall]”. (Fieldnote: 16/10/14) 
 
Because Stuart now had very limited mobility and generally used a wheelchair 
moving or transferring him safely was achievable only by hoisting him.  Staff 
followed the policies and procedures for hoisting, including the summoning of 
extra staff when Stuart ended up on the floor.  Stuart's sister's comment - 'if he 
feels he is being forced he will resist' signified intimate knowledge, knowledge 
that was relational in character. She had grown up with her brother and knew 
him.  This knowledge of Stuart was conveyed to me, not staff, and retrospectively 
of the event, when it was useful only in explaining but not in informing.  Had the 
hoisting of Stuart progressed without incident his sister would have had no need 
to make the comment at all, so the comment was perhaps contingent on this 
instance of hoisting, a sensemaking comment, maybe.  
This seems to bring another issue into the foreground: that of 'timing' or knowing 
in time - as a temporal dimension of knowing.  The timing of knowing in care 
provision is meaningful when thinking about the passing on of 'critical' knowledge 
about an individual.  Both acquiring knowledge and conveying of knowledge in a 
timely manner (for example: knowing about allergies or intolerance to certain 
foods before there is any possibility that an individual may imbibe particular 
foods) is important in order to avoid unintended consequences.  What mattered in 
Stuart's situation was knowing him, because knowing him meant it was possible 
to anticipate how he would react to a particular approach and thus the approach 
could be moderated and adapted to him.  Stuart expressed bodily what he was 
unable to articulate verbally - he tried to resist, and went rigid when staff were 
attempting to hoist him.  As I have drawn attention to in chapter 2, knowledge of a 
person is regarded as fundamentally different to knowing the person, and 
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knowing the person gives regard to human agency. (Liaschenko, 1997:27)  
Stuart's sister's comment was also an acknowledgement of his individual agency 
being a fundamental strand of who he was, irrespective of his learning disability 
and regardless of him having a diagnosis of dementia.  This also represented a 
bringing of knowing of Stuart (by his sister) from the past, when Stuart was 
known as a person without dementia, into the present.   
The fact of Stuart’s parents being, up until his entry into Oak Hall, his primary 
carers prompts a comment about intersectionality.  Although Mrs Harris appeared 
to be an active woman and in good health both she and her husband were in their 
late 80s and Mr Harris looked quite frail and had recently fallen at home.  One of 
the consequences of ageing for people with Down Syndrome (a specific learning 
disability) is that as they move into their 50s and 60s their chances of developing 
dementia increase. Estimates are that among people with Down Syndrome 1 in 3 
people aged 50+ and 2 in 3 people aged 60+ will develop dementia. The 
“interlocking oppressions” (Hulko, 2009) between disabilities and ageing of carer 
and the person with dementia become highlighted in the situation of Stuart and 
his parents.   
 
Timing, and time running out, for Oak Hall's service for people with 
dementia 
Alongside business as usual at Oak Hall and the everyday lived experience of 
dementia of individuals with dementia and carers, there was a parallel story about 
the threat of non-continuation of two council-run respite and day-care facilities, 
Oak Hall and Long Edge. The experience of implicit time in lived experience of 
dementia was being touched by an explicit temporality that threatened to disrupt 
and change the experiences of people with dementia and carers. 
The Minton Suite at Oak Hall was itself the product of the closure of Minton Lodge 
- a former centre of excellence for dementia care located in a village two miles 
from Northweston, funded and run by the local council.  Closing Minton Lodge 
was expected to result in significant savings and, despite the protestations from 
carers and supporters achieving a delay in the final decision being made, Minton 
Lodge did eventually close.  By 2012 the entire day and respite services, as well as 
staff, transferred from Minton Lodge to the newly-built wing at Oak Hall.   It was 
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rather ironic then that within a month of commencing fieldwork, during my 
second progress meeting with the then manager Cath, I found out that the local 
council - Polshire - was threatening to close the day and the respite service for 
people with dementia at Oak Hall.   The news was widely reported in the local 
press in July and August 2014 with quotes from several local councillors about 
outsourcing respite care to the private sector, and responses to those comments 
from dismayed carers whose loved ones used the respite and day-care services.  
There had been no warning of this news and the coverage in the local newspapers 
was the first that the manager, care staff, clients, and carers knew about the 
possible closure.  In one of the newspaper reports the course of events leading to 
the story breaking were described.  At the Polshire cabinet meeting in August 
2014 members had decided to initiate a review of services at Oak Hall and its 
sister organisation Long Edge (located eight miles away in Crouston) as part of a 
new dementia commissioning plan being developed.  The point of discussion that 
was likely to have particular impact on people with dementia and their carers was 
the proposal to block purchase beds for respite care in the independent sector. By 
implication this would render it unnecessary to have a respite service at Oak Hall 
and Long Edge respectively.  The newspaper reported that carers who had 
attended this meeting alleged that their concerns about the review of services had 
not been listened to, and that this was then both reframed and denied by the 
chairperson for the committee scrutinising the cabinet decision, who was quoted 
as saying that the meeting:  
"was not a forum for discussion of the future of the council's individual care 
facilities" [...] and "any future changes arising from the implementation of the 
dementia care plan will be subject to full consultation and robust scrutiny by 
members of this committee". (Newspaper One: 13/8/14) 
 
Whilst no decision was to be made about closing the service until the autumn, the 
possibility of closure had been 'outed' and, critically, was now firmly in the public 
domain.  Within the sphere of Oak Hall nobody was immune from the potential 
'fall-out' from this news. For clients and carers it represented both the uncertainty 
of future care arrangements as well as a disruption to continuity of care, which 
itself was multi-faceted, comprised of continuity and ongoing familiarity of staff, 
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place, care practices and routines. For staff too there was concern - mainly about 
job security, but also concern about the impact closure would have on clients and 
what services they would end up with. Although I was not personally involved, a 
closing of the service during my fieldwork would have meant the loss of one of my 
field sites and I would need to consider other options: either identifying another 
social care site, or looking at the feasibility of 'following' individuals through their 
use of different respite services in the independent sector. For me, as for clients, 
carers and staff, closure would mean discontinuity and disruption in some form. 
One early reaction to the potential service closure was a Union meeting for staff 
one afternoon in late July in the main day-care lounge. This meant that day-care 
after lunch resumed in one of the much smaller lounges, with all clients being 
asked to move from their usual room and squash into the other lounge; not ideal: 
"Quite a different environment, and less scope for doing activities in this 
room".(Fieldnote: 29/7/14) 
 
During my visits to Oak Hall I heard virtually nothing more about its future fate 
until early September when I asked Cath about the details for the public 
consultation on the council's proposal.  There were to be four consultation 
sessions available at Oak Hall during which 30 minute slots were to be provided 
for individual customers (clients) and carers. Thinking that it would be really 
useful to observe aspects of the process of the consultation I made contact by 
email with the lead person for this, and subsequently followed this up with a 
(what turned out to be fruitless) phone-call.  I gleaned a little more insight into 
developments in mid-September when I visited the home of William, a man with 
dementia who I had recruited to my research study, and his wife Cherry.  Cherry 
was opposed to the closure of the respite service at Oak Hall. She had given a 
response to the council's consultation document, and she subsequently emailed 
me a copy of the council's full consultation information pack.  Around this time - 
mid September 2014 - also marked the moment when Cath, the manager of Oak 
Hall who had been in post only from around the time I began my fieldwork, left.  
No-one offered any explanation for this, but I did imagine that managing a service 
which had its future in doubt, and having to potentially wind things down, make 
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staff redundant, deal with the distress of carers, and so on - this was an 
unattractive proposition. 
To councillors the proposals for change were framed and presented by Polshire as 
"moving towards local personalised carer respite", and the concept of "local" was 
particularly pushed as a key selling point to members and carers at the two 
subsequent meetings where decisions were made about the future of respite care 
services.  In the consultation pack for carers and people with dementia the 
rationale for change was presented as: 
"...the commissioning review has identified that more ways other than 
residential care should be developed to provide respite care to give carers a 
break so that people have increased choice and their preferences can be 
met." 
 
Interestingly no absolute commitment was given by the council about respite 
provision. Rather, the consultation pack stated (my emphasis in italics): "we will 
look at developing more types of support that may include for example:  
- "Care provided in the person’s own home through home care services. 
-  Shared Lives service. Shared Lives is a service, where a carer approved by the 
Council, provides support to an individual within a family setting. This could 
be in the home of the approved carer, or in the home of the customer needing 
care.  
- Receiving a Direct Payment – an amount of money which can be used by a 
customer to buy services/support from the independent sector or employ a 
Personal Assistant to meet their needs. A Personal Assistant is a care worker 
who is directly employed by the service user or their nominated 
representative. " 
 
I heard more about client and carer experiences of the consultation in October 
2014 during a visit to Oak Hall, when Paul told me that his wife Rose had already 
written to her local MP expressing her disquiet at the proposal to close the respite 
service at Oak Hall, and they had both now given their views as part of the 
consultation:  
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"Paul and his wife had asked to have separate appointments and be allocated 
30 minutes each.  As they had arrived ten minutes early, and Paul's wife Rose 
had the first slot, Paul had laughingly speculated that she might get 40 
minutes (it turned out that she did)." 
"Rose had forewarned the council staff consulting that whilst Paul came 
across as relatively unimpaired 'he does have dementia' and please to be 
mindful of this."  
"During the consultation Paul asked what the basis was for the proposed 
new model of provision: had this approach already been tried and, if so, what 
were the findings?  He had pointed out that on Trip Advisor and Amazon, for 
example, people leave reviews about their experiences, and similar 
information should be made available relating to the evidence and feedback 
about the model being proposed. Otherwise, Paul had said "You are going in 
blind".  The reply to this was that those consulting 'thought' that something 
similar had been done in two other large towns in the north west of England. 
I commented to Paul that they seemed to be proposing a mixed model of 
care. Paul said that what was mentioned was staff coming into people's 
homes to provide a service and give carers a break; but also staff also 
opening their own homes up to offer day-care and/or respite. I mentioned to 
Paul the issue of inspection and accessibility of these sorts of arrangements. 
Would that not 'up' the cost, and the complexity? Paul's view was that a 
whole team of people would be required per person." (Extracts from 
fieldnotes: 9/10/14) 
 
Both the consultation pack and the conversation with Paul suggested that even if 
the evidence base for the proposed model of care had been considered it was 
neither central to, nor driving, the decision-making of Polshire council.  
Paul had a view that there was some political manoeuvring going on involving the 
conservative leadership at Polshire. My view was that for all parties, whatever 
decisions were ultimately made about Oak Hall and Long Edge would represent 
winning or losing of political points. Even though the labour councillors 
strenuously opposed the proposal to close the respite service, undoubtedly there 
was a political dimension to this.  
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There was no evidence that certain outstanding practicalities involved in 
developing new respite provision had been addressed at the stage that 
stakeholders were being consulted.  At Oak Hall there were twelve respite beds, 
yet under the new proposals Polshire council was undertaking to block purchase 
just three respite beds in local nursing homes.  Paul had made the comment that 
from the perspective of nursing homes there was "shock" at how many bed days 
even three respite beds would equate to. The proposed three beds would need to 
be used solely for respite equalling supply of 1,000 actual bed days per year. 
However, this would represent a reduction in current capacity (i.e. Oak Hall's 
twelve beds) of seventy-five percent (75%).  The capacity of twelve beds at Oak 
Hall facilitated not only pre-booked respite stays but also fulfilled an important 
role of admitting people when there was a crisis of some sort (e.g. a breakdown in 
care arrangements, or behaviour that became difficult to manage at home), or in 
instances where a person needed to have specialist assessment. How such 
scenarios could be managed with only three respite beds was unclear, and it 
remained to be seen whether carers would be convinced that the changes 
proposed to provision would provide a robust, good quality and safe service. 
In early November 2014 I took the opportunity to attend an overview and 
scrutiny committee meeting for Polshire council with the hope of hearing some of 
the discussion and narrative in relation to the proposed changes to local respite 
care services.  There is always a slot provided at the start of these meetings for 
interested members of the public to speak, and two ladies spoke about their 
knowledge and first-hand experience of the respite care provision at Long Edge. 
One was a member of a local older people's forum, and she highlighted the value 
of the service provided at Long Edge: its accessibility to local people, the 
excellence of the care provided, that people are treated as individuals, and that 
their social, medical, and care needs are all addressed. The other speaker was a 
carer to her 92-year old father who had Alzheimer's disease, as well as a former 
carer to her husband with Alzheimer's disease (now deceased).  She spoke about 
the alternatives for respite care provision should Long Edge be closed down: 
"Of the three local care homes offering respite care one has three 
enforcements from the Care Quality Commission (CQC), another has one 
enforcement, and one failed its CQC inspection. Costs (for carers) are 
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'prohibitive'. Carers have asked 'countless times' where will respite care be 
provided."(Fieldnote: 6/11/14) 
 
The significance of this comment was that it highlighted the view that the local 
alternative provision to Long Edge could not be relied on either in respect to 
quality or to continuation, yet there was a real possibility that respite in provision 
such as this would become part of the new landscape of respite care.  The stated 
purposes of CQC enforcements underlines the risks that people may be exposed to 
in care homes that are subject to CQC enforcements. The definitions of purpose of 
CQC enforcements are: "To protect people who use regulated services from harm 
and the risk of harm, and to ensure they receive health and social care services of 
an appropriate standard", and  "To hold providers and individuals to account for 
failures in how the service is provided." (Care Quality Commission, 2015). The 
alternative provision available to carers did not compare favourably with Long 
Edge which had been inspected by the CQC in March 2014 and was assessed as 
having met all of the required standards.   
The expectation from carers and staff was that the consultation report would be 
discussed at the Polshire cabinet meeting in mid-November 2014, but it was not 
an agenda item. The day after the meeting at Oak Hall I heard about a letter 
published in one of the local newspapers written by the son of a lady who 
regularly used the day-care and respite at Oak Hall. The lady's daughter was 
dropping her off at day-care when the letter was mentioned.  Several people had 
seen and read the letter, including Paul who thanked the daughter. Kate had a 
copy of the newspaper with her, and showed me.  The letter's narrative 
highlighted flaws in the rationale that the council was applying in its proposals to 
close the respite and day-care services at Oak Hall. The council, the author wrote, 
was following a national trend of councils that were discharging to the private 
sector their legal responsibility to provide respite care. Unlike in other council 
areas, however, the proposed closure was not to save money but was about 
preparing for an alleged "onslaught of dementia sufferers, and offering greater 
choices".  The author reframed this suggesting that the growth rate of people 
being diagnosed with dementia would amount to no more than a gradual increase 
over the next fifteen years.  Choice would not increase but would diminish if 
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affordable respite care (Oak Hall) was removed because the cost of the remaining 
private provision would require carers or relatives to pay a top-up fee, the 
implication being that people unable to pay would have no choice. In the wake of 
the closure of a local, highly thought of respite and day-care service there would 
be an unknown and untested system for respite care in which people with 
dementia would be "shipped off to a different, remote care home for each period 
of respite".  The letter ended with -  
…"risks of poor care, uncertainty, long journeys, transport costs and top-up 
fees all serve to deter caregivers from seeking respite care. Caregivers 
foregoing respite care could increase the risk of themselves falling ill. This 
could remove the choice of dementia sufferers being able to live with or near 
their caregivers and increasing the likelihood of their requiring permanent 
care". (Newspaper One: 12/11/14) 
 
The letter, and the fact that it was printed in its entirety, seemed to acquire an 
advocacy-like symbolism.  The giving voice to (carers) was set out in a popular 
local newspaper and represented an action outside of the constraints of the 
official consultation process. The voice and opinions of the letter could not be 
reined in, reduced or made less controversial by people with political interests: 
the letter was out there for anyone to read.  Implicit in the narrative of self-
advocacy by a carer was a voice advocating for protection of the interests of 
people with dementia.  The letter narrative also expressed the temporal 
dimensions of the unfolding situation: there was a looking back to the former 
service, Minton Lodge, considered to be a centre of excellence and the 
continuation of excellence through its reprovision at Oak Hall. The articulation of 
praise for the existing service was overshadowed by the council's proposals which 
promised an uncertain and unwished for future.  
 
Decision-making about Oak Hall: December 2014 
The discussion of the consultation, and the proposals it was linked to, did not take 
place until the meeting in mid-December 2014 of Polshire cabinet. This was not a 
meeting that I attended, but I watched the webcast subsequently.  The meeting 
room was full, and a large contingent of carers were in attendance, several of 
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whom spoke. One of these was a man who was carer to his wife and daughter who 
spoke for six or seven minutes. He read from a script a beautifully crafted and 
considered piece describing what it felt like to be faced with the possibility that a 
service that he relied on may be withdrawn. He started by talking about his 
experiences of the consultation: 
"I was offered a derisory 30 minutes in which to discuss this matter with 
representatives, three of them, from Polshire council. They couldn't answer 
my questions and 30 minutes is quite honestly not enough to get to know 
people, much less answer all the matters which arose in the consultation 
document. It really was an insult." 
 
It was inevitable that naming a process as a 'consultation' would contribute to 
expectations of carers and service users about being heard, having their questions 
addressed, and confidence that due process had been followed by the council in 
the consultation.  As the meeting unfolded there was a sense on one hand of 
strong carer opinions being voiced and, on the other, conservative members of the 
council attempting to conduct 'damage limitation' through managing (or trying to 
manage) carer expectations about the proposals on closure of the two services.  
This was a meeting in the public domain, broadcast live as well as being minuted, 
and the broadcast was accessible from the council's website for several months 
after. Politically speaking, the council was no doubt thinking about the 
forthcoming general election in May 2015 and may have wished to avoid a 
decision that would be viewed as unpalatable by the public in the two 
constituency areas (Northweston and Crouston) where the services were located.  
Both constituency areas were held by conservative Members of Parliament and it 
was possible that an unpopular decision by the council may have had a knock-on 
effect for the current political status quo.   
As the gentleman carer continued to speak he started to deconstruct the lines of 
argument that the council had put forward to advocate for the changes:   
"I'd like now to deal with the three points which were used to argue against 
my article in [newspaper one]. First of all the Care Act is a red herring. There 
is nothing in the Care Act - and I've been through it with a fine toothcomb - 
that says you are required to do what you're doing with Oak Hall and with 
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the situation in Crouston - nothing whatsoever. You can interpret it any way 
you like, of course, and you can make it sound like that's what being said, but 
it isn't. The second this is - choice. Quite candidly, when I was an infant I was 
taught basic arithmetic and that basic arithmetic is very, very simple and 
straightforward. If you've got two of something and you take one away 
you're reducing the options. How on earth anybody with any reasoning in 
their mind can say that it's increasing choices is beyond me!" 
 
The carer moved on to speaking about the issue of affordability of paying for a 
respite break at one of the local alternative care homes, a topic which had been 
raised in relation to Long Edge by the two ladies who spoke at the start of the 
council's overview and scrutiny meeting a month previously.  Cost factors, the 
carer continued, ranked alongside availability of respite beds at any moment in 
time that a respite place was required: under the proposed new system it could 
not be guaranteed that the time the respite was required would match with 
availability: 
"...if my wife needs respite while I'm trying to entertain people at the Raven 
Arms or wherever I might be, my wife has got to go from where we live to 
maybe Happleton or somewhere like that! You don't know - it's no good 
shaking your head - you don't know, you don't know, you can't know, you 
can't possibly decide when beds are going to be available. Anyway, in my 
opinion, it's impossible for anybody who's running a council, to dictate the 
terms to people who've got private businesses. The council appoints 
directors ...the only people who carry real weight are proprietors." 
 
The matter of demand and supply regarding local respite services for people with 
dementia had a temporal dimension which was very clearly elucidated by this 
carer.  The council run respite service was at that time able to respond directly to 
demand through providing beds at its own service. Demand for a bed 'in time' to 
meet an urgent need (e.g. a breakdown in carer ability to continue to care at 
home) could be met promptly through the council respite service at Oak Hall, and 
in cases of non-urgent, planned respite this was linked into assessments of need 
for respite care which were undertaken by statutory social care staff (council 
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employees). So time in, and time for, respite was negotiated and directly provided 
by the council in the current service arrangements. However, if the council run 
respite service was to close and beds be purchased from the independent sector 
on behalf of people with dementia this represented a relinquishing of direct 
control of supply towards marginal involvement via block-purchase, and so the 
responsibility of matching up demand for time (for respite) in time (e.g. in cases of 
urgent need) would also be surrendered by the council. 
The carer's final point was: 
"Finally, I've got to say that I utterly endorse everything that's been said by 
the previous speakers. How on earth can you shut these beds? How on earth 
can you do it?  Did someone suddenly get a flash on the road to Damascus 
...oh yeah 'let's close Long Edge, let's close Oak Hall!' I don't know what other 
explanation there can be". 
 
The carer's narrative received a lengthy response from the leader of the council: 
"Let me make it very clear to you, that this paper, which I support, is trying 
to offer people respite locally and y'know, you say that we don't know, - 
we're going to actually book beds locally to give people that choice. So we 
will make sure that they get beds in Langlet, in Wartle Bridge, in Plimley. But 
I want to make it very clear to you all - you seem to think that this road to 
Damascus thing...let me make it very clear to you that my father died of 
dementia two weeks ago. My mother is dying right now of dementia, this 
very minute. This cabinet knows how strong I feel on dementia.  We're very 
clear about what we're doing on this - trying to make a win for everybody.  
We take seriously the comments you're making.  But do not think for one 
minute that this is an easy discussion.  We are genuinely trying, not to play 
politics, but trying to get it right for the many people.  Not just today but also 
tomorrow.  Now what I feel is important to look at is this is not us taking a 
decision on the road to Damascus - this is a well thought out process.  We 
have to go forward - not just in terms with what we do with Oak Hall or Long 
Edge, but actually how we get early diagnosis of dementia which, if we had in 
my parents' area (which is not Polshire) they would be alive today. And 
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that's an important point to understand. [..... ] So what I'm saying is that we 
are listening, we do listen." 
 
This response illustrated an interesting juxtaposition between two sets of strands: 
of lived experience and implicit temporality with explicit temporality.  The council 
leader spoke of having a parent living with dementia and recently being bereaved 
through the loss of his other parent from dementia. This, in a sense, placed him in 
the same camp as the carers at that meeting as having lived experience.  Fuchs has 
suggested that the distinction between 'implicit' versus 'explicit' temporality is 
near to the distinction in phenomenology between the 'lived body' and the 
'corporal body' (Fuchs, 2006:196). The council leader seemed to privilege explicit 
time - "tomorrow" over the now moment ("today"), presenting an argument that 
suggested that the provision of respite care could not stay as it was in the now, 
but that plans needed to be made for tomorrow and further on into the future 
(explicit time). 
His comments were followed by a response from a female councillor, KD, whose 
emphasis was on trying to pre-empt and allay any fears carers might have about 
ongoing respite provision: 
"We would never expect you to move out of Northweston for your respite 
care, and the whole point of this paper today is to allow us, to give us 
permission as a cabinet to go forward and make sure that before we close 
anything we have services provision in place that actually provides the 
domiciliary care, the respite care, that people need. We would not expect you 
to go to the other end of the borough for respite - that actually is counter to 
everything this paper is saying. The one thing that we got out of the 
consultation and even the petitions (although they were limited) were three 
things: you want local care; you want good quality care; and you want it 
when you need it. That may be that you want to book a holiday, or you want 
regular respite every Saturday, or that in periods of acute need and crisis you 
can get the care that your loved one needs while you sort that particular 
situation out. So that is what this [the consultation] is geared up for, whilst at 
the same time having to make sure that we have enough respite care in place 
over the next two, ten, fifteen years. And from the questions that have been 
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raised here there is some confusion about the way that beds are paid for, the 
cost if you went out as an individual to the market you would have to pay - 
I'm not arguing with the figures you have given us, but that is not the fiscal 
relationship that a local authority has with its private providers. Because if it 
did, private providers wouldn't come here. They wouldn't set up their 
businesses here. They rely on our provision and our guiding of residents to 
them." 
 
Similarly to the leader of the council this councillor expressed a prioritising and 
favouring of explicit temporalities of care over implicit, lived time, underlining the 
importance of focusing on: care when it is needed; care that can be planned in 
time; and the provision of care into the future.  Neither the leader of the council or 
the female councillor directly raised the issue of continuity of care in terms of the 
impact on people with dementia of removing a service and its staff, nor how the 
effect of this at a personal level might be addressed. However, as the councillor 
moved on to speaking about choice, there was an obvious continuity of care 
narrative concealed beneath the account of choice.  So, a narrative of privileging of 
choice of type of service over choice of provider of service in effect removed the 
question of continuity of care by taking choice of provider out of the equation: 
“Are we talking about a choice of provider....in which case I would agree with 
you. If we close these two down we are reducing the choice of provider." 
<interruption from carer who spoke previously>  "Or are we talking about a 
lack of choice - in terms of choice of service then we are not reducing choice - 
we are actually increasing it. As we are required to do - we have to provide 
residential respite because people have told us they want it. You're quite 
right. We have to provide community-based respite, because people have 
said they want it." 
 
Here KD gave an impression that the council and carers were seeking the same 
thing - choice - and made out that the definition of choice in the consultation had 
been specifically related to choice of type of service. This was followed by further 
attempts to pacify carers' concerns about the equation around the number of beds 
that would replace the existing provision: 
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"I would admit, it seems perverse, to close 50 beds....and you're right, we're 
not going to do that. Not until we know that we have sufficient capacity in 
the system to take over. And I think what people don't necessarily realise, 
and that we have done an awful lot of homework on, and that we actually 
have the experience of in relation to Crouston, is that when we look at 
respite - proper respite for carers - actually that didn't result in very many 
beds in the independent sector. We've actually been able to commission 
more beds in the private sector than were being used at Long Edge, which 
was a 34-bedded unit. Now that is mathematics, and we can give you that 
evidence, in fact I think that the councillor who asked for that information 
has already received that information from us. So we wouldn't do anything 
until we were sure that we had robust figures, quality of service, and range 
of choice available. And that is why we are looking to keep these two 
provisions open until such time as we are confident that that is the case. And 
we would bring that back to cabinet for your verification." 
 
What seemed to happen at this point in the meeting was a calculated act by the 
leader of the council to diffuse a situation of irate and discontented carers.  The 
leader of the council called for a suspension of the meeting and a fifteen-minute 
adjournment during which time he and two other councillors, plus some of the 
officers, would discuss the closure proposals in light of concerns raised by carers 
during the meeting.  After twenty minutes the meeting resumed and an 
announcement was made confirming firstly that the social care budget would be 
raised by £1million for the next financial year which would provide the required 
expenditure to fund the services at Oak Hall and Long Edge for a further year; 
secondly, that although the consultation report would be endorsed overall, some 
of the original recommendations would be amended; and thirdly and most 
significantly Oak Hall and Long Edge would be given a reprieve for a 12 month 
period: 
"This is about doing things the right way. Although many of you have 
consulted, many of you have come here to tell us what you think, we should 
listen. We should listen to the silent majority as well. To have had many of 
the comments put forward, and perhaps we have heard them louder than 
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you realise" [...] "There'll be no views put forward from cabinet. We've heard 
from the people today - that's more than sufficient for me. So Oak Hall and 
Long Edge remain open. Ok, they remain open" <applause begins> 
 
In temporal terms this might be described as an intervention that brought about a 
stopping or pausing of the clock (explicit time) in conjunction with "promised 
time" by legitimators, the members of the council (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:37). 
There was a sense of at least a minor victory being achieved by carers and people 
with dementia who would be affected by any proposals to close the service, and 
the feeling of victory was reflected in headlines in local newspapers in the days 
following the meeting. Newspaper 1 had as its headline "SAVED! Delight as respite 
centre reprieved for year after users' pleas." In Newspaper 2 the header for the 
same story was "Council U-turn on respite care plan". 
The implications of the pausing of time for carers and for people with dementia 
were that the pause provided some temporary relief from concerns that the 
service at Oak Hall might soon end, and assured them of at least a temporary 
continuity of the service and all that this represented in terms of maintaining 
familiarity of environment, staff, other clients, and care approaches.  However, 
just six months later - one month after the general election in which the 
conservatives held their seats in Northweston and Crouston - the closure 
proposals were brought back to a cabinet meeting.  In the weeks leading up to the 
meeting there was a feeling amongst carers, people with dementia, and staff at 
Oak Hall that the council would this time recommend closure of the two services. 
I planned to go to the meeting and had requested a slot to speak during the 
allocated public speaking time at the start of the meeting. This choice to speak 
meant that I would be, in a sense, adding to my role as researcher and entering the 
periphery of terrain of data sourcing: i.e. the sense that the interaction between 
me and the meeting was about the producing of new data in my own research 
project. 
 
Decision-making about Oak Hall and Long Edge: out of time  
At the end of June 2015 a meeting of Polshire Council Cabinet took place.  There 
were a large number of carers and other representatives present and the meeting 
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room was full to the point where all the seats were taken so that new people 
coming in had to stand. The proposals for closing the respite and day service for 
people with dementia at Oak Hall and Long Edge were towards the bottom of the 
agenda at item 11, and the first words from the leader of the council were 
proposing to move agenda item 11 forward to be considered at the start of 
meeting. There were seven speakers (identified here as Speakers 1, 2, and so on) 
of which I was Speaker 6. 
Speaker 1 expressed concerns about the alternative provision of care: would 
private sector homes pay minimum living wage to staff? Can Oak Hall and Long 
Edge be kept open by running them more efficiently? Will the quality of care be as 
good in the private sector as it is in local authority run care? How will quality of 
care be measured? Can we have a guarantee that no member of staff or council 
member would make a profit if you decide to close these care homes? Can there 
be a discussion about raising council tax in order to pay for care for the old and 
vulnerable - you need to look at these people as having worked and looked after 
you all their working lives and now it's your turn to do the same for them. 
A female councillor, KD, responded, emphasising the point that working with the 
Care Quality Commission (CQC) Polshire was -  
"...delivering better care than almost anywhere else in the north west and we 
will continue to do so, and that is why we can say that the independent 
sector is an excellent way to go forward." 
 
This seemed to fail to recognise something of a disparity in CQC findings between 
care facilities in Northweston and those in Crouston, which had been raised at an 
earlier meeting by two carers who had spoken about the poor CQC ratings given 
to care provision that was proposed as an alternative to Long Edge.  Clearly there 
were inconsistencies in quality across independent sector dementia care 
provision about which there was significant concern amongst carers. 
Speaker 3, even before she had started to speak, was pressed by the leader of the 
council who told her she had less than a minute and a half to make her point.   
"I've taken some time out of some severe family problems to be here today. 
As you are aware I have already made arrangements to present a petition on 
behalf of 4028 people, to the full council meeting in July, but because of this 
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discussion at the moment I felt I was obliged to come and speak here" 
[...]"The document presented by your head of adult services states lots of 
fluffy hope and cheer with little or no substance. It makes the obvious point 
that the services at Long Edge and Oak Hall are both very much valued. So it 
is shutting down? Why? Extreme old age and disability is growing greater as 
we speak […]"  
 (At this point the council leader interrupted saying "you have had your time" and 
then instructed the man who was passing round the microphone around to take 
the microphone from Speaker 3, which he attempted to do. The leader of the 
council then said - "you're not going to be rude in my meeting". Against this 
backdrop other people in the room said "let her speak", and she continued) 
"I wish to point out one last thing in respect of the Carers' Strategy - which is 
being proposed here. That is in respect of your Carers Together part of the 
Carers Strategy, which was before the governing body of Polshire Clinical 
Commissioning Group on the 29th April where what they said was - the 
governing body agreed it could not explicitly support the strategy without 
clearer evidence of the benefits to carers and without clearer governance 
arrangements of how those benefits will be delivered. This is what I came 
here to tell you today, that this is acting against Caring Together, thank you 
very much." (this was followed by a round of applause from people in the 
room). 
 
At this point the leader of the council deflected attention away from the content of 
Speaker 3's words announcing that because she had taken two and a half minutes 
of time that reduced time for other speakers. Speaker 2 interjected saying that 
"you should not stop people from speaking at a cabinet meeting where you are 
discussing something that is really, really important." This was followed by 
another round of applause from those in the meeting.  The council leader 
continued with tactics that seemed to be designed to discredit Speaker 3, but this 
was met by yet another round of applause for the speaker. 
Speaker 4, a man, spoke about carers' needs, pointing out that carer health and 
wellbeing was of prime importance because if a carer became ill this created a 
problem of who would look after the person with dementia. The leader of the 
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council responded, indicating that the solution being proposed would give carers 
"more time" in terms of the amount of respite that they would get, and that care 
would be local so that carers would have to travel less.  
Speaker 5 was a man who introduced himself as speaking for the Long Edge 
campaign, from Crouston. He wanted to question the Chair and the council officer 
about how many beds have replaced the thirty that were axed. This drew a 
response from the leader of the council - "One thousand".  Speaker 5 repeated his 
question, emphasising the word "beds", and the same response was repeated by 
the council leader.  
Speaker 5 continued:  
"That's bed nights. With due respect you're talking about bed nights. How 
many beds? Thirty beds were at Long Edge - how many are still there? And 
where are they?"  
 
Speaker 5 continued to press the council leader for an answer to his question, and 
then asserted that the council wanted to cut costs, but that these costs will 
transfer to carers and clients. A round of applause followed this speaker, and then 
the council leader responded not by answering the question but by describing 
how Long Edge and Oak Hall have slipped over into the provision of "permanent 
care", evidenced by instances where people have been there for more than six 
months. This was a problem because the standard stay was set at no more than 29 
days, and the council was not licensed to provide permanent care.  This issue 
came up several times more, the next when I spoke (Speaker 6). I read a short, 
scripted piece about types of value that can't be quantified and may be hardly 
noticed until a service that encapsulates the value is removed. The closure of Oak 
Hall as I saw it would represent a loss of the value hidden in the knowledge, skills 
and experience of staff, and this value was irreplaceable. About two thirds of the 
way through reading I was cut short by the leader of the council, who then 
questioned me about how many people I had come across at Oak Hall who had 
been there for more than 29 days, people he described as "overstayers". Without 
waiting for my answer he proceeded to say that those long stays were not the job 
of the council to support. There had been, throughout the meeting, comments 
from carers, other members of the public, and even opposition councillors, about 
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the attitude of the council leader towards them and how the meeting was being 
run. This became very noisy soon after I had spoken and the leader of the council 
then said to those in attendance that if they would like to leave they could; if they 
didn't like what they were hearing.  This also marked a point where the leader of 
the council began to talk about the basis for closure of the services at Oak Hall and 
Long Edge being in order to address the longer than 29 days 'rule'.  
Speaker 7, a lady, provided an account of the independent sector in Crouston, 
characterised by a lack of beds, 'rules' about a minimum stay of two weeks for 
respite, and top-up costs. One home didn't accept social services funded stays, and 
none of the homes had respite care facilities. In fact, some didn't even have full-
time care places available at all. There was more applause for the speaker.  The 
picture that Speaker 7 painted seemed to catch the leader of the council unawares 
as he provided a blustering response that there would be a need to pre-book beds, 
and that the council would be ensuring the availability of beds. 
The allocation of time for the public to speak ended, and the debate was then 
opened up to other councillors. EH, a labour councillor was the first to speak. I 
knew EH from previous employment with the local branch of the Alzheimer's 
Society where she had been the chair for a time. In relation to Oak Hall she had 
started an online petition through the network '38 Degrees'.  Her first question 
was about how much the council had paid (2014/15) to the private sector in cases 
where residents could not pay for their care costs.  This information had not been 
possible to find, and she asked for a written response.   
The next speaker was a young male labour councillor, LR, who put it to the leader 
of the council that he was "obsessed" with listening to the public prior to getting 
elected, but what of this now?  LR said he would pay homage to Oak Hall for 
providing the bridge for his granddad who used the service and then went into 
long-term permanent care, describing those who worked at Oak Hall as "fantastic, 
fantastic staff".  There was another round of applause, followed by further 
comments from the council leader about how badly labour councils in other areas 
have handled scenarios involving transferring of services from the council to the 
independent sector, and that Polshire council has had to make tough decisions in 
tough times. LR tried to continue speaking but was cut off by the council leader 
with the words - "this is my meeting". This generated further angry comments 
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from people in the room, including shouts from some people. A conservative 
councillor from Crouston then spoke, saying that "the older generation doesn't 
understand the difference between respite, intermediate and long-term care".  She 
requested that if Long Edge is closed could information be sent out to reassure 
people that the care they will receive in the independent sector will be as good as 
the care they receive at Long Edge.  This prompted another off-the-cuff response 
from the council leader assuring her that the care would be as good.  
It was at this point that item 11 (regarding future provision to replace Oak Hall 
and Long Edge) was introduced by KD. This was the paper that was brought to the 
December meeting in a different format. KD described how the council had started 
to implement the Care Act, and that it was incumbent on the council to provide 
not just one form of respite care for residents, but multiple forms. Other forms of 
respite care had started to be implemented, such as "at home respite".  At home 
respite was clearly not viewed by carers as appropriate for the needs of the 
people who used respite at Oak Hall and Long Edge, and the noise level in the 
meeting increased again.  KD expressed the view that providing care from Oak 
Hall and Long Edge was very expensive, and followed this by saying that the 
numbers of people with dementia using Oak Hall and Long Edge were actually 
"very few".  Again, this was followed by more rumblings from members of the 
public present. KD made her recommendation to cease carer respite at Oak Hall 
and Long Edge as from December 31st 2015. This timeframe would allow enough 
time for the council to ensure that what was put in place would meet people's 
needs, finishing her line of argument with - "I will guarantee that it [replacement 
respite services] will be of a similar quality". 
Councillor N was asked to propose the motion, and he addressed the carers and 
other members of the public present by saying: "It's up to you to monitor where 
we go with this and to monitor the outcomes from it."  
A labour councillor SB then spoke against the proposed closure:  
"The cabinet changed their minds about the closure of both establishments 
and agreed to a reprieve for a year. Many people admired that decision for 
the stance they took, believing that you cared about what would happen to 
them and those they cared for. Today, on behalf of those same people, I 
would ask you all to reconsider the plans to close Long Edge and reduce the 
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service at Oak Hall. Nothing has changed since December 2014. Indeed, we 
know that month by month more people are taking on a caring role, saving 
local authorities millions of pounds a year. Carers have not been properly 
consulted in the time between December and the present, there are fewer 
places in the private sector than this time last year, the independent sector 
are clear that they cannot provide respite care for what local authorities are 
prepared to pay, and may say that they can only provide respite in the short 
term because somebody has left or died." 
 
He highlighted that, for some people, models of respite where the service was 
provided in the person's own home were not desirable because too many 
arrangements had to be made, and in any case it can't be assumed that a carer 
would want to leave their home, or change their own sleeping arrangements to 
accommodate the person coming in to care. Whilst it had been said that the 
closure of Top View (a respite service for older people) was without negative 
consequence this did not seem to have been borne out in practice, with anecdotal 
evidence that some carers were left unsupported.   
SB asked councillors to think about local people and their needs: "after all, they're 
not asking for much".  He pointed out that the issue of "overstayers" begged the 
questions - why hasn't anything been done about this before; and why not fix the 
problems rather than close the facility?  This councillor's last comment drew 
murmurs and nods of agreement from people in the room, and then a big round of 
applause. 
It seemed to me that if the decision about keeping Oak Hall and Long Edge open 
had rested either on arguments about quality, or arguments about carers' lived 
experience, the evidence provided via the consultation and at the meeting itself 
would have been more than sufficient to prevent the closure. Clearly this was not 
what the decision rested on, and the leader of the council then confirmed this, 
saying that respite needed to be increased for thousands of people and that 
closing the two services would make savings that would then be ploughed back 
into providing respite; and that evidence would be provided to support this view. 
The savings argument was then picked up by the labour councillor, EH, who 
outlined what she called 'facts': there have been some notable failings in decisions 
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made about spending in the council and some of these have cost a lot of money. 
The £1million needed to fund Oak Hall and Long Edge was the cost of one of these 
failings. This comment was immediately refuted by the council leader, amidst 
growing signs of dismay in the room: shouting and questions, and a mini slanging 
match then ensued, with one woman describing the behaviour of the council 
leader as "awful", "nasty" "arrogant".  Her comments were applauded, but the 
leader of the council then declared that if the woman did not stop talking he 
would stop the meeting and clear the audience. This outburst contained, EH 
continued.  She had tallied up the various pots of money in the general reserves 
and earmarked reserves.  Even after schools costs were deducted from the council 
tax income there would still be about £700 million remaining for the current year.  
Whilst it was not disputed that there needed to be savings made the savings 
outlined for reinvestment from the potential service closures were £1.3 million, 
which she considered fairly modest in the light of the council's total reserves.  The 
respite service the council provided prior to Oak Hall (Minton Lodge) closed and 
the savings made were then reinvested in Oak Hall. The portfolio holder at the 
time had given assurances to carers that they would always have Oak Hall. EH's 
comments were met with another round of applause. 
The distances carers had to currently travel to take their loved one to a respite 
facility was raised by the leader of the council, and then by another conservative 
councillor who stated that her constituents were having to travel a minimum of 
eighteen miles to get respite. Another councillor's view was that he didn't want 
his residents travelling anywhere if at all possible, but wanted local care homes 
for them or for them to have respite in their own home. 
Here KD provided a summing up about resources in the form of sixteen new 
senior social workers, and the current social care budget from which greater 
efficiencies would have to be made over the following twelve months. In what 
seemed to be a political manoeuvre she then said: 
"...but I hear what the PhD student says, because she's absolutely right - it's 
 about more than money - it is about the quality of care, it is about the nature 
 of the relationships that are built between those that are cared for, their 
 carers and the staff who they trust to look after their loved ones, and it is 
 about place and time and appropriateness." 
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I was struck by the way that KD had taken my narrative and recast it using the 
expression "place and time".  It seemed to me that this was a rather odd situation 
where my narrative was being used to justify (or at least to support) a decision 
that involved completely changing the "place" (of service provision), and imposing 
a different temporality ("time") on carers and people with dementia than the one 
which already worked for them. 
After KD's summing up there were more murmurings and questions from 
members of the public. Then, seemingly in a final act of reputational damage 
limitation, the leader of the council reiterated that he had lost two parents to 
dementia and that he understood the heartache.  At this point he had to virtually 
shout to make himself heard, as he proceeded to call for a vote on the proposals to 
close the services at Oak Hall and Long Edge. The voting itself was very brief, and 
the council leader stating that the call to close the services was carried 
unanimously. 
A five-minute recess was announced to allow time for anybody who wished to 
leave at this point. Apart from a handful of people who remained to hear the 
debate on other items on the agenda all carers, other members of the public 
(including myself) left at this point. A carer whose husband was a participant in 
my PhD study was there and looked very upset. I had a brief conversation with 
her outside, and then with two town councillors and with Speaker 3.  
Whatever the fall-out from the meeting and the decision that was made, it did not 
result either in any back-tracking on closing the service at Oak Hall, or 
resignations from the council.  The story was reported on in Newspaper 1 with the 
header: "Respite care reprieve at site to be short-lived". This provided an 
interesting, if unintended, reference to the temporal dimension of the service 
provision. One vote at one moment in time and the service quite suddenly did not 
have a future. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Introduction to this chapter 
The two previous chapters (four and five) are ethnographic case studies in which 
the accounts of my data and findings are set out.  
In chapter six my aims are: to try to distil the points that I surfaced in my case 
accounts about the specifics of 'knowledge', 'time' and 'practice'; to set out my 
perspective on the interplays and interrelatedness between knowledge, time and 
practice in the two service settings; and then to illustrate using examples from 
fieldwork how I have envisioned knowledge, time and practice as converging.   
This chapter is set out in several sections. Initially, I discuss my approach to 
making sense of the data in the context of my interactions with the field settings. I 
then restate the core elements of knowledge, time and practice, from a 
perspective shaped by understandings that have 'grown' through the journey of 
doing a PhD.   
Based on examples taken from the two case study accounts I present a set of 
notional convergences that I have envisaged between knowledge, time and 
practice in each of my service settings. I then suggest an overarching convergence 
of knowledge, time and practice that helps in making sense of the two case studies 
– how they differ and yet how they also display these common abstract 
properties.   
I close chapter six with some reflexive thoughts about knowledge in each of the 
service settings, conscious that the account of it I have produced is essentially my 
account.  
I reflect on what has been surfaced about each fieldwork context in terms of the 
differing knowledge regimes and currencies; and I consider questions regarding 
what do I now know (that I did not know when I began my PhD), and can I surface 
what I now know? 
 
It is important to revisit, briefly, the characterisations of tacit knowledge that I 
found helpful in my reading of theoretical and empirical bodies of literature. 
Fundamental to the building of my argument here is that our understanding of the 
nature and the practical worth of tacit knowledge might be extended by giving 
attention to the specifics of knowledge, time and practice.  
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The accounts in chapters four and five helped to reveal and clarify the nature of 
knowledge, time and practice interrelatedness, which are the subject of work in 
the theory of practice (e.g. Liaschenko in Thorne and Hayes, 1997;Reckwitz, 2002; 
Hopwood in McLean et al, 2014; Hopwood, 2014; Falk et al, 2017).   
Characterisations of tacit knowledge that were helpful in terms of their relevance 
to the two service settings were Gabbay and Le May’s (2011) "inexpressible 
knowledge" (aspects of practice knowledge that cannot be linguistically 
articulated);  Eraut’s (2002) “intervisibility of practice” where practice might be 
conceived as oscillating between being visible and invisible - an idea that prompts 
thoughts about the knowledge embedded in practice (Polanyi, 1961); human 
bodily sensorial faculties (sight, smell, touch) through which the external world is 
perceived and by which a practitioner can come to know about/know their 
patient or service user (Goodwin in Buscher et al, 2009; Polanyi, 1961);  and 
practice experience as one means for knowledge acquisition and accumulation by 
practitioners  (Benner, 1980, 1982; and Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1980).  
 
Making sense: data and interactions in the field 
The data I have presented in chapters four and five signal theoretical pathways for 
analysis and understanding.  Notwithstanding this assertion, an indispensable ally 
in my sensemaking has been my own imagination. During the fieldwork stage and 
in the periods when I was making sense of my data, imagination is what enabled 
me to simply wonder about the experiences and concerns of my research 
participants, to sit with my data and let thoughts and possible meanings arise, and 
to envision the possible connections between ideas.  
Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg (known by his pen name, 
Novalis), a German poet, author, mystic and philosopher of early German 
Romanticism, was writing during the late eighteenth century.  In an unpublished 
fragment he wrote: 
"To romanticize the world is to make us aware of the magic, mystery and 
wonder of the world; it is to educate the senses to see the ordinary as 
extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the mundane as sacred, the finite as 
infinite." (Novalis, cited by Beiser, 2006:101) 
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If making sense of the world is an imaginative endeavour then imagination should 
not be dismissed from the researcher’s repertoire of resources for sensemaking 
during the various stages of a research project.  Additionally, Novalis’ call to see 
the "ordinary as extraordinary" and "the familiar as strange" are ways of seeing 
which are fundamental to the ethnographic tradition.  
In Weick’s (2006) work there are also allusions to imagination's involvement in 
sensemaking.  Weick endorses the idea that it is a feature of everyday life that 
people "believe ahead of the evidence" (Weick, 2006: 1725), illustrating this with 
an example from pre-1950s (clinical) practice: paediatricians believed that brittle 
bones was the explanation for injuries in children because they would not believe 
that the injuries may have been inflicted deliberately by parents. In explaining this 
Weick suggests that events happen and then we make sense of these sometime 
afterwards:  "'[t]he after-the-fact, ex post, life-trailing nature of consciousness - 
occurrence first, formulation later on'" (Geertz, 1995:19, cited by Weick, 
2006:1725).  Sensemaking involves people noticing, then extracting cues, and 
then embellishing what they extract (Weick, 1995:49).  Citing Charles Peirce's 
approach known as "abduction" (Weick, 2006:1731), Weick elaborates further on 
this process: 
"[W]hen people imagine reality, they start with some tangible clue and then 
discover or invent a world in which that clue is meaningful." (Weick, 
2006:1731) 
'Clues may be "obscure" or "remote" (Harrowitz, 1988:184, cited by Weick, 
2006:1731) and the taking of a tangible clue, seeing it as a "meaningful symptom", 
and then wholeheartedly following it results in the enactment of a complex reality 
not directly observable. (Weick, 2006:1731).  Embellishment, imagination, and 
invention are all terms Weick uses for expounding his ideas about sensemaking.   
 
The respective ideas from Novalis that an imaginative sensibility is one 
orientation to the world that we can adopt to make sense of it, and the guiding 
theoretical underpinnings of sensemaking from Weick, are now followed with 
some brief points about my own sensemaking and how I practiced imagination 
during and after leaving the field. 
In an early, though undated, field-note made at Oak Hall I wrote: 
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 "Karl Weick (1995) uses the word “sensemaking” and this is interesting because 
this is what we all seem to be trying to do. Staff, clients, the researcher, visitors 
who come in, are all trying to make sense." 
This was a reflexive point based on my own noticing, and my interpretations, 
themselves filtered through my past experiences of working in care homes, NHS 
and social services day centres, my knowledge about dementia, my values and 
beliefs about the world, and my personal orientation to knowledge and towards 
resolving what I had constructed as problematic about knowledge. 
 
Imagination involves a creative act of conceiving mental images or visualisations 
that are not accessed as material or tangible.  Imagination allowed me creative 
licence to wonder about individuals, based on encounters with them.  My 
reflections were oriented towards aspects that engaged my attention such as: 
what a person had said or their demeanour and emotional expression. Whether or 
not a person with dementia can linguistically articulate aspects of their current 
experience does not matter. What matters is that the person is continuously 
having experiences. Thomas Fuchs - writing both as psychiatrist and philosopher - 
suggests that being in a state of memory impairment does not diminish or change 
this certainty that a person had experiences previously and continues to have 
them. (Fuchs, 2016: 7-9).  My imaginings about an individual were how I tried to 
connect the pasts, presents and possible futures of that individual.  Stuart, for 
example, I had already encountered fifteen or so years earlier and I could 
remember my interactions with him before he developed dementia.  Even though 
Stuart was not physically present at his parents' home during my visit, he seemed 
held there in his parents' remembrances of him - their anecdotes about him and 
photographs of him in the home that he had shared with them until recently.  I 
wondered about the experience for his mum and dad in relinquishing caring for 
Stuart, and I thought about what Stuart might have felt at being separated from 
his parents and familiar surrounds of home.  He was now unable to articulate 
linguistically his wishes for the future, which caused me to wonder whether he 
would have wanted his end of life care to be somewhere other than his family 
home.  Another scenario - that of Ms Evans who was seen by Laura at home - 
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prompted reflections about how she experienced living alone: how did she fill the 
long stretches of time when there was no-one present?   
 
My imaginings became written into my narratives about individuals.  One instance 
of attempting to extend an individual story was based around my observation of 
Mr Burton's appointment with Laura in clinic. Mr Burton was aware of his 
forgetfulness: forgetting people's names, and forgetting to lock the door of his 
house during the day.  He did not state that leaving the door unlocked was a 
problem, but I speculated on the scenarios that might result, such as the house 
being burgled.  I took this idea - that forgetfulness might become a problem in 
certain situations - and elaborated it further to open up insights about 
associations between forgetting and exposure to risks. 
 
I stated in an earlier paragraph in this chapter that data presented in chapters 
four and five signalled theoretical pathways for sensemaking.  Weick offers the 
perspective that in building theory researchers use imagination (Weick, 1989; 
1995):  
"[T]heorizing consists of disciplined imagination that unfolds in a manner 
analogous to artificial selection." (Weick, 1989:516).   
 
The analogy of "artificial selection" conveys the idea that the imagination is used 
for envisaging or speculating about how (for example) a set of ideas, or the 
complex arrangement of narratives within a story, or items on a list of variables, 
may be interrelated or linked.   In Weick’s example of the theorising process 
oriented to organisational problems he writes: 
"Organizations are complex, dynamic, and difficult to observe, which means 
that whenever we think about them, the thinking will be guided by indirect 
evidence and visualizations of what they may be like, often captured in 
metaphors." (Weick, 1989:529) 
 
I can relate my own attempts to provide a theoretically oriented account of tacit 
knowledge in the two services to this quotation from Weick.  Without empirical 
means to differentiate between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge – that is, 
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being able to definitively state in a given instance that only tacit knowledge or 
only explicit knowledge is involved – it becomes helpful to use imagination for 
visualising connections that cannot be substantiated empirically.   
The way that I found helpful for envisioning tacit knowledge was through seeing 
tacit knowledge in relationship to practice and time.  
 
Knowledge: articulation 
For this PhD I set out with the intention that I would investigate tacit knowledge 
in two dementia service settings. Initially my interest was in the tacit knowledge 
of practitioners in their day-to-day interactions with people with dementia. 
However, once in the field, the conversations and interactions I had with people 
with dementia sparked my interest in the tacit knowledge of people with 
dementia and carers.  
Before I turn to developing my argument about the convergences between 
knowledge, time and practice, I give some consideration to types or aspects of 
knowledge in the two services that it is possible to articulate linguistically.  
Beginning with knowledge at the NHS memory service, I list instances of 
knowledge that can or could be articulated in written or verbal form:  
- Guidelines for assessment and treatment that assist in determining memory 
status and/or mental and physical health status.  
- Scan and test results. 
- Knowledge of dementia drugs: what drug to prescribe for specific symptoms 
and for the type/stage of dementia, and contraindications and possible side 
effects.   
- Knowledge of symptoms and their manifestations. 
- Knowledge of difficulties that people diagnosed with dementia face, and their 
families and carers. 
- Knowledge of the support the team offers, and what support and help is 
available outside of the team. 
- Knowledge about what people can do to improve their own health and 
wellbeing. 
- Knowledge of a range of interventions for people diagnosed with dementia.  
 
199 
 
Although not included here, the knowledge that is behind the conception of 
material objects - on which clinical practice is reliant - might be added to this list.  
By this I mean aspects such as: the knowledge represented in pharmaceutical 
drugs prescribed to persons with dementia; the knowledge represented in the 
actual material onto which an image is taken of a person's brain; or the knowledge 
signified in a piece of equipment such as the sphygmomanometer. 
At the local authority service knowledge that is articulable linguistically is:  
- Knowledge of individual clients: individuals' key relationships (e.g. with 
family, friends pets), their likes and dislikes, their needs. 
- Technical knowledge such as for operating a hoist, or transferring people 
from wheelchair to chair, or bed.  
- Knowledge of how to organise, design or support activities appropriate for 
people with dementia. 
- Procedural knowledge - such as administering medication or following 
safeguarding procedures. 
- Knowledge of good practice in dementia care such as how to respond to 
people behaving in particular ways.  
Just as knowledge in the NHS service could be further added to by thinking of 
knowledge in material objects, so too the local authority service list. Additions 
might be the knowledge represented or embedded in specialist equipment such as 
hoists, beds and mattresses.  
 
In giving attention to knowledge at the two settings one important question that 
surfaces concerns how knowledge and practice are related: whether, in an 
instance of practice, it is possible to differentiate between the practice part and 
the knowledge part. For example: when a clinician is making their assessment and 
deciding on appropriate treatment is it possible to articulate precisely the 'what' 
and the 'how' of the combination of practice and knowledge?  We can say that 
codified knowledge is available to the clinician in the form of  the assessment and 
treatment guidelines for determining memory status; and that the clinician acts 
purposefully in orienting tacit and explicit knowledge in the practices required to 
assess the individual.  We might describe practice as being powered by knowledge 
in the sense that Corradi and colleagues (2010:267) have alluded to: that 
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"practical and 'hidden' knowledge" is what supports practice.  Whilst not 
resolving the questions raised about whether and how knowledge and practice 
might be disentangled, the idea that knowledge and some form of action (e.g. 
doing, speaking) together are required for practice might be one strand of 
conceptualising how knowledge and practice are related.  This idea adds to the 
already stated problematisation of tacit knowledge in chapter two:  if knowledge 
and practice overlap and intertwine in a given instance of practice (e.g. assessing a 
person's memory status) then within an account of practice will always be 
contained (though not necessarily articulable) referents to knowledge. 
 
 I now turn briefly to consider from the service settings the knowledge repertoires 
of people with dementia and their carers, and the positioning of these in relation 
to the idea of a knowledge-practice dyad which has become highlighted through 
thinking about knowledge at each service. 
Becoming a clinician or care practitioner to work with people with dementia is a 
matter of choice.  It involves training in order to acquire the requisite knowledge 
so that one is equipped for practice.  We may assume that becoming a person with 
dementia and having first-hand experience of dementia is not consciously chosen 
or sought out.  Nor would it be supposed that - when physical changes to the brain 
start to occur - an individual has any inkling about what is happening.  By the time 
that memory becomes affected by cognitive decline an unstoppable process is 
already in motion.  Dementia is experienced first-hand only by a person with 
dementia. Regardless of whether the person can convey to others what it feels like 
to have dementia, the person knows experientially what it feels like.  Likewise, a 
carer knows experientially what it feels like to be a carer, and knows (sometimes 
in an intimate way, depending on the nature of the relationship) the person, which 
is a knowing of how the person was and how they seem different now.   
Articulating the knowledge of people with dementia and carers as experiential is 
about as much as can be stated, in that we cannot know the nature of the actual 
experience. We can only linguistically refer to the experience of dementia from an 
outsider perspective, as those who lack the direct experience. What we can state 
is: 
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- People with dementia have lived experience and lived knowledge of their 
dementia.  
- Carers have experiential knowledge of caring for someone with dementia. 
- Both carers and people with dementia may know about aspects of the specific 
type of dementia they have been diagnosed with.   
- People with dementia have knowledge of and experience of using particular 
services (e.g. Oak Hall). 
- Carers have knowledge of local services specific to people with dementia, and 
have knowledge of risks that might arise at home and how to reduce risk.  
In encounters between carers and practitioners, carers' knowledge is both 
historical (a carer has known and knows the person) and practical: the carer 
knows the tasks of care, how to ensure the person's safety, and how to support 
adherence to treatment. 
Individuals with dementia themselves are positioned as recipients of 
practitioners' knowledge. Yet, it is also the case that a person's own "lived 
knowledge" (Nygard and Johansson, 2001:89) - exclusive to the person and 
experiential - is useful to the practitioner in constructing a picture of the current 
situation (so long as the individual is able to give an account of some of this).  For 
example, in chapter four I described Mr Seward's appointment with Dr Ozha, 
where Mr Seward described his hallucinations.  He ‘saw’ - as though they were 
material - snakes, people in the house, people down the toilet, cameras outside, a 
man with a moustache, and furry creatures. The vividness of Mr Seward’s account 
of what he had seen would have been significant to Dr Ozha in a clinical 
knowledge sense. It confirmed to Dr Ozha that these were hallucinations.  Dr Ozha 
could not himself know what Mr Seward’s experience felt like, but Mr Seward’s 
articulation of what he ‘saw’ was sufficient to provide Dr Ozha with enough clues 
on which to base the diagnosis and subsequent specifying of appropriate 
treatment.  
What might be reasonably concluded from this practice example is that at least 
some parts of experiential knowledge can be surfaced (thus are articulable) when 
individuals speak about their experiences.  Since the account provided by Mr 
Seward was helpful to Dr Ozha, it might also be suggested that thinking in terms of 
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interdependencies between the knowledge of practitioner, person with dementia 
and carer is a useful characterisation of knowledge in practice. 
In the context of the social care setting the interdependencies between different 
individuals' knowledge can be illustrated when thinking about the brief 
conversations that take place between a carer and a member of care staff when 
the carer brings the individual with dementia into day-care.  Through even such 
brief exchanges the member of staff might gain new knowledge about the person 
with dementia - e.g. about the person’s particular interest or skill, or that s/he has 
recently been on holiday, or that the person is not sleeping well.  This knowledge 
might be incorporated into practice through, for example, directing a conversation 
or an activity towards the interests of the individual.   
 
This discussion about the articulation of knowledge, and how this might be 
relevant when applied to practice, opens up some ideas about the relationship 
between knowledge and practice.  It does not, however, resolve the problems 
concerning tacit knowledge specifically.  That is, if the dimension of 
comprehensive knowledge that is tacit cannot (in any practical sense) be 
extracted from the ‘whole’ of comprehensive knowledge, even in aspects of 
practice that are observable or audible it is impossible to determine the part that 
tacit and/or explicit knowledge plays in shaping practice at any given moment.  
Acknowledging that the question of isolating the action or activity of tacit 
knowledge in practice remains unresolved, it has been highlighted in this 
discussion that experiential knowledge of people with dementia and carers’ 
knowing of the individual with dementia, respectively, has worth to practice. In 
the memory service the worth of this knowledge might be in how it helps in 
informing diagnosis or specifying treatment. In the social care setting its worth 
might be in influencing how the practitioner interacts with the person, or in the 
selecting of social care activities by the practitioner.  
 
Knowledge, practice and time 
Having established that conceiving tacit knowledge in terms of its relatedness to 
practice is helpful for surfacing ideas about the knowledge of practitioner, person 
with dementia and carer, I now move attention to the day-to-day practice in the 
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two services. I introduce the idea that the knowledge-practice relationship is 
occurring in and through ‘time’.  Temporality in relation to practice is a recurring 
theme in Nick Hopwood’s work. One way that Hopwood (2014:140) has 
conceptualised the relatedness between practice and time is as “bodies” being 
required for practice, and bodies coordinated "in space and time in order to 
perform practices [...]."   
 
The way that I started to think about a relationship between tacit knowledge, 
practice and time was by identifying interactions between practitioners and 
individuals with dementia that seemed typical. I then elaborated through 
speculating on how time might be implicated. For example:   
-  An individual or a carer can articulate to a clinician the ‘when’ of memory 
becoming problematic. This knowledge is not insignificant in that it 
contributes to the picture of what stage the memory problems are now (e.g. 
mild, moderate), a picture that is added to through means such as memory 
test, and physical/mental health history. 
- In the social care setting good 'timing' – in the sense of practitioners knowing 
when to intervene (e.g. timing of intervention in an emergency situation is 
different to timing when a person needs assistance to mobilise from a 
wheelchair to a chair) – may be directed or informed by the practitioner’s 
knowledge or knowing of the individual.  
There are a number of time conceptions that are helpful for orienting time to the 
two services in terms of their everyday activity and practice, and the people with 
dementia and carers who use the services.  
Barbara Adam's Timescapes (2008) perspective of irreducible elements for 
understanding time is helpful for thinking about the two services in terms of how 
the practices of each were differently organised in relation to time, and how time 
was differently emphasised.  'Arriving and departing', highlighted in chapter 5, 
marked the beginning and the end of a day in day-care, or the start and finish of a 
respite stay.  The bounding of time in this manner Adam (2008:7) conceptualises 
as a "time frame".   The memory appointments in the NHS setting may be similarly 
characterised as bounded time frames although, unlike the day-care service, these 
are fixed and if a person missed their appointment a new time frame has to be 
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scheduled. "Sequence" (Adam, 2008:8) refers to ordering, and this offers a way of 
thinking about the typical entry-and-moving-through pattern and structuring of 
NHS memory appointments: referral in, initial assessment appointment, referral 
for scans and tests, and then the appointment at which a diagnosis is given.  The 
terms of the sequence are prescribed by the memory service, and individuals are 
slotted into it through allocation of appointments in the sequence.  Glaser and 
Strauss (1971:36) write about the overseeing of sequencing, timings and stages of 
passages by "legitimators".  
This is a useful strand to pull in because it serves to highlight an emergent point 
about the structuring and imposing of sequences according to service-driven 
objective frames of calendar/clock time onto an experience of dementia that is 
being individually lived.  This is perhaps an unavoidable tension between service 
timeframe agendas and those of individual realities which, as Adam points out, are 
"personal frames of life time and family time, and/or times of illness and stress", 
which are "relative and mobile". (Adam, 2008:8). "Timing" in terms of 
synchronisation, co-ordination, the right/wrong time (Adam, 2008:8) is another 
way of thinking about time, which may be applied to my two service settings. For 
example, decisions made by the council about when to close Oak Hall profoundly 
impacted on people with dementia using the Oak Hall service, their carers, and 
staff working at Oak Hall.  Even if timing was 'right' because it fitted the council's 
political or financial agenda, timing did not, and probably never would feel 'right' 
for recipients of the service.  "Timing" has its roots in 'Kairos', a concept that has 
been largely lost to the English language, but which is an essential expression of 'a 
time to': "the right or opportune time to do something often referred to as 'right 
timing'." (Smith, 1986:4). Kairos-relevant questions are "When?" and "At what 
time?"  The conception of time that seems to directly contrast with Kairos is time 
"as measure, the quantity of duration, the length of periodicity, the age of an 
object or artefact, and the rate of acceleration of bodies [.]" (Smith, 1986:4). This 
is the Greek conception of 'Chronos', the root of the word 'chronological'.  "How 
fast?", "How frequent?", "How old?" are all questions to Chronos. (Smith, 1986:4).  
Thinking about time conceptions that are useful in relation to the individual 
histories of people with dementia, Abbott (2001) offers two ways of seeing types 
of historical process such as a life course. One way of seeing focuses on finding 
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causes of (or for) something that happened, and the other focuses on narratives, 
with the aim of finding typical patterns. Applied to a life course of a person with 
dementia, Abbott's latter conception is one of seeing the life course as a logical 
narrative with an inherent purpose or end point. (Abbott, 2001:161-165). To 
think narratively, Abbott (2001:164) suggests, is to think "along cases rather than 
across them", indicating a focus on following the individual.  During a life course 
the person concerned participates in "events" in the social world (Abbott, 2001), 
and according to a narrativist perspective an "event" is defined as "a combination 
of particular values of many variables". (Abbott, 2001:166).  Abbott draws 
particular attention to the inherent complexity of events and individual subjects 
that participate in them.  Thinking specifically in terms of the life course of a 
person who later in life is diagnosed with dementia: a way of appreciating 
complexity might be through highlighting that the multiple variables (and their 
combinations) operating at the many different stages of a person's life, create such 
complexity that ascertaining 'how' dementia arose out of these combinations of 
variables seems impossible.  One of the helpful insights that Abbott's (2001) 
'thinking narratively' surfaces is that one particular value of a variable may 
become significant.  Abbott writes that a value becomes significant either: 
…"because it is the first reversal of a long, steady fall or because it initiates a 
long steady state. In either case, it is the general temporal context, not the 
immediate change that matters". (Abbott, 2001:172).   
 
Thinking in terms of life courses of individuals who develop dementia, Abbott's 
quote offers a helpful focus for thinking about temporal contexts, including how 
the temporal context may vary in accordance with the type of dementia. In 
chapter five I highlighted Paul's situation of living with Pick's disease. The 
particular temporal context of Pick's disease might be described as 'a given' in 
terms of an individual's life expectancy in years from onset and/or diagnosis.  
Although, in Paul's case, some time after diagnosis it came to light that his 
symptomatology was atypical for Pick's disease. This unexpected reality was 
potentially very impactful for Paul, who joked that he might now outlive his wife. 
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One further conception of time from Abbott which I would like to draw attention 
to as relevant in thinking about dementia is "trajectories" (Abbott, 2001:248).  
Abbott (2001:249) suggests that trajectories may be referred to as "master 
narratives" in the sense of being comparable to "master statuses": 
"Just as a master status like race overrides subordinate statuses like 
occupation, eradicating them in a simple comparison, so a master narrative 
is an overarching social process that has the character of coercing processes 
within it, and indeed of preventing those processes from creating 
combinations that disrupt it. It is this coercive characteristic that makes 
trajectories master narratives."  
 
The idea I considered in chapter two, of non-reversible passages (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1971) being a possible way of conceptualising dementia, seems to 
resonate with Abbott's idea of trajectories.  Qualities that are conjured up by 
Abbott's idea of trajectories are their pervasive and all-consuming nature: the 
sense that they are unstoppable like courses set that are unalterable.   
One other conception of time I think is illuminating for my work is from Bluedorn 
(2002). He writes about the way that people connect with the future, either 
through activity whereby people connect by creating in front of themselves, or 
through expectation: we see the future advancing towards us, and we wait for 
what we expect to become present. (Bluedorn, 2002:237).   One illustration from 
the NHS memory service is of Merfyn Jenkins who was being supported by Keith 
(a CPN) through regular home visits.  An important aspect of Keith's visits which 
Merfyn looked forward to and expected would happen, was a game of snooker 
played with Keith.  The idea of the future advancing towards people might be 
illustrated in instances where individuals seemingly reject or try to push further 
away into the future the prospect of living with dementia.  ‘Resistance’ in the face 
of a diagnosis being given was articulated by Dr Ozha's patient, Ms Baker: "That's 
not very nice, telling me that! Won't it go worse?"  In contrast, Mr Wooler - 
reviewed in clinic by Laura - seemed upbeat about the future, describing keeping 
going on his project of building a dolls' house.   
Most of the people with dementia I met at Oak Hall had been living with dementia 
for years rather than months and most were noticeably less independent than 
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people I encountered through the NHS memory service.  However, people at Oak 
Hall did engage with time, albeit in a different way to people I came into contact 
with through the memory service. One illustration of this was when I noticed that 
individuals in singing sessions demonstrated that they knew the words of a song 
and its melody, which I viewed as an indication that they anticipated what was 
coming next in a song.  This might be conceptualised as people connecting with 
the very near future.  Similarly, the occasions I was present at when individuals 
verbalised that they were looking for a person or a personal item that appeared 
'lost' - the very fact that they were looking indicated that they were orientated to 
finding what was lost, hence describable as a 'future' (time) concern.  
Having introduced some ideas about how I am orienting knowledge, practice and 
time (respectively) for making sense of my two case studies, I now set out how I 
have approached the challenge of representing how I see the interconnectedness 
between knowledge, time and practice. 
An essential consideration for representing relations between a set of essentially 
abstract and non-spatial concepts is that the descriptor selected should not be 
suggestive of spatial dimensions.  Metaphorical terms such as 'interlaced' or 
'interwoven' suggest spatial properties, and even the seemingly abstract term 
'connectedness' still implies spatiality.  The term 'configuration' seemed initially 
promising to describe notional interrelatedness, but 'configuration' implies spatial 
properties, and lacks a sense of dynamic qualities.  In the absence of a perfect 
descriptor I have used the word 'convergence' (in its noun form) which seems to 
capture a state or quality of things meeting, and also has a dynamic, active sense.   
 
My aim has been to assemble two sets of convergences for the respective case 
study sites, to try to illustrate a way of making sense of events or happenings I 
considered to be significant (e.g. the diagnosis at the NHS service; 'knowing' the 
person at the social care service).  For the NHS service the convergences I have 
selected reflect aspects of how the service responds to or is mapped around 
individuals with memory problems in terms of both the appointment chronology 
and the complexities involved in working with people with dementia.  For the 
social care service the convergences reflect crucial elements of the service's 
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orientation to people with dementia such as 'knowing' the person, and events that 
derail or interrupt continuity of knowledgeable care.  
Using these convergences my intention is to try to illustrate how knowledge, time 
and practice feature in health and care services to people with dementia.  The 
proposition that follows each convergence is where I try to glean what is surfaced 
about tacit knowledge through the envisaging of its interconnectedness with 
practice and time.  
 
NHS case study: convergences of 'knowledge-time-practice' and associated 
proposition statements 
Convergence 1: the first appointment following referral of the person to the 
memory service 
The structure for clinicians to see patients is through a prescheduled appointment 
at which the patient and the clinician meet, often with a carer also attending. The 
job of the clinician at this early encounter is "to sort out mild memory problems 
from more severe ones", a description given by Laura.  The chief means for 
discriminating between dementia and any other types of problems with memory 
(e.g. mild cognitive impairment/MCI) is the mini mental state examination 
(MMSE) devised by Folstein et al (1975).  The single cut-off for abnormal  memory 
function is a score of less than 24 out of 30 when tested using the MMSE, and 
scores are further graded in ranges of  "mild" (20-25); "moderate" (10-20); and 
"severe" (0-10).  Other factors that might be involved in memory impairment, and 
therefore need to be considered alongside the MMSE result, include the person's 
physical and mental health history, symptoms, and the results from other tests 
(which may not be available at this initial appointment) such as brain scans. 
Thinking in terms of what is actually observable and/or linguistically articulated 
in an appointment, and what is hidden and/or silent, examples may be given of 
both.  Some parts of the administering of the MMSE are observable and audible, 
such as the paper folding exercise where the clinician hands the piece of paper to 
the individual and instructs her/him to fold it and drop it on the floor.  What is 
hidden and silent are the thought processes and perceptions of the clinician as she 
watches the individual, and the thought processes and perceptions of the 
individual performing the task.  
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The process of human perceiving is itself innately complex, involving human 
sensorial faculties:  "actions and stimuli" that are interior to the body 
(Polanyi,1961:461) are in some way assimilated to form perception which 
ultimately leads to knowing.   
Laura in interview talked about prescribing of medication (knowledge that is 
codified) whilst intimating that she did not entirely rely on this formulaic 
knowledge for making decisions: 
"I probably use the dementia medicine more than most other people do, so 
people come to me and say, ‘What do you think about that, what do you think 
about that for this patient?’ And some of the drugs, particularly things like 
Memantine are reasonably new in clinical practice and using them with 
different kinds of patients and does it have a benefit for aggression, does it 
have a benefit… what are the drawbacks to it, are the things that are not 
always evident from clinical research, and perhaps it is about shared 
experiences and using it in practice." [Emphasis added]. 
 
Laura also referred to assessment and diagnosis as impressionistic, and oriented 
towards getting to the core of what was happening with the person. This is 
reminiscent of Polanyi's words: 
"Clinical practitioners call the peculiar indescribable appearance of a 
pathological condition its facies" (Polanyi, 1961:458) 
 
Reaching the level of expertise that enables a clinician to diagnose a complex 
condition such as dementia seems to involve a knowledge-practice mix.  In her 
early training as an Advanced Practitioner Laura spent time with consultant 
psychiatrists while they practiced, observing and listening as they assessed 
patients with dementia.  This was the basis for her to build her own way of 
assessing people: 
..."so that at the end of an hour’s assessment I could come up with some kind 
of impression and know whether I was going to refer for tests or a review or 
discharge or whatever. And I started looking at how I could write down what 
they were saying, how I could capture what the essence of what all these 
different consultants were doing and what was important."  
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The stacking up of the various sorts of 'evidence' that enable the clinician to come 
to an understanding of the individual's memory status, and to reach conclusions 
about that status is not an instantaneous process. Time is implicated, and a way of 
thinking about time that might be helpful here is Abbott's (2001) "events". Thus, 
one way a value may become significant is in initiating "a long steady state" in 
which the general temporal context becomes important, not the immediate 
change that has occurred. (Abbott, 2001:172).  The general temporal context 
might be viewed as time that is of indefinite duration, in the sense that neither the 
clinician (nor probably the individual) know when memory problems first started 
to develop, and nor is it known how much future time will elapse before the 
person's life ends.  Ramakers et al's (2007) conclusions that changes in the brain 
begin as many as ten years before the signs of cognitive decline become apparent 
point rather poignantly to a decade of living with a pre-stage of dementia before 
diagnosis.  
Even though it would be unusual for a formal diagnosis to be given at an initial 
appointment with the memory service because evidence from brain scans is not 
usually available at this point, the initial appointment does set the stage for 
whatever conclusions will be ultimately reached.  A scan can reveal whether there 
is general age-related brain shrinkage or specific dementia symptomatology, the 
former which may be an indication that the person has mild cognitive impairment 
(MCI) rather than dementia.  For example, one of Laura's patients - Mrs Bourne - 
underwent a CAT scan and an ECG following the initial referral appointment.  
When Laura reviewed the scan results during a follow-up appointment she 
concluded that at that time there were insufficient grounds for a diagnosis of 
dementia. 
 
As a referral appointment is the first encounter the clinician has with the person 
and their memory problems, the clinician's knowledge might be described as 
partial: she knows about the person from notes and correspondence provided by 
other agencies involved (there is usually a GP letter) but she doesn't know the 
person.  However, the clinician does have her own repertoire of knowledge 
accumulated from past practice which includes the conversations and encounters 
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she has had with people with dementia, and the accounts those people have given 
about their experience of dementia.  Past experience might provide insights for a 
present situation: e.g. clues about where the person is on a memory problem 
trajectory.  Yet, interaction with the person and their carer is as important for 
honing the emerging picture of the particular memory difficulties of the 
individual.  The clinician makes enquiry in the here and now by asking the person 
and their carer about the experiences they are having in relation to memory, 
asking first some questions about the recent past - what has the person noticed 
about their memory and what are their concerns, and what account is given by the 
person who knows them well. A person with memory problems may wish to play 
down or make light of the problem, perhaps for the reason of not being aware of 
the nature or extent of the problem.  Accordingly, differences may exist between 
an individual's account and that of a carer. This was illustrated in the differing 
accounts of Mrs Ladley and her daughter in the first set of clinic appointments I 
observed, detailed in chapter four.  
It may well be a carer rather than an individual with memory problems who 
provides an account about a particular moment at which an individual stopped 
being able to perform a particular activity or task.  One way of getting at the 
knowing of an individual or carer about emerging memory problems is to ask 
'what happened' to bring the memory problems into the person's awareness, and 
'when' did it happen?  The making sense by the clinician of what is happening in 
terms of the person's memory, I suggest, could be regarded as involving 
connecting with time and engaging different forms of knowledge. The following 
ideas help to illustrate how we might see time and knowledge being involved: the 
clinician connects with past practice experience in order to bring insights into the 
present situation;  the clinician draws on her knowledge of symptomatology of 
dementia; the clinician picks out from the accounts of individual and carer clues 
about the impact of memory problems on both the individual and carer, and these 
become relevant for aspects such as gauging risks and predicting future support 
needs.  A important aspect that potentially can be surfaced during the clinician's 
investigation of memory problems is where the person is on a trajectory of 
dementia.  Having an informed idea of this can guide decisions about whether (or 
what) medication is likely to be effective for symptom management, and what 
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information is most likely to be useful to the individual and carer at the current 
stage. 
Whilst understanding when memory began to become problematic for an 
individual and whether symptoms are worsening are the sorts of concerns a 
clinician may have about time, for an individual with dementia the concept of time 
might take on a very different complexion. For some individuals with dementia 
questions posed about the 'when' of memory problems emerging are difficult.  
Whilst a person may easily recall memories from the more distant past s/he may 
struggle to sequence, or even to remember, recent events. It may seem as though 
the person has difficulty tracking or locating their experiences in calendar time, 
suggestive that event time may break down as a basis for ordering experience.  
Nygard and Johansson (2001:86) suggest that temporality is a "quality" 
individually lived rather than a quantity that can be measured. Their empirical 
study of the temporal experiences of five people with dementia highlighted 
experiences whereby everyday events like 'when to get up' were strongly 
influenced by "inner personal temporal rhythms". (Nygard and Johansson, 
2001:88). Outer, calendar time - in terms of remembering the past, gauging how 
long an activity would take, and expressing thoughts about the future - became a 
source of worry and confusion,  and participants expressed "apprehension of time 
passing in everyday life". (Nygard and Johansson, 2001:88). 
Adam's (2008:8) ideas about "personal frames of [...] time" are helpful as a way of 
attending to different standpoints on time which are highlighted in encounters 
between the clinician, person with memory problems and carer. Adam (2008) 
differentiates between situating research subjects in objective timeframes of 
calendars and clock time which are stable and fixed (Adam, 2008:8) and placing 
research subjects: 
"in their personal frames of life time and family time, and/or times of illness 
and stress [...]. These latter frames are relative and mobile. They move with 
every new moment, situation and context. Their implied past and future 
expands and contracts as people move along their life course." (Adam, 
2008:8) 
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Another dimension involved in the clinician's enquiry is the corporal.  The 
questions the clinician asks are deeply encoded in physical expressions of the 
body. Bodily gesture and gaze are employed in a manner that is congruent with 
the words voiced. In Laura's practice, ways she expressed empathy included 
selectively disclosing information about herself. For example, with Mr Powell who 
Laura thought was drinking heavily she told him that she herself needed to lose 
weight - intimating that she empathised with his fallibilities in relation to alcohol.  
Even though the smell of alcohol was apparent of anyone near to Mr Powell, Laura 
neither commented on this nor did she position herself to sit at a distance from 
him.  The assessment of memory through the memory test is a process which is 
'exposing': it is seemingly impossible to feign a normal-functioning memory when 
that is not the case. I imagined that undergoing the test may cause the person to 
feel vulnerable, anger, or perhaps be in denial about memory problems. Laura's 
approach was pragmatic (the test needed to be completed) but empathic also in 
that she allowed individuals time and did not rush them. As a person looking in I 
did not observe any 'joins' or 'seams' between what I heard Laura say and what I 
saw her 'do' (i.e. doing in terms of actions involved in practices, and bodily 
gestures such as eye contact).  At one level this might be interpreted as 
congruence between saying and doing, and at another level it might point to the 
impossibility of separating out the practitioner's knowledge and know-how from 
practices themselves.   
The physical examination is a diagnostic tool, yet it also has a corporal dimension. 
The examination involves standard procedures of checking blood pressure and 
taking the pulse. Taking the pulse involves direct physical contact between the 
clinician and the individual: the clinician positions her hand on the person's wrist 
and this action enables detection of signals from the body through feeling the 
pulse beating.  A watch is used by the clinician as a measuring device for 
determining the number of pulsations per minute, and from this it can be 
ascertained whether the pulse is slow, normal or fast. The pulse rate is a 
significant factor in terms of future prescribing of medication, should it be that the 
person is ultimately diagnosed with dementia.  For example, prescribing 
Donepezil if the pulse rate is <60 is not advised, because this medication can cause 
slowing of the pulse.  
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There are typically two possible outcomes from the referral appointment.  The 
first (and most favourable to the person) is where the individual's memory 
problems are deemed relatively mild and are categorised as mild cognitive 
impairment. The clinician explains that memory will be kept an eye on, and that if 
further concerns about memory arise the individual should contact the team. The 
second possibility is that the clinician suspects dementia and refers the person for 
tests or a scan, and then for a follow-up appointment to discuss the results.  This 
process sequence was the one followed by practitioners in the memory team, and 
it was aligned with the local dementia pathway.  NICE (National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence) in association with SCIE (Social Care Institute for 
Excellence) provides comprehensive guidelines concerning "identification, 
treatment and care of people with dementia and the support of carers" 
(nice.org.uk/guidance/cg42), which I discussed in chapter 2. NICE guidelines are 
specific about the use of structural imaging in the assessment of people with 
suspected dementia.  The preferred practice modality to help clinicians in 
reaching an early diagnosis is magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), although CT 
(computed tomography) scanning is suggested as an appropriate alternative. 
(NICE guidance CG42: 1.4.3.2). 
 
Proposition 1:  
The initial memory appointment is defined as being the first encounter between 
the memory service clinician, individual and carer.  The clinician has read the 
referral letter and any relevant case notes available, but it is the face-to-face 
contact that represents the start point for the person and their individual memory 
difficulties becoming known by the clinician.  This appointment is not a 'stand-
alone' event, but is linked to a previous event where memory problems were 
suspected (typically a previous appointment with the GP).  
One way of expressing the initial appointment is as knowledge repertoires 
converging. Essential to the building of an accurate picture of the person - their 
past, their health and memory status, needs, living situation, and any risks 
involved - is the cooperative engagement between the knowledge repertoires of 
the individual, carer, and clinician.  
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Even though giving of a diagnosis at a first appointment is rare, the initial 
appointment does 'set the stage' for this future likelihood.  The score from the 
memory test, the individual's and carer's responses to the clinician's questioning, 
the individual's medical history, provide evidence about memory status.  A 
carefully worded phrase used by Laura to one of her patients at first appointment: 
"I do think that your short-term memory isn't so good" brims with consequences. 
It represents a tacit acknowledgement that memory difficulties have slipped 
beyond a 'normal' range of age-related forgetfulness into a state that is more 
troubling.  
The initial appointment is the basis for defining and initiating sequences of future 
events, such as referring the person for a scan.  In these terms it can be said that 
knowledge, invoked and engaged, commands time. It also orders the past as sense 
is made of previous events that may, until now, have been seen as random 
unrelated events but now appear as a pattern. 
 
Convergence 2: the appointment at which a diagnosis is given 
After the initial appointment, and before calling the individual in to discuss 
conclusions about their memory status and offering a diagnosis, it is usual to 
conduct brain imaging - a brain scan which the individual undergoes in a hospital 
outpatients department.   
Even though individual and carer know that there is some sort of persistent 
problem this has not yet been named.  Nonetheless, the contact with the memory 
service signifies the strong possibility that if a diagnosis is given it will probably 
be dementia - a non-reversible condition.  This possibility must surely engender 
some sense of trepidation in the individual and their caregiver.  
Dhedhi et al (2014) suggest that from the perspective of health professionals, 
diagnosing dementia is a process which may be described as - "the slow unfolding 
of becoming a person with dementia" (Dhedhi et al, 2014:3).  The sense of process 
is signalled by the word becoming, and becoming is itself an ever-present 
phenomena, as Smith (1986:8) highlights: 
"Process, the ubiquity of becoming, stretches over the entire physical and 
organic world. We are by now well aware that nothing happens in an 
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instant". [...] "The serial order of before and after constitutes the continuity 
of becoming which in turn leads to a definitive outcome." 
 
Another set of ideas that provide a lens on becoming a person with dementia are 
from Glaser and Strauss' (1971) status passage. The term "transitional status" 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1971:47-52) might be a way to conceptualise the course of 
dementia over time, starting with having a normally functioning memory, then 
starting with indistinct problems of forgetfulness.  Transitional status may go on 
for a long time (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:48).  Early changes in the brain that 
ultimately result in realised cognitive decline, Ramakers et al (2007) suggested, 
may begin as many as ten years before dementia becomes perceptible.  The 
transitional status frame of reference positions people with as yet undiagnosed 
memory problems spending, literally, years in transitional status.   
 
Becoming a person with dementia has a start point that is probably impossible to 
determine with accuracy because the moment at which changes to the brain reach 
a critical point is unobservable.   Somewhere on each individual trajectory there is 
a worsening of memory that likely signifies some sort of deterioration but which 
might not mean dementia, yet (as with Mrs Bourne to whom Laura said that 
'Alzheimer's Disease could not be ruled out entirely').  The point at which 
‘becoming’ a person with dementia arrives at 'being' could be viewed in various 
ways: for the individual and their loved ones it might be at the point when they 
accept the dementia diagnosis as the giving of a name for real and severe memory 
problems; whereas for the clinician it might be when she sees irrefutable evidence 
of damage and change in results from a brain imaging scan.   
'Being' and 'continuing to be' a person with dementia might be viewed using the 
time conception "trajectories" (Abbott, 2001:248-249) which offers the quality of 
"inertia" whereby large amounts of minor variation can be borne "without any 
appreciable change in overall direction or regime".  Trajectories, as Abbott goes 
on to suggest, might be called "master narratives" equivalent to "master statuses", 
which are characterised by coercive processes within them. The sense of the 
course being set without possibility to alter it, and the coercive, entrapping quality 
brings to mind the occasion when Laura saw Mrs Maddox in clinic. In Mrs 
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Maddox's words is the sense of comprehending a pathway that she does not want 
to get onto, leading to a state she does not wish to experience: 
 "I've seen people a lot worse. I never want to go like that."  
 
Master statuses, as Abbott (2001:249) suggests are all consuming in terms of 
identity: a master status such as race prevails over "subordinate statuses like 
occupation", essentially making these subordinate statuses seem not to exist.  
Whether clinicians actually name 'dementia' as the diagnosis is probably variable.  
Laura - in the appointments I observed - did not use the word in front of 
individuals and their carers, and this was probably for good reasons relating to 
the stigma and identity issues that may accompany a diagnosis of dementia.  
Thinking about the meaning of a diagnosis for the person's spouse or close family 
members - whether this impacts on their identity(ies) - is an important question.  
A spouse, partner or family member may have been 'supporting' (minimally or 
comprehensively) the person over a period of time prior to diagnosis. The fact of a  
partner or family member being present at a memory appointment almost 
certainly indicated a relationship involving 'caring' about the person. Yet, going 
from 'caring' (which might be one amongst many facets of a relationship between 
two people) to being the 'carer' suggests a subtle shift towards greater 
dependency of the cared-for person, and implies a singular role which has the 
dominant character of 'care'.   Moving into being a carer for someone with 
dementia indicates that the person is not fully capable of looking after him/herself 
- that capability has been 'lost'.  So, loss might not only be experienced by the 
individual with memory problems, but might also be part of the carer's 
experience: loss (or erosion) linked to how the two people relate to each other, a 
fundamental change in the nature of the relationship which the 'now' carer has 
with their mum, dad, partner, wife. 
During my observations of the seminar for carers at the CSD Centre comments 
from carers about the changes they witnessed in their loved one such as "loss of 
interest", "passivity", "loss of independence" were suggestive of quite 
fundamental changes in the person being cared for which it may be assumed 
would have some effect on the dynamic in the relationship.  The metaphor of a 
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'line' was used by the partner of someone with dementia to convey the idea of a 
theoretical line being the divide between being simply 'you' and being 'a carer': 
  "There's no 'line': today you're you, and tomorrow you're a carer..." 
The mental image invoked is one of a shadowy landscape where, perhaps, familiar 
and long-held roles of being a husband or wife to someone are now blurred (or 
perhaps temporarily disappear) as the relationship shifts, gradually 
accommodating changes in the person with dementia. 
Unlike receiving a diagnosis of a condition which is treatable and has a good 
prognosis, a diagnosis of dementia - essentially a non-reversible condition - is 
unlikely to bring about a sense of relief for the individual and carer concerned.  It 
is likely that there is a period of time required for coming to terms with a 
diagnosis, but in the immediate aftermath it is clear that elements of the person's 
and their partner's life have been rearranged in some fundamental and 
irrevocable sense by this news.  
Thinking about how a person with dementia may be affected gradually over time, 
this would suggest that carers themselves steadily adapt to caring in a way that 
corresponds to their loved one. For example, in the Wellbeing College session I 
observed carers talking about the need to make ordinary activities easier for the 
individual with dementia.  One strategy was described as:  
 "It's reducing choices, isn't it. I ask my wife to put her 'black shoes on'".   
 
There was obviously a time when this man's wife had been perfectly able to 
independently choose what shoes she would wear.  By the same token, at a time in 
the future it would be probable that her ability to follow such an instruction from 
her husband would be diminished, or disappear entirely.  Yet, even though carers 
witness sudden or subtle changes, continuing to care requires that they 
accommodate change and adapt.  For example, Mr Maddox - whose wife was seen 
by Laura in clinic - reflected on the fact that he was intervening with greater 
frequency to assist his wife in activities of daily living. 
A diagnosis, regardless of whether the word 'dementia' is expressly used, is 
directed to the individual. Yet, the individual continuing to manage in their 
current living situation is likely to be contingent to some degree on a family carer.  
Inherent here is a tension between the clinician's primary duty of care to the 
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person with memory problems, and consideration towards a carer. Laura referred 
to this in interview: 
"...a patient that I saw in clinic today attended with her husband but was very 
clear that she wanted to be seen alone. And so I saw her alone and said 
goodbye to her and then the husband was saying, ‘But don’t I have any time 
with you?’ And unfortunately no they don’t, but I think sometimes there is a 
tension between carers wanting to have time to express their concerns about 
people, and from my point of view it’s always best if they can do that and I’m 
always very, very happy to help them in clinic but if the patient really doesn’t 
want to, then that can sometimes cause some tension." (Laura, interview) 
 
This instance highlights the personal agency of individuals with memory 
problems, and the question of how this should be balanced in relation to the needs 
or wishes of carers.  
The articulating of a diagnosis through the naming of the type of dementia I 
observed in two of Dr Ozha's clinic appointments with Ms Baker and Mr Seward 
respectively. To Ms Baker the diagnosis was articulated unambiguously:  
 "Clinically, I would say you have a mild form of dementia". 
In Mr Seward's case Dr Ozha's delivery of the diagnosis of 'Lewy Bodies dementia' 
provided confirmation to Mr Seward's daughter of the diagnosis she was 
expecting.  Important to note is that Mr Seward's response to the diagnosis was 
rather nonplussed, yet this was fully explainable by giving attention to the 
context: diagnosis explained the frightening hallucinations Mr Seward 
experienced, and diagnosis prompted Dr Ozha to review and alter the medication 
which should reduce the hallucinatory symptoms and ultimately provide relief to 
Mr Seward as well as reassuring his daughter and wife. 
In both instances described the naming of 'dementia' elicited words about the 
future from either the person diagnosed or their carer. Ms Baker expressed shock, 
and a reference to the future - "Won't it go worse?" Her partner Damien seemed 
unsurprised at the diagnosis, as he had noticed over the past months that during 
conversation she would forget straight away what had just been said. 
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Mr Seward's daughter expressed what seemed to be relief at Dr Ozha's proposal 
to change the medication her father was taking as a way to stop the hallucinations, 
and that a plan was in place. 
 
Selecting to name 'dementia' at diagnosis (as opposed to a less clear articulation 
such as 'memory problems') is decided by the clinician, and probably involves 
taking into account different variables about the individual, their situation, and 
how well the clinician knows them at the point of the judgement about their 
memory status.  
Ms Evans, a lady seen by Laura and the occupational therapist during a home visit, 
lived alone and without a family carer involved.  Laura voiced to Ms Evans her 
presumption that she was "very committed to staying here, in the home you know 
and love?" This presumption was indirectly (at least) confirmed by Ms Evans.  
Laura's words and the implied acquiescence by Ms Evans seemed to link the past, 
present and future together. Ms Evans knew her home because she had lived there 
for a long period of time. Laura had concerns about Ms Evans at home alone now, 
and the risks of this current arrangement.  Of the two possible futures - remaining 
in the familiar, known environment of home, or entering into an unfamiliar and 
not desired situation of permanent care - Laura understood that Ms Evans' 
wished-for future was to stay at home.   Personal agency is brought to the fore in 
Ms Evans' case.  For some people remaining at home might be the factor that 
makes life seem worth living: retaining independence, choice and control may 
take precedence over the risks that have to be accepted in doing so.  Accumulated 
life experience - the repeated activities of daily life, and the general managing of 
oneself over time - is what humans fall back on in order to get through duress. 
This is personal and tacit knowledge.  In Ms Evans' case her own personal 
resources to continue to manage at home were unknowable, and neither Laura 
nor Ms Evans could predict how she would fare over time if she continued to stay 
in her own home.  
 
Proposition Statement 2:  
The diagnosing of dementia is, at one level, a distinguishing of significant memory 
impairment from 'normal' forgetfulness. Taking this perspective diagnosing 
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involves the clinician ‘pulling into the present’ (or into the immediate, the 
particular) a combination of various forms of knowledge, both codified and tacit. A 
diagnosis provides an explanation for memory problems that the person has been 
exhibiting over a period of time. 
Actually communicating a diagnosis to the individual and the person who is with 
them requires a nuanced approach, with the need for a clinician to take account of 
the life-changing nature of a diagnosis of dementia for those involved.  For the 
individual and their carer, in one instant of receiving a diagnosis there may be 
both a sudden making of sense (i.e. of gradual alterations in the person's abilities 
that have been noticed - a sense of things being 'not quite right'), while 
simultaneously the future may suddenly appear uncertain and undesired. From 
the individual's and carer's perspective the rapidity of deterioration, how long the 
person will be able to continue to live at home, and will we 'cope' may be 
questions and thoughts that arise.   
 
Convergence 3: working with complexity  
A way of thinking about Dementia is in terms of the peculiar combinations of 
complexity it seems to represent. There is inner complexity involving changes to 
the brain and how these may impact on the mental wellbeing and abilities of an 
individual, and outer complexity such as that of being catapulted into a difficult to 
navigate service system, or facing situations of everyday life that used to pose no 
likelihood of harm but become risky and difficult to negotiate.  The proclamation 
in the title of a report by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Dementia (2016) 
is: ‘Dementia rarely travels alone’; a statement which draws attention to the 
reality that people live not just with dementia but also other mental and physical 
health problems.  
For memory services to be equipped to help people with dementia, clinicians need 
to be well versed with working with situations that are innately complex, and to 
which there may be no obvious resolutions.  
Laura said that referrals she dealt with were "reasonably straightforward, not too 
complex", yet risks, and the sometimes precarious nature of health or of a living 
situation (for example, care arrangements could suddenly break down, or health 
could deteriorate rapidly) did indicate complexity.   Mr Powell's drinking Laura 
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thought might be affecting his driving,  yet she had no way of knowing for sure. 
His behaviours in this respect seemed unregulated: his ability to self-regulate 
diminished by dementia, and his family seemingly unfazed by this risky 
combination.  With Ms Evans, her symptomatology of dementia, unsteadiness, 
seizures, headaches and behaviour change, were related to Meningioma, and she 
was living alone which carried obvious risks that if she fell there was no ready or 
reliable help available.  
How is time implicated in this complexity?  I read a comment from Mr Powell's 
son as being rather telling: "my dad has his moments but nine times out of ten 
everything seems to be ok".  It reveals a relaxed attitude to how things are now 
and - because as yet nothing untoward has happened - there is no sense of 
urgency to put in place particular provision or safeguards. Laura seemed 
unconvinced that the family had followed the legal requirement of informing the 
DVLA about Mr Powell's diagnosis of dementia.  
The cases of Mr Powell and Ms Evans highlight the combination of personal 
agency with risks, and how these weigh against each other. Time is implicated in 
the sense of how long a situation continues until either the risks to the individual 
become so significant that incisive action must be taken, or there is a crisis or 
incident that forces something to change. 
In the face of situational complexities, and the reality of the infrequency and short 
duration of face-to-face contact between individuals and clinicians, the 
'timeliness' of knowledge surfaces as an important concern.  What timeliness of 
knowledge might mean given that appointments are, by definition, events fixed in 
time, is an interesting point.  From individuals' and carers' perspectives timing of 
an appointment might feel out of kilter with particular problems or concerns 
arising that may need addressing straight away.  One way to talk about 'timely 
knowledge' is that it is about dealing with priorities.  For example - highlighting 
precarious situations and associated risks, offering options for managing risks, 
and having a sense of how to 'pitch' these sorts of conversations with the 
particular person with dementia and carer(s) present.   
Another frame for approaching timeliness of knowledge might be through an 
appreciation that the manner in which life is to continue for the person (and 
maybe carers) is of great consequence for that individual.  So, timely knowledge 
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might mean giving thought to the general 'shape' of the individual's life and 
situation currently: the person's general health, what the person actually wants, 
and how they (and possibly carers) are/have been managing generally. So, in 
practice this was characterised by often very informal 'settlements' between 
clinician, individual and carer about the way of proceeding.  For example,  
one of Laura's patients, Mr Wooler, had lost the argument with the DVLA over 
whether he could continue to drive but he accepted this.  His memory problems 
were well managed with Donepezil.  Problems he had with his legs could not be 
dealt with surgically but were not so severe as to be unmanageable.  His mood 
remained positive and upbeat. So, although there were some rough edges to life 
that could not be entirely smoothed away, things seemed settled and the 'plan' 
from Mr Wooler's perspective was "I'll just keep doing what you say and I can't go 
wrong then."   
 
Proposition Statement 3:  
Knowledge, time and practice converge in individual situations of complexity.  The 
timing of an appointment in which the clinician's knowledge is brought to bear 
may not match the when that risks become highlighted, or may be mismatched 
with the when of individual's concerns or needs arising.  From a clinician's 
perspective the time frames for addressing the complexities involved in 
individual's situations of living with dementia are the appointments themselves. 
The clinician therefore must optimise the help she can provide to the individual 
within the time frame of the appointment. This involves thinking around what is 
happening now for the person (concerns, difficulties and risks), and what would 
help - e.g. - referral to the occupational therapist. It also involves the clinician 
trying to pre-empt possible catastrophes linked to high risk situations. The 
clinician's foresight may be translated into, or activated as giving advice to the 
individual and their caregiver about practical adjustments for staying safe in the 
home, or making provisions for the future such as updating their Will. 
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Social Care case study: convergences of 'knowledge-time-practice' and 
associated proposition statements 
Here I move the discussion of ideas about convergences between knowledge, time 
and practice to the social care setting.  The day-care and respite service provided 
at Oak Hall are for people who have already been diagnosed with dementia.  As 
such these services represent support for individuals and their carers negotiating 
what it is to 'live with dementia'; their reality that began before a formal 
diagnosis, and is ongoing. Here I consider different sorts of knowledge and 
practice in terms of their usefulness, and how they are framed by, or frame, time. 
 
Convergence 1: Time matters for getting to 'know' a person 
In a day-care service setting 'knowing the person' may be realised through time 
spent together.  The frequency and regularity of individuals attending day-care, 
alongside the duration of time spent on a respite care stay, is the basis for 
spending time together and the establishing of relationships.  In some cases 
individuals come to Oak Hall because care arrangements at home are no longer 
viable, perhaps because the individual's needs have changed and the carer is no 
longer able to cope, or maybe the individual lives alone with domiciliary care 
support and this is no longer sufficient so an assessment of care needs is required. 
Such situations necessarily involve an extended stay at Oak Hall, and may 
ultimately result in the individual entering permanent care. 
There is an important distinction between empathy and rapport with an 
individual (which I saw being skilfully established in memory clinic 
appointments), and 'knowing' an individual.  At Oak Hall 'knowing' the person is 
core to providing care, and knowing unfolds through time spent together. 
Everyday care practices such assisting a person with bathing, or dressing, are 
vehicles for getting to know a person with dementia because during such 
practices aspects of the person's self may be revealed.  These routines of care have 
a dimension that is intimate and occur in private spaces such as bedrooms and 
bathrooms.  I had deliberately chosen to limit my observations to communal 
spaces (e.g. lounges) and therefore the only data that surfaced about personal care 
activities was that which came up in interviews conducted with care staff.  Sarah, 
a member of care staff, provided several examples during interview, one which is 
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discussed in the Oak Hall case study section on how staff got to know clients.  A 
different example from Sarah highlighted how staff undertook personal care from 
a perspective of intentionally recognising personal agency: 
"looking at the person and saying now what would you like, how would you 
like it, when would you like it, down to the last little thing. For example I 
can’t bear socks with holes in – how would I know that of somebody with 
dementia?" 
Here, Sarah's words highlight the attention to detail required for gleaning the 
wishes and preferences of people who may not be able to express their views in 
ways that others can make sense of.  Once a member of staff has made sense of an 
individual's particular preferences in the context of care this 'knowing' can be 
relayed to other members of staff who, knowing this about the person, can 
incorporate it into care practice with the individual.  
It seemed, from Sarah's accounts, that staff took their cues from the individual 
client in terms of the 'pacing' of care. Time, it appears, may have different 
dimensions of worth: staff allowing enough time (duration) for one-to-one care 
activities; staff making optimum use of time for getting to know individuals; and 
staff allowing individuals to direct the 'pacing' of the care activity.  Stuart ending 
up on the floor whilst staff were trying to hoist him might be an illustration of a 
process taking over and the individual having no control over the pace, which his 
sister's words seemed to confirm: "if he feels he is being forced he will resist.” 
Another temporal aspect of care might be described as 'anticipatory': the idea that 
instances arise where staff get an impression that an individual is about to 
become distressed, angry, or move into some other emotional state. An instance 
described in the section on the lived experiences of people with dementia, chapter 
five, illustrated that when Andrew declined Jan's offer of drink and biscuits, Jan 
picked up on this being an indication of Andrew's restlessness (she mentioned it 
to Kate), and within moments Andrew had removed the blanket from his lap in an 
action to get up. The worth of being able to anticipate what will happen next is 
that the member of staff is prepared for what is about to happen, and can decide 
whether a particular intervention is necessary (or not) and, crucially, when to 
intervene. Intervening from the position of having this sort of foresight may be 
helpful in terms of preventing further escalation of situations. 
226 
 
 
More generally, any interaction between staff and individuals with dementia 
provides an opportunity to get to know the person.  The frequency of occurrence 
of certain scenarios, such as Michael misappropriating the cutlery spoon, perhaps 
make these instances less noticed by staff.   However, such scenarios offer clues as 
to the individual's world, the person's 'take' on the world at that moment.  If 
noticed, clues may nudge staff into attempting to understand and make sense of 
how the person is reacting or behaving. 
Historical information about a person such as their profession, interests, or where 
they grew up might be helpful for revealing a sense of who the person is.  Staff at 
Oak Hall would draw on what they knew about the lives of individuals as a way of 
engaging with people, even in instances where it was no longer possible for the 
person to verbally respond.  
Reminiscing was one of the ways used by care staff to encourage clients to talk 
about their past.  In one activity involving passing around items from the past (e.g. 
an old penny; carbolic soap; a ration book) the objects were themselves 'cues' to  
opening up memories about which an individual would talk.  These sorts of 
narratives staff could use as the basis for extending the discussion further and 
encouraging clients to elaborate on their experiences of the past.  The 
articulations of  individual clients about aspects of their life when they were 
younger were often retold by staff in the group setting (something which I 
observed).  This signalled that things that were particular to a person such as a 
hobby a person had enjoyed or a job, were known about by particular members of 
staff. This validating of features of an individual's earlier life might be interpreted 
as affirming an individual's identity in the presence of the person and other clients 
and staff who are present.  Affirmation of identity is encapsulated in Fuchs' idea of 
continuity of self (as subject) carried in the 'remembering' body: 
"...the lived body also manifests a specific form of memory whose continuity 
comprises not only explicit memory, but all the habits, capacities and skills 
which a person has acquired". (Fuchs 2016: 7) 
 
This perspective seems to open up possibilities for positively framing identity in 
respect of people who have been diagnosed with dementia.  One conclusion that 
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might be drawn from the reality that staff talked about and highlighted the past 
experiences and achievements of people with dementia, is that the totality of an 
individual's experiences is the material to look to in order to know the person.  
 
At Oak Hall a notable feature was that so many of the staff had worked in the 
service in its previous incarnation at Minton Lodge. Most staff had been at Oak 
Hall for at least five years, and the combination of a low staff turnover combined 
with long service may justify describing staff as a 'constant'. This seemed 
important in a service where the day-care and respite service were used by 
individuals with dementia over time, and in a planned, prescheduled manner.  
Whatever the permutation of service use by an individual the same staff were 
doing the caring: they were staff who knew, or were getting to know, individuals 
using the service.  The knowledge and knowing of individuals by staff augured 
well in cases where individuals entered permanent care. Knowledge about 
individual preferences and 'what works' with the person could be passed onto the 
care provider.  
 
Proposition Statement 1:  
Aspects of the worth of care practice are revealed through convergences of 
knowledge and time.  During time spent together aspects of the person's self are 
revealed which are the grounds for a member of care staff to get to know the 
person with dementia. A care practice such as helping someone to dress can, if the 
staff member is attuned and attentive, reveal knowledge about how an individual 
prefers to be assisted, which can be shared more widely with colleagues for 
integration into future practice. 
A staff member taking cues from the individual in terms of the 'pacing' of care 
entails attentiveness to the individual and the noticing and following of clues. 
Personal, tacit knowledge is implied here.  
In care settings the art of 'anticipating' (through making sense of clues) is 
valuable: it allows a member of staff to be prepared to intervene to change the 
course of an event that it is anticipated will occur. 
Continuity over time of a style or particular philosophy of care may be carried 
through the knowledge of long-serving staff in terms of: their witnessing of the 
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service evolving over time, their experience of working with people with 
dementia, and their knowledge of theories about dementia.  Because carers and 
family members see the same staff over time this fosters the building of relational 
trust and trust in the care institution.  
 
Convergence 2: responding to a crisis in a practice setting requires good 
timing and knowing what to do 
At Oak Hall two situations that I came to know of during the period when I was 
doing fieldwork required urgent responses. One of these I witnessed - the incident 
where Stuart was being hoisted - and the other, in which Michael suddenly 
became very unwell and stopped breathing, was recounted to me by one of the 
Seniors who was present during the incident.  In both incidents the wellbeing of 
the person with dementia was jeopardised in some way.  In both cases there were 
visual and audible 'clues' that signalled to staff that the individual was in distress, 
and that urgent intervention was needed. In the incident involving Stuart being 
hoisted he became rigid and started to tremble precipitating his sliding down off 
the chair and onto the floor. Staff acted by pressing the emergency button 
immediately summoning additional staff, and Stuart was then hoisted from his 
then supine position on the floor.  Stuart's parents and his sister were present and 
witnessed this unfold.  Although they did not appear unduly alarmed, it was likely 
that staff would have wanted to demonstrate their competence by bringing the 
incident to a swift conclusion and with no detrimental effect. Staff recognised that 
this was an emergency and followed the procedure to resolve it. 
In the situation of Michael becoming unwell and not breathing, a particular set of 
events preceded the incident.  Michael had undergone hospital treatment for a 
blocked vein behind his eye, which was initially unsuccessful and had to be 
repeated. Additional complications of a build-up of pressure in the eye were 
causing Michael to have headaches.   
It was only realised that there was something seriously wrong with Michael when 
a noise from where he was sitting alerted Kate to look round and then see that 
Michael was shaking and his skin was white.  Kate's understanding of what these 
physical signs meant prompted her immediate call for an ambulance.  Kate's 
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knowledge about the events that had occurred in the weeks prior to this incident 
helped her make sense of Michael's rapid deterioration. 
 
Proposition Statement 2: 
In care settings situations can suddenly or rapidly arise which are unpredicted 
and have not been, or cannot be, anticipated by staff.  Some of these events take a 
course that is potentially harmful or detrimental to an individual.  
An event that is unanticipated is one in which foresight is not available. The event 
is already in progress so a response is required to halt or change the course of the 
event in order to stop or limit harm to a person. The essential characteristics of 
the response are: rapid appraisal (knowledge of the situation and events that may 
have preceded it); knowing what to do (which may well be a mix of knowing the 
procedures alongside experiential tacit knowledge); and swift action. 
It is the speed of knowledge-infused action which counts in these types of events, 
so switching rapidly between various modes of knowledge performances is a way 
of expressing how knowledge converges with time. 
 
Convergence 3:  a threat to close a service may prompt people to try to get 
more time by delaying the action, or trying to prevent it happening 
When Polshire council mooted the possibility of the day-care and respite service 
at Oak Hall closing it should be remembered that something very similar had 
happened in 2012 when the council decided to close the Minton Lodge facility and 
reinvest the service at Oak Hall.  The sense of 'déjà vu' surrounding the news of 
possible closure might not have been a cause for concern to users of the service 
and their families had the proposal been to simply relocate the service elsewhere. 
However, unlike the closure of Minton Lodge the proposed plan did not involve 
continuation of the service and its philosophy of care.  Rather, the idea was that 
the council would cease providing respite and day-care at Oak Hall and would 
purchase respite care beds across a number of nursing homes which would be 
available for use by individuals. Alongside this there would be the development of 
other forms of local respite care to include arrangements whereby a carer 
approved by the Council would provide "support to an individual within a family 
setting", and Direct Payments where the individual would receive a payment with 
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which to buy in their own care and support, usually by employing a personal 
assistant. (Consultation Information Pack, 2014).   
Carers, people with dementia, Oak Hall staff, and the public first found out about 
the council's intentions through the publication of the proposals in the local 
newspaper.  Following their publication the proposals were swiftly rebuffed in 
written responses (also published), alongside which were published views of 
several councillors who were defending the proposed scheme. With news about 
the proposals now 'outed' it became clear that consultation with users of the 
service and carers had not taken place nor was there any evidence to suggest that 
consultation had even been considered.   
Autumn 2014 was mooted as the likely time for councillors to make their 
decisions, and consultation activities (ostensibly hastily planned and assembled) 
were now mapped around the autumn date and formally announced. There was 
also a political backdrop to the council's proposals: a general election was 
expected to take place in May 2015, and shrinking financial settlements to local 
authorities were continuing to be a pressure point for council spending on public 
social care services.  
It is highly probably that 'timing' for making what would be unpopular decisions 
was all important.  The scrutiny committee and cabinet meetings that took place 
in the autumn of 2014 came and went without news of what would happen to the 
service at Oak Hall.  There were definite rumbles of discontent and disquiet 
amongst carers, service users and staff. A question mark hung over the survival of 
the service at Oak Hall, and neither service users, carers or staff really knew how 
they would be affected if the service was closed. Some ideas about alternative 
provision had been put forward for consultation, but these 'possibilities' failed to 
allay the fears of carers and service users.  Some carers lobbied their local 
Member of Parliament, and there was a letter written by a family member of a 
client at Oak Hall published in full in one of the local newspapers. In the autumn of 
2014 service users and carers were consulted on the proposals, but not staff.  
Continuity of care - as it was perceived by carers and clients - meant day-care and 
respite components would continue in the same or in an acceptably similar form.  
For current clients and carers who were benefiting from the service at Oak Hall 
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delays in the decision-making  bought more time for lobbying and were to be 
welcomed.   
There are echoes here of the notion of an encroaching reality that an individual 
wishes to push away into the future, an idea which surfaced in chapter 4 in the 
describing of responses by individuals to the clinician informing them that they 
had significant memory problems.  In the case of being faced with the likely 
closure of the service at Oak Hall there was always the possibility that a critical 
factor would change - perhaps there would be a rethink, or maybe the leader of 
the council would be ousted - and the service would be saved.  
In this situation we might view delay and timing as both being involved in how 
events unfolded.  Delay was a source of hope for carers and clients as it kept the 
threat of closure at bay, pushing it away into the future so that it represented only 
a distant or weak threat.  The timing for decision-making, however, was dictated 
by the council, and carers and clients were not party to the when.    
The meeting in December 2014 where the proposals were discussed drew a 
strong lobby from carers and groups representing service users from Oak Hall and 
Long Edge. The outcome from the meeting was that Oak Hall and Long Edge 
would for the next twelve months remain open, representing, metaphorically, a 
temporary stopping or pausing of the clock.  One way of seeing the interlude 
created is as "promised time" (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:37) which enabled care 
continuation as normal for as long as the promise held.  Another way of thinking 
about this is in terms of a sequence of events in which 'closure' was shifted to a 
different position in the sequence: closure would still happen, but was not 
imminent. 
The re-election of the Conservative party in Spring 2015 put the council back in a 
strong position. There was now no particular need to direct efforts towards 
attracting votes, and unpopular decisions that had been put on hold could now be 
reactivated.  Continuation of the Conservative led council was the circumstance 
in which a meeting of the cabinet took place in June 2015.  Here - in spite of  the 
protestations of carers, town councillors, Labour councillors and members of the 
public - councillors voted to close the services at Oak Hall and at Long Edge, 
setting the date of closure for January 2016.  
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Proposition Statement 3: 
For people to accept changes in services such as service closure, legitimisation in 
the form of a sound rationale needs to be provided in advance of consultation and 
decision-making.  Both the sequence and sequencing of steps (Chronos) that lead 
to final actions, and timing (Kairos) are significant factors for seeking consensus 
and agreement for change.  The threat to continuity of care that is implicit in 
service closure is highly significant for service users and their carers and families. 
For staff, the implications relate to uncertainty about continuation of employment.  
In conditions where services are not threatened with closure, time ticks away in 
the background and is not viewed as consequential, except in an ordinary sense of 
time slipping away. However, in times when undesired change looms time 
acquires a particular significance related to the proposed changes. Responses 
from people most affected may include delaying tactics, or interventions to try to 
stop change. These sorts of responses signify that people are engaging with time 
and its meaning to them in a given situation. "Promised time" bestowed by those 
making decisions about service closure on recipients of care may feel like a 
reprieve, or at least a delay to closure. As the duration of "promised time" in this 
context is clearly defined, so the inevitability of change is not removed altogether 
but is pushed away further into the future. 
 
Convergence of 'knowledge-time-practice' across the two case studies 
Taking stock 
An individual's forgetfulness starts to become noticeable and problematic, yet 
memory problems themselves do not arise in an instant. In the background of a 
person's life memory problems have been gradually edging to the surface and 
taking form, a process that may take years.  When the 'problem' becomes 
noticeable it might initially be defined by the individual - and those who know the 
person - as a problem of forgetting, but the nature of the problem is as yet 
unknown.  
Another idea about how time meets forgetfulness is to think of time as 
experienced by an individual.  This is time conceptualised as "lived time" - an 
"implicit mode of temporality" (Fuchs, 2006:195). Outer time is passing, and 
marks the progression of memory problems, but for the individual, absorption in 
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personal lived time feels most meaningful and eclipses any sense of the ticking of 
clock time.  This is not to say that the individual with memory problems lacks 
awareness that something is not quite right, but the person may not fully 
recognise the impact memory problems are having on her everyday life.  
To lead into the account of the unification of the two case studies I present a 
gathering together of insights that are distinctive to one or other case study.  
 
Insights from the NHS case study 
There are several different modes of emphasis that may be useful for 
comprehending knowledge in the NHS service: 
- Knowledge can be viewed as ordered and configured through practice, an 
illustration of which is the accumulation of evidence about memory status 
through practices of the memory test, the physical health examination, and 
brain scanning. 
- Whilst it may be claimed that knowledge is involved in healthcare practice 
there are no means to 'prove' this by isolating knowledge from practice.  And, 
in instances of practice, attempts to differentiate between personal tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge are similarly fruitless as there are no 
methods to achieve this.  
- Characterising knowledge as enmeshed in practice expresses the quality of 
indivisibility.  Thinking of observations of memory appointments this idea has 
some traction: in an appointment some parts of practice are observable, such 
as the clinician holding the person's wrist as part of checking the pulse rate. 
And knowledge is involved - what is normal or abnormal for pulse rate, 
coupled with perceptual knowing - e.g. the condition of the skin (cold/hot 
clammy / blotched / pale/trembling), and from this the judgements and 
impressions formed by the clinician.  
- In the encounters between healthcare practitioners, individuals with 
dementia and their carers it becomes apparent  that there are multiple 
perspectives on knowledge of dementia.  Knowledge repertoires of clinician, 
individual and carer differ, and are grown and formed through experiences 
unique to each person. Laura, for example, spoke of when she was first 
training as an Advanced Practitioner and was learning from Consultants 
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through observing how they assessed patients with dementia, and from this 
she was building her own ways of practicing. In contrast, an individual with 
dementia experiences first-hand what it feels like to live day-to-day with 
dementia.  The knowledge of the carer is knowing the person before and now, 
and knowing what is changed.  
 
It is the process of diagnosis through the memory service that engenders 
'becoming' a person with dementia.  Becoming is ubiquitous in the fundamental 
sense that everything in the world is subject to change and flux from one state to 
another. In "becoming" a person with dementia time is implicated: the discussion 
in an initial memory appointment involves asking questions about the past - 
'when' and 'for how long'.  The memory test ascertains the status of a person's 
memory now, and if this indicates there is a problem then the next steps are set 
out - usually a referral for a scan.  "Transitional status" (Glaser and Strauss, 1971) 
captures the idea that there is a non-delineated period of time during which brain 
changes occur but there are no obvious or debilitating problems with memory.  
Abbott's (2001) time conceptualisation of "trajectories" expresses the sense of 
being carried along on an inescapable course: changes to the brain that may 
ultimately manifest as dementia have been set in motion and cannot be undone. 
Trajectories have a quality "of enduring large amounts of minor variation without 
any appreciable change in overall direction or regime". (Abbott, 2001:248). Mrs 
Maddox's words to Laura "I never want to go like that" (Fieldnote 24/6/14) are 
wistful, yet also seem futile in the face of the direction of a dementia trajectory. 
"Becoming"  is a way, also, to conceptualise how a person closely involved with an 
individual with memory problems may silently step over a line into being a carer. 
 
The memory service sees people whose situations are complex, and in some cases 
the type of risks involved indicate the precariousness of a situation: for example, 
the unknown quantity of Mr Powell's drink/drive combination.  The prescheduled 
appointments and time frames that are fundamental to how the memory service 
operates may limit whether a pressing need or risky situation can be responded to 
promptly.  However, what may be possible is for a clinician to anticipate or in 
some way pre-empt a growing risk or problem.  In Mr Powell's case Laura did 
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what she could by pressing on the family the fact that there was a legal 
responsibility to contact the DVLA regarding the dementia diagnosis.  Knowledge 
of a current situation might also be helpful in predicting when something will need 
to happen. By way of illustration, establishing a Lasting Power of Attorney (LPoA) 
is a future-proofing measure which the clinician will generally advise as a sensible 
course of action. The clinician knows there is a timing aspect to this of gaining 
signed agreement from an individual whilst s/he still has capacity, and can advise 
the individual and carer accordingly.  
 
Insights from the Social Care case study 
Different from the orientation of the memory service where there is a very clearly 
bounded time sense of time, is the open ended feel of time at Oak Hall.  
Nonetheless, there are some certainties: the fixed shift work pattern of staff, some 
elements of pre-scheduling such as booking people in for a respite stay, the set 
time set for lunch, and times for administering of medication are all indicative of 
working in time frames.  However, beyond this relatively small set of examples 
time overall has a rather relaxed feel.  Notably, it was common for clients staying 
in respite to appear for breakfast mid-morning, having only just got up; or a staff 
member leaving a person to sleep in because they had had a bad night.  One 
insight regarding flexibility that allowed individuals (in these instances) to sleep 
in is that it suggests a respect towards "personal frames" of time (Adam, 2008:8); 
and the allowing and supporting of individuals to continue in their own natural 
rhythms of time.  This flexibility also supports continuity of a person's routines 
and preferences across home and care setting.  Another insight is time oriented to 
the person's own sense of time - "implicit time" (Fuchs, 2006).  This can be further 
elaborated on by thinking of the inner temporal rhythms of an individual that 
alert a person that it is time to get up (discussed in Nygard and Johansson, 
2001:89). 
 
From a pragmatic perspective an insight about conditions that make the service's 
relaxed approach to time possible is generous staffing levels: getting up later 
presents no particular problem in terms of any knock-on effect like causing other 
things to be delayed, because there is a member of staff available to assist the 
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individual with dressing and getting breakfast.  Generous staffing is a condition 
that supports time spent together during which staff get to know individuals and 
relationships are established. 
 
Through practice - in its typical scenarios of group activities (quizzes, games, 
crafts, reminiscence, singing along to music, entertainment that is brought in), or 
one-to-one interactions with individuals (such as personal care, giving 
medication, and assisting with mobility/movement around the environment) - 
different sorts of knowing a person are opened up.  For example, personal care 
opens up knowing the person at a most personal, embodied level; administering 
of medication may provide insights about how an individual feels about taking 
medication, or whether the person understands why a particular medication has 
been prescribed.  
Activities where remembering, recall, or knowing how to do something are 
involved open up a different sort of knowing: of experiences people had in the 
past; of individual skills and talents that an activity reconnects a person with.  
Remembrance itself opens up possibilities for a person to re-experience a feature 
of how they were in the past (e.g. remembering times at school).  The reminiscing 
may be seen as representing an idea that past and present are (and continue to 
be) aspects of this person's self.  So, whether or not it can be declared that a 
person remembers the past, the person has a past, made up of a flow of 
experiences which the person continues to have.  Fuchs' (2006) notion of 
"subjective self" represents a way of expressing this complex idea of how self-
identity is constituted through the totality of life experiences, each experience 
unfolding into the next, and each having a placement in time that connects it to the 
time placement of another experience.  
 
These points about ways in which practice might be viewed as opening up 
knowledge and knowing about people with dementia, and about how dementia 
may affect people, start to form a notional argument about a convergence of 
practice, knowledge and time. 
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Personal knowing, of one's own experiences - regardless of whether these are or 
can be declared - is one of the ways that knowledge carries time.  
The past experiences of individuals with dementia come to the surface in 
situations of practice through activities involved in care: this is a way that 
knowledge carries time. 
 
Another temporal dimension of care knowledge is being able to 'anticipate' a next 
event, through interpreting of what is perceived visually or audibly - picking up on 
the signs that something is about to change.  In care work this is a valuable 
attribute that enables a state of preparedness to be assumed, and mental 
garnering of ideas about what to do (including not doing anything) and when. 
However, also important in this is the requisite authority to act or intervene; the 
question of whether intervention is in one's own sphere of influence.  
 
Thinking of contexts other than care practice, what would anticipatory knowledge 
have meant regarding the threat of closure of the day-care and respite service at 
Oak Hall?  An important defining characteristic of this scenario is that it bore such 
similarity to the previous situation of the threatened (and then realised) closure 
of the service at Minton Lodge.  The sense of familiarity induced in a current 
situation because of its similarity to a previous one is nicely captured in the term 
déjà vécu which refers to the (subjective) feeling of having already experienced or 
lived through something.  Yet, in this instance two situations that appeared similar 
took different trajectories.   
The letter, written by a family member of a person using the Oak Hall service, 
anticipated the closure at the stage it was being threatened. So too, the 
representations that carers and representatives of people with dementia made at 
council meetings were premised on anticipating the closure that was at that stage 
a possibility.  The council seemed unprepared in the sense of not having 
anticipated the strength of the anger and desire for the service to remain open 
expressed by carers. There were complexities to the evolving situation which 
included financial factors and a forthcoming election.  
Although the question of what provision would replace the current service was 
pressing, the time question of when was the immediate concern, and the different 
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engagement with 'when' is the insight that is gained from these points about 
service closure.  The priority of the council was how soon could the service be 
closed - a matter that was contingent on demonstration that consultation with 
stakeholders had been conducted; based on results from the consultation both 
sides entering into some form of negotiation and compromise; and a final decision 
being reached.   
How carers and representatives of people with dementia engaged with time might 
be summed up as a wish to delay an event in time, even if there was also a 
realisation that closure was probably inevitable eventually.  Carers' anticipation of 
closure was valuable, probably, only in two senses: that an aspect of carers 
preparing for the finality of closure was that they interrogated the council about 
plans for continuity of respite care services; and that it was the case that some 
carers did explore other possibilities for respite for the person they cared for. 
 
The 'reprieve' to closure that was initially given provides an insight about a 
further orientation of time.  A representation of reprieve is as the delaying of an 
event, and this might be viewed as aligning with Glaser and Strauss' (1971) 
concept of “promised time”.  The council essentially deferred what it wanted (and 
intended) to do which was to close the service, and the effect of this was 
continuation, temporarily, of the service.  Although this delaying of a decision 
about closure placed the council in a favourable light, and might have appeared 
benevolent, from a position of hindsight the view expressed by Labour councillors 
and some carers was that the Conservative-led council was simply delaying the 
decision until it had been re-elected the following Summer: a strategy for 
maintaining the support of the electorate. 
 
Unifying aspects across the two case studies 
In dementia services terms there is an ordering of knowledge processes starting 
with identifying the nature of the problem through memory assessment, followed 
by diagnosis and any treatment.  Beyond this are the various services and facilities 
that might be available for the longer-term care and support of individuals with 
dementia.   
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Thinking about what contingencies might be highlighted between the memory 
services and Oak Hall, a dementia diagnosis confirmed through a clinician (usually 
at the memory service) is essential criteria for then accessing services at Oak Hall.  
So, whilst the memory service and Oak Hall service are distinct and separate from 
each other, they are also linked through the ordering of 'memory assessment-
diagnosis-treatment,' and subsequent 'assessment of care-needs and care 
provision'.  
Three concepts that are used to characterise dementia in the case studies are 
"becoming a person with dementia", "status passage" and "trajectories".  
'Becoming' - the idea of changing 'from' - 'to'  is one way to represent aspects of 
the individual's contact with the memory service: knowledge is brought to bear 
during the clinical encounter where dementia is revealed, validated and made 
sense of through assessment, diagnosis and prognosis. 'Becoming' from the 
service focus of recognising and acknowledging the nature of the problem is 
primarily a concern of healthcare professionals rather than social care 
professionals.  
From the individual's perspective "becoming" a person with dementia might be 
regarded as lived experience of forgetfulness, a knowing that something has 
changed and that things are not as they were.   
The disease-of-the-brain "formulation" of dementia, referred to by Cheston and 
Bender (1999) and described in chapter two, refers to physical changes in the 
brain that indicate cognitive change.  The effects of dementia can actually be seen 
in a brain scan. Brain changes represent another dimension of the idea of 
"becoming".  Importantly, the result from a brain scan is not a definitive indicator 
of a person becoming a person with dementia.  The Nun Study (Snowdon, 2003) 
which I referred to in my introduction reported exceptions where post mortems 
on physical brains showed advanced stages of dementia but right up until the 
person died cognitive test results showed no indications of mental deterioration.  
By contrast, in the social care setting the notion of "becoming a person with 
dementia" might be a peripheral concern to the priorities of knowing and getting 
a sense of who the person is, facilitated through 'time together'.  Whilst it is an 
unalterable reality that the person has a diagnosis of dementia, the focus in the 
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social care setting is 'knowing' the person, and seeing the person rather than sets 
of symptoms (e.g. behaviours exhibited) associated with dementia.   
The concepts of "status passage" and the related concept of "transitional status" 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1971); and the concept of "trajectories" (Abbott, 2001) are 
each helpful for characterising temporal aspects of the whole journey of dementia 
in terms of moving through different stages and various types of contact with 
services that a person may have.  
Transitional status provides a way for considering and conceptualising states that 
might seem to have an 'in-between' or 'not yet' quality such as the period between 
memory problems starting to impinge on daily life, and the diagnosing of those 
problems as dementia; or the transitioning from living at home and accessing a 
day-care service to moving into permanent care.  So, for the two services I suggest 
that transitional status is useful for conceptualising and highlighting these various 
transitions.  
I have considered the idea of dementia as a whole status passage that is non-
reversible (Glaser and Strauss, 1971:14-32). "Trajectories" (Abbott, 2001) 
similarly, are characterised by a sense of a direction being set - the idea of a 
singular course even though large amounts of minor variation may exist. The 
priorities at the NHS memory service are identifying people who have dementia 
and symptom management in people who are diagnosed.  This singularity of focus 
on dementia as the main concern lends itself to Abbott's idea of trajectories as 
overarching processes to which other statuses are subordinated.  We can say that 
dementia as a 'condition' is the determining factor for a person to be seen by the 
memory service.  
In the social care setting attention is given to the individual's wider statuses.  
Present statuses - such as grandparent, pet owner, husband - along with past 
statuses that might relate to former job roles, talents, and interests, are 
considered relevant and important. Features of a person's life currently, or from 
the past, can be explored through conversations and activities and can be helpful 
as a basis for getting to know the individual.  
 
The complexity associated with individuals' situations is clearly seen in the 
memory service, where Laura and other clinicians try to steer through or look for 
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resolutions to risks and precarious living situations, and emergent problems.  In 
the early stages of memory problems when individuals are able to articulate how 
memory problems are affecting them the individual's knowledge can be 
harnessed alongside the knowledge repertoires of carer and clinician.  
In the social care service, arguably, it is the set of unknowns that are presented 
(aspects of individual history and past experiences, reasons for behaviours, and 
feelings, any of which the person may now be unable to articulate) which requires 
complex detective work of noticing and following clues, and trying to make sense 
of these. 
Knowledge in the memory service is ordered and configured through practice 
primarily, in conditions of time frames: appointments of short duration, focused 
around assessment, diagnosis, treatment and review. Yet, the complexity of 
individual circumstances and life situations outside of appointment times requires 
the anticipating of risks, of how a situation may become unsustainable or unsafe, 
and advising individuals and their families about these potential problems. 
Anticipatory knowledge in the social care setting involves noticing visually or 
audibly signs or clues that something is about to change, and this enables a state 
of preparedness to be assumed. Knowledge is also oriented to making sense of 
behaviours - particularly important in the social care setting where individuals 
may not be able to articulate why it is that they are unhappy, uncomfortable or 
distressed.   For example, a person may be seen to be searching for their spouse. 
The individual has clearly forgotten that their loved one dropped them off in the 
morning and will be returning 'later' to take them home; or a person may 
repeatedly ask members of staff 'when' will they be going back home.  Seeing 
these cameos (as another member of staff, a carer, or a researcher) may bring to 
the surface certain emotions: sadness or anger that the person seems unable to 
manage.  However, a way of making meaning of such scenarios is by viewing them 
as examples of how that individual is experiencing time: possibly s/he is 
disoriented in time, or is unable to reconcile his or her personal sense of time with 
clock time. 
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Unifying proposition across the two case studies 
Dementia services are sites of knowledge where the knowledge of health and care 
practitioners, which is interwoven with practice (van Manen, 1995:11), meets the 
knowledge repertoires of individuals with memory problems and carers, which 
are enmeshed in experience.  All knowledge can be considered as a mix of tacit 
and explicit, the tacit dimension being inarticulable.  This 'inarticulable' quality 
renders it impossible to give an account of tacit knowledge. If, in health and care 
settings, there is a requirement to explain or justify a practice, only a partial 
account is possible.   
Knowledge and practice expertise of clinicians and care staff in the respective 
services is both oriented to and characterised in the work of practice, which itself 
is directed towards people with dementia.  Today's knowledge and practice is an 
accumulation of a practitioner's knowledge and practice performances in the past.  
A claim to 'know' dementia in the experiential sense of knowledge is, by 
definition, a claim that only a person who is on a trajectory of dementia can make.  
Carers' knowledge is characterised by knowing the person, often in intimate, 
personal ways. The relationship of a carer to an individual with dementia has a 
past times dimension characterised by continuity of knowing: both before 
memory problems began to develop, and into the present.  
 
In the two service settings the quality of tacit knowledge as being 'inarticulable' is 
revealed and becomes distinctive not only through instances where there is a 
requirement to justify a practice, but also in instances when practitioners are 
trying to make sense of the lived experience of an individual with dementia: how 
the person's everyday life is being affected by dementia.  At the stages of referral 
to the memory service and being diagnosed, although the individual's memory is 
impaired, she or he is usually able to verbally articulate some aspects of 
difficulties experienced.  Yet, at another, later encounter between the clinician and 
the individual (perhaps at a home visit), or when a person's needs have changed 
and she or he is regularly accessing day-care at Oak Hall, dementia may now 
impinge on a person's ability to articulate difficulties or wishes.  What can 
compound the problem of articulation further is loss of insight that memory is a 
problem. 
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In the social care site this problem of addressing the needs of individuals whose 
abilities to verbally articulate are diminished might be viewed as partly resolved 
through 'knowing' the person, which is made possible through time spent 
together. Getting to know the person involves a practitioner's tacit knowledge in 
the noticing of clues through visual and auditory perceiving and sensemaking. 
Time is implicated in the two service settings, and a way this might be expressed 
is as various convergences between time and the different knowledge repertoires 
of practitioners (performed in/through practice), individuals with dementia, and 
carers.  
 
In this chapter I have discussed a perspective that orientates tacit knowledge to 
practice and time. Through this I have started to assemble a set of ideas and 
materials about knowledge, time and practice converging. I end this chapter by 
putting forward a set of possible categories that distil these knowledge-time-
practice ideas. These are: 
- Personal knowing of one's own experiences - regardless of whether this is or 
can be declared - is one of the ways that knowledge carries time.  
- Knowledge of a person's past and present, and how that person's future may 
be, is one of the ways that knowledge may carry time.  
- In practice settings during various activities that are part of care, the past 
experiences of individuals with dementia become known about by care 
practitioners. This is a way that knowledge carries time. 
- The initial memory appointment is the basis for defining and initiating 
sequences of future events, such as referring the person for a scan.  In these 
terms it can be said that knowledge, invoked and engaged, commands time.  
- In an initial memory appointment knowledge orders the past as sense is made 
of previous events that may, until now, have been seen as random unrelated 
events but now appear as a pattern. 
- Practices of the memory test, physical health examination and brain imaging 
accumulate evidence about memory status. Knowledge is ordered and 
configured through practice. 
- Knowledge - in the anticipation of an event or sequence of events - predicts 
and shapes time. 
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Concluding reflections 
I end this chapter with some reflections about knowledge, starting with 
differences that have been surfaced between the knowledge regimes and 
currencies at the respective services; and then giving some consideration to the 
equally important question of - have I done justice to what I now know?  The 
strands of this question are what do I now know at the end of my PhD, and can I 
surface and articulate what I now know? 
A way of characterising the NHS memory service is as a cycle of dynamic activity 
and processes directed towards the sole purpose of investigating memory 
problems through the lens of clinical knowledge.  During a cycle there are points 
at which conclusions are reached, such as the point at which a clinician sees and 
makes sense of a scan result, or reaches a decision about the probable diagnosis.  
Knowledge is inherently involved and engaged in the activities and processes that 
this cycle represents, and may also be viewed as authoritative in the sense that 
knowledge indicates or provides the grounds for particular conclusions, and is 
enmeshed in such conclusions.  
From the first interaction between the practitioner and the person with memory 
problems there is a clear intent (on the part of the clinician) to find out the nature 
of the memory problems. There is a whole diverse gamut of processes mobilised 
for this investigation, all of which intrinsically involve knowledge.  Knowledge is 
embedded in assessment of memory and health status; scans and tests (conducted 
in other specialist NHS settings); interpreting scan/test results; diagnosis; 
prescribing of medication and other treatments; making sense of  an individual's 
current situation (e.g. care arrangements, risks); and referring and signposting to 
other support.  Even though a specific process might appear to signal either 
explicit or tacit knowledge coming to the fore, or being expressly involved, 
adopting such a view requires making assumptions about the relations between 
tacit and explicit knowledge.   
For example, in terms of the knowledge involved in prescribing Donepezil to a 
person with Alzheimer's disease it might be presumed that prescribing involves 
and is oriented to explicit knowledge.  This assumption seems to hold up initially 
if we think about Donepezil in its material form - as a tablet - representing 
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codified knowledge.  Prescribing, in the sense of the practice, involves the clinician 
and the individual to whom the medication is prescribed.  Available to the 
clinician is information about who the drug is suitable for (NICE) and drug dosage, 
side effects, monitoring requirements, directions for administration, patient and 
carer advice (BNF). Guidance and information in a protocoled format may give the 
impression that prescribing is dependent on following a protocol, with no 
particular involvement of the clinician's personal knowledge. However, not only is 
it impossible to say categorically that clinicians follow such protocols without 
deviation, it is also impossible to disregard individual knowledge and experience 
having a part in this. By this I mean aspects such as: a clinician's experience of 
prescribing this particular medication, the norms and accepted prescribing 
practices in a given memory service, and the clinician's knowledge of the 
individual with dementia - including whether the clinician believes the person will 
be compliant in taking the medication.   
Thinking of the investigatory process and its cycle, once diagnosis is made and - if 
appropriate - medication is started and dosage reviewed, the individual is 
discharged back into primary care with provisos that s/he can contact the 
memory service if problems arise. The total face-to-face contact time between a 
memory service practitioner and an individual with memory problems during this 
investigatory process in most cases is actually very brief: typically running over 
three appointments. Based on such brevity of contact it would be imagined that 
the knowledge surfaced is of a clinical nature concerning the disease process, and 
thus represents only a thin ‘slice’ of knowing the person: knowledge of the 
person’s memory problems viewed through a clinical lens. Given the substantial 
catchment area from which individuals may be referred to the memory service, 
we can say that this rather narrow knowledge is of many individuals - a whole 
population of people with memory problems. 
In practice, knowledge in the NHS memory service is valuable in identifying the 
nature of a memory problem - distinguishing dementia from other factors that 
might be affecting memory (e.g. brain tumour or delirium).  Confirmation of 
dementia through diagnosis enables the person to access relevant treatments 
such as medication, and also practical support in the form of local respite and day 
services. For families a diagnosis can prompt planning and preparation activities 
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such as establishing Lasting Power of Attorney, reducing risks in the home, or 
updating a Will.  
 
A key characteristic of the social care service setting which differentiates it from 
the NHS memory service is the duration of time practitioners and people with 
dementia spend in face to face interaction. Unlike the NHS memory service - 
where the purpose of investigating memory problems can be conducted over, 
typically, three appointments –the social care service setting offers regular 
support over time to individuals living with dementia.  The social care service is 
purposed around providing day-care and respite care to individuals living with 
dementia, and closely allied to this is that during the times when an individual is 
at Oak Hall their spouse, partner or other family member is not directly caring, 
and so effectively has a break from caring. At Oak Hall ‘care’ - in the broad holistic 
sense – might be viewed as the primary activity. ‘Caring’ ranges from responding 
to physical needs and preferences (e.g. food, drink, warmth, mobility, toilet 
assistance) through to health needs (such as administering medication), and to 
social needs and preferences - such as engaging the person in activities and 
conversation, and recognising and supporting the person’s sense of self. The 
provision of a clean, comfortable, attractive and safe environment is also a part of 
caring: a setting that is specifically designed with the needs of people with 
dementia in mind.  The garden at Oak Hall is particularly well designed – being 
fully accessible for people to walk in alone (should they wish), linking two areas of 
the building, which enables walking a whole circuit without encountering any 
barriers to access (e.g. locked doors). 
Knowledge is inherently involved in all aspects of care. Knowledge of the 
particular concerns and ‘problems’ associated with dementia is imbued in the 
material environment (e.g. bedroom mirrors that can be covered). In the 
administration of medication knowledge (codified) is in the material liquids and 
tablets that are the medications, and in the policies, procedures, and practices 
involved in the administration and safe storage of medication.  
In the social care service the knowledge emphasis is on the person as a whole, 
rather than just one aspect. Activities and practices which are essential to care 
(e.g. hoisting, giving medication, personal care such as bathing) become tailored 
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and specified to individuals on the basis of knowing the person. Knowledge, in this 
sense of knowing the person and what matters to the person, might be best 
described as experiential knowledge.  When particular conditions arise ‘knowing 
the person’ might become a critical facet of care. An example is if an individual 
suddenly becomes unwell, yet is unable to articulate verbally this experience and 
thus does not alert others.  Subtle indications that something is not right with the 
individual are most likely to be noticed by a practitioner who knows the person.  
This knowing can be what activates a timely response. 
 
I now turn to the question of have I done justice to what I now know, and what can 
I articulate of what I now know?  The account I have given is about tacit 
knowledge in two dementia services, and how understandings of tacit knowledge 
might be aided through the envisioning of knowledge in relation to practice and 
time. This is essentially my account, which represents one version of what I know.  
What I now know is that if we approach tacit knowledge with the orientation that 
it is separate, or could be separated out from explicit knowledge, we introduce 
limits (or even shut down other possibilities) to ways that tacit knowledge might 
be comprehended.  Related to this is my sense that, in practice settings, tacit 
knowledge is deeply involved in practice. Even in the NHS setting where forms of 
codified knowledge are fundamental to the assessment and diagnosing of 
dementia (e.g. the memory test; brain scan imaging) tacit knowledge is involved in 
the doing of practice and in the interpreting of results and subsequently 
considering what this means for a specific individual.  In the social care setting, 
tacit knowledge is involved in the knowing a person – a complex process involving 
getting to know the subtle clues that can be used to make sense of a person’s 
behaviour, and what the person may be trying to express. However, a little more 
surprising in the social care setting is that adherence to rules and procedures can 
sometimes become immediately important, and override or ‘trump’ tacit 
knowledge: for example, following emergency procedures in a case where a 
person becomes ill and requires urgent treatment. 
 
I recognise that my account of tacit knowledge is partial, in that I have given my 
account of it which is one version of my own sensemaking. I have, for example, 
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upheld a stance that it is valid and useful to consider tacit knowledge in its own 
right, even though I have concluded that it is not possible to differentiate between 
instances of using tacit knowledge and those of using explicit knowledge. For 
another researcher investigating tacit knowledge in dementia services, different 
conclusions might have been reached about what tacit knowledge means for 
practice, individuals with dementia, carers, and knowledge. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
Introduction 
There are some challenges involved in concluding this thesis.  My aim in this PhD 
was to open up and explore some ideas about tacit knowledge in dementia 
services, but as I have progressed through the PhD there has been a burgeoning of 
thoughts and ideas about the concepts of practice and time.  These concepts 
became important to me for opening up insights about tacit knowledge, and I feel 
that my consideration of them has enriched this thesis.  However, grasping and 
assimilating these concepts and drawing them into my work has felt like a 
considerable undertaking.   A thesis has to be brought to an end regardless of 
whether the author feels that it is 'finished', yet trying to craft an ending that fits 
this thesis given the scope of what has been opened up, is no small undertaking.   
 
In this chapter I bring the focus back to tacit knowledge.  I start by looking back to 
the conceiving of my research project, briefly recapitulating my original intentions 
and reflecting on the limitations of this research.   My second and more critical 
aim is consolidation: to express where I have got to in terms of enquiry into tacit 
knowledge.  The third aim is to set out the implications of this thesis: what it 
means for people with dementia, practitioners and carers; what it means for 
knowledge; and what it means for social science and myself as a social sciences 
researcher.  
 
Recapitulation and review 
In the introduction to this thesis (chapter one) I described my vision to 'trace' in 
two service settings expressions of tacit knowledge.  My primary motivation I 
expressed as 'giving voice' to tacit dimensions of knowledge.  I also drew attention 
to the main challenge I expected to contend with: that of marrying practice 
perspectives with theoretical perspectives on tacit knowledge within the scope of 
an empirical study.  
With the hindsight that comes from being in the field, I now view my intention to 
'trace' tacit knowledge as representative of an over simplification of the concept 
of tacit knowledge, underpinned by a certain naivety about what was entailed in 
the handling of quite difficult concepts.   
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Whilst my two fieldwork settings provided enviable scope for ethnographic work, 
actually getting to the point of starting fieldwork involved compromises, 
particularly in the way my work needed to be presented in order for me to obtain 
NHS and social care ethics and governance approvals.  My encounters with the 
research approvals system left me with a sense of a non-messy world in which 
concepts, ethical issues, research methods, organisational settings, and data 
collection have the appearance of being unproblematic, reducible to simple 
notions.  This was typified in a question from a member of the NHS Research 
Ethics Committee during the meeting at which my application was reviewed. I was 
asked:   
 …"how tacit knowledge could be transferred, if useful, to others?" 
The moving away from the clearly delineated and tidy processes of NHS research 
approvals, and into fieldwork, felt like a defining transition:  a certain security 
induced by the predictability of the approvals process was replaced by a feeling of 
looking out at an amorphous mass of concepts and ideas.  For me, this transition 
was certainly characterised by feelings of doubt in my own abilities to create a 
credible research project.  To move past these doubts I found that I needed to 
relinquish the idea that it was possible to isolate or pinpoint tacit knowledge, and 
start to see everything in my fieldwork activities as being potentially relevant.  
This way of looking I attribute to starting to think in terms of interconnections 
and inseparability as a possible frame for understanding. 
Over time, my focus on tacit knowledge spawned other ideas and concepts: 
continuation of self, identity, personal agency, and 'becoming'; status passage and 
trajectories; memory; practice; and different conceptions of time. My interest in 
seeing interconnections between tacit knowledge and these other ideas propelled 
my thesis in a direction that I had not anticipated at the point I started my 
fieldwork.  
 
Limitations 
I consider first the limitations of this research concerning practical matters 
related to the fieldwork, and then limitations regarding methodological and 
conceptual matters. 
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There were various factors relating to the system of scheduling of memory 
appointments which made it unachievable for me to attend and observe 
individuals' appointments more than once.  The gaps between an individual's 
appointments were such that even if I saw a person at their initial referral 
appointment I had no idea whether or when a second appointment would be 
scheduled. Having a day job necessitated juggling my fieldwork around work 
hours, and work reduced my flexibility for being available to observe particular 
appointments. Appointments were scheduled in advance and I was limited to 
doing fieldwork on one day or two half-days per week.  It was only in one instance 
that two home visits to the same person were scheduled less than three weeks 
apart, providing me with the opportunity to attend both.   
Seeing each person only once made it difficult to gain anything more than a 
fleeting sense of each individual.  I had no opportunity to see how individuals 
were over time.  The impact of this was that the narratives I constructed around 
individuals were almost exclusively based on data collected during any given 
memory appointment.  Very rarely was it possible to extend an individual's 
narrative beyond these confines.   
As a researcher, having ‘face-to-face time’ to establish rapport with participants  – 
which I have thought about as being instrumental for care practitioners to get to 
know individuals with dementia – was curtailed in the memory service setting.  
This limited any claim I could make about establishing rapport with appointment 
attendees. In the clinic appointment setting - even if it had been feasible to see the 
same individuals in clinic several times (i.e. by ‘following’ people through their 
journey of contact with the memory service) - the characteristics of the purpose of 
a clinic appointment  including its focus on assessing memory status and physical 
health examination excluded the possibility of me spending time with 
participants. In contrast, the sense I had of being able to establish rapport with 
Merfyn Jenkins – a man who I twice visited at home with a clinician – has provided 
me with an important learning point regarding the design of my research project. 
In hindsight, the study design might have been improved had I built in the option 
of visiting the individuals I encountered in clinic at home, or elsewhere in the 
community.    
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A further limitation was that the perspective of a consultant psychiatrist is not 
reflected in the data, as I was unable to secure an interview with the psychiatrist 
whose appointments I had observed.  The psychiatrist's explanation of practice 
and knowledge would have provided further insight alongside my observational 
data from his clinics.  
Regarding the social care service the limitations related to recruitment of 
participants with dementia, and to what I would call certain 'boundaries of 
propriety' concerning being a researcher in a setting which has temporarily 
become a person's home. 
Of the potential research participants with dementia there were about four people 
who I would have liked to recruit into the study - but who I felt were not able to 
give informed consent to participate - and my attempts to obtain consent via the 
nominated consultee route were variously thwarted.  Either my fieldwork visits 
never coincided with the presence of a relevant relative who I could have 
approached, or I was unable to obtain an address and so could not write to the 
relative. Even my attempts to gain retrospective consent from relatives to use 
selected fieldnotes made at the time their loved one attended Oak Hall failed: 
individual's files (containing relatives' contact details) were closed and moved 
elsewhere as the service began to wind down prior to its closure.  In the cases of 
only two individuals unable to consent was I able to obtain nominated Consultee 
consent. The words and expressions of people who might perhaps be considered 
to be furthest along a trajectory of living with dementia are less well represented 
than those of people who were able to consent for themselves. 
There are no accounts from direct observations in the respite care part of the 
building: essentially the corridor and bedrooms, sluices and a second lounge.  Any 
insights about the respite service I have included in this thesis are based on 
interview data: what staff talked about in terms of personal care; and insights 
from conversations I had with people with dementia in day-care who spoke of 
their experiences of staying in respite care.  Even though I had approvals to 
conduct observations in the respite service, once in the field I came to the view 
that this would be intrusive.   
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I consider that the main conceptual limitation is one associated with difficulties in 
identifying a descriptor sufficient to represent relations between abstract and 
non-spatial concepts (knowledge, time, practice). For example, I tried but then 
rejected the term 'configuration' because it implied spatial properties. My 
eventual choice of 'convergence' I considered to be adequate although imperfect. 
This limitation signifies a problem of greater proportions which is to do with the 
limitations of language to adequately convey particular ideas.  
My own capabilities sometimes felt like a limitation. An example of this was my 
moments of reflection during writing my thesis when an unformed idea or insight 
would arise. I would try to grasp the insight but, frequently, the sense of its 
meaning would evade me, as an impression that floats (frustratingly) at the 
periphery of one's awareness yet is resistant to articulation.  
In terms of how I have structured this thesis, and whether this particular 
structure diminishes the impact of the ethnography, is a point to consider. In the 
lead up to  starting to write my first draft I discussed in some detail with my 
supervisors the shape and structure of the thesis. For me the considerations were 
that: it felt risky to try to pull off a thesis of a very free format without previous 
experience of writing a piece of this size; having a framework of chapters with 
specific content I felt would provide a focus that would help me in writing the 
thesis; and I anticipated that the chapters would ‘naturally’ provide the source of 
material for future publications. 
 
Where I have got to in my enquiry into tacit knowledge 
The tacit dimension of knowledge is unproblematic unless or until someone wants 
either to define it, explain how it relates to explicit knowledge, or assess its 
function or value.  Collins succinctly captures this idea of letting something be 
without interrogation: 
"...nearly the entire history of the universe, and that includes the parts played 
by animals and the first humans, consists of things going along quite nicely 
without anyone telling anything to anything or anyone. There is, then, 
nothing strange about things being done but not being told - it is normal life." 
(Collins, 2013:7). 
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But, in health and care practice telling of practice might well be required.  For 
services, learning both from situations that end badly and those that end well is 
important.  Yet, a complete account of practice - i.e. one that includes the tacit 
dimension of knowledge in practice - cannot be given if we concur with Polanyi's 
view that the tacit dimension is 'inarticulable'. 
In introducing where I have got to in my understanding of tacit knowledge, I have 
found that a helpful way of considering tacit knowledge is that there are ways, 
rather than a way, to envisage it. 
In the memory service I viewed one pointer to tacit knowledge being the 
impressionistic aspect involved in the assessment and diagnosing of memory 
problems: the manner in which impressions arise and are perceived by the 
clinician.  In this, it is the clinician's personal (and therefore individual) sensorial 
faculties of touch, sight, hearing and smell that are involved.  For example, when a 
clinician is sitting in close proximity to the individual it might be the case that the 
clinician smells alcohol emitting from the person. In the context of assessment, 
knowing that a person is drinking may well represent information that is valuable 
for the clinician in considering risks.  Similarly, when a person is giving an account 
of their own recent memory problems, the clinician's faculties of hearing are 
engaged in the act of listening.  Hearing - in terms of what and how the clinician 
hears - is individual and personal, as is the impression that the clinician arrives at 
about the individual and their memory problems.  Investigations into the 
individual's memory problems may involve looking at symptoms, physical health 
presentation, care arrangements and the carer's account.  The meanings of the 
'results' from investigations are not only mediated and made sense of through the 
clinician's prior experience and knowledge, but are also filtered through the 
sensorial faculties of the individual clinician.   
 
Another way that I have envisaged tacit knowledge is as an individual know-how 
that individuals acquire and retain.  In terms of health and care practice I view 
individual know-how as arising in such instances as clinicians knowing how to 
craft a question to an individual about their memory problems; or care workers 
knowing how to diffuse an incident where an individual is becoming agitated.   
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In relation to individuals who are becoming cognitively impaired by dementia, the 
idea that know-how may be retained was a possibility that I felt was worthy of 
proper consideration. The know-how that Merfyn Jenkins demonstrated in 
snooker whereby he played competently, even skilfully, and won, is a particular 
example.  Individuals at Oak Hall - many of whom seemed severely impaired and 
many whose verbalisations were infrequent and limited to a small repertoire of 
words - showed flashes of knowing how.  This know-how, as I viewed it, was 
demonstrated in singing the words to a song, dancing a waltz, or producing as if 
from nowhere a correct answer to a crossword clue or quiz question. These sorts 
of instances struck me as surprising, given people's impairment.   
From observing and listening to people with dementia I thought about whether 
the actual 'living' of an experience of dementia might be viewed in terms of 
experiential knowledge.  I also thought it was a possibility that people might 
retain the know-how required for adapting to instances where they view 
themselves, or are viewed by others, as forgetful.  In clinic appointments, where 
assessment and diagnosis exposes the presence of a significant memory problem, 
it is conceivable that know-how (i.e. of norms for responding to bad news) is 
demonstrated in an individual distancing her/himself from, or 'talking down' 
problems with memory.   
I also considered the tacit dimension of knowledge in terms of its relation to the 
explicit dimension. The two interrelated questions that came to be important 
were - how might the relationship between tacit and explicit be comprehended, 
and what would be the implications of it being possible (even if not currently) to 
differentiate instances of using explicit knowledge from instances of tacit 
knowledge.  In practice settings the way that I found helpful for framing these 
questions was in terms of individual repertoires of knowledge which I conceive of 
as representing the full scope of an individual's knowledgeability across tacit and 
explicit dimensions.  In practice terms, the knowledge repertoire idea is helpful 
for envisaging the entirety and variety of a practitioner's knowledge, and for 
thinking about how knowledge is brought to bear in helpful ways to individuals 
with dementia and carers.   
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Differentiating between instances of explicit and tacit knowledge used in practice 
might become a relevant exercise if the goal was to understand (a) what the tacit 
dimension added to practice, or (b) what practice might look like without tacit 
knowledge if there was only explicit knowledge.  Accounts of practice might be a 
useful means through which to consider this.  Sarah, a care worker at Oak Hall, 
gave an account of a care practice involving helping a lady to dress who initially 
refuses, but then through Sarah's imaginative approach ultimately concedes to 
getting dressed. What comes to attention is that the dressing 'goal' is set in a 
situation with features that are unique to it, such as the ways of communicating 
the individual with dementia uses and the clues that the care worker picks up on.  
Sarah's adaptation of her practice around the individual is what seems to achieve 
the desired result. Yet, if Sarah was required to give an account of how her 
practice accomplished the outcome of the lady being dressed, this would seem 
unattainable. It would require Sarah to break down the whole process into 
mechanistic steps, and to provide a complete commentary which detailed aspects 
such as the basis on which she picked out particular clues from the lady's 
behaviour; the words she had used; the manner in which she had spoken (the 
volume and tone of voice); her gestures; her facial expressions; and so on.  The 
dissection of a care practice - even if it were possible - would at most only result in 
a sequence of steps, and would fail to capture the subtleties and complex 
contingencies involved.  
My experiences in the two service settings, and connecting experience with 
theoretical and empirically-based perspectives have opened up to me some very 
absorbing ways of thinking about tacit knowledge.  Where I have got to as a result 
of my enquiry is summarised thus. I began this PhD with an interest in the value 
or worth of tacit knowledge within health and care services for people with 
dementia, and a curiosity about why tacit knowledge seems to be given little 
attention relative to the attention given to explicit knowledge.  What has become 
apparent to me is that, on the one hand, thinking about tacit knowledge as a 
distinct dimension of knowledge within practice settings allows or even promotes 
consideration of the non-obvious or normally overlooked aspects of knowledge in 
practice.  On the other hand, I suggest that this does not imply that tacit 
knowledge can be 'isolated' or seen in isolation from the explicit dimension of 
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knowledge.  In a very pragmatic sense explicit and tacit knowledge can be viewed 
as working together mutually in whatever the intent (or perhaps 'direction') of a 
situation. 
 
Implications of these conclusions about tacit knowledge  
What this means for knowledge 
I gave some thought in the previous section to ways that we might conceive of or 
think about tacit knowledge.   
The most important implication for knowledge, as I see, is whether the questions 
of interest and debate about tacit knowledge that have been considered through 
and framed by a theoretical lens, now need to be made relevant and engaging to 
practice and practitioners.  Scholars and researchers coming together with 
practitioners to discuss ideas about knowledge per se might provide starting 
points for defining questions about knowledge relevant to practice.  For example: 
what ways of knowing are relevant or inherent to practice; what constitutes 
knowledge in practice; how do we see knowledge in relation to evidence?  
A linked concern is whether more might be made of the 'knowing' the person 
aspect of knowledge.  Aspects of health and care (e.g. assessment and diagnosis; 
providing personal care, or engaging a person in an activity) necessarily involve 
human interaction, during which the practitioner gains at least some knowledge 
of the person as an individual. The ability of individuals with dementia to 
articulate linguistically wishes or needs does become impaired over time so, 
arguably, 'knowing' the person and what matters to the person is helpful when 
considering care and treatment options over time. Some situations illustrate 
knowing of an individual with dementia by a group of practitioners (e.g. a respite 
care shift handover meeting). However, it would be interesting to explore ways 
that knowledge in the sense of  'knowing the person' could be passed on from 
existing care providers to new care providers in instances such as the transition 
from living at home into permanent residential care. 
 
What this means for people with dementia, carers and practitioners 
For people with dementia continuing to know how to do something and 
demonstrating this to others (e.g. Michael still knew how to call the numbers out 
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for bingo at Oak Hall) is significant.  Exercising know-how is one way that 
individuals with dementia continue to engage and interact with the world.  A carer 
or practitioner - seeing that a person with dementia knows how - might see this as 
an opportunity to encourage the person and try to cultivate and maintain the 
capabilities involved.  Clearly, there are particular or exceptional circumstances 
where exercising know-how might expose the individual to risk.  For example, a 
person with dementia who continues to exercise know-how in driving a car but 
fails to remember what a red traffic light signifies or which side of the road to 
drive on, will be considered at risk. But, the principle of nurturing and perhaps 
even actively stimulating people with dementia to carry on using their know-how, 
seems like a progressive tenet that would be worthwhile to embrace in care 
practice. 
This line of thought opens another idea about tacit know-how in relation to 
people with dementia: that of adapting and improvising in a given circumstance 
or set of conditions.  During Merfyn's snooker playing he changed from one cue to 
another in order to adapt to the positioning of the ball and the particular shot he 
thought would be needed to pot the ball.  This suggests improvisation.  A patient 
of Laura, Mr Wooler, was building a dolls' house - a non-formulaic endeavour 
involving imagination and creativity. And there was Paul at Oak Hall who 
continued to sketch pictures, even though his eyesight was deteriorating.   
In both fieldwork settings practitioners did notice and comment on individuals' 
know-how.  One practical way to make the most of know-how might be to link 
individuals at the fairly early stages of dementia into hobby/interest groups that 
could support them in maintaining individual interests. 
 
In care settings time seems significant. Establishing a relationship - and the trust 
and confidence that is involved in this - requires time. Time is an essential 
requirement for getting to know a person with dementia: time affords the 
learning to pick up on clues about possible needs or wishes that the person may 
be unable to verbally articulate, or to talk in such a way that grounds the person in 
the familiar such as talking about family or places that are familiar.  Conversely, 
when there is not time to get to know a person, potential consequences include 
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the missing or overlooking of vital clues such as those which indicate that the 
person is becoming unwell, or that a behaviour is starting to escalate.   
Practically speaking a shift towards placing value on time for getting to know 
individuals with dementia in residential or respite service settings would manifest 
as changes to work patterns, staffing ratios, and supporting appropriate staff 
development and training.  Alongside this some form of evaluation or appraisal of 
the impacts of staff spending time getting to know people would be important. 
This might become part of the remit of formal inspection regimes such as Care 
Quality Commission inspections.  
Findings from a recent NIHR-sponsored multi-site study about improving the care 
of people with dementia in hospitals (Godfrey et al, 2018) highlight both ‘time’ 
and ‘knowing’ for good practice in hospital care: 
“ ‘Knowing the person with dementia’ posed challenges at several levels: in 
the time and skill required to communicate with the person, especially with 
loss of language, and in the nature and depth of knowledge required to 
understand the person ‘in their world’.” 
“For staff with an understanding of dementia, ‘knowing the person’ involved 
more than biographical knowledge. It encompassed a deeper knowledge of 
the person, including what was personally meaningful to them and what 
evoked emotion (whether positive, such as joy, or negative, such as anger, 
irritation and distress). A prerequisite to acquiring such knowledge was an 
‘imaginative connection with the person’, whether professionally or 
experientially derived.” (Godfrey et al, 2018:58-59) 
 
What this means for social science and me as a social science researcher 
The implications for social science and me as a social science researcher relate to  
(a) health and care services as fieldwork settings, and (b) the engagement of 
empirical research with theory.  
The settings where health and care are provided are essentially non-public 
settings, where permissions and approvals have to be sought in order to conduct 
research involving people who use health or care services.  Whilst these settings 
offer potential for obtaining very rich data, in order to gain access to the setting a 
social science researcher has to be prepared to go through a lengthy process of 
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having their proposal scrutinised by both an NHS research ethics committee and 
local NHS research and development staff, who may or may not be versed with the 
methodology and methods proposed.  For the full-time PhD route, candidates 
might rule out doing fieldwork in an NHS setting because of the length of time it 
might take to obtain the necessary approvals.  A further factor is how a social 
science researcher feels about what the process actually entails: subjecting their 
research project to scrutiny by NHS systems and processes that are 
paradigmatically different to those of the social sciences, during which a social 
sciences project may be queried or challenged on methodological or ethical 
grounds.  
More optimistically, research conducted in such settings might be viewed as 
positive by those who manage or work in health or care settings, perhaps seeing 
that there could be gain for the service in having a researcher (an outsider-visitor) 
involved.  The implications of social science research not being conducted in such 
settings is that valuable critique and enquiry concerning aspects of practice, 
service user and carer experiences, or organisational culture is not available to the 
social science research community.   
 
For a PhD the choosing of a particular combination of topic, setting for enquiry, 
and method seems to symbolise a commitment, a sense of choosing something 
and sticking with it. My relatively smooth experience in the field with no 
insurmountable obstacles to collecting data, and the possibilities that seemed 
available to me in terms both of the method and how I might make sense of the 
data, indicated to me that ethnography had been well paired with topic and 
setting.  What I had not envisaged was how my project, which I originally 
conceived of as grounded in and oriented to settings of practice, would require me 
to engage with theory at a level that felt like a stretch well beyond my capabilities. 
However, the moments of clarity where I could see how ideas and theories might 
fit together felt immensely rewarding at a personal and professional level.  
I do not know of work by other social science researchers which has considered 
tacit knowledge, time and practice together and in relation to dementia services.  
However, there are several PhD theses which overlap with my work in terms of 
method and population.  These are: Dennis' (2016) ethnography of music in the 
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everyday lives of people with dementia; McColgan's (2001) ethnographic study of 
relationships of people with dementia; and a thesis by Börjesson (2014) whose 
ethnography concerned how, and what knowledge is expressed and made visible 
in everyday care practice with older people, including people with dementia. 
 
The manner in which social scientists engage with people with dementia is an 
aspect that is highlighted through my work.  How to 'be' in service settings; how 
to approach and initiate conversations with people with dementia; how to 
describe or explain one's role; how to manage seeing things that might cause 
distress in oneself; how to observe in ways that draw least attention, and knowing 
when to stop or pause observation or note-taking are all challenges that may well 
come up.  My prior knowledge and experience of service settings for people with 
dementia meant that I was not perturbed about being in dementia service 
settings, and what I might see or hear. I also had a good understanding of what 
norms of behaviour might be expected from someone in a work or study capacity 
in that setting. One conclusion I have drawn is that exposure to service settings 
prior to entering the field can be helpful for sensitising researchers to those sorts 
of environments and the people in them.  
 
Signals for future work 
In this PhD some substantive questions have been opened up which signal future 
directions for strands of research - both empirical and conceptual.  
A significant focus which is indicated is the development of ways for empirically 
investigating tacit knowledge, in terms of paradigmatic and theoretical 
frameworks, methods for data collection and modes of analysis. Development 
along such lines could make a contribution not only to how tacit knowledge is 
studied but also to the investigation of other intangible forms. 
Several areas concerning dementia are also signalled for research. Making sense 
out of the experience of people with dementia was highlighted in the two case 
study chapters, and work in this area could include: the experience of people with 
young onset dementia; people's experiences and perceptions of time and space; 
and individuals' and carers' experiences of different types of transitions involved 
in living with dementia.  A particular area of transition which has been highlighted 
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in the two case study chapters concerns the movements into and from ‘precarity’. 
A potential implication of, for example, precarity of care arrangements is the 
changes in status that it might bring to the individual with dementia and related 
carers – such as hospital admission of the person with dementia or the carer.  
Also signalled for enquiry is time in health and care services. There is considerable 
scope to pursue conceptual and empirical work, but just two possible areas for 
enquiry are timings of care and interventions across different sorts of health and 
care settings; and different perspectives about time in service settings from 
managers, frontline staff, service users, and families.  The availability of ‘time’ for 
people with dementia admitted into acute general hospitals is clearly a topical 
issue, as emphasised in Godfrey et al (2018) whose findings I have briefly 
described in the ‘limitations’ section of this chapter.   
In terms of developing my own research, two areas of enquiry that I would like to 
explore further are, firstly, "status passage" (Glaser and Strauss', 1971) 
specifically in relation to dementia and the perspectives of the individuals and 
institutions involved.  Secondly, I would like to explore further the idea of 
continuation or perpetuation of know-how of individuals in spite of real and 
ongoing dementia-type memory problems. I would see this as collaborative 
enquiry with others who have special interest in this topic, to explore the 
dimensions of know-how. Potentially, a grounded and multi-stranded description 
of know-how could emerge which could inform focused empirical work in this 
area. 
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Version 2/071013.  Information Sheet (Service Users, Patients, Carers). --------------------------------------- 
 
PhD Research Study - Information Sheet 
Title of the research  
An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, organisation 
and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
Researcher's name and place of study 
Sue Molesworth, Keele University, North Staffordshire. 
 
Your involvement 
Before you decide whether you want to take part it is important that you understand why 
this research is being done, and what is involved. Please take time to read this 
information and discuss it with others if you wish.  If there is anything that is not clear, or 
if you have further questions then please ask me.  
 
Purpose of the research and where it will take place 
This research is investigating how individual staff such as care workers, managers, 
nurses, doctors, and social workers, use their knowledge when they are providing and 
managing services for people with dementia.  
 
We know that staff in health and social care organisations rely on and use different types 
of knowledge. For example:   
• knowledge about dementia; 
• Knowing an individual’s preferences, dislikes, and wishes;  
• knowledge about what works based on previous experience; 
• Knowledge about medication.  
 
All of us use many different sources of knowledge in everyday life, and most of this is easy 
to find: for example - in books, policies, and even recipes. 
My research is interested in a particular type of knowledge in health and social care 
organisations, known as 'tacit' or 'personal' knowledge.  
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Tacit knowledge tends to be hidden and is often quite difficult for people to express or 
describe.  
For example - 
• the ability to ride a bike 
• the ability to recognise faces 
Research in this area suggests that health and social care practitioners are constantly 
drawing on personal, tacit knowledge as they provide care and support to service users 
and carers. In my research I will be trying to bring to the surface some of this hidden, tacit 
knowledge, and to investigate what its importance might be for providing and managing 
services to people with dementia.  
 
I will be using an approach called 'Ethnography'. This will involve using two methods: 
• Observing everyday activities in a particular organisation or setting; 
And,  
• asking people to talk about these everyday activities in an interview.  
 
I will be observing and taking notes of everyday interactions between people with 
dementia, carers and staff at -------------------------------------------------------------------- I will 
also interview frontline staff and managers, and I will be observing organisational 
meetings such as reviews of care, and team meetings. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part, and what will it involve? 
You have been invited to participate because you are using the services at --------------------
or you are a carer of someone -------------------------------- 
Participation in this study involves giving your consent for me to observe interactions 
between health and social care staff and you. 
Taking part is voluntary, and you can stop participating at any time without giving a 
reason. Be assured that whether you choose to participate or not it will not affect your 
statutory rights nor the care or support you or your loved one receives. 
 
What are the hoped-for benefits? 
It is hoped that findings from this research will help social care and health organisations 
to be more aware of tacit knowledge and understand its potential value (e.g. to open up 
debate about how this type of knowledge could make a positive difference to services to 
people with dementia and their families). 
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What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
I do not know of any risks or disadvantages of taking part in this research. 
 
Will my participation in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential to the researcher and her two research supervisors 
 
• If you agree for the researcher to conduct observations when you are present 
the researcher will make field notes. These notes will be made anonymous so 
that there is no information that could identify you, or others, in these notes. 
Notes will be stored in a locked filing cabinet at the researcher’s home. 
• All reports and publications arising from the project will be made anonymous. 
No information will be included that would identify you as an individual. If any 
quotations from you are used, then your name will be removed. 
• If during the course of the research you disclose to the researcher a previously 
unknown serious criminal offence (for example – involving serious harm), then 
she would be bound to discuss this with her supervisor to check whether it 
would be necessary to report this to the police in the public interest.  
 
What will happen to the findings from the research? 
The research will be written up for a PhD thesis. Findings may also be published in 
journals and be presented at conferences. 
 
Who has reviewed this research study? 
Keele University has peer-reviewed this research. It has been reviewed by an NHS 
Research Ethics Committee and has also been reviewed through ------------------- Research 
Governance Framework. 
 
Thank you for your consideration to participate in this study. 
If you agree to participate, a copy of this information sheet and a signed consent form will 
be given to you to keep. 
 
If, during the study you wish to raise a concern or make a complaint about the conduct of 
the research please contact the researcher in the first instance: 
Sue Molesworth     
E-mail: s.molesworth@keele.ac.uk 
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Version2/170214: Health and Social Care staff: ------------------------------------------------------ 
PhD Research Study - Information Sheet  
 
Title of the research  
An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, organisation 
and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
Researcher's name and place of study 
Sue Molesworth, Keele University, North Staffordshire. 
 
Why I am inviting you to be involved 
This study is interested in the knowledge of health and social care staff (nurses, care 
workers, managers, doctors, social workers, therapists, receptionists), and how this 
knowledge is used when staff are providing and managing services for people with 
dementia.  
 
I will be using observations and interviews to study a particular type of knowledge called 
"tacit" knowledge. I will be observing how health and social care staff interact with 
patients and service users and their carers. 
 
Your participation in this study involves giving consent for me to observe conversations 
between you and people with dementia, and the interactions that take place. For example, 
observing when people are having their appointment at ---------------------------, and 
observations at the --------------------------------------- 
Taking part is entirely voluntary, and you can stop participating at any time without 
giving a reason. Whether you choose to participate or not, it will not affect your statutory 
rights. 
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Purpose of the research 
Staff in health and social care organisations rely on and use different types of knowledge 
when they are providing care and support to people with dementia and their families. For 
example:   
• knowledge about dementia; 
• Knowing an individual’s preferences, dislikes, and wishes;  
• knowledge about what works based on previous experience; 
• Knowledge about medication.  
 
A lot of the knowledge we use is easy to find: for example - in books, policies, and even 
recipes.  
 
However, there is a type of knowledge called ‘tacit’ or ‘personal’ knowledge which tends 
to be hidden and is often quite difficult for people to express or describe. For example - 
• the ability to ride a bike 
• the ability to recognise faces 
 
In my research I will be trying to bring to the surface some of this hidden, ‘tacit’ 
knowledge, and to investigate whether ‘tacit’ knowledge is important for providing and 
managing services to people with dementia.  
I will be using an approach called 'Ethnography'. This will involve going into services and 
observing how health and social care staff use their knowledge in practice, and then 
asking staff to talk about the different types of knowledge they draw on in their practice. 
 
Study Setting and fieldwork sites 
I have identified two points on the care pathway for people with dementia which are (1) -
-------------------------- and (2) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I will be doing the research 
fieldwork over a period of about 1 year. 
 
How I will investigate 'tacit' knowledge 
• I will conduct detailed observations in services of the interactions between people 
with dementia and health and social care practitioners; 
269 
 
• I will observe different types of management meetings (e.g. service management 
and care management); 
• Using interviews, I will explore the views of health and social care practitioners and 
managers about how they use tacit knowledge in their work. 
 
Benefits of taking part in the research 
This research has potential to lead to a fuller and better understanding of tacit knowledge 
amongst staff in health and social care services. It is also hoped that people with dementia 
and their families will gain a better awareness of tacit knowledge and the part that it 
plays in making services more person-centred. 
Risks of taking part in the research 
There are no known risks of taking part in this research. 
 
Obtaining consent for the research 
I will be seeking consent from staff, people with dementia, and carers to allow me to 
conduct observations at -------------------------------------------- 
In all cases I will seek written consent, but where this is not achievable (e.g. where people 
with dementia have difficulties reading and signing a form) I will seek verbal consent 
which I will record using a digital audio recorder. 
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Version 1/270114. Simplified Pictorial Information Sheet. --------------------- 
Participant Information Sheet 
I am carrying out a study to look at the knowledge of staff and how staff use their 
knowledge. 
 
This study is looking at - 
• What knowledge do staff have? 
• How can they use their knowledge to directly help people with memory 
problems? 
• How can this knowledge be used to improve care services for people with 
memory problems? 
 
I would like you to help me. 
I am asking you whether it is ok for me to spend time at -------------- so that I can 
look at what happens here, and take notes of what I observe. 
I will be visiting ------------- about once a week for one year. I will write a report at 
the end of my study.  
People who attend ------------- and people who work here will be able to see the 
report.  
My name is Sue. You can ask me any questions about the study. I will be happy to 
answer them.  
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: OBSERVATIONS 
 
Title of Research Project:  
 An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, organisation 
and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: No observations will take place in the bedrooms of individuals, and no 
observations will take place of personal care nor in any areas where personal care is 
provided (e.g. bathrooms, toilets). 
 
 Please 
initial 
box 
 
Prior to the observations: 
I give my permission for the researcher to conduct observations in ------------
--------- when I am present. I understand these observations will take place 
in the respite and the day service.  
 
 
 
I give my permission for selected field notes from observations to be 
reproduced in the researcher's final PhD thesis and in any publications that 
result from this research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your name: __________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Your signature: ________________________________________ Date __________ 
 
 
 
Researcher/name of person taking consent  
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Version 1/270114. Pictorial Consent Form ------------------------------------  
 
 
 
 
 
    
Your name:____________________________________ 
 
 
Your signature:____________________   Date: ____________ 
 
 
Have you read the information 
sheet or had it explained to you? 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
Have you had time to ask questions 
and talk about the study? 
 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
Are you happy with the answers 
you have been given? 
 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
Do you understand that it is your 
choice to take part in the study? 
 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
Do you understand that you can 
stop taking part in the study at any 
time? 
 
 
YES 
 
NO 
Consent form  
 
273 
 
 
 
Version 2/190913.   PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM. Staff (Interviews):  ------------- 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEWS 
 
Title of Research Project:  
 An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, 
organisation and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
 Please 
initial 
box 
Prior to the interview: 
I give my permission for this semi-structured interview to be audio 
recorded and for the recording to be transcribed into an electronic 
document that will be stored securely on a password protected 
computer. 
 
After the interview: 
I give my permission for selected anonymised quotations to be 
reproduced in the researcher's final PhD thesis and in subsequent 
publications resulting from this research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your name: __________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your signature: ______________________________________ Date ___________ 
 
 
Researcher/name of person taking consent  
 
________________________________________________ 
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Poster for displaying in ------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Project --------------- 
This study is investigating ‘knowledge’ in health and social care 
organisations. 
  
For organisations to provide care and support to people with memory 
problems and their carers they must use knowledge. For example:  
• knowledge about memory problems; 
• Knowing an individual’s preferences, dislikes, and wishes; 
• Knowledge about medication.  
  
Knowledge in books, policies, and even recipes, is easy to find.  
However, there is another type of knowledge called ‘tacit’ or ‘personal’ 
knowledge which tends to be hidden and can be difficult for people to 
explain. For example - 
• the ability to ride a bike. 
• the ability to recognise faces.  
 
 I will be trying to bring to the surface some of this hidden, ‘tacit’ 
knowledge, and to investigate whether ‘tacit’ knowledge is important 
for providing and managing services to people with memory problems. 
 
My name is Sue. I am doing this research for my PhD at Keele University. I 
will be doing observations in the --------------------------------, and I will   also 
do some interviews with staff. 
I will be visiting about once a week for the next 12 months. Please do ask 
me any questions you have about the research. I look forward to meeting 
you! 
 
My contact email: s.molesworth@keele.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
My next visit to 00000000000 House will be on - 
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Version 2/170214. Simplified Pictorial Information Sheet: ---------------------------- 
Participant Information Sheet 
I am carrying out a study to look at the knowledge of staff and 
how staff use their knowledge. 
This study is looking at - 
• What knowledge do staff have? 
• How can they use their knowledge to directly help people 
with memory problems? 
• How can this knowledge be used to improve care services for 
people with memory problems? 
 
I would like you to help me. 
I am asking you whether it is ok for me to spend time at the ------
------------------ so that I can look at what happens here, and take 
notes of what I observe. 
I will be visiting ----------------------- about once a week for one 
year. I will write a report at the end of my study.  
People who attend appointments and people who work here 
will be able to see the report.  
My name is Sue. You can ask me any questions about the study. 
I will be happy to answer them. 
 
 
276 
 
 
 
 
Version 3/010714.   PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM. Staff, service users and carers (Observations) 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: OBSERVATIONS 
 
Title of Research Project:  
 An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, 
organisation and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: No observations will take place of personal care nor in any areas  
   where personal care is provided (e.g. bathrooms, toilets). 
 
 Please 
initial 
or tick 
box 
Prior to the observations: 
I give my permission for the researcher to do observations in ---------
--------------- ------- ------ I attend when I am present.  
 
 
AND / OR  
 
I give my permission for the researcher to sit in on and observe a 
home visit  appointment  
 
 
 
I give my permission for selected field notes from observations to be 
reproduced in the researcher's final PhD thesis and in any 
publications that result from this research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your name: __________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your signature: _______________________________________ Date __________ 
 
 
 
Researcher/name of person taking consent _________________________ 
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Version 2/190913.   PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM. Staff Interviews: -------------------------  
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEWS 
 
Title of Research Project:  
 An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in the management, 
organisation and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
 
 Please 
initial 
box 
Prior to the interview: 
I give my permission for this semi-structured interview to be audio 
recorded and for the recording to be transcribed into an electronic 
document that will be stored securely on a password protected 
computer 
 
 
 
 
After the interview: 
I give my permission for selected anonymised quotations to be 
reproduced in the researcher's final PhD thesis and in subsequent 
publications resulting from this research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Your name: __________________________________________________ 
 
Your signature: ______________________________________  Date __________ 
 
Researcher/name of person taking consent  
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Version 170214: Declaration Form for Nominated Consultee of Person lacking Capacity to Consent. 
   Nominated Consultee Declaration 
Title of the Research Project: An Ethnography of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in 
the management, organisation and delivery of services to people with dementia. 
 
My relationship to the person I am nominated to give consent for:  
 
Main carer Family member Friend  Advocate Other __________ 
 
The person's name is _____________________________________________ 
 Please initial 
to show you 
understand 
and confirm 
agreement 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information sheet about this study. 
 
2. I confirm that I have had time and opportunity to ask 
questions about the study in my role as a Nominated 
Consultee. 
 
3. I understand the purpose of the project and what the 
participant's involvement would be. 
In my opinion he/she would not object to taking part in 
this study. 
 
4. I understand that taking part in the study is voluntary 
and that the participant will be withdrawn if at any point 
and for any reason they do not wish to continue taking 
part.  
 
5. I understand that if the participant is withdrawn from 
the project this will not affect in any way the care or 
treatment they receive, nor affect their legal rights. 
 
 
 
Name of Consultee Date Signature 
 
 
  
Name of researcher who has 
discussed the study with me 
and given me information 
Date Signature 
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Appendix B: Semi-structured interview schedule 
 
Semi-structured interview question schedule/Health & Social Care staff. Version 06.09.13 
 
Semi Structured Interview Question Schedule: Health and Social Care Staff. 
(Adapted from Habersam and Piber, 2003, with permission from Michael 
Habersam) 
 
(To all staff) 
1. What characterises a ‘good’ service to people with dementia? 
 
2. Please describe your personal contribution to it. 
 
(To Managers only) 
3. At times when you have sufficient access to money, personnel, rooms/space 
and time, how do you continue to improve your service? 
 
4. In the face of chronic shortages of money, personnel, rooms/space and time, 
how do you ensure that the service continues to be ‘good’? 
 
5. What are you doing in order to become an even better service in the future? 
 
(To all staff) 
6. How do you know/realise that you are doing a good job, day to day? 
 
7. How do others know/realise that you are doing a good job, day to day? 
 
8. What aspects/parts of your daily work could you explain and transfer to 
your colleagues? And how does that process work? (prompt: ask for any 
examples) 
 
9. What aspects/parts of your daily work can be written down? (prompt: ask 
for any examples) 
 
10. What aspects/parts of your daily work may be quantified? (prompt: ask for 
any examples) 
 
11. Please recount a story/narrative about your service which has made an 
impression on you in a positive way. 
 
12. Please recount a story/narrative about your service which has made an 
impression on you in a negative way. 
 
(Digging deeper...) 
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13. Do you regularly get access to the knowledge and experience of others and, if 
so, (a) whose knowledge and experience and (b) what is the nature of this 
knowledge? 
 
14. In your view to what extent does it make sense to draw on and use the 
knowledge and experience of others? 
 
15. Would you personally share your knowledge/experience with others? 
 
16. If yes, under which conditions? 
 
17. If not, why not? 
 
 
 
 Final question: 
 
From your point of view, who else should I interview in order to get further 
perspectives on tacit (hidden, unspoken, embedded, implicit) knowledge within 
dementia services? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
281 
 
Appendix C: Research Protocol 
 
Research Protocol: 
Version 3/010714 
An ethnographic study of the tacit dimensions of knowledge in 
the management, organisation, and delivery of services to people 
with dementia. 
 
Project Summary: 
This project will investigate tacit knowledge in two services for people with 
dementia (one NHS and one Local Authority) -------------.  For the NHS component 
the project will focus on memory services provided by an older people's mental 
health team (---------------------------------------------------) and the management of 
these services. For the local authority component the project will focus on a 
respite and day service provided at ---------------------------------- and the 
management of these services. To frame the research the researcher will draw on 
the metaphor of the dementia pathway as a ‘journey’ on which are points where 
people with dementia may enter or exit. These points also represent intersections 
where organisations intervene in the lives of people with dementia and their 
families. Each point provides a lens through which to observe tacit dimensions. 
The dementia pathway provides access to points of service delivery and 
negotiation, and is therefore considered a good place to observe the ‘reality’ of 
essential tacit knowledge. 
Ethnography is the method that has been chosen. The study will entail very 
detailed overt observations of verbal and non-verbal communication, interactions, 
human expressions and behaviours within frontline services, and in meetings 
related to the management of services. Alongside the observational work semi 
structured interviews will be conducted with frontline health and social care staff 
and managers to explore the nature and concepts of tacit knowledge. 
 
Background: 
Organisational and management research has produced a general consensus that 
the most valuable intangible resource of an organisation is knowledge, and that 
tacit knowledge specifically provides a unique organisational advantage because 
it is complex, rare, idiosyncratic and therefore difficult for other competitor 
organisations to imitate. What underpins both the activity and productivity of an 
organisation is essentially unseen "hidden in the intangible assets of an 
organization, and it entails the knowledge of what the firm does, how it is done, and 
why it is done that way"( Zack, 2003: cited by Curado, 2006:4).  
This represents a perspective on organisations known as the Resource Based View 
of the Firm (RBV) and it refers to the bundling of strategic assets considered to be 
critical in determining sustainable competitive advantage and ultimately 
organisational performance (Porter, 1991; 1996; and Michalisin, Smith and Kline, 
1997; 2000).  
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In organisations this tacit or personal knowledge resides in individual employees 
and includes expertise, know-how, "rule of thumb" approaches, hunches, 
intuitions, and subjective insights. This individual tacit knowledge belongs not to 
the organisation but exclusively to individuals, used by them voluntarily in their 
daily work for the organisation (Lytras and De Pablos, 2009).  In practice, 
however, employees may be unable to articulate the content of this highly 
intangible form of knowledge, making it difficult to assess its impact on and 
potential benefit to the organisation (e.g. Stiles and Kulvisaechana, 2003).  In 
health and social care organisations not only staff but also patients, service users 
and carers possess tacit knowledge in the form of knowledge of the experience of 
living with a particular condition, and the fears and anxieties that may be involved 
in this reality. This suggests that they are complicit in the creation of knowledge in 
organisations where they receive care. 
The tacit knowledge of employees in health and social care organisations may 
have particular relevance to the delivery and management of care for people with 
dementia in terms of managing acute situations, harnessing non-verbal ways of 
communicating, and acknowledging the embodied, tacit knowledge of people with 
dementia and allowing this to help to inform care-giving (e.g. Moreno, 1953; 
Crystal et al, 1989; Carlsson et al, 2000;Kontos, 2003;Kontos and Naglie, 2007, 
2009; Edvardsson and Nordvall, 2007; Rossiter et al, 2008; Kontos and Naglie in 
O’Connor and Purves, 2009; Kontos et al, 2010). 
A number of authors have indicated that there are some key challenges associated 
with investigating tacit knowledge (e.g. Gourlay, 2006; Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 
2008) not least those of understanding the nature and processes of tacit 
knowledge.  Nonetheless, research on tacit knowledge in different organisational 
settings has proved fruitful not only in furthering understanding of tacit 
knowledge but also in revealing methods that have particular application for such 
investigations, and which may help in 'surfacing' tacit knowledge (e.g. Ambrosini 
and Bowman, 2001; Collins, 2001; Habersam and Piber, 2003; Gabbay and Le May, 
2004, 2011; Mulder and Whiteley, 2007). 
 
Aim and Objectives: 
The overall aim is to generate insight and knowledge about what influence does 
tacit knowledge in health and social care organisations have on how care for 
people with dementia is specified, organised, delivered and managed. 
 
The objectives are - 
• To identify what tacit knowledge actually is, or might be, in the context of 
individuals' health and social care practice; 
• To explore how tacit knowledge may manifest itself within the work practice 
of health and social care practitioners/staff, drawing on key 
conceptualisations of tacit knowledge from other researchers who have 
conducted empirical work in this area (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; 
Habersam and Piber, 2003; Mulder and Whiteley, 2007; Gabbay and Le May, 
2004, 2011); 
• To reach conclusions about whether and how we can know that specific 
practices, behaviours, and gestures equate to tacit forms of knowledge; 
• To gain an understanding of the value that is placed on tacit knowledge by 
health and social care staff; 
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• To identify ways in which tacit knowledge is managed in services for people 
with dementia. 
 
Methodology and Methods of Data Collection: 
This study involves investigating and making sense of tacit knowledge in the day-
to-day interactions and practice of one organisation providing memory services 
and another that provides day and respite services for people with dementia.  
The aim of making sense of typical life of organisations lends itself to the method 
of ethnography. Ethnography has a credible history as a research method in 
institutional settings for older people, in health and social care settings for people 
with dementia, and in mental health settings more generally (e.g. Goffman, 1961; 
Henderson and Vesperi, 1995; Chatterji, 1998; Hertogh et al, 2004; Holthe et al, 
2007; Baumbusch, 2010).  
Ethnography is a method which can be said to help to 'close the gap' between 
research and participants. It amplifies what is there, and it gives voice to 
participants and their experiences.  It provides a 'closeness' and type of narrative 
which is considered difficult or impossible to achieve through other methods such 
as questionnaires or surveys, or even observational studies. Ethnography invites 
the researcher to become embedded (to a greater or lesser extent) in the research 
setting where s/he makes detailed observations of verbal and non-verbal 
communication, interactions, human expressions and behaviours, alongside semi 
structured or unstructured interviews. 
For this study I will be conducting overt observations and will recognise myself as 
a player in the research setting. Atkinson and Hammersley (1994) suggest that 
"social research is a form of participant observation because we cannot study the 
social world without being part of it".  I will conduct detailed, in-depth 
observations in both of the organisational settings, in other local clinics where the 
team provides memory services to people with dementia, and during home visits 
conducted by members of the team. The observations will be of practice-specific 
and informal interactions between people with dementia, their carers, and staff.  I 
will also conduct detailed in-depth observations of management meetings (e.g. 
team meetings, case conferences) of both organisations.  
Semi-structured interviews with health and social care frontline staff and 
managers will provide a way for me to test out my provisional understandings of 
what I have observed,  and explore in depth the understandings of staff of what 
tacit knowledge is and whether/how it manifests itself in practice. 
 
Conducting overt observation requires me to announce my role as a researcher to 
participants. I will wear ID and will verbally inform staff, service users and carers 
of my role and intentions. However, I will have no control over how staff, service 
users and carers understand, respond to, and view the researcher role (i.e. what 
people make of me as I observe and make field notes and whether people will 
approach me and initiate conversation).  
 
 
Sampling: 
Non probability sampling is considered the appropriate approach for 
ethnography, and I am specifically selecting theoretical sampling. In theoretical 
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sampling an optimal case is selected as the fieldwork site where the processes 
being explored can be expected to happen (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
I will adopt a flexible approach in terms of the sample size in order to reflect the 
idea of data saturation.  Data saturation is a useful idea at a conceptual level but 
provides little practical guidance for estimating sample sizes prior to data 
collection. Therefore, my approach is to state that conducting a project over a 12 
month period is likely to bring me into contact with between about 120 and 160 
potential participants across both sites. Therefore the total potential sample 
consists of: 
• All members of staff from the older people's mental health team who are in 
post during the fieldwork period; 
• All members of the social care team at ------------- respite and day service in 
post during the fieldwork period; 
• All managers with management responsibilities relating to the older people's 
mental health team in post during the fieldwork period; 
• All managers with management responsibilities relating to the social care 
team at -------------- who are in post during the fieldwork period; 
• People with dementia being seen at the NHS memory service by any member 
of the older people’s team; 
• Carers (this will include a friend, family member, or other relative) 
accompanying a person with dementia to an appointment with any member of 
the older people’s team; 
• People with dementia using the respite or day service at --------------; 
• Carers (this will include a friend, family member, or other relative) present at 
the respite or day service at -------------. 
 
In ethnographic studies it is possible that data saturation (the point at which “no 
additional data are being found whereby the [researcher] can develop properties of 
the category" [Glaser & Strauss, 1967:65]) is achieved early in the fieldwork, and 
researchers may withdraw from fieldwork at this point. The ramification of this 
for selecting a sample size is that the initial sample size estimated may be at 
variance with the actual sample size depending on when data saturation is 
reached. To account for this the approach I am adopting is to say that I expect to 
recruit a sample of 80 people (minimum) but that achieving data saturation may 
either occur before I reach 80 participants or not until I have reached a larger 
sample size than 80. 
 
 
Data Analysis and Synthesis: 
In ethnographic research data analysis begins in the very early stages of the 
research project (even at the pre-fieldwork stages in terms of formulating and 
clarifying research problems) and continues through the entire journey of the 
project. It will be important to maintain a degree of reflexivity in order to reflect 
on the data collection process and what is being produced.  
'Making the familiar strange' (Erickson, 1984) is essential to analysis of data in 
ethnographic studies. This requires continually adopting a critical and questioning 
attitude towards what is being seen and heard, and Erickson suggests doing this 
by asking the simple question - "Why is this _______ the way it is and not different?"   
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During analysis I will draw on analytic concepts that help to make sense of what is 
happening in the scenes which the data document, and I will also be engaged with 
theory in the field of knowledge and how theories might help me to illuminate the 
data. In the advanced stages of data analysis and synthesis I will be attempting to 
recontextualise the observational and interview data in the context of current 
thought about tacit knowledge in organisations, and current practice in dementia 
care. 
I envisage using NVivo 9 computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
primarily as a way to organise the data, but may also draw on specific applications 
available in NVivo, such as ‘modelling’ for presenting data and findings. 
 
Involvement of Patients, Service Users, Carers, and Staff: 
I propose convening a mixed group of health and social care staff and informal 
carers at the midpoint of my data collection (i.e. approximately 6 months into my 
fieldwork) to whom I will present emergent data and my thoughts and ideas on 
analyses of these. This will be a way of giving access to participants to my data, 
and I will invite the group to consider the data and give their input in terms of 
thoughts and commentary about the meanings they attach to the data.  Input from 
the group will be treated as 'new' data, and incorporated into my data analyses, 
thus providing an interesting further 'layer' of analysis. 
 
Dissemination of Findings: 
The research governance approvals from ----------------- council include the 
condition that the researcher will provide a short report to the council about the 
research. I will duplicate this report for the NHS trust. I will also provide a lay 
summary of findings for carers and service users and will request the two 
organisations to make copies available at the fieldwork sites. I will also make 
copies available to local relevant voluntary and community sector groups and 
their members (e.g.  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------) 
I will present interim findings at a conference relevant to the topic (2014/15), and 
I will also present interim findings at ---------------------------------------------- Trust’s 
R&D research event in February 2015.  
During the first year following completion of my final PhD thesis, I will produce at 
least one publication for submission to a peer reviewed journal. 
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